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Abstract 
Under the shade of escalating violence and fundamentalism, our epoch's diffused aura of 
liberalism supposedly tolerates difference, by exorcising the evil phantasms of 
totalitarianism, in favour of a liberal and humane post-modem order. Consequently, 
behind contemporary versions of evil, one demonises modem 'fascists', 'totalitarian 
threats', and 'Hitlers'. As if not obscure enough, fascist evil has been equivocally linked 
with perversion. Considering this link a tenebrous enigma, my thesis suggests that 
psychoanalysis can successfully elucidate its problematic and feeble basis, by re- 
appraising previous narratives from a number of different discourses that inscribe the 
liaison between fascism and perversion in their representational stage. In a first approach, 
the present study dissects texts as heterogeneous, as film, social theory, political 
philosophy, and psychoanalysis. This is to show that, despite the divergent speculative 
angle that each discourse espouses, perversion is a common exegetic thread, 
intertextually sewing their narratives. The objective of my criticism that goes through 
psychoanalysis, without, however, exempting it from this criticism, is to reveal that both 
fascism and perversion implicate the non-symbolisable kernel in politics, which becomes 
the source of their mystification. My thesis argues that the fascist does not take the same 
discursive position, as the pervert does, regarding this symbolic gap. The first is 
interested in domination, drawn from the superiority of his ideology's master signifier, 
whereas the latter is interested in excavating the emptiness of any master signifier and in 
constantly provoking prefabricated knowledge, similarly to the hysteric. Apart from the 
level of discourse, on the ethical level, I disengage the view that sees Sade and the Nazi 
officer, as emblematic figures of a Kantian ethical gesture. Considering the imaginary 
hypostasis of their ethical performance, I argue that personal interests, fantasies and 
desires, determine the austerity of their ethical duty. Yet, the fantasies of Sade and 
Nazism are incongruent, insomuch as they are organised by antithetical ideals. Finally, I 
develop a new rhetoric, de-pathologised and de-ideologised, regarding the structure of the 
so-called pervert, introducing new vocabularies and directions for psychoanalytic 
research that further distance the pervert, or whom I call the extra-ordinary subject, from 
fascist politics and, instead, expose his diachronic "fascist" isolation from the social 
edifice. This reveals the fruitful alternatives that can stem from a 'return to Freud cum 
Lacan, ' which supports a flexible on-going reformulation of psychoanalytic knowledge. 
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Prologue 
A recent event has brought to our mind the cliche that suggests our world is full of 
contradictions. In May 2005, the ideal of a unified Europe underwent a cavernous crack, 
following the rejection of the European constitution by the French referendum. Many 
believed it was a decisive blow that clipped the wings of the European union, only a year 
after celebrating its expansion. However, the rejection of the constitution was nothing 
more than another illustration of the ellipsis in the political stage. The chimera of Europe 
as a united body contradicts the fact that each fundamental country member zealously 
advocates its autonomy and its distinctive identity. 
This contradiction reiterates the impossibility of surpassing differences relating to 
nationality, religion, culture, ideology and so on that obviously operate not only at the 
heart of European politics but in socio-political relations in general. To that effect, the 
constitution, rooted in contradiction, was de facto doomed to failure, as a deceptive 
attempt to reconcile these differences. Precisely, the contradiction that foments the 
sanctimonious field of politics and the need to actively contravene the somniferous aura 
of our epoch, so that a critical cogito is promoted, stirred up the desire for conducting the 
present study. 
My endeavour to dive into the contradictory nature of politics spawned this 
psychoanalytic study that critically explores the intricacies of desire in the political arena 
and the impossibility of the latter to quench the former. The impossible in politics refers 
to a condition that exceeds the symbolic boundaries of social order, carving the latter and 
inscribing a space beyond it. This space is neither positive nor negative per se. What is 
essential is that impossibility, the unoccupied place that 'lies beyond', can constitute a 
catalytic hinge for radical action in politics. Nevertheless, an imaginary expectation about 
a tangible and total acquisition of this impossible essence, as a fantasmatic counteraction 
to any genuine act that transforms social relations, may turn this unfeasible condition into 
a dark shade for politics. These ideas are grounded in Jacques Lacan's theory and its 
implementation by contemporary critical thinkers, such as Ernesto Laclau, Slavoj Zi2ek, 
Alain Badiou, Sean Homer, Joan CopJec, Yannis Stavrakakis and more who ingeniously 
interweave Lacan with the critique of ideology or with cultural and political analysis. 
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The ontological paradigm that I espouse for scrutinising the impossible and its failure to 
be grasped within a certain discursive frame, is historical fascism, with the primary focus 
being on German and Italian fascism. These two versions of fascism led to regimes 
associated with the worst atrocities ever to have occurred in history, the excessive 
character of which impairs any attempt to provide a complete account of the fascist 
phenomenon. The fascist atrocities of the Second World War were decisive for the 
current denouncement of utopian thought in politics. 
In our epoch, where utopian models are undergoing a severe crisis, it is important to 
assess the possibility for utopia to fuel any transformative social change, before we 
stigmatise and repudiate utopian politics. For Jameson, the ideological needs to be 
identified with the utopian, in accordance with Bloch's 'Utopian impulse' as the ideal of 
hope. ' Bloch's aim was to restore the notion of utopia as an abandoned Marxist category 
and a catalyst for opening the future. Yet he does not prompt utopia uncritically, but 
rather makes an important distinction between anticipatory and compensatory utopia. The 
latter concerns an abstract idealism, an infecund fantasy that brings no transformations in 
the future. Its motivational dynamism for change is rather feeble. On its antipode, 
anticipatory or 'concrete' utopia does not rest on fantasy, but determination to proceed in 
radical changes which open the future as a real possibility. It breeds hope, whereas 
compensation breeds desire. 2 
Therefore, Marxism must accord with an anticipatory utopian project that moves from 
an abstract critique of current reality towards action that impels dynamism and renders 
the future possible. This is in line with ZiZ'ek's recent adumbration of the authentic 
utopian gesture: 
In a proper revolutionary breakthrough, the utopian future is neither fully realized in the 
present nor simply evoked as a distant promise that justifies present violence - it is rather 
as if, in a unique suspension of temporality, in the short circuit between present and 
future, we are - as if by Grace - for a brief time allowed to act as if the utopian future (is 
not yet fully here), but already at hand, just there to be grabbed. ' 
Yet Homer draws the heuristic limitation of the idea of anticipatory utopia, inasmuch as it 
4'rests on the definition of Utopia as a function rather than a matter of a particular form or 
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,, 4 content. This is problematic considering that, in effect, the anticipatory utopia can be 
differentiated from compensatory utopia with regard to their content solely. Taking 
racism as an example, Homer demonstrates that for Jameson it constitutes a 
compensatory projection, whereas for racists themselves it is anticipatory. 
But why the utopia of fascism and first of all, what is fascism? The question regarding 
fascism's ideological foundation still troubles political theorists. Some years ago, when I 
prepared the seed of the present work, I came across a meticulous account by a 
contemporary scholar in fascist studies. As recently as 1998, Roger Griffin highlighted 
the lack of a singular definition of fascism in political science, only to agree with the rest 
of the authors on the perplexed picture of the matter. Griffin gives the following 
description of the fascist phenomenon: 
Fascism is a genus of modern, revolutionary, "mass" politics which, while extremely 
heterogeneous in its social support and in the specific ideology promoted by its many 
permutations, draws its internal cohesion and driving force from a core myth that a 
period of perceived national decline and decadence is giving way to one of rebirth and 
renewal in a post-liberal new order. 5 
Although condensed and precise, this definition does not reach the bone. It rather 
assembles the different phenomenological characteristics of fascism: revolutionary and 
nationalist aspirations, alongside mythical components, related to the rise of a vigorous 
post-liberal society. 6 With the utopian profile of fascism still mystifying its ideological 
status, a psychoanalytic approach to the question - not so much antithetical, as 
complementary to other approaches - was the pedestal for developing the present 
research. Griffin correctly draws the 'core myth' that comprises the positive content of 
fascism and solidifies its ideological identity, but he never explains how this vision could 
breed the horrific fascist barbarities. Psychoanalysis, by inserting the notion of fantasy, 
has proffered enlightening insights, regarding the function of the 'mythical' aspects of 
fascist ideology. 
In the chapters of the present work, the reader will be able to discern the substantial and 
fertile role of psychoanalysis in understanding socio-political phenomena. Rather than a 
masterful application of the psychoanalytic doctrine to political analysis, the underlying 
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principle of my study is the reciprocal relation between the two. My telos is neither a 
commentary on previous political narratives nor a fabrication of an alternative profile of 
fascist ideology. It is beyond the scope of this study to provide an answer to the enigma 
of fascism. 
Psychoanalysis has been selected as the only appropriate methodological tool for 
unearthing the contradiction endemic of the fascist discourse (e. g. the blissful labourer of 
a post-liberal reborn society) and the discourses on fascism as an indication of an 
unfathomable lacuna in these symbolic speculations. This elusive element of fascism has 
been misinterpreted and misconceived, through insufficient discursive schemata, such as 
the projection of the phenomenon on a perverse frame. Being at the epicentre of my 
critical focus, I perceive this concatenation between fascism and perversion, as the 
projection of an ellipsis in the dianoctic contemplation of the fascist phenomenon, rather 
than an elucidatory reflection upon the latter. The 'perverse' side of fascism may reflect 
nothing but the part of it that eludes representation, the part that, up to today, retains the 
fascist mystery. 
According to a general aphorism, after a plethora of discussions and analyses, all there 
was to be said about fascism has already been said and therefore, the topic has grown to 
be irrelevant to contemporary politics. The present study discards this aphoristic demand 
to put an end to the fathoming of fascism. In a world of increasing violence, racism, 
alienation, terrorism and fundamentalism, the analogy with the 20th century ferocious 
antagonisms and crises that culminated in the ultimate catastrophe of the Second World 
7 War, is far from trivial . 
A glance at Europe today makes it apparent that the fascist discourse has not faded. 
Notwithstanding their populist spirit, Jean-Marie Le Pen in France, Jorg Haider in 
Austria, Umberto Bossi in Italy, Pia Kjaersgaard in Denniark and Vladimir Zirinowski in 
Russia are some of the leading names that belong to far-right parties and, as recently as 
2003, obtained considerable percentages in national elections. 
8 Along with these 
parliamentary parties, a number of illegally operating political and paramilitary groups 
foster a neo-fascist bloc that sustains the imaginary narcissistic core of nationalism in 
ideological discourse. In the rise of the new millennium and the post-modem society, 
supposedly more liberal and multicultural than the past, these phenomena circumscribe a 
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present cul-de-sac. Considering its relevance to contemporary human affairs, interwar 
fascism constitutes an essential field of continuous scrutiny, which tries to unveil the 
cloaks of the violent doctrine of Will-to-Power, behind existing forms of power. 
As far as the historical atrocities are concerned, fascism had an indelible impact on post- 
war ethics. Even today, sixty years after the end of the war, ethical debates revolve 
around controversial views that see the atrocities as the horrific heritage of fascist 
politics, incarnating absolute evil, or as the revelation of the 'dark side' of human 
civilisation. The nefarious crimes related with Nazism or with Mussolini's final period 
(1943 - 1945), exposed the void in representation. All retrospective accounts, which have 
produced heterogeneous narratives regarding this void, have simply failed to fill it. The 
tragedy of the Holocaust resists any attempt to be discursively enfolded with knowledge, 
precisely because the Nazi crimes carve a space outside discourse that marks the 
impossibility to represent all. Nevertheless, this does not mean that we have to give up 
the impossible task of symbolising the non-symbolisable. In Commitment, Adomo 
articulates the impossible demand addressed to artistic expression to represent what 
escapes its representation. 9 In a paradoxical manner, he recites his statement about the 
inability of lyric poetry to capture the Holocaust, only to emphasise, a few lines later, the 
need to create a narrative for the latter through representation: 
I have no wish to soften the saying that to write lyric poetry after Auschwitz is barbaric; 
it expresses in negative forrn the impulse which inspires committed literature [ ... 
] The 
abundance of real suffering tolerates no forgetting; Pascal's theological saying, On ne 
doit pas dormir, must be secularized. Yet this suffering, what Hegel called consciousness 
of adversity, also demands the continued existence of art while it prohibits it; it is now 
virtually in art alone that suffering can still find its own voice, consolation, without 
immediately being betrayed by it. 10 
The paradox that resides in art demands the eschewal of cynicism through the inclusive 
acknowledgement and anamnesis of the 'real suffering' the Holocaust suggests. Lyric 
poetry may not effectively represent the Holocaust, yet Adorno does not opt for silence. 
Instead, he underpins the significance of creative representation of inconceivable 
suffering as the only valid expression of commitment. Its horrific atrocity opened another 
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dimension for art that surpasses the antithesis between political and apolitical art. 
Emblematic of this dimension are the works of Kafka and Beckett, which do not thwart 
the barbaric element of artistic representation, but they apply it in order to reveal the 
horrific aspects of reality. " 
The limits and the possibilities of representation require thoroughgoing reflection. What 
is very meaningless must become the basis for producing some meaning, through 
representational means. Adomo's dual thesis was neglected by post-modem revisionists 
in the 1980s, such as Lyotard or the historian David Irving. As Homer notes, Lyotard 
emphasised the conception of the Holocaust as the deadlock upon which rational 
discourse stumbles, unable to move beyond it. 12 But representation must always be the 
attempt to narrativise this beyond: 
The suffering of the Holocaust is at once on a scale that cannot be represented but at the 
same time it must be, and this is the paradox of the Holocaust as an historical event. ' 3 
[ ... ] From a Jamesoman perspective, we are still 
left with the problem that the Holocaust 
is not a narrative and remains fundamentally unrepresentable, but at the same time we 
only have access to it through narrative representation. 14 
We must follow the representation of impossibility as an ethical imperative that increases 
our awareness of the limits of human experience. The fundamental task of representation 
is to represent a real totality that remains interminably ungraspable. 15 Signifiers, such as 
totalitarianism, denoting the violent encroachment and confiscation of personal freedoms 
and human rights, were launched in order to describe regimes such as Nazism and 
Stalinism. 1 6 However, aligned with other theorists, such as Z'iz'ek, Badiou attacks the 
notion of 'totalitarianism' as a common categorisation of the Nazi and Stalinist regimes 
that does not assist our understanding of Nazi atrocities. A contrario it is ineffective as far 
as our thinking is concerned, especially when Evil is taken into consideration. Badiou 
suggests, "We must accept the irreducibility of the [Nazi] extermination Oust as we must 
1,17 accept the irreducibility of the Stalinist Party-state) . 
Without proceeding to a critique of the term 'totalitarianism' at this point of the study, I 
just wish to draw its failure to symbolically grasp the magnitude of the destruction caused 
by fascism and its erroneous equation of the Nazi phenomenon with Stalinism. The 
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'indivisible remainder' of this failure is mystified through perverse designations. ' 8 What 
came to my awareness was that numerous explications of the phenomenon touch upon 
the glossary of the perversions, whereas Sade, as the archetypical figure of the perverse 
universe, appears to be the precursor of fascist ideology and its ethics of cruelty. Thus, 
the argumentative web of the discourses on fascism comes upon a certain snag, as 
fascism qua perversion engraves a terra incognita of theoretical, moral, religious and 
legal contradiction and paradoxes. 
My intention is to reveal the inadequacies of such nexus, in terms of both clarifying the 
conundrum of fascism and disentangling the notion of perversion from its marginal 
frame. Perversion functions as the 'scum' of discourse, that is to say it becomes the main 
reference for any failing point in discourse that eradicates the knowledge produced within 
its boundaries and thereby exposes its limits. Put in more concrete terms, this study poses 
one main research question: What is it about the fascist discourse that cultivates the 
creation of perverse narratives, within a range of discourses that attempt to explain 
fascism? 
Does the fascist follow Sade's trail, wishing to eradicate differences in politics, or is it a 
conservative 'perverse' tactic that only tackles the epiphenomenon, unable to submerge 
into fascism's deeper dynamics? If fascism were congruous with the Sadean fantasy, then 
perverse sexuality would be their common ground. This is the point drawn by the 
narratives I present and discuss in the opening part, unrolling the first string of the coil 
for guiding the reader through the present work. The second string is my methodological 
use of psychoanalysis, as a critical tool, which, rather than hermeneutically providing 
definitive answers to the difficult questions posed, exposes the thorny realisation that 
there will never be a definitive answer to the enigma of fascism and perversion is just the 
moralistic veiling of this inadequacy. 
The endurance of factors, such as anxiety, ambiguity, doubt and ambivalence, is the 
distillation of the psychoanalytic experience that perturbs the definitiveness of totalising 
terms and types of knowledge. So, if one anticipates this study to treat fascism as a 
clinical case study, s/he will be let down, since the psychograph of fascism is not only 
jettisoned, but is also antithetical to the objectives of the present research. On the 
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contrary, the aim is to divulge the insufficiency of analysing fascism, as a 
psychopathological entity. 
The main argument that I put forward is that the category of perversion, due to its 
particular status in the symbolic continuum (i. e. its inscription in the symbolic order and, 
at the same time, its 'ex-scription', its diastole due to excessive enjoyment that goes 
beyond the symbolic register), becomes a source of misidentification with extreme socio- 
political phenomena. In contemplating these phenomena and perversions, always 
something escapes symbolisation and this 'something' cannot be grasped by knowledge. 
The term 'perverse' appears as a signifier for any parasitic condition that escapes firm 
symbolic meaning. 
Historical fascism has been the habitual example of an ideological phenomenon 
associated with various perverse designations. Having its basis precisely on this 
ambiguous and paradoxical relation to social order (complying and radically going 
against it), this link is ahistorical and precarious for both the explanation of extreme 
phenomena, such as fascism, and the category of perversion, which is translated to the 
gangland that requires control, monitoring and isolation from the social edifice. 
Thus, I confront this misconceiving equation, which, in its effort to reduce the 
ambiguity of fascism, actually further mystifies it, together with the notion of perversion. 
I see this as an ideological response to ambiguity itself and the so-called pervert's 
idiosyncratic toleration of the latter. The ultimate goal of this ideological strategy is the 
'fascist' vilification and marginalisation of the pervert. 
a) Methodology: Psychoanalytic Criticism and the Text(s) in Question 
The exploration of the main research question requires a suitable method of criticism. In 
this respect, my methodological tools are derived from the Lacanian psychoanalytic 
corpus, as it allows a critical elaboration of the unconscious economy that regulates 
discourse and the production of messages that have a formative and transfigurative role 
for social or cultural phenomena. 
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Lacanian discourse assesses "psychological and social effects of particular texts and 
discourses. "19 It reflects the power of signification as the force that determines 
intersubjective relations, which gives the opportunity to study, not only the individual 
psychological phenomenon, but also its collective parameters. Furthermore, there is 
probably no other type of discourse, apart from the psychoanalytic, to have produced a 
more illuminating and comprehensive theory on perversion, both in its sexual and non- 
sexual aspects. This is because psychoanalysis approaches subjectivity, in a highly 
systematic and explicatory fashion. 
Today, only the psychoanalytic pathway, in the basis of its scrutiny, addresses and 
'undresses' the subject from her objective conception, revealing her split, lacking status, 
namely the subject of the unconscious. As Stavrakakis notes, "the object of 
psychoanalysis is not the individual it is not man, but it is what he is lacking. , 20 
Subjective experience means more than what occupies the predominant empirical 
research and scientificity. Unconscious desires, anxiety, shame, guilt, fantasmatic 
constructs, tension and more compose the complex mosaic of subjectivity. All are 
interrelated and interposed multifariously in the subject's life. 
The emphasis of my critique is put on discourse per se. I must note here the meanings 
under which the notion of discourse appears in my analysis. In the first part, where the 
link between fascism and perversion is explored within various discourses, the term 
discourse refers to the systematic discussion of the topic, in line with a certain theoretical 
framework. In other words, discourse refers to the body of knowledge that articulated a 
link between fascism and perversion. 21 For the following parts, the term discourse is used 
in its main Lacanian conception, referring to the intersubjective bond established and 
maintained by language. 22 
Without promoting the Lacanian discourse as the only truthful approach of social 
relations, far from it, my aim is to accentuate its advantage as a critical analytical tool, 
which enables the researcher to bring forth some of the real processes behind 
representation, beyond the knowledge produced in discourse. This is its main difference 
from sociological or economic discourses which eulogise the objective rather than 
subjective factor in their explanations. This is because objectivity points towards an 
external and complete Other who holds the answer for everything. The baseline of this 
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work refuses to see the Other as a non-lacking entity that provides us with the knowledge 
that would embank the vacuum of our existence. The fascist threat does not come from 
'outside'. 23 If we thwart the pernicious for our social organism forces that stem from 
'inside', an ideological justification of violence, as a response to an external enemy, will 
continue to be the case in politics. 
Yet one must not forget that the Lacanian discourse can only supplement other accounts 
rather than providing an alternative sufficient and autonomous exegesis of the fascist 
phenomenon. Psychoanalysis neglects the materialist factors that contributed to the rise 
and continuation of the fascist ideological discourse from the beginning of the last 
century until today. So, it is pharisaic to draw the inadequacies of sociological accounts 
in grasping the essence of the fascist phenomenon, without acknowledging a similar 
scantiness of psychoanalysis in its ability to historicize a socio-political phenomenon and 
incorporate the complexity of economic factors in the rise of fascism and its different 
'faces'. This would serve the fantasy of psychoanalysis comprising a closed and thus 
masterful discourse. 
The problem is that psychoanalysis often encrypts the risk of reducing subjective 
experience into 'objective' interpretations. 24 The problem of psychological reductionism 
undermines any study that implements the findings of the psychoanalytic clinic to dissect 
social phenomena, inasmuch as the field of the social ('objective') can be reduced to the 
individual ('subjective'). Stavrakakis points out that the analysis of socio-political 
conditions must avoid any type of psychologisation, that is, the use of internal, 
dispositional attributions for explaining them. 25 This reductionist practice lacks even 
explanatory power, considering that any event or behaviour is a combination of internal 
and external factors, and psychoanalysis must provide the golden thread that links the two 
(perhaps, extimacy, to make an early use of a Lacanian neologism, better describes the 
continuity between 'internal' and 'external'). More accurately, the focal point must be the 
bond that ties the individual to his/her social context. The essence of analysis relies on the 
bond formed between the analysand and the analyst. 26 
Rather than 'applying' Lacan's ideas to socio-political dialogues, it is more appropriate 
to speak about an inter-lacing between Lacan's theoretical ideas about subjectivity and 
the study of political phenomena. 27 Considering that Lacan's theory of the divided 
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subject indicates various symbolic and imaginary attempts of the latter to cover her 
division within her social milieu, it is possible for psychoanalysis to link its theoretical 
suggestions with socio-political analysis. 28 This does not suggest the emergence of a 
meta-discourse through the synthesis of these two fields. My approach treats itself as a 
text, equivalent and placed on the same stratum as the texts in question. This is a basic 
component for a productive theory. Nevertheless, the critical exposition of messages, 
propositions and vocabularies produced by the texts in question raises the nagging 
question of whether my critique is articulated from the vantage point of a meta-discourse. 
Stavrakakis attests: 
Insofar as every analysis presupposes the elucidation of a particular problem or field by 
reference to an element which is usually external to it, and thus articulates a certain meta- 
discourse every analysis becomes, to a certain extent, reductionist. Even the most 
'objective' (casual) reading of a text, the most simple analysis of an issue, is 
contaminated by a certain reductionism. 29 
In this way, it is impossible for any analysis of discourse to escape from reductionism 
completely and the articulation of a meta-discourse. Nonetheless, this does not open the 
possibility for the enunciation of "a closed successful reduction, a closed successful 
meta-language, " as Stavrakakis notes. 30 Lacan points towards the realisation of the 
impossibility of a meta-language, by trying ineffectively to operate in its very impossible 
meta-linguistic field ('a meta-linguistic negation of meta-language'). In this regard, my 
text does not claim to eliminate the reductionist parameters of analysing discourse, 
precisely because this would entail and maintain reductionism. In line with Stavrakakis, 
the question is to avoid absolutist reductionism and not reductionism itself 
I resort to Lacanian psychoanalysis for the purposes of a criticism (or a failed meta- 
discourse) that allows psychoanalysis to analyse its analyses. A psychoanalytic criticism 
of psychoanalysis augments theoretical ideas and practices, rather than disabling them. 
Especially considering the lack of extensive research on perversion, reflected in its 
problematic and convoluted status as a category, the revision and re-articulation of 
theories, describing the perverse condition, are much needed. Even when I discuss 
narratives from the psychoanalytic discourse, the aim is to reveal the plenitude of 
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resourcefulness that inheres to the texts produced by Freud and Lacan. One can return to 
31 these texts again and again, without losing their originality and their fertile hypostasis. 
Less than a field of masterful interpretations, the texts by Freud and Lacan excavate 
guiding channels, through which the rationale of this theoretical approach flows. Yet 
there are practical implications, inasmuch as the need to reappraise vocabularies and 
attitudes towards what eludes knowledge is addressed. Only then psychoanalysis is not 
reduced in itself to a model of institutionalised knowledge and intellectual mastery. 
Stanley Fish cauterises psychoanalytic mastery, by delivering a methodical 
deconstruction of the Wolf-man, Freud's famous case study. 32 For Fish, what is at stake 
is Freud's persuasive and authoritarian position as an analyst. He points to the rhetorical 
mastery Freud exercises upon Wolf-man's narrative and the anal enjoyment he derives 
from it. By withholding information and failing to provide a historical account of the 
case, on the one hand, and by articulating self-serving interpretations, on the other, rather 
it is Freud's own anal desires that surface in his masterful rhetoric, revealing his will to 
dominate and persuade. 33 
In addition, Derrida produced an effective and prismatic critique of Lacan with regard to 
his reading of Poe's text "The Purloined Letter. , 34 Lacan treats the literary text in 
analogy with the symbolic structuring of the unconscious, taking the role of the analyst 
who uncovers the truth of the text. Thus, Lacan appears as the connoisseur of truth, the 
master who gives an absolute meaning to Poe's text, falling into the decoy of 
logocentrism. Lacan reduces the letter to the indivisible phallus which is "idealized and 
located in the voice, " in the spoken word. 35 Countering Lacan, for Derrida, the letter may 
not arrive at its destination; the truth cannot be traced, as it is always in the process of 
ever changing and subject to the divisibility of meaning. 
Considering these criticisms, the risk of succumbing to masterful Lacanianism is not 
entirely eradicated in my study. However, my approach articulates no postulations nor 
provides any leading lights, regarding the Truth of psychoanalysis. The main effort here 
is to detach Truth from established psychoanalytic cliches and expose it as 'unknowable', 
i. e. the irreconcilability between Truth and closed knowledge and consensus. My analytic 
pathway tries to expose contradiction (within any discourse), following the belief that its 
surfacing reveals the incompleteness of Truth. In this regard, I try to maintain a distance 
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from the current reality of growing psychoanalytic research that aims to reveal the truth 
behind cultural, social and political phenomena and ultimately, the Truth for 
psychoanalysis itself. That would lead to a cul-de-sac for psychoanalysis and an apostasy 
from its basic principle about Truth being always incomplete. Thus, the present study 
leaves aside its scope the revelation of Truth and points out more the misapprehension of 
its unrepresentability. 
Psychoanalytic mastery appears to corroborate one main paradox of the Lacanian 
discourse. If Lacan fabricated a text deliberately subversive of "classical" authority of 
36 discourse, then his own discourse is conveyed as classical. Lacan weaves a discourse 
which delineates a real space beyond symbolisation and its acknowledgement suggests 
that the closure of our symbolisations is impossible. This closure is nothing but a fantasy 
that the main goal of psychoanalysis is to traverse it. The fluidity and the diversity of 
meanings inherent to Lacan's discourse evince this. As Stavrakakis says, "the Lacanian 
system is perhaps the closest we can get to a discourse opening itself up to what exceeds 
its liMitS.,, 37 This suggests that Lacan's most original argument about the real becomes 
the hindering element of his discourse. 
What is more, the researcher who engages with the Lacanian theoretical corpus has to 
confront its fluid and often cryptic character. Notwithstanding the thorny debate 
surrounding this issue, it is the acceptance of the "irreducible ambiguity and 
indeterminacy" of Lacan's discourse that renders a research project fruitful. 38 In my view, 
it is part of the responsibility that the researcher needs to assume for his/her desire to 
operate within the field of Lacanian discourse. My analysis maintains the difficulty and 
intricate character of Lacan, because this is another reflection of something that resists 
representation, namely it lets some of Lacan's real come forth . 
39The aim of my reading 
is not to fabricate a representation of this real, in search of the 'real' Lacan, but to reveal 
its provocative yet constitutive character that disturbs symbolic and imaginary absolutism 
and certainty, as Stavrakakis notes. 40 It is more accurate to say that my aim is less to 
reveal the misrepresentation of the real and more to expose its troublesome operation 
within representations, through the discussion of contradictions, oscillations and 
inconsistencies. 
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Within this discursive context, my text attempts to elucidate this impossibility for 
closure, while is itself prepared to be exposed to the self-hindrance of what goes beyond 
its limits. My methodological implementation of the Lacanian discourse sets forth an 
exploration and approximation of the x-factor, operating beyond various discourses on 
fascism and the fascist discourse itself. Eluding representation, this unknown factor 
constantly returns and disturbs symbolisation in its attempt to represent all. 
Consequently, a fissure emerges that adumbrates the real dimension of discourse, 
residing in the heart of our reality. This fissure is embodied by a surplus, namely the 
object a, a quintessential Lacanian concept which inscribes lack and excess in discourse. 
Despite the ungraspable character of the object a, Lacanian psychoanalysis can function 
as a compass that guides us in the multitude of the apparitions of the object. Thus, it is 
feasible to fathom the fissure in discourse, without turning it into reducible observable 
knowledge. What comes forth, at the end of this effort, is the iridescence of the 
unrepresentable non-symbolised lacuna in the socio-political kaleidoscope. 
Inscribing new theoretical horizons, where the researcher has to bear the uncertainty of 
what the future will bring, is a more fertile and fascinating process than producing 
interpretations that affirm previous scholarly schemas. A substantial endeavour of my 
study, in terms of methodology, is to crystallise the verve of psychoanalytic theory that 
precludes the risk of becoming a self-referential closed system of knowledge, by guiding 
the researcher to a creative anamorphosis of existing concepts, in the light of new 
theorisations about human affairs and intra-psychic processes. At least, this is a 
realisation that came after my personal catechesis and increased awareness of the 
transfigurations of the models and the lexicon of 'applied psychoanalysis', with the tenn 
'applied' itself enough to fire up numerous debates. 
Psychoanalysis must not be a process that searches for narcissistic confinnation, 
regarding the superiority of its theories. As clinical psychoanalysis is not panacea for the 
subject's mental suffering, 'applied' psychoanalysis does not represent a dogmatic body 
of knowledge. Otherwise, the risk of instrumentalisation of psychoanalytic knowledge 
and its exclusion from social and human sciences, as many historicists and proponents of 
scientific objective research claim to have achieved, gain ground. In a world that 
dramatically changes every day, psychoanalysts must take precautions from becoming 
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graphic caricatures, caustically commenting on everything and armoured with the robust 
explanatory valence of psychoanalytic theory. 
b) Mad, Cad, Sade: The Historical Profile of the Pervert 
What does it mean to be on the perverse side? Before I commonly allude to perversion 
and its alleged fascist liaison in my analysis, an overview of the convoluted status of the 
notion of perversion and the variety of meanings it can acquire in different narratives, is 
required. Despite its frequent use in discourse, perversion is far from a straightforward 
term to define. It is not possible to single out a definition that diachronically describes the 
practices, behaviours, and personality, with which the concept of perversion has been 
linked, through the years. In his leading work, The History of Sexuality, Foucault shed 
essential light on this problem, by observing and exposing the subordination of perverse 
sexuality's semantics to discourse. 41 The prevalent discourse of each era, contingent upon 
the mechanisms of power, is what determines the connotations that perversion as 
designation holds. For some, it is a distinct psychopathological category, whereas for 
others, it is the product of culture and current politics. In any case, the obscurity of the 
notion of perversion is at stake. I will briefly explore some of the statements, regarding 
perversion, that have dominated discourse historically, noting that this is far from a 
complete account. 
In the History of Sexuality, Foucault scrutinises the determining role of discourses in the 
conception, expression, and regulation of sexuality and the notion of perversion. Until the 
end of the 18 th century, there were three main codes that regulated sexual practices: the 
canonical law, the Christian pastoral law and the civil law. 42 Sexuality followed a coded 
practice, as any other behaviour did, in the course of interpersonal interaction. The 
fundamental basis of the code was morality. In this tone, perversion was regarded as the 
immoral degenerate posture of the subject, regarding sexuality. The switch from a moral 
to a medical definition of perversion occurred in the second half of the I 9th century. Since 
that time, perversion has belonged to the field of clinical research and practice, following 
the psychiatric indoctrination that emerged, as a firm body of knowledge. The core of the 
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medicalisation of perversion involves the sexual instinct, inasmuch as perverse sexuality 
refers to the pathology of the instinct, as something that constitutes a 'functional disease' 
of the latter. 
The first to have produced the most systematic work on perversion, as an object of 
clinical discourse, was Krafft-Ebing, who is accounted for the introduction of the typical 
perverse terminology, still in use by psychiatric manuals. Krafft-Ebing promoted a 
paradoxical equation between diverse modes of perversion. Under the same 
classification, homosexuality, sadism, masochism, voyeurism, fetishism and so on were 
seen as the degenerating result of a common functional disease of the sexual instinct. 43 of 
course, the picture is much different today, in terms of both moral values and psychiatric 
diagnostic categories. 44 This reveals the solid link between non-native behaviour and 
medical discourse. Diagnosis, prognosis and treatment of perversion have evolved around 
the non-native expression of sexual instinct, which is also considered the natural function, 
i. e. heterosexual coitus. All deviant sexual behaviours are thus linked to the category of 
perversion as disorders of the natural function of the instinct. 45 
An allusion to Freud's contribution in the study of the perversions cannot omit his 
seminal work Three Essays on the Theory on Sexuality. 46 The first essay of the book is an 
analysis of sexual aberrations, something that probably startles the reader who does not 
expect a paper on sexuality, especially at the beginning of the 20th century, to address the 
issue of perversion in its opening pages. However, this is not unfounded, considering 
Freud's intention to emphasise the theory of infantile sexuality that he develops in the 
subsequent essays. Rather than the pathology of perversion, Freud accentuates the role of 
the latter in the child's normal psychosexual development. 
Perversion used to be seen as a digression from instincts upon which moral and social 
behaviour is contingent. 47 In this respect, a crime of particular ferocity was classified as a 
perverse behaviour. Freud, who does not consider perversion as deviation of the instinct, 
links it solely to sexuality, which is polymorphous and infantile. Polymorphous sexuality 
refers to the amalgamation of the component instincts with the range of the erogenous 
zones, before genital organisation takes over. 48 The integration of the erogenous zones to 
the primacy of the genitals is the nonn that Freud adopts in order to define the complex 
nature of the perversions. Two notions, specifically the sexual object and the sexual aim, 
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provide the baseline for what deviates from the norm. The sexual object describes the 
person at whom sexual attraction centres and the sexual aim refers to the act itself, 
through which the sexual instinct finds its expression. In their non-native conception, 
these two terms mark out the attraction towards members of the opposite sex and the 
genital coitus. 
Nevertheless, at the same time, Freud is critical of the norm. He argues that perverse 
sexuality in adulthood does not suggest deviation from adult normative sexual patterns, 
but the persistence of a sexual component, or regression to a previous stage of 
psychosexual development, in which libido has been fixated . 
49Deviations of the sexual 
object, (previously regarded as "inversion"), cannot be seen as either innate or acquired, 
because for Freud, bisexuality lies in the basis of psychosexual development, which 
explains inversion. So, it is true that Freud relies on a norm, but this is determined by 
neither social nor moral criteria. If we are to accept perversion as clinical entity with 
particular symptoms, the definition of its pathology must not reside in its negative status, 
as a socially reproachful practice. Even if perverse practices were seen in socially 
favourable forms, they would still be perverse, inasmuch as they rely on pre-genital 
organisation. Freud puts across this tenet in the Three Essays, where he famously stated 
that perversion is the reverse of neurosis. 50 Repression, which makes the neurotic express 
his instinct through the symptom, is absent in the pervert who remains outside the 
Oedipus conflict, by implementing mechanisms, such as disavowal, which Freud 
elaborates in his later paper on fetishism. 51 
From a Lacanian perspective, perversion receives a different conceptualisation. Lacan 
does not take the view of perversion as the negative of neurosis, due to the absence of 
repression. The pervert is defined by the position he takes in relation to the drive, which 
is not homologous with the instinct. 52 Neurosis and perversion are both structures equally 
determined by the Oedipal problematic. But perversion is a structure formed in an inverse 
way from that of neurosis, since the pervert is not tormented by the enduring question of 
the neurotic about what the Other wants from him. The pervert is certain about what the 
Other desires. By turning himself into the instrument of the Other's enjoyment, the 
pervert renounces his subjective status and takes the place of the object of the Will-to- 
Jouissance. 53 The Will-to-Jouir is not his property, but it rather belongs to the Other. This 
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structural perception allows perversion to be disengaged from social normative 
definitions and even Freud's norm of heterosexual genital coitus. In addition, it extricates 
perversion from its exclusive pertinence to sexual practices. A perverse structure does not 
necessarily suggest an acting out of perverse sexual behaviours. 
Lacan's definition of perversion concerns the structure of fantasy per se, which is the 
54 inverse of neurosis. The inversion of fantasy appears first in 'Kant with Sade'. Lacan's 
matheme that reflects the fantasmatic relation (i. e. desire) of the subject to the object a 
($ <> a) is inverted, which means the subject is identified with the object (a <> $). Since 
'Kant with Sade', and despite the fact that there is no explicit reference to perversion, 
Lacan's matheme of the reverse fantasy has been typically associated with the structure 
of perversion. Given that the reverse form of the matheme describes the Sadean fantasy, 
one has to ask whether Sadean fantasy functions as the prototype for sadism, which is 
casually applied to fascism. Sadism in fantasy does not necessarily mean sadism in 
action. The crimes of Sade's writings bear little resemblance to both the deeds he actually 
55 committed and the reasons for his punishment. So, is the structure of the Sadean fantasy 
the criterion for identifying all other perversions? 
In the present study, my main critique of the use of perverse designations in the 
psychoanalytic discourse evolves around one question: Is it possible for psychoanalysis 
to approximate non-sexual phenomena (such as power and ideology) and still refer to 
designations derived from the clinic? Furthermore, to what extent are narratives that link 
the phenomenon of fascism to perversion influenced by morality? Is there any benefit in 
the comprehension of political movements when one 'perversifies' ideology and any 
advance in the conception of the perversions, when they become 'ideologised".? 
c) Thesis Synopsis 
The quadripartite structure of this study is centred on the 'misfortunes of the Sadean 
pervert', whose spirit seems to haunt variegate narratives about fascism. The first two 
parts explore and expose the discursive representation of fascism, infiltrated by a 
polymorphous perverse aura, in order to reveal, that on the level of discourse, the pervert 
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occupies a different position from that of the fascist. Furthermore, Sade's discursive 
system forms a closed circuit, incongruent with the discursive system of 'totalitarianism', 
to which historical phenomena of fascism belong. The second part reappraises the 
homonymy of Kantian ethics with Sadean anti-morality, as the prognosticative ethical 
exemplar, materialised by the fascist atrocities of the 20th century. In the final part, I 
adumbrate the predicament of contemporary politics, which (mis)use the notion of 
perversion, in order to keep at bay any destabilising factor that breaks their non-native 
portcullis. Hence, I articulate an alternative view of the 'perverse parameter' in society. 
The first part embarks on a detailed illustration and juxtaposition of narratives that 
comprise my 'textual data'. The latter were gathered from various discourses (i. e. a 
discussion of the topic, following a certain school of thought), such as social theory, 
political philosophy, psychology, cinema and psychoanalysis. From the reproduction of 
the stereotypical image of the fascist qua sadist, whose lash bestows him with power, to 
more complex and sophisticated philosophical, socio-political and psychoanalytic 
readings of perversion's linkage to fascism, the objective is to furnish the evidence about 
this 'perversology' around fascism, dissecting the multitude of its narrativisations and 
demonstrating its problematic aspects. The selection of the texts was grounded in their 
enduring impact on social theory and representation and they are recounted in a 
chronological order. 
The first major study to have introduced the idea of fascism's perverse pedestal was 
Horkheimer and Adorno's Dialectic of Enlightenment that acerbically exposes the 
irrational basis of capitalist domination that breeds fascism, by perverting natural instinct, 
as Sade's figure comes to exemplify. Sade, as the proto-bourgeois exponent, who 
perverted and instrumentalised enlightenment reason for his own personal depraved 
interests, seems to be also the proto-fascist figure for the two authors. Furthermore, in his 
essay 'Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda', Adorno draws on the 
regressive massification that sustained the perverse structure of fascist regimes. The 
narratives of the Frankfurt School, resonant of the critical spirit of the thought of 
modernity, produced a compelling polemic against fascism, while their ideas evoked the 
revolutionary fortitude of social movements of the previous century. As late as the 
students' demonstrations and revolts of the 1960s and 1970s, the Frankfurt School 
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thinkers have long been a source of inspiration for radical political action. Nevertheless, I 
confront some mystifying aspects of the Frankfurt School and the Freudian Left, as well 
as the intricacies of their exegeses of fascism. 
The reason for including texts from the psychoanalytic discourse has dual justification. 
First, it is difficult to disregard the major impact of psychoanalytic discourse on a wide 
range of intellectual disciplines, including social theory, psychopathology and cultural 
production, or its formative role in the shifting perceptions of subjective experience and 
conscience. So, if psychoanalytic argumentation embroiders narratives produced by 
differential discourses, it is important to see the way psychoanalytic discourse fathoms 
the relation of fascism to perversion, especially as the basis of the present work is itself 
psychoanalytic. Second, the belief that psychoanalysis cannot benefit from previous 
works of the same framework, without re-evaluating the application of its concepts, is 
what guides the rationale of my critique. A critical psychoanalytic work has to re- 
examine and restore the suggestions of psychoanalysis in order to advance its theory and 
establish a constructive podium in contemporary critique. 
The chronological presentation of psychoanalytic narratives, from the 1940s to today, 
reflects the hermeneutical trajectories that psychoanalysis has followed, after Freud. An 
early example of the application of psychoanalytic insights to fascist politics is a text by 
Ernest Jones which draws on orthodox Freudian hermeneutical patterns. In the course of 
my presentation, I also consider other psychoanalytic works, from Neo-Freudians, such 
as Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, to contemporary readings by Juliet Flower MacCannell 
and Slavoj Ziz'ek, repercussive of the Lacanian cogito. My critique of Jone's text focuses 
on his interpretation of the Nazi phenomenon as part of a general symptornatology, 
engendered by a re-activation of elliptical Oedipal dynamics. Specifically, homosexual 
trends characterise the psychic structure of Nazi aficionados and those who remained 
lethargic in the face of the fascist threat. The fear of Hitler, as a sadistic paternal imago, 
causes this re-enactment of perverse psychic elements. By prioritising the importance of a 
complete Oedipus complex, Jones explains fascism, and consequently the associated 
perverse traits, as the failure of the patriarchal structures of society. 
In the early 1950s, expanding the ramification of the Freudo-Marxist perspective, the 
well-known socio-psychological study on the Authoritarian Personality intended to 
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provide objective measures of the repressed perverse features of the potential fascist. 
Considering the numerous unresolved biases of the study, eventually it only reproduced 
the stereotypical conception of perversion as linked to criminological and pathological 
parameters of social relations. Since the 1950s, the work of Hannah Arendt has also been 
increasingly inspirational, forming a sine qua non today for any study on ideologico- 
political conditions captioned under the term 'totalitarian'. From a philosophical scope, 
Arendt addresses ethical issues related to fascism. Before the introduction of the notion of 
the 'banality of evil', Arendt's proclivity to associate Nazism with perverse labelling is 
traced in her work. More importantly, her discursive arguments stirred up the ethical 
debate regarding the affinity between the thought of Kant and Sade, which I develop in 
the third part of the study. 
Given the impact of psychoanalytic and Marxist views in the post-1945 years, it is not 
surprising to discern their impact on other discursive contexts, related to culture and 
artistic creativity. In the 1960s and 1970s, cinema had become a powerful discursive 
medium, with an immediate impact on a cultural level. 56 The narratives of three 
influential films are recounted, inasmuch as they fabricate a relation between fascist 
politics and perverse sexuality. These films are: Luchino Visconti's The Damned (1969), 
Liliana Cavani's The Night Porter (1973) and Pier Paolo Pasolini's Sa16 or the 120 Days 
of Sodom (1975). These three emblematic delegates of Italian cinema not only had 
inestimable impact on international cinema, in terms of aesthetical style and technique, 
but also produced caustic and provoking narratives about contemporary politics, which 
were far more daring than Hollywood productions. For this reason, even nowadays their 
works are essential references for scholarly analyses of the representation of fascism. 
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During the 1970s and 1980s, a new force in Freudian psychoanalysis produced original 
theorisations on perversion, which were again applied to fascist politics. Chasseguet- 
Smirgel is a renowned Neo-Freudian who points out the creative aspects of pre-oedipal 
idealisations that characterise perversion. Without disengaging herself from the 
conservatism of orthodox Freudians, Chasseguet-Smirgel over-emphasises patriarchal 
hegemony and reduces any attack against the paternal ringside to a perverse effort of 
establishing a Sadean chaotic universe, alluding to Hitler and Nazism as embodiments of 
the latter. Within this pre-Oedipal theorising framework, Klaus Theweleit adds the 
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ý'k abolition of the matemal image, along with the paternal image, to the explanation of the 
solidarity of the Nazi military forces, without demonstrating adequately how these 
decomposing perverse rudiments can consolidate an organic military body, like the 
fascist Freikorps. 
The work of Juliet Flower MacCannell and Slavoj ZiZ'ek represents the recent 
psychoanalytic discussion about fascism and perversion in the last fifteen years. Their 
predilection to ground the plenitude of their arguments in ideas, derived from the 
equivocal psychoanalytic theorisation of perversion, is contended (e. g. the explanatory 
role of disavowal in ZiZ'ek). I must note my solidarity with these two authors' endeavour 
to unearth the dynamics of fascism via a Lacanian pathway and their emphasis on 
psychoanalysis as an essential plinth for a prospective political praxis. My critique is 
aimed instead at the frequent and immune scholastic application of knotty ideas related to 
perversion that averts this political prospect of psychoanalysis. Above all, my analysis 
identifies a common ground between leftist radical narratives and conservative narratives, 
whether produced within the psychoanalytic discourse or not, that takes perversion as the 
dark crypt where social and political misfortunes of the human condition lie in ambush. 
The second part contains an original psychoanalytic criticism of the statement that 
discursively relates fascism to perversion. The logic of Lacan's theorisation of the 
discourse of the unconscious enables us to scrutinise this statement beyond its discursive 
limits. Only psychoanalysis, as an intellectual tool, can elucidate this transcendental of 
any ideological dimension. In this vein, I discuss the limits that the pervert and the fascist 
appear to surpass, arguing that each one fits a separate discourse, as contoured by Lacan. 
Thus, I defy the idea of their deviation from existing discourses that shape social bonds. 
Nonetheless, fascism cannot be taken into the same discursive canvas as perversion. The 
first is in agreement with the discourse of the master, whereas the latter appears to be 
commensurate with the structure of the discourse of the hysteric, bearing in mind that 
Lacan did not develop a schema of a distinct perverse discourse. 
At least one factor renders fascism and perversion incompatible representational 
schemata. This is domination, which characterises the discursive position of the fascist. 
As the master, who embodies a signifier of absolute value (the Aryan ideal) in the 
dominant position in discourse, the fascist forces an inferior other, a slave (the non- 
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Aryan), to work for hisjouissance. This discursive circuit, which I associate with power, 
produces a fantasy of domination. As for the perverse subject, it is possible to incorporate 
him into the discourse of the hysteric, challenging the crossing boundaries between 
neurosis and perversion. Given their dissimilar positions, the fascist and the pervert 
follow different discursive attitudes, in the formation of their social bonds. The pervert is 
dominated by the Other, inasmuch as he serves the Other's jouissance, whereas the 
master seeks to dominate the Other. Each discourse produces a certain fantasy of a 
complete Other, forming a closed circuit of power. In the case of the master's discourse, 
we have a fantasy of domination, as the fulcrum that determines the relation between the 
terms of the discourse. 
The fantasmatic position of the Sadean characters, which I consider to be different from 
the perverse position, is part of a closed system of masterful domination that can be 
juxtaposed with two more systems: an 'Oedipal' and a 'totalitarian' system, both 
inscribed in the master's discourse. The Oedipal system is dominated by the law's 
repression of the real, which marks its presence through the perverse fantasies of any 
'ordinary' subject. Through versatile images that entrap the gaze and fantasmatic 
apparitions in the subject's life, the Oedipal system gives vent to the imaginary Real, in 
the ZiZ'ekian sense. A dilation of repression shifts the relation to the real. An 'over- 
repression' via 'over-identification' with the law establishes an oppressive totalitarian 
system that modifies the circuit ofjouissance in its relation to the law. The law becomes 
the route for the symbolic Real to emerge. It is noted that the 'totalitarian' system is 
conceived as an extension of the 'Oedipal' system and not as something that operates 
outside the boundaries of the latter. The Sadean system, taking The 120 Days of Sodom as 
its epitome, is based on neither repression nor oppression. It is a self-subversive system 
of the real Real, worshipped by Sadean characters as the absolute devouring and diluvian 
experience for the subject to enjoy, which is something impossible. 
The third part of the study contains a scrutiny of the ethical debate regarding the 
historical atrocities of fascism. Conceived as the legacy of Sade and, furthermore, as a 
horrific ontological example of the fulfilment of the Kantian ethics, the fascist atrocities 
raise vertiginous ethical questions. Does the Holocaust emblematise the paradoxical 
affinity between the thought of Kant and Sade? Horkheimer and Adomo were the first to 
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elaborate the question of whether Kantian ethics is in harmony with Sadean cruelty, 
followed by Lacan's s similar allusion to Sade as the truth of Kant. But if the reverse is 
also true, Kant being the truth of Sade, the subject who adheres to the supremacy of the 
ethical duty is also a Sadean pervert. I confront this problematic equation by illuminating 
the flaws of the Kant-with-Sade thesis. 
Behind the aspirations of Sade, as well as of the fascist, lies an omnipotent narcissistic 
fantasmatic position. From this position, both imagine a rigid law, which is not lacking 
and thereby founds their system of domination and plasters every gap. Both Sade and 
fascism formed systems incongruous with Kantian ethics. Without claiming that they had 
a common ethical pedestal, the two systems are characterised by masterful domination 
that prioritises an ideal linked to personal interests (fantasies). Therefore, this ideal 
cannot acquire a universal status. The fascist does not reveal the perverse truth of the 
Kantian law, but a common malformation of Kant's maxim that we find in every system 
of domination, where an ultimate fantasy, reflective of egotistic interests, arbitrarily takes 
the status of a universal law. 
Furthermore, in this ethical discussion, I scrutinise the role of guilt, by exploring its 
relation to the symbolic, the real and the imaginary. My argument is that an ethical action 
first requires the acceptance of symbolic guilt. This does not occur in the case of Sade or 
fascism, where the dominance of the imaginary methodises a suspension of guilt, by 
patronising a complete and absolute law that could satiate desire. As long as guilt is on 
the side of the servant, the master's reliability remains intact and his signifier appears to 
be capable of accomplishing this imaginary goal. This does not constitute an ethical 
attitude for the fascist, who excludes symbolic guilt, as incompatible with the supremacy 
of the ideal that he serves. 
The last part deals with an enduring problem in psychoanalysis that cleaves to the 
nebulous notion of perversion and the related glossary. Regardless of its spinose 
character, perversion is seen as a field of fixed and definite propositions. Consequently, 
one finds assertive, yet bewildering applications of these propositions in the analysis of 
fascism or other political phenomena. For this reason, the update of the psychoanalytic 
philology of perversion is an exigency. This means that novel theorisations, regarding the 
clinical, ethical and political status of the subject, described under the nominal category 
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of perversion, are required. The casual use of this category in the interpretation of socio- 
political phenomena adds more obscurity to the terms involved, without considering 
perversion on new ground. Sado-masochism, fetishism, repressed homosexual tendencies 
or terms like disavowal, have become rigid explanatory schemes for the flourishing of 
last century's fascism. 
Despite the discrepancy between fascism and perversion regarding discourse and ethics, 
as discussed in the second and third chapters of the study, the intoxication of fascism with 
perverse traits facilitates the segregating practices of an authoritarian norm against the 
subject who receives the label 'pervert'. Seen as the subject who raises anxiety in the 
agents of the institutional dome of society, precisely by denouncing subjectivity and 
identifying with the object, the so-called pervert receives an empty label, so that the very 
emptiness of the discursive accounts of perversion, the failure of attaching any fixed 
meaning to the notion, is disguised. Given that it serves ideological purposes, I challenge 
this 'fascist' segregating practice, by engraving a new trail that abandons the perverse 
designation. Specifically, I incorporate into my rhetoric a de-pathologised, de-ideologised 
and de-moralised term for referring to the so-called pervert. I prefer to call him the extra- 
ordinary (subject), as the one who is caught up between lack and excess, there where the 
object a, the object of anxiety, emerges and marks the extra-ordinary position, which is 
conformist and provocative, at the same time. 
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PART I 
Fascism and Perversion 
Introduction: 
The Perverse Refractions of Fascism: A Retrospective 
Last century's fascism and predominantly Nazi Germany demarcate a crepuscular territory 
in modem history. Despite the copious readings, debates and interpretations in the field of 
social and political theory, the memory scars of fascism have not yet healed and many 
questions persist regarding its nature, motivation and impact on history. The first part of 
the present study aims to shed some vibrant light on the diversity and lack of consensus in 
explanatory narratives about fascism. By critically exploring the discursive frameworks of 
these narratives, what becomes clear, despite any exegetic discrepancies, is that a common 
thread interweaves thern. ' Specifically, at the centre of their discursive stage, one finds a 
casual linking of fascism to conditions typically described by the notion of perversion and 
its multifarious synecdoches, concerning stereotypes, terminology and practices associated 
with the pervert. As a recurrent intertextual motif, this link seeps a noticeable body of 
cultural, philosophical and psychoanalytic works. 
So, how close is fascism to the notion of perversion? On this issue, the compelling 
analyses of fascism produced in the early 1940s by two leading exponents of the Frankfurt 
School, Max Horkheimer and Theodor Adomo, are discussed first. 2 In their work, we find 
early traces of the link between fascism and perversion, which appears to be a 
manifestation of the reified and dominative structures of society that endorse the 
objectification of the other. Wilhelm Reich was also one of the first to relate fascism to 
perversion in his anti-fascist critique, which dates back to 1933, but was not published in 
English until 1946. In the 1940s, psychoanalytic research also steadily expanded its scope, 
relating clinical material to socio-political conditions. We find a representative example of 
this direction in Ernest Jones' attempt to explain the rise and spread of fascism, by means 
of perverse mechanisms. 
In the early 1950s, the Frankfurt School axioms had an impact on the nascent, at the time, 
field of socio-psychological research in North America. Their influence is conspicuous in 
the configuration of the famous Authoritarian Personality theory, the product of 
collaboration between different researchers. Despite regular allusions to Adomo's name as 
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the author of this work, this neglects his peripheral role in the development of the theory. 
Another eminent figure who meticulously dissected fascism and totalitarianism as modem 
phenomena is Hannah Arendt. Early suggestions in her work in the 1950s give a perverse 
nuance to fascism, repercussive of the extremity of its atrocities, but Arendt later revised 
her ideas, after attending Eichmann's trial in 196 1. 
In the light of such theoretical works that emerged during or soon after the end of the 
Second World War, different discursive means contoured the nexus between fascism and 
perversion. A fine example is European cinema, which became distinctively political in the 
1960s and 1970s. Fascism became a central theme of many films, often represented 
through images of perverse acts. Suffice it to recall the filmic texts of three eminent 
directors, namely Pier Paolo Pasolini, Luchino Visconti and Liliana Cavani, for a clearer 
illustration of the inscription of fascism into perverse aesthetics. 3 
Moving towards the end of the 1970s and into the 1980s, Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, a 
prominent delegate of Neo-Freudianism, re-introduced the notion of perversion in politics, 
exploring the relation of Sade to Nazism. Adopting a similar Neo-Freudian scope, Klaus 
Theweleit weaves psychoanalytic theorisation with cultural analysis, dissecting the 
fantasies of the fascist militia, perverse in their core. More recently, contemporary thinkers, 
Slavoj Ziz'ek and Juliet Flower MacCannell, are assessed on the basis of their 
psychoanalytic suggestions, which seem to further underpin the idea of fascism's perverse 
undercurrent. 
The argumentation of each narrative is related to the discursive framework of its 
production, that is the school of thought it trails. The main objective here is not to discover 
any truth of pathology behind fascism or Nazism as historical events or to assess the 
degree to which each discourse has succeeded in providing sufficient and reflective 
exegeses about the fascist phenomenon. The emphasis is put on the explanatory role of the 
category of perversion, as far as the fascist phenomenon is concerned. I will proceed to an 
appraisal of the validity of the discursive suggestions presented, focusing on contradictions 
and insufficient elaboration. 
Centred on perverse themes, texts and filmic images fabricated a view of fascism which 
has grown to be rather stereotypical. Without any detectable trace of such a stereotype 
before the Second World War, this was brought into play as fascism culminated in 
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unparalleled atrocious evil, merging with its Nazi dimension and less with its Italian 
version. 4 The perverse designation somehow seemed to fit with the extremity of this evil. 
As a result, 'deviant' sexuality has become a frequent point of reference, when the 
constitutive elements of fascism are fathomed. 
The validity of this stereotype and its precarious impact on the social representation of a 
rather complicated ideological construct, like fascism, is questionable. The majority of 
these narratives apply psychoanalytic ideas to their arguments, in order to explore the 
unconscious economy behind fascist ideology. Thus, psychoanalysis played a formative 
role in shaping an exegesis, by bringing sexuality to the ideologico-political terrain. But 
can psychoanalysis contribute to astute comprehension of socio-political conditions 
without being reduced to a machine of institutionalised knowledge and vertiginous 
theoretical doxa? With regard to this question, I will explore the elucidatory outcome of 
psychoanalytic interpretation in the clarification of labyrinthine ideas that dominate theory 
and research on perversion. If there is an implicit or explicit link between perversion and 
fascism sketched by psychoanalytic discourse, the question is whether it advances the 
theory and the knowledge on perversion. 
These questions bind the knot that each part of the present study aims to critically expose. 
The axis of my analysis, rather than throwing a stone of contempt against earlier discourses 
on fascism, tries to re-inscribe the points in each narrative that envelop the interlacing of 
fascism with perversion as a message. At the risk of an anodyne reflexive equation 
between the last two terms, this message requires further elaboration if we want to gain a 
flexible and polygonal psychoanalytic understanding of socio-political phenomena. 
Notes 
' In the first part of the study, the term 'discourse' refers to the body of knowledge that articulates the link 
between fascism and perversion. 
21 follow a chronological order for presenting and discussing each text, based on the first English 
publication. 
31 am referring to three of their films, respectively: Sa16 or The 120 Days of Sodom (1975), The Damnedl 
La Caduta Degli Dei (1969) and The Night Porter (1973). 
4 The focus is German and Italian fascism; these were the first two types of fascism to have seized power 
and they had an indelible impact on history. 
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1.1930s-1940s: The Frankfurt School and the Freudian Left 
1.1 Critical Theory against Fascism 
Since its foundation, in 1923, the Frankfurt Institute of Social Research has produced one 
of the most influential discourses on modernity, while its work has become synonymous 
with the movement of Critical Theory. Better known as the Frankfurt School and without 
forming a unified body of congruent theoretical ideas, the movement dissected, under its 
analytic and kaleidoscopic spectrum, state capitalism into the components that transformed 
it into the prevailing model of socio-economic relations in Western society. Concerned 
with the escalating pervasiveness of despotism in the West, the School's Critical Theorists 
aimed to develop a contemporary theoretical encapsulation of the shifting configurations of 
capitalism, inquiring into the rise of fascism, as an interrelated trend. In the 1930s, as the 
spreading of fascism cast a shadow over Europe, the particular socio-political conditions in 
Germany occupied the centre of the Frankfurt School's analytical focus. 
Critical Theory, as a methodological strategy, involved critical reappraisal of traditional 
philosophical theories and values, as well as adoption of radical dialectics that 
amalgamated philosophy with social sciences, in the service of nurturing a critical cogito 
as a guide to action. Another essential bastion for the ratiocination of the precepts of 
Critical Theory was the interlacing of Freud's psychoanalytic speculation with Marxian 
dialectics. This innovative speculative frame, commonly referred to as Freudo-Marxism, 
drastically transcended pure socio-economic explanations, encompassing psychoanalytic 
discoveries and inscribing the multifarious role of the unconscious in politics. 
This prismatic dialectical methodology aimed to unveil the contradictions that percolate 
modem society, evincing the thread that sutures together the individual with her social, 
economic and cultural context. Capitalism weaves its hegemony through the exploitation 
of human needs and the oppression of the individual by established social relations, 
mediated by commodification, reification, mass culture and consumerism. A critical 
exposition of the contradictions and problematic aspects of the individual's social milieu 
can foster the prospect of a viable social metamorphosis. 
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Among the most distinguished delegates of the Frankfurt School is Theodor Adomo, who 
applied Critical Theory in a seminal and innovative way, confronting capitalist domination 
and its fascist parameter. The polemic of fascism is a recurrent theme in his work or, as 
Espen Hammer puts it, "the experience of fascism is the great political trauma to which 
Adorno always keeps returning. " I In 1944, Adorno co-authored with Max Horkheimer the 
pivotal study, Dialectic of Enlightenment. 2 Written between the years 1941-1944, the work 
emblematises the new directions in social theory engraved by the two authors, departing 
from immanent critique3 and moving towards a more philosophical approach. This also 
marked a departure from the earlier radical interdisciplinary approach which relied more 
4 on empirical research . Apart from these methodological innovations, one finds the seeds 
of what would later become a common leitmotif. the exposition of the perverse roots of 
authoritarianism and fascism. 
1.1.1 The Dialectic of Western Rationality 
Horkheimer and Adorno related modernity to the capitalist status quo of Western society, 
which, far from reaching its collapse, grew more vigorous by decomposing revolutionary 
consciousness. 5 Taking this into consideration, the authors of the Dialectic did not 
emphasise directly radical politics and economic factors that encumber class struggle from 
its socialist objective. They rather prioritised a philosophical critique of the culture 
industry and the Enlightenment project, the mythological properties of which legitimised 
the domination of nature by the bourgeoisie and the barbarous effects it had on humanity. 
With scientific thought having succumbed to various dominative forces of the West 
(capitalism, fascism) and the East (Stalinism), Horkheimer and Adorno viewed critical 
philosophy as the ultimate bastion for countering mechanisms of control and domination. 
Adorno was particularly critical of a predominant quantitative conception of scientific 
reason and objectivity. 6 Instead of inaugurating social change, the positivistic paradigm 
and technological advances impeded this prospect, serving domination. Positivist scientific 
reason protracts existing socio-economic relations, becoming an instrument of capitalist 
power. As long as scientific and technological developments benefit capitalist relations of 
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production, reason is perverted to an atavistic ideological force, authenticating 
administered societies and rationalisation. 7 Hence, science becomes the aftermath of a 
hegemonic type of rationality, contagious to all aspects of human civilisation and nature. 
Under the effect of such an ideological manipulation of reason, the subject is deprived of 
autonomy and the self-determination of her subjectivity. 
Far from being a liberating force then, Western rationality opens the way to fascist 
mytho-logical irrationality. Horkheimer and Adomo evoke an extensive pandect of 
"historical events, from the epic dawn of mankind to the present, all of which display a 
reversibility between enlightenment (liberation from the powers of necessity) to myth (the 
perpetuation of the Immergleiche). -)98 Without avoiding the putrefying effect of existing 
dominative systems, philosophical reason turned, from being the backbone of social 
critique, to becoming part of the reified and instrumental structures of modem society it 
was meant to fight against. Thus, for Horkheimer and Adomo, philosophical reason needed 
to reinstate its critical aptitude and forin a distinctive research paradigm. 
Pulling the strings of socio-economic relations, the bourgeoisie instrumentalised reason 
so that it served its utilitarian purposes and turned the Enlightenment project into a 
medium of control. The thrust of reason's purity and authenticity deteriorated, recanting its 
status as an emancipatory and life-affirming force, reformative of the predominant socio- 
economic relations. As a result, the cathartic and critical power of reason reversed into an 
irrational force, which oppressed the expression of natural instincts and gave rise to 
destructive and totalitarian dominative forms. 9 Horkheimer and Adomo discern the peril of 
instrumental reason that resides in rationalization, stating, "The totalitarian order gives full 
rein to calculation and abides by science as such. Its canon is its own brutal efficiency. "10 
Under the epaulet of the primacy of Enlightenment reason, liberalism amplified and 
extended oppressive practices, which made the hope for liberation languish and ultimately 
bred fascist domination. 
[ ... ] After the short intermezzo of 
liberalism, in which the bourgeois kept one another in 
check, domination appears as archaic terror in a fascistically rationalised form. " 
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As the culmination of the irrational forces operating in Western civilisation, fascism 
reflects its tendency towards self-destruction; it constitutes an annihilating force par 
excellence and a violent blow against the civilised world. 12 Contributing to this 
deleterious operation, the bourgeoisie mistreated the Enlightenment's messages of 
civilisation's return to nature; consequently, such distorted messages forged the mythical 
fagade of fascism. The idea of administering an untamed nature inserts reason as a rigid 
calculative medium and presents nature as an adversary for human beings. But, in reality, 
this hostility is indicative of rationalism's own fading to mythology. The myth of a 
hostile Nature, against which the subject has to defend herself is a form of alienation and 
control. 13 It endorses the idea that man can control the natural world, while, in effect, it is 
an illusionary idea that only amplifies human suffering. 
This mythology fosters modem reified configurations and, consequently, ensconces 
neoteric types of confinement, such as fascism, which wove its mythology around the 
vision of recuperating the bonds with Mother Nature. Rather than fon-ning the equipage 
for controlling the physical world, reason enforced a despotic and gruesome control over 
individuals. The Nazi atrocities and their rationalisation were the apotheosis of the 
perverted application of Enlightenment reason. The destructive Nazi project of founding 
a global new order, by materialising the ideal of returning to the physicality of the natural 
world, dramatically vitiated the progressive conception of reason. 14 However, as 
Horkheimer argues, this restoration of natural bonds was very different from its idealistic 
philosophical capture, being the sheer product of exploitation and oppression of natural 
desires rather than the liberation and demystification of the latter: 
In modem fascism, rationality has reached a point at which it is no longer satisfied with 
simply repressing nature; rationality now exploits nature by incorporating into its own 
system the rebellious potentialities of nature. The Nazis manipulated the suppressed desires 
of the German people. 15 [ ... 
] The revolt of natural man - in the sense of the backward strata 
of the population- against the growth of rationality has actually furthered the fori-nalization 
of reason, and has served to fetter rather than to free nature. In this light, we might describe 
fascism as a satanic synthesis of reason and nature-that very opposite of that reconciliation 
of the two poles that philosophy has always dreamt of . 
16 
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The return to the natural expression of the instinct, as ideologised by fascist paganist 
ideas, served an arbitrary and utilitarian twist of rational reason, which oppresses rather 
than liberates. Inevitably, sexuality, as an essential dimension of the instinct, was also 
distorted by this ideologisation. The pseudo -revolutionary fagade of fascism exploited 
popular slogans of the people revolting against suppression and misused radical 
messages, in favour of the same malign bourgeois power it pledged to subvert. Thus, 
suppression was perpetuated. 
1.1.2 The Perverse Decay ofReason 
The ossification of the authenticity of critical reason is not translated to a perversion of 
reason solely, but also to an actual perversion of the natural instinct, with sexuality being 
an essential part of it. The natural expression of the instinct is impaired, once the subject 
is deprived of the critical capacities of her reason. In place of the natural instinct, a 
perverted and artificial expression of the latter occurs, alienating the subject and 
sanctioning her self-destructive domination. 
The alienating forces of the capitalist deployments of mechanistic and technological 
expansion operate on the unconscious (or the 'alienated psychic substance', as Ziz'ek 
notes) 17 and take over a feeble ego. This alienated and perverted ego reflects the subject's 
eidolon of her thwarted desires, disguised by a violent veil. Violence is a perverse 
expression of the sexual instinct. Rather than its pre-requisite, perversion is more the 
consequence of the authoritarianism of capitalist institutional structures that suppress 
nature and sexuality. 
Fascism is the extension of this suppression. 18 Instead of forming an individual 
pathology, perversion indicates the inhumane instrumentalist roots of capitalist 
industrialism. Fascism constitutes the annexe of the irrational and self-destructive 
bourgeois culture. 19 The authority of the bourgeoisie certainly does not wither, as it is 
concealed by the vicious and barbaric profile of fascism. 20 A rationalised scheme of 
brutality maintains bourgeois control and deviously presents liberalism as liberation. 
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This type of vicious liberation is congruous with Sade's model of sexual cruelty. More 
than an enumeration of perverse sexual practices and behaviours, the writings of Sade are 
exemplary of a broader constellation of manipulative socio-economic relations. The 
economic exploitation of the individual for the benefit of the capital consummates Sadean 
morality. Sade's philosophy of exploitative debauchery is upheld by a pseudo-rational 
pedestal for the blatant and callous exercise of sexual catachresis, consonant with the 
dominative rationalisation of capitalism and fascist brutality. To illustrate the Sadean 
parallel with the Enlightenment thought Horkheimer and Adomo write in an excursus in 
the Dialectic: 
[ ... ] The work of the Marquis de Sade, like that of Nietzsche, constitutes the intransigent 
critique of practical reason, in contradistinction to which Kant's critique itself seems a 
revocation of his own thought. It makes the scientistic the destructive principle. [ ... ] The 
primeval behaviors which civilization bad made taboo had led a subterranean existence, 
having been transformed into destructive tendencies under the stigma of bestiality. Juliette 
practices them not as natural, but as tabooed activities. [ ... ] Juliette embodies (in 
psychological terms) neither unsublimated nor regressive libido, but intellectual pleasure in 
regression - amor intellectualis diaboh, the pleasure of attacking civilization with its own 
weapons. She favours system and consequence. She is a proficient manipulator of the organ 
of rational thought. " 
The liberal (per)version of Enlightenment rationalism treats nature and, concomitantly, 
man, as objects subjugated to the domination of a Kantian universal formalism. Sade's 
ideas embrace this formal functional rationality by reversing Kant's model, graphically 
exposing the catastrophic and exploitative effects of its appropriation by the 
bourgeoisie. 22 Sadean relations and Nazism inflicted a cruel exploitation over the other, 
reducing him/her to an object. In Sade's writings, the degradation of the victim, 
suppressed and abused by the destructive domination of the sadist, and the catalogue of 
horrific executions form a paradigmatic frame for the mortification of the other (e. g. Jew) 
in fascism. In this regard, the crimes of fascism are associated with Sadean 'sexual 
pathology'. 
The fascists derived enjoyment from killing, affirmative of their ruling power. 23 This 
raises the question whether mastery is able to have a perverse undercurrent, inasmuch as 
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a Sadean image crystallises authoritarianism and embodies the Will-to-Power. Joan 
Copjec alludes to Horkheimer and Adorno's view of perversion and sadism in particular: 
Sadism [ ... ] expresses a will to dominate the other by instrumentali zing him, by treating 
him as a mere object to be exploited and tortured. [ ... ] By inflicting pain the sadist does 
indeed aim, as Horkheimer and Adomo maintain, to produce in the other a certain 
objectification, an excess of corporeality, a suffering or sheer passivity of the body that 
would no longer be summonable to purposive action. 24 
According to Horkheimer and Adorno, the aim of the sadist is to turn the other into a 
sight of passive suffering. But CopJec notes that it is exactly the opposite spectacle that 
turns the sadist on: the other's choice to stop transcending the pain s/he has been 
subjected to and instead surrender him/herself to this pain. 25 If Sade personifies the 
fascist Will-to-Power, this implies an objectification of the other as the victim or the 
slave. Nevertheless, from a Lacanian prism, the slave is not the object; s/he is rather the 
one who stages the object, the spectacle (or the voice) usurped and enjoyed by the 
master. 26 But does mastery and domination have anything to do with the perversions? 
Fascist atrocities could effortlessly yet bewilderingly be characterised as demonical 
products of a sadistic inclination, while perversion could sexualise the field of the 
political, implying that equality and freedom of expression go through the normalisation 
of taboo sexual practices that feed the perverse tendencies of the oppressed individual. 
1.1.3 The Perspicacity of the Dialectic and its Blocks 
It is difficult to discern the main goal of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. The 
discontinuous structure of the text and the dense intricate argumentation make it hard for 
the reader to draw a definite conclusion about the objective of the work or the presence of 
core theory. 27 Yet it is possible to discern a central task in the Dialectic: to unveil the 
destructive foundation of Western civilisation, as far as the individual and his/her rational 
cogito are concerned. But if fascism was really the apogee of this alienating and 
calamitous turn of liberalism in the 1930s and 1940s, as Horkheimer and Adorno seem to 
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believe, does not such a view make later capitalism and phenomena of domination appear 
as states devoid of the disastrous propel of fascism? Today, Slavoj Ziz'ek underscores the 
potential of contemporary permissive liberalism for culminating in a dystopian culture 
that is deleterious for rationality. 28 Although the Dialectic does not tackle permissiveness, 
Adorno, in his later work, as well as other Frankfurt School thinkers, noted these 
surreptitious dominative forces operating in permissive societies. Marcuse implemented 
terms, such as 'repressive tolerance' and 'repressive desublimation' in order to discuss 
the ways contemporary capitalism would allow some desublimated instinctual 
expression, but only through consumerist routes that reinforce the repressive structures of 
its power. 29 
Nevertheless, a cul-de-sac barricades the analytical pathway of the Dialectic. It 
ingenuously accentuates mechanisms, such as instrumentalisation and domination over 
nature, that perverted reason and the natural expression of the instinct, yet the origins of 
the problem that turned the Enlightenment project into a despotic instead of a liberating 
development remains unscathed. There is no sufficient explanation as to what the faulty 
provisos that rendered reason a bourgeois oppressive agent were. What happened and 
what turned the Enlightenment into a brake pedal for the progress of rationalism? By 
highlighting singular factors, such as instrumentalisation and suppression, as the 
problematic areas of Western society, the critique of the Dialectic ended up in a reductive 
scope. 
As Whitebook notes, this reflects an interpretative monism, displayed by the Frankfurt 
School, inasmuch as it overvalued, at hyperbolic rates, a singular core process at a time, 
in the dissection of modernity's dynamics. Any one process, such as "rationalization, 
commodification, technification, reification, instrumentalization, or power, " is considered 
as the unconditional fulcrum of the modem world . 
30 This leaves aside all other original 
democratic developments, as derivatives of these central processes. 
According to another criticism by Hammer, Horkheimer and Adomo's endorsement of a 
categorical repudiation of Enlightenment ideals, such as "progress, freedom, 
emancipation and technology, " makes their overall argument appear politically 
conservative. 31 Horkheimer and Adomo seem to disown any of the conspicuous 
achievements of scientific and technocratic reason in Western society. Yet, their 
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aphoristic tone is understood, if one considers their critique as an ultimate alerting action 
against the escalating fascist despotism of the time. Even today, it is an exigent task for 
Critical Theory to surmount this impediment, by updating socio-political theory and 
critique, in the face of capitalism's current reform as a global prospect for opulence. 
Another question that remains ambiguous is whether the relentless critique of 
Enlightenment reason calls for a reconstructed invigoration or an entire repudiation of the 
latter. To that effect, one can say that the Dialectic prognosticates post-modernist motifs, 
such as the renunciation of reason as the tool of power apparatuses and the departure of 
Neo-Marxism from its traditional socio-economic context which it critically rehashed. 
However, this does not place Horkheimer and Adorno's work outside the spirit of 
modernity. The principal belief of modernity about the primacy of rational reason is still 
the propulsion of their critique. Critical reason is a vital force against any oppressive 
system. Whether it was fascism or Stalinism, Critical Theory deplored any totalising form 
of authority. It may be that the Dialectic of Enlightenment fabricates an acerbic critique 
of the Enlightenment project and its self-destructive quality, but Horkheimer and Adorno 
also note: 
We are wholly convinced - and therein lies our petitio principii - that social freedom is 
inseparable from enlightened thought [ ... 
] If consideration of the destructive aspect of 
progress is left to its enemies, blindly pragmatized thought loses its transcending quality 
and its relation to truth. 32 
This means, the two authors did not abdicate Enlightenment in its essence, this is the 
priority given to reason, but they called for an enlightening reason that could cease 
consternation and bewilderment and inaugurate a liberating social transformation. A 
historical reappraisal of reason is an urgent attempt to draw attention to its 
instrumentalisation, as the main barrier for the realisation of the revolutionary vision. 
Radical changes, a propos of socio-economic structures, are condemned to collapse, as 
long as Enlightenment reason fails to bring its gifts and capitalism severely infringes its 
principles. Therefore, the reconstruction of reason is needed in order to restore its critical 
dynamism. 
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The help Adorno draws from psychoanalysis in order to brace philosophical reasoning, 
meticulously isolates simplifying applications of psychoanalysis in the service of Marxist 
ideological purposes. In this sense, his Freudo-Marxist approach is different to those 
adopted by Marcuse, Fromm or Reich, who directly link up the Freudian doctrine with 
revolutionary and liberating ideas. Thus, when Horkheimer and Adorno implement the 
psychoanalytic notion of repression for describing a socio-political model of repression, 
this is not drawn from 'clinical Freudianism', as Fredric Jameson notes, but from the 
Freudian corpus that reflects on society (works such as Civilization and Its Discontents 
or, as we will see next, elsewhere Adorno has recourse to Freud's Group Psychology and 
the Anal sis of the Ego). 33 This keeps at bay the reductionism of the social to the y 
individual, what is represented by Freud's case studies, yet it presupposes that Freud's 
socio-cultural approach is not reductionist in itself, which is something contentious. 
1.2 The Irrational Mass 
The Marxian ideal guided the Frankfurt School's prioritisation of rationality. Yet Adomo 
did not fail to see the potential for authoritarianism inherent to any progressive movement 
which loses its rational consistency by clinging to the psychology of the masses in its 
effort to gain political power. 34 Ideologies and philosophies in modem society echo as 
destructive forces, inasmuch as their main source of energy is the emotional part of 
human character that confiscates the purity of reason. 
Thus, for Adomo, the exploitation of the emotional needs of the masses, related to 
irrational components such as primitive fears and wishes, was accountable for the 
affirmative reception of fascism and its detrimental consequences. The implication of 
emotion for politics has catastrophic consequences, as far as it allows the manipulation of 
needs in a strategy that disguises irrational ideologies under an appealing and non- 
reproachable veil. 
In "Freudian Theory and the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, " Adomo has recourse to 
Freud and works such as Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego, 35 in order to 
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denote the artificial character and the perilous consequences of fascist propaganda and 
demagogy. Epitomising his previous work on fascism, during the 1940s, Adorno's essay 
directly draws upon psychoanalysis and the psychology of the masses in developing an 
exegesis of the fascist phenomenon. His interest is in deciphering the mechanisms behind 
identification of the individual with fascist power and his/her subjugation to it. 36 The 
eradication of individuality and its transformation into a mass enact the modus operandi 
of fascist propaganda. 
For the fascist demagogue, who has to win the support of millions of people for aims 
largely incompatible with their own rational self-interest, can do so only by artificially 
creating the bond Freud is looking for. If the demagogues' approach is at all realistic -and 
their popular success leaves no doubt that it is - it might be hypothesized that the bond in 
question is the very same the demagogue tries to produce synthetically; in fact, that it is the 
17 unifying principle behind his various devices. 
Freud traces out a libidinal process in order to explicate the massification of individuals. 
The abolition of their very individuality results from a libidinal bond that develops among 
them. Namely, an authority figure, such as a leader, becomes a source of identification for 
each individual. His/her ego ideal is partially or totally identified with the leader, giving 
rise to a collective mass formation. The crucial point that Freud draws and Adomo discerns 
in his theorisation is that the psychology of the masses is not a repercussion of an archaic 
brutal instinct, but more indicative of a primitive attitude of otherwise ordinary and 
rational individuals who are incorporated into a mass, as Homer points out. 38 In line with 
this process, the fascist leader functions as an idealised figure for the individual who 
regresses to an archaic state, preceding to the development of his/her ego ideal. The whole 
process is secured by the imposition of a rigid and artificial hierarchy. For Adorno, fascist 
hierarchies serve sadomasochistic purposes, which means it is not a purely libidinal force 
that maintains their solidity, but there is also a destructive component. 
The fascists, down to the last small-time demagogue, continuously emphasize ritualistic 
ceremonies and hierarchical differentiations. The less hierarchy within the set-up of a 
highly rationalized and quantified industrial society is warranted, the more artificial 
hierarchies with no objective raison d'etre are built up and rigidly imposed by fascists for 
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purely psycho-technical reasons. It may be added, however, that this is not the only 
libidinous source involved. Thus hierarchical structures are in complete keeping with the 
wishes of the sadomasochistic character. 39 
As Homer notes, Adorno expands Freud's logic to the circumscription of a "new type of 
character structure, the rise of the narcissistic subject. 3540 The emergent fascist character 
combines authoritarianism with his libido, in such a manner that unconsciously 
reactivates the archaic wish to identify with the authority of the primordial father. 
Fascism cultivates this narcissistic identification, endorsed by a despotic narcissistic 
leader (Hitler) reminiscent of the primordial father. The image of the leader is idealised, 
activating a mere narcissistic process that stirs up the individual's fascination and love for 
the ideal leader. 
Nevertheless, inasmuch as it follows a narcissistic scenario, love is not reciprocated, but 
rather encircles a certain image, the authority figure. The individual obeys him, but also 
wants to be him. Infused by ambivalence, as Homer points out, this narcissistic process 
sustains fascist leadership. 41 On the one hand, positive libidinal energy is invested in the 
identification with the leader and, on the other, negative energy forges the solidarity of 
the group, in the form of a common "hatred for the other. , 42 
Adomo may sketch out a perverse nuance of fascism, yet he unequivocally states that 
the cause of fascism should not be attributed to 'psychological dispositions'. 43 It is more 
how these dispositions are manipulated and exploited by fascism. Propaganda serves 
precisely this purpose. It operates on an artificial regression of the groups rather than the 
immediate expression of instincts. 44 Such a regression solidifies the domination of the 
oppressor exactly because it diverts narcissism from the ego of the individual and 
substitutes it for a libidinal identification with the oppressor. Therefore, domination 
builds its power by exploiting the psychology of the masses and being aware of the 
indolence and manageability of groups brought together by archaic pre-oedipal ties. 
Lacking authentic personal emotional verve, the fascist mass fabricates a synthetic 
dramaturgy around the figure of the leader and acts its identification with him. 45 It is not 
an actual identification with the leader, but more a thespian partaking in his performance, 
which allows the mass to express its zeal. This cultivates a state of 'phoniness', which 
destroys the ego's critical reasoning. It is an artificial dramaturgic act that entails an 
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element of violence. The innuendo of the counterfeit underpinning of their 'group 
psychology' is what renders fascist mobs so barbarous and callous. 46 
But can we attribute this effect only to the regressive slide of individuals and their 
exploitation by the fascist leader? The level of Nazi catastrophe and the disparate fascist 
regimes that prevailed in European countries, during the previous century, draw a picture 
related to a constellation of factors. A strict psychoanalytic interpretation based on a 
regressive misidentification with an authority figure fails to capture this complexity. 
Freud cannot be exempt from this criticism, considering the emphasis he places in 
regression in Group Psychology, without efficiently expounding the parameters of an 
otherwise common mechanism. 
The omission of any reference to the notion of the death drive that Freud had already 
introduced in 1920 (in Beyond the Pleasure Principle) is striking and bewildering, 
especially when the operation of the masses is what is at stake. According to Hammer, 
this limitation renders Group Psychology a "theoretically unsatisfactory" text, which can 
be efficiently comprehended, only when other works such as "On Narcissism", Beyond 
the Pleasure Principle and "Mourning and Melancholia" are taken into account. 47 
Without the theoretical suggestions about narcissistic identification, it remains unclear 
whether Freud's view of mass regression has to do with a pre-object cathexis primordial 
identification or identification emerging from the libidinal object-choice, in a narcissistic 
regressive manner. 48 Adorno does not discern these problematic aspects of Freud's 
writing, nor does he expand on the logic of Group Psychology, by contemplating the 
implications of the death drive for his analysis of mass regression in fascism (especially 
when one considers that Freud recognised the validity of the notion of the death drive). 49 
Apart from this, Adorno makes no use of Freud's metapsychological concepts and thus 
seems to repeat Freud's reductionism of the social to the individual, since for Freud the 
former is a reflection of the latter. 50 This is indicative of a rather 'mechanical' 
interpretation of Freud, as Sean Homer characteristically notes, aligned with Anthony 
Elliot; such an interpretation strictly follows Freud's early biological suggestions, namely 
his id-psychology, that restrains the critical thrust of Adorno's effort. 51 Homer criticises 
Adorno, as well as Marcuse, for a 'partial and one-sided' consideration of 
psychoanalysis. 52 He critically refers to Adorno's emphasis on the mechanism of 
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identification and the psychological manipulation of the masses, as strategies 
implemented by fascism. 
Moreover, Homer canvasses Adomo's argument about the fascist leader occupying the 
place of the omnipotent father of the primal horde. Apart from his punitive side, the 
53 father is also the one who regulated his sons' pleasure and access to enjoyment . 
Considering the fantasmatic relations that weave the act of identification with the father, 
in Adomo's text there is little consideration about fantasy, the ambivalence it breeds and 
how they come to form the annoury of fascist manipulation, especially when they go 
beyond any rational frame. 54 It limits, if not contradicts, Adomo's philosophical 
postulations about self-reflection that must characterise theory. 
Perhaps, Adomo's 'mechanical' reading of Freud is understood, when his essay is placed 
in a frame wider than a plain acerbic critique of fascist domination. What is also at stake is 
the ego-psychology's post-Freudian revisionism that Adorno criticised for renouncing 
Freud's biological determinism and emphasising the mediation of socio-cultural factors. 55 
Adomo resorts to 'id-psychology' that focuses on the eternal conflictive dynamics between 
the biological status of the individual, namely the predominance of the drive, and his/her 
social context. 56 Adorno resists the 'revisionist' reduction of the Freudian doctrine to 
conflicts that torment the ego due to socio-cultural factors, by laying emphasis on the very 
essence of the conflict, that is the libidinal demands of the id and their clash with the ego. 
The biological basis of these demands, what is considered to be 'nature', cannot be viewed 
separately from the historical process that shaped it. 57 
Adorno remained loyal to the Freudian approach in his psychoanalytic conception of 
social relations. 58 The focus was still on nature, the uncompromising character of the 
drive, rather than culture and the adjustment to values shared by a group. The key role of 
4repression' qua restraint of libidinal drives leads to the emergence of a 'second nature', 
which founds the alienation of the subject and let external forces take over her 
subjectivity. 
Now, one contradiction that comes forth for psychoanalysis, as ZiZ'ek notes, is the role 
of the repression of the drive as the basis for a despotic regulation of the subject and at 
the same time, repression as the pedestal for any cultural and social development. 
59 The 
latter function of repression suggests a theoretical equation with the notion of 
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sublimation. Maintaining this contradiction, Adomo links repression and sublimation to 
social antagonism. For any advanced cognitive or mental ability, the drive has to be 
repressed, supporting social domination. What is more, domination utillses the 
sublimation of the libidinal drive not for any 'superior' cultural, non-sexual 
accomplishment, but for the preservation of its oppressive and brutal power. 60 
In order to describe this process, the Frankfurt School introduced the term 'repressive 
desulimation', which refers to a settlement between the punitive side of the superego, that 
is, its perverse side, and the id. Both serve the same purpose, the self-destruction of the 
subject and the eradication of her rationality. According to Ziz'ek, we have a "perverse 
,, 61 reconciliation of the Id and the Super-Ego at the expense of the Ego. Legal social 
authority ostracises the mediating rationality of the Ego, by taking the form of a punitive 
superegoic demand, which complies with the 'illegal' destructive drives of the id. 
'Repressive desublimation' does not suggest that the inversion of repression would bring 
a liberating effect and turn alienation to a life-affin-ning rational force. 
There is always the threat of totalitarianism as a 'post-liberal' transformation of 
domination, which can enact a synergy between the id and the superego, with 
catastrophic consequences. The demands of the id become harmonious with the 
superegoic orders conspiring against the autonomy of the ego, which is led to its absolute 
defeat and disintegration. The rational stamina of the ego gives its place to the regressive 
automatism of the id impulses. Contrary to an experience of ultimate freedom, regression 
to the impulsiveness of the id marks the ultimate confinement to social domination. The 
id's demands coincide with those of the superego, which is the 'militia' of social order. 
As Ziz'ek notes, this coalition between the id and the superego instates a control 
apparatus, whose forces acquire a direct domination over the drive, by exercising social 
ýrepression'. 62 Its manifestation in post-liberal societies is not that of a prohibitive 
intemalised law, typical of bourgeois liberalism. Quite the reverse, social repression takes 
the form of a transgressive command, which eradicates self-control. 'Repressive 
desublimation' is an extension of capitalist authoritarianism, as this is discussed in the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment. It exposes the underlying dynamics of an authoritarian 
regulation of social relations that escapes the common perception of authority as what 
represses the demands of the id. The manipulation of the regressive status of the masses 
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and their spurious imitation of the leader that Adorno describes in "Freudian Theory and 
the Pattern of Fascist Propaganda, " seem to reflect this logic of 'repressive 
desublimation'. 
However, Ziz'ek confronts a certain impasse in Adomo's argument about the fascist 
totalitarian threat and his psychoanalytic implementation. Adomo equates the subject's 
psychology with her psychoanalytic conception, disregarding the fact that 'psychology' is 
a negative term for psychoanalysis. 63 Furthermore, Adorno maintained a rather 
ambiguous position regarding the concept of the ego. He advocated the importance of a 
strong ego, as what opposes alienating forces, criticising its deterioration in late 
modernity. 
64 Yet the ego, within a social context regulated by capitalist organising 
principles is linked to an identity imposed on the subject, marking its falsity. 65 
For Adorno, the integrity of the ego is crucial for the subject's autonomous and rational 
functioning. The ego is the filter that affirrns the life essence of the drive, while it 
dismantles the destructive aspects of the drive, by relying on its critical capacities. At the 
same time, a rational ego fights against authorities that represent an oppressive 
superegoic order that put a barrier to the life content of the drive. The perverse outcome 
of authoritarianism is therefore deterred by a strong ego. The release of individuals from 
the heteronomy of their unconscious would result in their psychology being vanished. 
Psychology for Adorno may suggest a certain "bondage of the individual, " but it is also 
the prerequisite "for freedom in the sense of certain self-sufficiency and autonomy. , 66 
Despite this contradiction, Adomo seems not to denounce the illusory autonomy of the 
ego, even though he punctuates the aporia related to the latter. 67 The autonomy of the 
subject pertains to a bourgeois ideological veiling of her alienated nature in administered 
societies. Under its alleged exercise of Enlightenment reason, capitalism disguises its 
reified structures and legitimises the pervasiveness of instrumentalised reason. Thus, 
alienation is concealed, by being transfigured and exalted as autonomy. It is not clear 
how the loss of autonomy in the individual manipulated by the fascist takes place. In spite 
of the fact that autonomy has been subjected to relentless ideologisation and has become 
a normative trite notion, Adomo strangely does not relinquish, but maintains the term. As 
Sean Homer notes: 
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While he [Adorno] persuasively criticised the notion of the individual as an autonomous ego, 
on the one hand, and insisted on its demise in the increasingly narcissistic world of advanced 
capitalism, he was then forced to defend the notion, on the other, when faced with the 
prospect of its total eclipse. 68 
Considering that the post- structural i st perception of the subject as essentially divided did 
not reach maturation at the time, Adomo seemed to favour "the relative individuation 
achieved under liberalism. "69Autonomy and freedom were two indistinguishable ideals 
that guided the critical efforts of the Frankfurt School (or its utopia). If a radical social 
transfon-nation is feasible, this is translated to liberation qua autonomy. 
We can suggest a parallel here with Kantian philosophy and the idea of the autonomous 
subject who transcends any external authority and disposes her existence in accordance 
with a universalised law. 70 This requires a constant personal effort, which means 
autonomy is not something given for the subject, but something she needs to accomplish. 
Thus, freedom is there before autonomy. The subject holds the free will to choose the 
consummation of her autonomous or heteronomous status. Heteronomy suggests the 
subject is free, but not autonomous. The reified structures of modem society thwart the 
subject's attempts to realise autonomy and enforce their own ends, replacing autonomy 
with alienation. 71 The Frankfurt School's innovative thought has elucidated the 
commodifying and reifying advances, ratified by capitalism, that destabilise the 
autonomous status of the individual's ego. 72 
Post-modem critique of autonomy disengaged this notion from emancipation, since the 
latter became another mythical veil for concealing the Will-to-Power and human 
finitude. 73 Behind emancipation an absolute and omnipotent master lies in ambush. If 
emancipation is one side of the coin, the other side is the non-feasible task of unfastening 
oneself from the mortal lining of human existence. Fascism exploited this fantasy of 
overcoming finitude by giving a material basis to the reasons that maintained the 
incomplete status of existence. With fascism, these reasons appear to be controllable and 
modifiable. The fascist Will-to-Power emerged as a unifying force that cultivated the 
illusion of suturing the pieces of a fragmented symbolic reality (economic competition, 
national identity). Whereas the symbolic is the marker of finitude, fascism attempted to 
erase the latter by implementing images of mastery and omnipotence. 
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1.3 The (Un)Orgastic Character 
Among the works of the leftist dialectical polemic against fascism, the case of Wilhelm 
Reich is rather idiosyncratic, in terms of theoretical style and argumentative prowess. 
Nonetheless, as one of the most zealous critiques of fascism, Reich's discursive ideas 
deserve particular attention. 75 A member of the Vienna Psychoanalytic Society, as one of 
Freud's disciples, and later a member of the German Communist Party, Reich 
emblematises the marriage of psychoanalysis and Marxism. The Freudo-Marxist model he 
espoused forwarded a set of ideas endowed with vigorous explanatory potential regarding 
socio-political issues, but also became a source of various misconceptions. Wilhelm 
Reich's The Mass Psychology of Fascism exemplifies both aspects of his Freudo-Marxist 
version. 76 
As an attempt to adumbrate the characterological profile of fascism, Reich's analysis 
draws a link between ideology and parts of the human character, that is to say, the 
unconscious side of character. For Reich the unconscious is conceived as a reservoir of 
primitive impulses or as he says "an intermediate character layer, which consists 
exclusively of cruel, sadistic, lascivious, rapacious, and envious impulses. , 77 These 
impulses are considered as "secondary drives" that Reich associates with the Freudian 
unconscious, seen as the outcome of the repression of 'primary biological urges'. 
Liberalism, as the prevailing ideological system at the time (principally referring to the 
Weimar democracy), suppressed the unconscious layer by means of meticulous and strict 
ethical regulations operating on the conscious surface of personality; this is the superficial 
character layer. In other words, liberalism promoted an attitude of 'self-control', holding 
off the destructive impulses of the unconscious. This suppression was decisive for stirring 
up fascism in Germany. 
On the other extreme of the spectrum, fascist ideology does not suppress this 
inten-nediate unconscious stratum. Unlike liberalism, fascism encompasses this second 
layer of the human character which is also the perverse side of it, inasmuch as the 
unconscious is the hive of all destructive and irrational impulses, turned as such by 
despotic sociological patriarchal structures. Perverse features synthesise the core of 
fascism which "transforms the masochistic character of the old patriarchal religion of 
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suffering into a sadistic religion. "78 Therefore, fascism can hardly be seen as a 
revolutionary movement, since a genuine revolutionary action for Reich must spring from 
the pure biological kernel of human existence, which is also the source of anything 
creatively new. This is the deepest character layer and the bastion for any authentic 
revolutionary innovation in the arts or sciences. However, this layer is inaccessible to both 
the liberal and the fascist. Reich gives the following definition of fascism: 
[ ... ] "fascism" is the basic emotional attitude of the suppressed man of our authoritarian 
machine civilization and its mechanistic-mystical conception of life. 79 
In this defining context, Reich recognises three features of fascism: First, fascism is not a 
singular socio-pathological phenomenon, but rather a symptom of a complex network of 
endemic autarchy that involves liberalism. Autarchic suppression is the social dominative 
structure, pathological as such, behind Western civilisation that substantiates fascism as an 
emotional reaction against this structure. Fascism as a perverse emotional attitude 
originates from the suppression of the individual, which seems to be unhesitatingly equated 
with repression. Reich suggests that the perverse side is present in all individuals, but it 
requires the 'massification' of people as a precondition in order to make its appearance. On 
this ground, once the individual is incorporated in a mass that releases the suppressed 
irrational and barbaric character layer, fascism is the final outcome of this loss of 
individuality and critical reason, 
To that effect, German fascism owes its consolidation and ascendance to power to the 
manipulation of the psychic structures of the masses. In that spirit, Nazism initiated a 
policy of strict sex-economy so that it could serve its formidable imperialistic and 
destructive purposes. A despotic sex education of children and adolescents was greatly 
emphasised just to breed perverse desires. As Reich notes: 
The natural sexual strivings toward the other sex, which seek gratification from childhood 
on, were replaced in the main by distorted and diverted homosexual and sadistic feelings, 
and in part also by ascetism [ ... ] Sadism originates 
from ungratifted orgastic yearnings. 
The fagade is inscribed with such names as 'comradeship', 'honor', and 'voluntary 
discipline'. 'o 
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No more aphoristically than this, Reich ascribes the power of German fascism to the 
perversifi cation of the psychic character of the people. The oppressive model of sex - 
economy was nothing but perverse training and the motive force behind the sadistic 
brutality of Nazism. By turning the population into perverts, Nazism managed to conduct 
its imperialist atrocities. Reich obviously falls into the decoy of psychological 
reductionism, by drawing a character type and pathology that underlie a socio-political 
phenomenon. 81 Replicating the Freudo-Marxist logic about perversion as a synecdoche of 
repressive practices and structures, Reich's biologist account eulogises sexual liberation 
as an end in itself. 
To reiterate the main ideas of the narratives of the Freudian left, for Reich and the 
Frankfurt School perversion is a product and a medium of political power shaped by the 
authoritarian structures of Western capitalist society. Fascism exemplifies this negative 
process at best. This ignores historical dimensions (as Foucault has meticulously 
demonstrated) that influence sexuality and the destructive component of the (biological) 
instinct. For Reich, the oppression of sexuality and the displacement from its natural 
expression, serves the barbaric acts of fascism, whereas the Frankfurt School delegates, 
Horkheimer and Adorno, who abdicate Reich's naturalism and the emphasis on primitive 
biological instincts, desexualise perversion linking it to political purposes of obedience, 
conformism and leadership control, as deviations from critical reason. 
1.4 Freudo-Marxist Limitations 
The Frankfurt School's Marxist interpretation of the Freudian doctrine presaged the 
current confluence of psychoanalysis with social theory and cultural CritiCiSM. 
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Notwithstanding the innovative suggestions and applications of Freudo-Marxism, some 
versions of the latter bear various tensions. 
In the early Frankfurt School, Fromm's Freudo-Marxist thought reflected a 
reductionism which years later would also characterise Herbert Marcuse in what was 
probably his most explicit Freudo-Marxist attempt: Eros and Civilization. 
83 In his work, 
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Marcuse promotes the idea of sexual liberation from the repressive parameters of 
capitalist civilization. In the same line, Reich also formulated an idiosyncratic Freudo- 
Marxist synthesis, as we saw earlier. Like Marcuse, Reich combines radicalism with 
psychoanalytic theories on sexuality without overcoming the impediment of reductionism 
in his approach. Whereas Reich drew on the clash between the cathartic 'orgastic 
potency' and repression, Marcuse emphasised more the incongruence between 
malformed sexuality, due to superfluous repression, and true sexuality. 84 
Reich and Marcuse's views appear to limit the utopian project to the overturning of 
sexual repression. 85 Capitalist relations endorse pro-fascist reasoning through the 
suppression of sexuality and the amputation of rational thinking. If suppression engenders 
the relentless irrational character of the unconscious, then critical reason could dissolve the 
irrationality and the repressed status of the latter. However, this view conditions the 
formation of the unconscious with a particular organisation of social reality, without taking 
into account the culmination of the fissure between the innate and rigorous nature of the 
drive (originating in biology) and social reality, which is prohibitive as such. 
Yet the Freudian unconscious, as an anarchic and primitive biological force, is elusive 
and thus not reducible to specific socio-economic and materialist factors. In Beyond the 
Pleasure Principle, Freud relates self-destruction to the unconscious and the notion of the 
86 death drive (Thanatos) as the natural counterpart of the sexual drive (Eros). The death 
drive is a ubiquitous irrational force intrinsically operating and undennining the stability of 
the ego, regardless of its subjugation to any type of ideological power. Nonetheless, for 
Reich and Marcuse, the unrepresentable and unlocatable nature of the death drive is 
reduced to a product of capitalist domination and suppression. 
Furthen-nore, to the extent that Freud's theory neglects the historicizing dimension and the 
role of socio-economy in the formation of the subject, its synthesis with Marxism does not 
resolve this problem. Given that Freud's theorisation on sexuality, defined in strict 
biological terms, is the essential bastion for Reich or Marcuse's ideas, their approach does 
not efficiently historicize socio-political phenomena. In the face of this limitation, Adorno 
was sceptical of the Freudo-Marxist approach, discerning the deadlock of its endeavour to 
compose "a common language for historical materialism and psychoanalysis, " as 
2iz'ek 
87 notes. 
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In Reich and Marcuse, capitalist repression appears to transfigure the sexual drive and 
turn it into a destructive force. Thus, Marcuse advocated the 'resexualisation' of social 
relations, as the prevalence of Eros could limit destructive forces. But this posits the 
unconscious as a form which is adjustable to socio-political conditions. Had it not been 
for the economic antagonism of capitalism, the unconscious would have been reconciled 
with an autonomous ego. A rational ego harmonious with the Marxist ideal would be less 
alienated, rescinding destructive elements that may contaminate natural life and 
redeeming the purity of sexuality. If perversion is the impairment of the natural 
expression of sexuality, that is to say, its distortion by artificiality and external oppressive 
forces, the prospect of a revolutionary retraction of suppression qua repression fosters the 
illusory anticipation that perverse phenomena such as sadomasochism would fade away 
from society. The chart of the perversions would be futile because natural sexuality 
would prevail and the category of perversion itself would serve no purpose. 
One must bear in mind, however, that perverse behaviour is not experienced as coercion 
or as the product of suppressed sexuality by the pervert's ego. The eclipse of perverse 
sexuality is far from being a realistic prospect in a Freudo-Marxist vision that promises 
the expression of biological, natural instincts, dismantling their catastrophic capitalist 
distortion. It is not a coincidence that Marcuse's ideas about the revolutionary prospects 
of polymorphic sexual emancipation were so popular among the radical student groups of 
the 1960s. 88 Yet this popularisation of Freud's theorisation was criticised even by other 
Freudo-Marxists such as Fromm who considered it to be misleading and inaccurate. 89 
Another point that Homer draws in relation to the Freudo-Marxist efforts of Reich and 
Marcuse is their failure to provide a positive framing of desire, in contrast with Deleuze 
and Guattari's politics of desire. For Reich and Marcuse, desire is irrational and 
represents the antipode to the rationality of the social field. 90 
The Freudo-Marxist view of perversion as a condition arising from repression 
erroneously equates the latter with suppression. In this regard, repression suggests an 
unconscious operation that perverts sexuality and breeds pre-fascist artificial trends. 
Nevertheless, this disregards Freud's assertion that the development of sexual perversions 
is due to the persistence of archaic 'sexual components' thatfail to undergo repression. 
91 
The failure of repression, interlocked with the persistence of infantile sexual components, 
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accounts for perversion. Archaic elements that characterise the psychic structure of any 
individual turn to become an indispensable part of his/her conscious sexual behaviour. In 
"Television, " Lacan denounces this Freudo-Marxist thesis, by alluding to Freud's 
unequivocal assertion that repression does not stem from suppression. 92 
The abolition of suppression qua repression would not suggest a liberating and an 
authentically enlightening option, since the constitution of socio-symbolic relations is 
based precisely on repression. In Lacanian terms, the eradication of the latter inexorably 
erases the locus of the Other. Nevertheless, it must be noted here that Marcuse 
acknowledges the need of primary repression, in order for society to emerge. Rather it is 
the surplus repression that functions as a dominative agency that restrains individuals. 93 
Perhaps, it is more appropriate to say that a genuine revolutionary act does not eradicate 
repression, but re-organises social relations, by establishing a different position to the 
repressed. As Ziz'ek illustrates in his critique of ideology, there is always an 
unassimilable space embodied by conflicts and antagonisms that ideology represses, in 
order for society to constitute itself as a coherent whole. 94 Therefore, a genuine radical 
act does not dissolve repression, but it defies any fixed maintenance of the latter through 
oppressive means. A much-needed utopia would not eradicate repression, but lead to a 
different relation to the repressed, by transcending all ideological frames and eventually 
"traversing the fantasy, " as ZiZ'ek suggests. 95 The ultimate outcome would be a re- 
organisation of the symbolic structures of society. 
The cunningness of capitalism was that it managed to re-organise itself, in the second 
half of the previous century, concealing its oppressive features, something that so-called 
existing socialism failed to do. The Frankfurt School was critical of the Soviet Union, 
demonstrating that suppression is not a negative privilege of Western societies, but a 
mere repercussion of the idiosyncrasy of any authoritarian regime, regardless of its 
ideological standpoint. The Stalinist system concealed suppression under the 
sanctimonious veil of socialist equality among members of the party. But the main 
question of how socialist establishments disfigured Marxism in an equally authoritarian 
manner remained. 
As far as Stalinism is concerned , Ziz'ek argues that critical theorists 
failed to efficiently 
tackle this nefarious segment of Soviet Marxism in their critique, because of their 
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disregard and avoidance of Stalinist phenomena. 96 Lacking a positive theory of Stalinism 
which would evaluate the latter as a distinct case of domination, the Frankfurt School did 
not explain the reasons for Marxism's failure to become pragmatised. With regard to the 
Dialectic of Enlightenment , ZiZek points out the absence of Stalinism from the critical 
exploration of the instrumentalisation of reason as something that attenuates the 
vigorousness and the concreteness of Horkheimer and Adomo's critique. 97 The 
overemphasis of the Dialectic of Enlightenment on the rise of Nazism and anti-Semitism 
in the West, inevitably led to neglecting the main question of why Marxism went wrong 
in its Soviet manifestation. This feeds a neo-conservative idea, insinuating that there is 
nothing to be learned from the East. 
According to Ziz'ek, this shortcoming of Critical Theory can be attributed to limited 
accessibility to Stalinist phenomena compared to fascism and Nazism in the West. 98 So, 
while fascism has been profusely studied, the complexity of Soviet Marxism still remains 
in shadow, as well as the irrational synecdoche of its Leninist and Stalinist manifestation. 
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2.1940s-19 70s: The Authoritarian and Evil Profile of Fascism 
2.1 The Fascist Brunt against OediPus 
After years of meticulous research in psychopathology, the psychoanalytic clinic solidified 
its theoretical edifice and opened the possibility for the application of clinical material to 
the interpretation of socio-historical matters. As early as the first period of the 
psychoanalytic school in Vienna, renowned members attempted to identify the 
unconscious processes behind political events and social dynamics. 
Freud was the first to pave the way with works, such as Civilization and its Discontents 
and Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego. ' Freudians, such as Ernst Kris and 
Theodor Reik, also developed an interest in the efficiency of psychoanalysis in 
approaching social-political issues. 2 Erich Fromm was probably the most characteristic 
case, who departed from the traditional psychoanalytic clinic and conjoined Frankfurt 
school's radical Freudo-Marxism. It is not surprising then to find narratives from the 
orthodox Freudian discourse that try make some (psychoanalytic) sense of the fascist 
phenomenon and search for its pathological elements. 
The term 'p sycho -politics' has been occasionally used to describe this application of 
psychoanalytic knowledge into political analysis, providing insights about unconscious 
operations. Nonetheless, the term has been also negatively associated with the 
psychologisation of the political terrain and this field of research was greeted with much 
dispute and controversy. What is often confronted is the tendency to categorise and 
interpret complex historico-political events, based on pre-existing clinical material or a 
fragmented collection and interpretation of evidence. With regard to this rationale, it takes 
a lapsus or a parapraxis by Hitler in order to unearth some unconscious reasons behind his 
deeds and thus elucidate some of the Nazi enigma. 
Despite this oversimplification, one cannot repudiate the genuine intention of those works 
to draw an analytic vector that links the individual with his/her collective context. They 
may lack the passionate and radical quality of the Frankfurt School's analyses, yet it is 
important that traditional analysts recognised indeed the wider explanatory framework of 
psychoanalysis, taking the political factor as an indispensable dimension of their accounts. 
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The hegemonic paradigm at the epicentre of orthodox psychoanalytic narratives, 
interweaving their argumentation, is the Oedipal logic. So, it comes as no surprise to see 
the same logic dominating psychoanalytic interpretations of fascism. This is understood, 
when one considers that knowledge derived from the psychoanalytic clinic filters the 
construal of such political phenomena. 
Illustrative of a wider psychoanalytic scope is Ernest Jones's epic work Psycho-myth, 
Psycho-history: Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis, a collection of papers which deal with 
heterogeneous non-clinical applications of psychoanalysis. 3 One of Freud's most loyal 
disciples and later president of the International Psychoanalytic Society, Jones remained 
faithful to the authenticity of his master throughout his life and went on to produce a 
remarkable body of analytic work ranging from clinical cases to art and politics. His essay 
"The Psychology of Quislingism" is one example of Jones's effort to move to the 'psycho- 
political' terrain, exploring the unconscious dynamics behind the rise of German fascism. 
The text demonstrates the way mainstream Freudian psychoanalysts took fascism to the 
couch in order to explore its unconscious complexes. On the tracks of Freudian logic, the 
orthodoxy of which Jones perennially embraced, "The Psychology of Quislingism" was 
originally a paper presented at the British Psychoanalytic Society in 1940.4 It can be seen 
as an alerting call for action against the fascist threat that culminated at the time. Less than 
a direct mapping of the psychopathology of fascism, Jones's essay is more an 
interpretation of the underlying unconscious factors that facilitated the spread of the Nazi 
phenomenon. 
Jones believes that every emancipatory revolt in history is followed by a conservative and 
rigid system to which individuals respond with increased servitude. In this vein, after a 
period of emancipation brought by the rapid industrialisation of society and the progress of 
scientific knowledge in early 20th century, ultimately authoritarian political establishments 
took over. The liberating and emancipatory forces of scientific reason resulted in an 
unbearable burden of responsibility that elicited primitive infantile mechanisms. The 
individual tries to discard this responsibility by adhering to an omnipotent authoritarian 
figure. This figure can provide him/her with security and protection; that is to say, the 
leader of dictatorial systems more than any other system of political organisation feels 
obliged to meet the omnipotent role with which people bestow him. 
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For Jones, this explains the megalomaniac character of those authoritarian leaders. In this 
respect, Hitler as a powerful figure is nothing but a product of the German people's belief 
in omnipotence and the demand of its fulfilment by their leader, who expunges 
responsibility from the group. Jones finds recourse to the logic of the defence mechanisms 
as the main theoretical tool for constructing his arguments. He interprets the rise of fascism 
as the result of introjective and projective mechanisms that protect individuals against 
anxiety and guilt. 5 In search for the good leader, German people introjected the figure of 
Hitler. They incorporated him, as a kind of psychic cannibalism. On the other hand, 
projection, commonly encountered in paranoia, involved the expulsion of evil from 
Germans and its projection to Jews only to return in the form of delusions of persecution: 
the evil Jew who prioritises his personal wealth at the cost of Germany's prosperity. 
Apart from the omnipotence of the leader, Nazism's successful rise to power was also 
the result of the phenomenon of 'Quislingism', named after Vidkun Quisling, a 
Norwegian politician. Initially an honorary Commander of the Order of the British 
Empire and a minister of the Norwegian government, Quisling resigned in order to set up 
a fascist party and collaborate with the Nazis. Synonymous, thus, with treachery, Jones 
uses the terrn 'Quislingism' to denote a pro-fascist attitude and generally to give a name 
to a general condition of cooperating with the enemy. Oedipal unresolved issues sustain 
this treacherous attitude. Specifically, Hitler was perceived as an irresistible and 
formidable paternal imago that made people lethargic and docile. This is because a 
"formidable paternal figure" functions as a terrain of internalisations and projection of 
drives. 6 The pressing historical circumstances may justify the absolute and categorical 
style of Jones's discursive arguments, yet what becomes obvious is his unconditional 
belief in psychoanalysis's explanatory power by generalising its empirical evidence. 7 
Jones writes: 
Coming now to the psycho-analytical problem concerned, I may assume that every analyst 
has had ample evidence of the identification of the enemy in question with certain aspects 
of the formidable Father imago. The torture dreams about Hitler, and the still more 
revealing ones of friendly intimacy with him, are apt to occur in contexts that render this 
interpretation inevitable. ' 
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With the main axis of his argument evolving around Oedipal matters and relying on 
material derived from his clinical practice, such as dream analysis, Jones identifies two 
homosexual positions: a passive, linked to the dreams of torture by Hitler, and an active, 
expressed through dreams of affiliation with the latter. In an attempt to convert the evil 
father to a good one, other countries denied and repressed their aggressivity towards Hitler, 
taking a position of inertia. This explains the passivity in which other countries were 
caught up. 
The analytical point is that primary aggressive wanting was so repressed as to be 
inconceivable, though its existence was after all implied in the idea of the Father 
demanding back the penis of which he had been robbed. 9 
Jones sees this lethargic state of Quislingism as indicative of a homosexual position. While 
political leaders of neutral countries which did not take any action against Hitler nor 
barricaded his ascension to power, maintained a passive and masochistic homosexual 
position, leaders who allied themselves with the Fiffirer, followed an active homosexual 
pattern. For them, Hitler as a paternal imago was irresistible and called for identification. 
Galvanised by an active homosexual desire, the allies succumbed to the seduction of this 
imago, identifying themselves with Hitler. 10 Here, Jones resorts to the mysterious 
unconscious fascination the image induces, as far as the paternal imago involves feelings 
and behaviours related to the image of the Father. 
Nevertheless, the reasoning for adumbrating a paternal role of Hitler, homologous to that 
of Freud's primordial father, is absent from Jones elaboration. " It seems that leadership is 
equated with the paternal imago, an idea that reiterates Freud's view, but it does not 
explain why Hitler eclipsed other leaders' imagoes. Jones simply argues that this is due to 
Father/Hitler's sadism (identified here with sexual potency) that forms a projective rostrum 
for impulses belonging to the people or other leaders. It is an attitude of fear towards a 
sadistic father, which becomes both "sexualised and moralised. " 12 The outcome of this fear 
is submission or conformity with the forces of the enemy. Identification with the dictator 
proffers a safety net from disorganising revolutionary factors, such as Bolshevism that 
constituted an external threat for the stability of Nazi Germany. 
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For Jones, a submissive attitude corresponds to a passive homosexual position, displayed 
by countries such as Denmark and Norway, whereas fascist leaders like Mussolini who 
allied with Hitler took an active homosexual position. The sexualisation and moralisation 
of their fear and guilt determined this passivity. The degrading Treaty of Versailles, 
equivalent to castration, isolated from Germany geographical areas, previously under its 
rule, and burdened the Gen-nans with the exclusive responsibility of the First World War 
felonies. Treachery constituted a perverse pathway to overcome the guilt caused by the 
previous isolation of Germany. 
Treachery, by allying oneself with the conquering enemy, would seem to be an attempt to 
sadistically overcome the incest taboo by raping the Mother instead of loving her. " 
I would suggest that the people who are most subject to the wiles of Nazi propaganda are 
those who have neither securely established their own manhood and independence of the 
Father nor have been able to combine the instincts of sexuality and love in their attitude 
towards the Mother or other women. This is the psychological position of the homosexual. 14 
Concerned less with Hitler, who anyway seems to have completed his identification with 
the father, and more with other leaders, Jones places on the perverse side the aficionados 
who supported Nazism either inside or outside the German borders. Anyone who remained 
docile or actively cooperated with Nazism, assisted the enemy due to unresolved Oedipal 
conflicts, leading to perversion. Only the acceptance of castration would build an 
independent secure manhood that would enable the individual to love his mother or other 
women. It seems that followers of Nazism, tried to secure their manhood through a 
homosexual route, becoming dependent and submitting to the will of a despotic figure, 
namely Hitler. Regarded in terms of a negative obedience, homosexuality appears to be the 
pedestal for the fascist threat. 
The inability to take any action against Hitler, as a dreadful father, constitutes the main 
symptom of Quislings who is thereby the archetype for the general inability and inertia 
towards the Nazi threat. As a replica of his clinical 'liturgy', Jones interpreted the 
formation of this symptom as the result of either closing the blinds to the aggressiveness 
of the Father or by approving it. The common denominator of these two positions is the 
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refusal to fight the enemy. And this is because the enemy becomes irresistible. Despite 
submission and conventionalism being common attitudes in any political system, Jones 
translates these attitudes to homosexuality, as far as German fascism is concerned. 15 
Jones oedipalises an ideoligico-political occurrence and explains the rise of fascism as 
the product of a series of misidentifications. But far from adopting the Marxian logic, 
Jones does not attribute authoritarianism to the dominant socio-political structuring of 
Western society, but to the reactivation of early Oedipal dynamics and the ominous 
digression from the identification with the non-native superego, namely the patriarchal 
law. Inevitably, any digression from the Oedipal pathway leads to an open space of 
recourse to designations from the glossary of perversion. 
It is not difficult to detect the inadequacies and the risk of oversimplification that the 
orthodox Freudian approach harbours, inasmuch as it fails to draw a clear distinction 
between the collective character of socio-political phenomena and the symptoms of the 
analysand. It could only be myopic to reduce all leaders who collaborated with Hitler to 
homosexuals. Were they unable to resist and recognise the ferocious character of the 
escalating National Socialism, just because of their unconscious homosexuality? Apart 
from this, paradoxically, Hitler committed his identification with the Father, so he is 
exempt from these Oedipal unresolved difficulties. Nonetheless, his sadistic standing also 
insinuates a problematic Oedipal identification. 
The problem is that fascism had already began to show its impending protagonistic role 
in politics, shortly after the end of First World War, before Hitler became the dominant 
fascist figure in the mid 1930s. In fact, Mussolini preceded Hitler in being the first to 
establish a despotic fascist regime. Hitler became inspired by the rise of Italian fascism 
and had high regard for Mussolini as a leader (that is to say, a paternal figure in Jones's 
terms), although in the late 1930s the roles were reversed and growing rivalry damaged 
the relations between the two leaders. 
Furthermore, on a methodological level, Jones's ample references to projection 
encumber the profundity of his argument. The risk of the undifferentiated use of this 
particular mechanism was something that Freud himself pointed out, when he 
adumbrated the role of projection in paranoia: 
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In the first place, projection does not play the same part in all forms of paranoia; and, in the 
second place, it makes its appearance not only in paranoia but under other psychological 
conditions, as well, and in fact it has a regular share assigned to it in our attitude towards 
the external world. [ ... ] Having thus been made aware that more general psychological 
problems are involved in the question of the nature of projection, let us make up our minds 
to postpone the investigation of it [ ... ]16 
An exaggeration of the explanatory power of projection tarnishes the thrust of 
psychoanalytic arguments instead of rectifying them, since projection is pertinent to an 
epiphenomenal process that does not broach its underlying essence, namely fantasy. The 
projection of an imaginary construct, i. e. an image, is important for analysis, when the 
concomitant identification with this image is informative of the way the desire of the 
projector is implicated. 
The image of the formidable father has more to say to about its seductive aspects seeped 
by desire and fantasy and less about the negative consequences of the failure of Oedipal 
identification. As follows, Jones does not attempt to dissect the structural fantasmatic 
aspects and the utopian character of fascist ideology that leaders exploited and their 
people became fascinated with. There is no elucidation of the supposed homosexual 
fantasies that maintain the attitude of the allies or the fantasies that fascism promoted. 
One can presume that this replicates and superimposes over the psychoanalytic process a 
cliche fantasy about fascism's latent perverse structure. 
Jones' narrative is not the only traditional psychoanalytic narrative that weaves the fabric 
of the Nazi phenomenon around problematic individual intrapsychic processes, as 
elucidated by the clinical applications of psychoanalysis. Another distinguished 
psychoanalyst, working in the field of 'psycho-politics', Money-Kyrle also linked Nazism 
to psychopathology, taking a Kleinian perspective. 17 If Jones' interpretation vacillates 
between paranoia and perversion, Money-Kyrle emphasises more paranoid mechanisms, 
analysing Nazism as a case of moral pathology. For him, moral behaviour is defined by 
"the fear of a sense Of gUilt. 9,08 Guilt as the basis of morality is expressed through a 
persecutory and a depressive fon-n. Nazism was a pathological disturbance of this morality, 
cultivating a personality type that escapes guilt. Money-Kyrle discerns this type in Hitler. 
Being both manic and paranoid, Hitler established an immoral regime of "political 
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paranoia. " Thus, in line with Jones and Money-Kyrle's accounts, archaic and pre-oedipal 
processes form the psychotic or the perverse psychograph of Nazism. 
But a hardcore hen-neneuticism seems to lead these early psycho-political narratives, 
which abates rather than augments the vigour of their argumentation. Psychoanalysis is 
implemented as a rigid rational tool of interpretation of a particular, yet complex, political 
condition. Rather than a methodical analytic effort, Jones's paper is an isolated and 
ineffective response to a historical moment of instability for the international political 
equilibrium. Fascism's vision of a global new order is unhesitatingly reduced to the 
Oedipal model of interpretation. 
Less than a 'scientific' elucidation of an absurd phenomenon that tries to abolish the 
normative and rational political basis of liberal democracy, the psychoanalytic scrutiny of 
fascism requires more a thorough analysis of the structural components that sustained its 
ideological resonance, instead of focusing on its pathology. This must draw attention to the 
lack of rational meaning from the basis of all ideological formations that occupy the locus 
of political power. 
2.2 The Perversion of Authority 
The scathing opposition to fascism, as drawn by the Frankfurt School in the previous 
decades, was encapsulated in the collaborative socio-psychological work on the 
Authoritarian Personality, in 1950.19 The fulcrum of this systematic effort was the 
assembly of a more concrete tool by which the rationale of Critical Theory could find its 
empirical and verifiable ratification. The project was funded by the American Jewish 
Committee and was included as one of the five volumes in the Studies in Prejudice series, 
published in 1949-1950. The Director of Scientific research was Horkheimer. 
In standard social psychology texts, Adomo is portrayed as the architect of the 
Authoritarian Personality, even though his role in the whole project was only subsidiary, 
involving a qualitative analysis of the data collected. This regular misapprehension 
neglects Adorno's antithesis and relentless critique of the positivistic zealotry, which 
became prevalent in Western scientific community. In the introduction of The Positivist 
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Dispute in German Sociology, Adorno demarcates Critical Theory's dialectical approach 
to society as a totality from positivist sociological approaches, which rely on empirical 
verification: 
The concept of societal totality is not ontologized, and cannot be made into a primary thing- 
in-itself. Positivists who ascribe this to dialectical theory [ ... ] simply misunderstand it. [ ... ] 
Positivism internalises the constraints exercised upon thought by a totally socialized society 
in order that thought shall function in society. It internalises these constraints so that they 
become an intellectual outlook. Positivism is the puritanism of knowledge. What puritanism 
achieves in the moral sphere is, under positivism, sublimated to the norins of knowledge. 
From the outset, knowledge denies what it seeks, since this is denied by the desideraturn of 
socially useful labour. Knowledge then projects the taboo which it has imposed upon itself 
onto its goal, and proscribes what it cannot attain. The process which otherwise might be 
unbearable to for the subject - namely, the integration of thought into what confronts it and 
must be penetrated by it - is integrated into the subject by positivism and made into his own 
affair. 20 
Adomo confronts the 'truth' of scientific objectivity and methods. 21 What is more, 
fascism's appropriation of scientific reason and technological expansion propelled 
Adomo's reproach of the preponderance of positivism in epistemology and scientific 
practice in the West. 22 Perhaps, one can understand the involvement of Adomo in the 
project, considering his unbroken interest in anti-Semitism and its implications for socio- 
politics. For him, ideology and prejudice were commensurable notions. Thus, the 
Authoritarian Personality scale's aim to evaluate the underlying authoritarianism of the 
typical pro-fascist individual reflected this link between ideology and prejudice. 
Yet the scale serves as a further manifestation of the 'perversification' of the fascist 
phenomenon. Based on rather misleading measures of 'pre-fascist' characters, the scale 
and its underlying theory had a major impact on the configuration of a stereotypical view 
of the fascist as a pervert. Intended to measure the levels of authoritarianism in the subject, 
the Authoritarian Personality scale relied greatly on Erich Fromm's analysis of the 
authoritarian type of character in the collective work, Studien iiber Autoritat und Familie. 23 
Along the lines of this analysis, the 'authoritarian personality type' is characterised by 
irrationalism, reflected in sexuality in the form of sado-masochistic behaviours. According 
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to Fromm, the sadistic tendencies of the subject have their origins in the aggression 
towards a despotic father. After the displacement of aggression, the subject continues to 
obey authority taking up a masochistic attitude. This personality type generally describes 
the conservative individual, predisposed to extreme right ideology. 
Notwithstanding the influence of this early study of the Frankfurt Institute of Research, 
the work on the Authoritarian Personality by the 'expatriated' Institute in the US departed 
from the guiding principles of Critical Theory. 24 As an extensive empirical work, it is 
based on objective measuring of numerous dimensions which are thought to circumscribe 
the authoritarian subject. The collaborators developed an inventory with a number of 
categories, which attempt to identify and classify despotic beliefs, emotions and 
behaviours. 
In the Fascism (F) scale of the inventory, thirty-eight items measure the tendencies of the 
"potentially fascistic individual . 5, )25 Associated with anti-democratic trends, these 
tendencies are seen to predispose the subject to propagandistic messages of fascist 
ideology. Apart from the rational left versus irrational right, there are two sub-categories, 
clearly linked to the perversion of the sexual instinct: Authoritarian Submission and 
Authoritarian Aggression. The first alludes to masochistic tendencies, whereas the second 
encompasses the sadistic component of authoritarianism. 26 The scores for these sub- 
categories, supplemented by measures on Sex, Power and "Toughness, " Destructiveness 
and Cynicism, join the dots of the profile of the potential fascist. Authoritarianism 
suggests the camouflage of a sadistic attitude under a socially acceptable form. 
Nonetheless, what is the validity of a research hypothesis that relates fascist 
authoritarianism to an unconscious perverse character, namely a subject unaware of her 
perverse wishes, 27 when the assumption drawn is based on desexualised forms of 
aggression only and discursive authoritarian contexts? We have the portrait of a sadist who 
takes up desexualised violence, due to repressed sexuality. In that context, political 
attitudeS28 of obedience to a violent authority and conformity are products of the 
transformation of unfulfilled sexual wishes. Displaying the traits of conformity and 
conventionalism, the authoritarian individual would not address criticism raised by the 
decisions of a recognised authority, but on the contrary, s/he would censure and apply 
punitive practices to those who transgress the values promoted by authority. 
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As the emotional life which this person regards as proper and a part of himself is likely to 
be very limited, so the impulses, especially sexual and aggressive ones, which remain 
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unconscious and ego-alien are likely to be strong and turbulent. 
Despotism and conventionalism as political conditions correspond to certain personality 
traits that suppress sexuality, perverting it into an ego-alienating unconscious force; so 
the authoritarian individual does not differ from the perverse individual. As Whitebook 
notes, "the authoritarian personality, with its masochistic submission to the superego, is 
itself a form of character perversion. , 30 But this does not mean that the authoritarian 
subject is engaged in flagrant perverse acts, affirmative of his personality traits. This is 
because two mechanisms contrive to disguise the perverse nature of the fascist: one is 
displacement and the other is projection. The variable of 'projectivity' provides the 
degree to which projection as a mechanism operates in the authoritarian personality. 31 
The scale statements touch on issues subtly related to underlying sexuality, but they also 
include some explicit references to sexuality, such as the variable in the Fascism scale, 
which focuses on unconscious -or 'ego-alien'- sexuality. 
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A strong inclination to punish violators of sex mores (homosexuals, sex offenders) may be 
an expression of a general punitive attitude based on identification with ingroup authorities, 
but it also suggests that the subject's own sexual desires are suppressed and in danger of 
getting out of hand. 33 
The Authoritarian Personality scale, as a loose empirical crystallisation of the Freudo- 
Marxist scope, fails to sufficiently adumbrate the profile of the totalitarian master, so 
long as the latter does not designate a subject of any distinctive and identifiable image. 
However, the scale suggests that the fascist is dominated by an image of authority. The 
signifiers of its statements seem to reflect stereotypical fantasies held about the potential 
fascist who can be traced behind a given authoritarian image. 
Therefore, the certainty that the scale quantifies the resemblance of an ordinary 
individual to a pre-fixed authoritarian image is purely fantasmatic. The rising socio- 
psychological discipline of the time attempted to utter the point of fixation of the fascist 
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aficionado's fantasy, by reducing it to something measurable and thus controllable, which 
is another fantasy. In this respect, The Authoritarian Personality, as an early study on 
subjective prejudice, itself is subject to prejudice and stereotyping, which both involve 
the prevalence of fixed imaginary constructs. 34 
As far as the authoritarian personality resonates the characterological pieces of Hitler's 
Nazi despotism, one recalls a Ziz'ekian remark which cauterises the obsession of many 
Hitler biographers with discovering evidence for perverse sexual behaviour, "as if 
Hitler's alleged sexual perversion will provide the 'hidden variable', the intimate missing 
link, the fantasmatic support that would account for his public personality.,, 35 Likewise, 
we can say that the categories of the fascist scale related to the underlying perverse 
structure of the authoritarian subject seem to support this obsession with the 'hidden' 
perverse variable of fascism. My view is that the scale aims to provide objective and 
indubitable empirical evidence for fascist perversity, without effectively accomplishing 
this goal and isolating its biases. Instead it composes a crafty mosaic of elements, 
amongst them perverse trends, commonly associated with the (mis)representation of 
historical fascism. 
Inasmuch as 'authoritarianism' is a designation of power, the Authoritarian Personality 
scale cannot only be criticised for a flat objectification of the potential fascist, but also for 
the construction of a tool that serves ideological purposes, under the cloak of scientific 
reason. This is far from meeting the objectives of Critical Theory that implements a 
philosophical prism, critical of the dominant socio-economic edifice. For the 
Authoritarian Personality scale, individual responses to pre-fixed statements about 
prejudice and despotism provide sufficient evidence that enables the Western scientific 
community to identify an image that itself constructed and contrasted to that of the liberal 
anti-fascist subject. 
Thus, the creators of the scale endorse a radical image only in opposition to an 
authoritarian image. 36 1 see this as an admission of the inability to approach the lacuna 
carved by fascism (the immensity of its atrocities) and the fantasy that sustained its 
actions; instead, the scale crams this lacuna with the fantasy of the perverse authoritarian 
personality as the antipode to the 'healthy' liberal personality. 
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2.3 The Evil of the Nazi Bureaucrat 
Was Nazism the ultimate incarnation of evil? Since the end of the Second World War and 
the chronicling of the Holocaust atrocities, an ongoing ethical speculation on the historical 
examples of totalitarian regimes still tries to map out the conditions that enabled humans to 
turn against their own fellow being on such an echelon of catastrophe and misanthropy. 
The degree of Nazi barbarity troubles the preponderance of anthropocentric ethics which 
aims at the absolute good for all humans. Furthermore, the inability to understand how 
Nazism trivialised the supreme value of the moral law and carried out this evil became the 
pedestal for extensive philosophical discussion. 
There may be a more subtle relation between evil and moral law. Hanna Arendt 
researched this relation, producing an essential narrative on the ethical implications of 
totalitarianism, dissecting with acumen the Nazi phenomenon. With her ethical suggestions 
formative for arguments that associate fascist evil with perversion and with Arendt herself 
producing textual links between Nazi crimes and perverse terminology, an allusion to her 
work and its ramifications are indispensable. 
Without herself being exempted from conceptualising Nazi atrocities through perverse 
denominations in previous works, Arendt seems to favour perverse vignettes, when she 
refers to German fascism in The Origins of Totalitarianism: 
Torture, to be sure, is an essential feature of the whole totalitarian police and judiciary 
apparatus; it is used every day to make people talk [ ... ] To this rationally conducted torture 
another, irrational, sadistic type was added in the first Nazi concentration camps and the 
cellars of Gestapo. Carried on the most part by the SA, it pursued no aims and was not 
systematic, but dependent on the initiative of largely abnormal elements. 37 
Arendt demarcates a rational from an irrational type of torture performed by the SA and the 
SS, the two most forceful fascist parties in Germany, in the 1930s. Unless used for 
extracting information, the fascist ordeals were products of a pathological structure and 
linked to sadistic irrational character components. Given this irrational basis of fascism 
that epitomises its perverse 'abnormality', one can discern the influence of the Frankfurt 
School thought in Arendt's reading. 
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In The Origins of Totalitarianism, Arendt is concerned with the totalitarian phenomenon, 
focused on Nazism and Stalinism. She considers Nazism to be an ideological condition 
where critical thinking as the foundation of good disintegrates, favouring a mass 
community that unleashes evil. 38 Arendt uses terms, such as "bestiality" or "beasts in 
human form, " in her description of fascist acts, supporting the idea of a perverse pathology 
of the SA and the SS. 39 In a footnote, Arendt quotes a report of the operations in the 
concentration camps that characteristically states that the SA practised all forrns of sadistic 
perversion. Only when the Nazi took over did this type of sadism become a typical fascist 
policy. 40 
Decisive for the abandonment of this acerbic critique of Nazi evil through perverse 
designations was Arendt's interview with Eichmann, during his trial in Jerusalem in 1961. 
The image of the administrator of the 'Final Solution' was much different from the 
widespread perception of Nazi officers, seen as cruel and sadistic animals. Eichmann 
famously claimed that the Kantian ethical doctrine constituted his moral masonry 
throughout his life. Therefore, the extermination of the Jews was not his personal 
responsibility, insofar as he followed superior orders that required him to perform his duty. 
This assertion raised thorny ethical debates as to whether any individual has the potential 
to do harm only by austerely clinging to an ethical duty. Questions embracing the human 
condition and its relation to the moral law were radically re-examined. 
It is this dutiful stand of Eichmann that led Arendt to the introduction of a rather 
controversial notion, that of the 'banality of evil'. Under a 'banal' cloak, evil is presented 
as bureaucratic and trivial, rather than extreme and radical. Evil, in its banal form, is 
perceived more as the annihilation of the subject's capacity for critical thinking. According 
to her report, the Nazi officer seemed to lack critical thinking and spontaneity. 41 After the 
trial of Eichmann, Arendt further scrutinised the relation between the emaciation of critical 
reason with evil by developing her theory on the 'banality of evil'. Under a banal 
bureaucratic guise, evil is depthless, which means it lacks sophistication or any critical 
elaboration. It is a product of blind obedience to one's duty. This banality frames 
Eichmann and explains the apathetic execution of the 'Final Solution'. Arendt writes: 
[] such remoteness from reality and such thoughtlessness can wreak more havoc than all 
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the evil instincts taken together which, perhaps, are inherent in man - that was, in fact, the 
lesson one could learn in Jerusalem. 42 
This shallowness of critical thinking is an essential feature of banality and turns out to be 
the basic pre-requisite for unleashing evil. In his claims, Eichmann, alongside other Nazi 
officers, had recourse to the performance of a duty solely for the sake of it without 
reappraising its ethical status. If this was a deliberate Kantian position indeed, Nazi 
bureaucrats are exempt from the liability of their crimes. The banality of evil is a 
transfiguration of evil once incorporated into a monolithic bureaucratic mechanism, similar 
to official totalitarian apparatuses. The Nazi bureaucracy of the 'Final Solution' was the 
most horrific revelation of this forin of evil. 
After the observation of the superficiality by which evil appears, Arendt departs from the 
thesis of 'radical' evil, which is present in The Origins of Totalitarianism. 'Radical' evil 
can never exist, Arendt notes. Evil is banal and spreads like a fungus, while thought is 
unable to intrude the thin surface of floating evil. The search for depth in evil is fruitless; 
only good can be seen as radical, as having depth. 
In the present study, the banality of evil will not be set on a critical analysis in terms of 
ethical and philosophical validity. What concerns us here is to explore whether this shift 
from the radical perception of evil in fascism to its banal form has actually influenced and 
abandoned the perverse designations pertinent to the fascist atrocities. Rather than this 
being the case, together with the banality of evil, the figure of the Nazi fascist came to 
epitomise the banality of perversion. We will return to this point later, in the part of the 
study that canvasses the relation between Kantian ethics and Sade. 
2.4 Cinematic Images of Fascism: Sensuality and Oedipa sation 
The interpretative thrust of Freudianism and Marxism had an increasing influence over 
manifold discursive contexts, especially in the years following from the early 1960s to 
the middle 1970s. As a characteristic example, the cinematic edifice at the time 
75 
encompassed a psychoanalytic and Marxist critique in a number of films that drew on 
fascist politics. 43 
Belonging to a generation of endowed filmmakers, Luchino Visconti, Lilliana Cavani 
and Pier Paolo Pasolini created three filmic texts which divulge an intention to explore 
and expose the parallel lines between fascism and perverse sexuality. This parallel is 
inscribed in the central themes of films, such as The Damned (1969), The Night Porter 
(1973) and Salb or the 120 Days of Sodom (1975), which can have an auxiliary and 
illustrative role for the purposes of the present study and the theoretical ideas presented 
so far. 44 More than being the crux of these films' distinctiveness, the perverse portrayal of 
fascism also incited virulent controversy around these films, lasting until nowadays. 
When in 1969 Luchino Visconti's epic film The Damned was released, it received 
criticism for capturing the Nazi vision through deviant fonns of sexual behaviour. Yet the 
director claimed that his intention was to present a segment of fascism indicative of its 
degenerative basis. 45 Visconti's film attempts to adumbrate the Nazi debasement of the 
sexual instinct, through the portrait of Martin, an heir of a colossal steel industry and a 
troubled paedophile who ultimately turns into a pitiless Nazi officer. Martin's perverse 
character forms a contentious analogy with the ideal Nazi. The viewer is first introduced 
to Martin disguised as Marlene Dietrich in Blue Angel performing the song 'falling in 
love again' at his grandfather's birthday celebration. When his show is interrupted by the 
breaking news of the Reichstag fire, Martin/Marlene gets noticeably irritated, showing 
more concern about his drag show than Germany's faltering democracy. 
In another notable sequence, the film presents the young members of the S. A., the 
populist fascist party, indulging in transvestite camp performances, followed by an 
implicit homosexual orgy. This is terminated with their assassination by the Nazis, in the 
'Night of the long knives'. Imbued with homoerotic aestheticism, the depiction of the 
young fascists' drag feast has the nuance of a naYve and puerile playful activity. The S. S. 
fascists erase this perverse decadence of the S. A. with their massacre. Yet, Martin's 
transvestite, paedophile and infantile character betrays precisely the same perverse basis 
for Nazism. 
Before joining the Nazi party, Martin's character appears to be saturated with 
uncertainty, hesitation and gloom. While tormented by his paedophilic desire and lack of 
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confidence, Martin rapes a young girl. From an ambivalent and timid paedophile, he turns 
into a determined, dour and callous Nazi officer, going as far as to rape his mother. Under 
the palpable impact of Freudian theories, the emphasis on the infantilism of the S. A. and 
Martin implies a perverse deferment of the Oedipal conflict which seems to explain their 
allure by fascism. Visconti portrayed a fascist icon, whose perverse structure seems to be 
a prerequisite for his transformation to an inhuman agent. 
A second film that resorts to the psychosexual complexities of the Nazi is Lilliana 
Cavani's The Night Porter. Released in 1973, it became one of the most notorious films of 
the decade, yet influential for a number of 1970s cult films, which presented Nazi fascists 
engaging in various perverse acts. 46 As with The Damned, Cavani's film attracted 
polemical reviews, because of its main thematic axis which revolves around a relationship, 
typically perceived as sadomasochistic, between Max, a former SS officer, and Lucia, a 
survivor of the concentration camp. Max works as a night porter in a lush hotel, where 
former Nazi officers meet, plotting ways to retrieve and destroy evidence of their wartime 
activities. Lucia, who arrives at the hotel with her husband, is the only living witness who 
can testify against Max. Soon after they meet, the two characters return to their faithful and 
passionate sadomasochistic bond, which seems to have been developed in the 
concentration camp. 
This is where most of the film's controversy is centred. During Lucia's incarceration, 
Max, as the Nazi officer, appears to sexually exploit his female victim. The memory of 
exploitation in the concentration camp is given in faded colour and grim lighting, 
contrasted with its elevation to the rejuvenating motive force that fuels the colourfal and 
passionate perverse rapport between Max and Lucia. Nonetheless, Lucia's compliance was 
most probably the reason for her survival. Furthermore, the formation of their 
extraordinary love affair, if it is love indeed, increases the esotericism of their relationship 
and raises questions over her exploitation. 
Many parts of the film remain deliberately equivocal. It is impossible to trace where it all 
began and ends. The setting of the hotel has no past or future, only present. This is an apt 
metaphorical context for the a-temporality of both Max and Lucia's relationship. Cavani 
does not disclose anything more about the identity of the characters, apart from their 
common past, so it is difficult to figure out who exploits whom, whether it is power or 
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perversion that ties their irresistible bond. To add more controversy, the main idea of the 
film came from the real experiences of a female survivor of the Holocaust, who recounted 
her coercion to comply with the sadistic wishes of one of her captors in an interview with 
Cavani. 
Through this intricate narrative, Cavani raises some radical and provocative questions. 
Can fascism become the net that supports a sensual, yet a sexually deviant experience? 
Was it possible for a strong love relationship to flourish in the concentration camp, 
concealing ideological contrasts and power relations- the 'Aryan' and the 'vulgar Jew'? 
The concentration camp, the most horrific aspect of Nazi exploitation, functions as a stage 
for sensationalism and sexual exchange, which put together an 'erotic custody', that is, the 
mutual invincible attraction between Max and Lucia as a bizarre operation of desire. Is it 
exercise of power or just a perverse desire, in the form of a 'contractual' and pennanent 
sadomasochistic bonding? It may be love that holds together the two characters as an 
imaginary veiling of the exploitation of fascist power, but it is not clear how this love 
grows. In any case, the perverse eroticisation of fascism is the imprint of this enigmatic 
relationship and Cavani presents perversion as a synecdoche of the Nazi exercise of power. 
Ae Night Porter seems to support the idea that fascist power is organised around a 
perverse structure. 
In 1974, a year after The Night Porter came out, Pier Paolo Pasolini completed the 
making of SalO' or the 120 Days of Sodom, which even today appears in the lists of most 
scandalous and controversial films of all time. The film was finally released in 1975, 
shortly after Pasolini's brutal death, which added to the notoriety of what became his last 
film. The representational space of Sa1O' amalgamates sexual politics with philosophical 
and ideological critique, as Pasolini narrativises the boundaries between perversion and 
fascism, in the same line as the creators of the The Damned and The Night Porter. 
47 The 
film exhibits the tortures nineteen young men and women undergo by four fascist leaders, 
who abducted and held them in a luxuriant mansion. Through painful and breathtaking 
images, the film portrays intolerable and crude Sadean scenarios as the modus operandi of 
fascist power. 
At first glance, the film seems to be an illustration of the fantasies which Sade unfolds in 
the pages of his novel, the 120 days of Sodom. Nevertheless, by adding another dimension 
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to this literary tribute to libertinage, Pasolini implements Sade's novel as a metaphor for 
Mussolini's fierce exercise of power in the years between 1943-1945, while his fascist 
regime in Sa16 was sinking. The Sadean model is stripped from its fantasmatic context, 
equated with an irrational fascist law of debauchery and a medium of both sexual and 
political oppression. Without a cause and effect relationship between the two, fascism is 
seen as indistinguishable from sadism. 
Pasolini goes beyond the aesthetic leitmotifs used in previous representations of the 
perverse fascist. He eradicates sensationalism and transforms sensuality to a stem and 
punitive fascist law which rules the bodies of the victims. The romanticism of Cavani and 
the operatic melodrama of Visconti are thwarted as Pasolini creates a highly denaturalised 
and austere representation of fascism, denoted by a static and monotonous use of the 
camera and a symmetrical mise-en-scene. This combination of ideological commentary, 
shocking images, innovative and idiosyncratic film structure is what gave Sa16 the status of 
one of the most litigious and anti-conventional works of international cinema. 
The narratives of Sa16, The Night Porter and The Damned draw a radical fascist profile 
which stitches brutality with deviant sexual behaviours. Nonetheless, the question is 
whether this heterogeneous 'perversification' of fascist politics reflects something more 
valid than a stereotypical and a mystifying representation. 48 Such filmic representations of 
fascism confront two main problems. First, a bewildering sexualisation of the fascist 
phenomenon is inscribed in their centre. Considering the frequency with which this 
sexualisation appears, it is obvious that rather than criticising it, cinema endorses a 
normative sexual expression that associates any deviation and uncommon sexual practices 
to the violent, anti-social and felonious profile of fascism. 
Second, the underlying perversity of these filmic characters conveys a troubled 
psychological disposition. The aetiological schemes for this disposition are often germane 
to a psychoanalytic theorisation about intra-psychic Oedipal conflicts and structural 
dysfunctions that result in perversion. Indicative of this point is the sequence from The 
Damned, where Martin, once a fierce Nazi, rapes his mother. Ernest Jones' postulations 
about the Nazi proponent could be the paradigmatic frame for Visconti's scenario. Martin, 
as an ambivalent and apprehensive paedophile, is evidently outside the realm of secure 
manhood, but, as soon as he joins the Nazi party, he is transformed into a determined and 
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brutal officer. The rape of his mother is the ultimate evidence of Martin's perverse 
deten-nination derived from belonging to the Nazi party and reveals his inability to 
successfully integrate sexuality with the love for his mother. Nazism for Visconti, as in 
Jones's narrative, becomes the pedestal for a perverse solution to the Oedipal complex that 
veils castration. 
Such a portrayal does not simply adumbrate the pathology of fascism. It suggests a 
pathological distortion of sexuality that fascism comes to embody. Pathology of the sexual 
drive becomes the bastion for criminal activities. Ravetto criticises Oedipalised 
visualisations of fascism, similar to those constructed by The Damned . 
49This is because 
she views psychoanalysis as what categorically equates desire with perversion and reflects 
on the impact that fascist representation, imprinted by perverse erotica, has on the 
imaginary level of the cultural mind. 
For Ravetto, the sexualisation of fascist politics undermines the radicalism of other 
critical works, like Pasolini's, since they imply the necessity of a repressive arrangement of 
socio-political relations. Given the polymorphism of the perversions and the constitutive 
repression of this polymorphism in social relations, psychoanalysis confronts a paradox: 
fascism is attributed to rigid repressive strategies and at the same time envisaged through 
images of perverse sexuality. This is a contradiction found in the theoretical arguments of 
the Frankfurt school against the repressive structure of the Western world, which were a 
major influence for neodecadent cinema. 50 However, the root of this contradiction lies in 
the problematic status of the notion of repression in psychoanalysis. 
Oedipalised aesthetics embroiders one of the most powerful sequences of The Night 
Porter: while Max recounts a dream about Lucia, we see her semi-naked, in Nazi uniform, 
dancing voluptuously in a decadent cabaret with male soldiers, until she abruptly confronts 
in horror Max's decapitated head (a scene that a common psychoanalytic view would link 
to castration). Filled with superb sensationalism, the scene elevates the Nazi attire to a 
fetish. Exercise of power and sexuality collapse, producing a fetishistic fantasmatic image: 
a modem 'Salome', dried out of all stereotypical feminine features, yet being as seductive 
and irresistible as the Nazi officer. The victim is identified with the Nazi, through an image 
of androgynous sexuality. The dream reveals the strange, undifferentiated and fatal 
fascination that Max derives from both Lucia and Nazism. This eroticisation of Nazi 
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aesthetics implicates the viewer in a peculiar ideologico-erotic spectacle. Fascist politics 
are sexualised, in spite of the strong anti-erotic stamp of fascism's historical occurrence or 
Nazism's ideological programme. 
Without vetoing their anti-fascist intentions or artistic aptness, Salo', The Damned and The 
Night Porter cultivate a misleading perception of the fascist either as an ostensibly 
innocent camp Nazi figure or as the Nazi 'Satan', engaging in dark sadistic rituals. This 
may be due to the ideological perspective Visconti, Cavani and Pasolini adopt. Despite the 
divergent angles of their commentary, they compose filmic representations that reveal a 
common Marxian standpoint. They all make perspicuous references to the role of the 
bourgeoisie in the rise and invigoration of fascism in the political terrain, during the pre- 
and post-war years. Visconti and Cavani cauterise bourgeois values, by framing the 
perverse-fascist characters of their films in patrician settings and by injecting an operatic 
aura in the actors' performances. The interlacing of bourgeoisie and fascism is depicted in 
several parts of SaI6 in a lucid, acerbic and categorical manner. The four fascist libertines 
belong to the higher socio-economic backgrounds. Their identity dwells in obscurity; we 
know only the titles of their nobility: The Duke, the Bishop, the Magistrate and the 
President. Fon-nal suits, typical politeness, (mis)quotations of philosophers and artists, 
piano melodies create a diffused bourgeois atmosphere. 
Sa16 betrays proximity between Pasolini and the Freudo-Marxian scope. It could play the 
role of a graphic synopsis of ideas by Horkheimer and Adorrio, so long as the figures of the 
four bourgeois fascists encroach the victims' right for self-determination and autonomy, by 
usurping their bodies and regulating their sexuality. They violate scientific and critical 
reason, instrumentali sing it for the purposes of their own enjoyment. In their philosophical 
discussions, Nietzsche and Baudelaire are unwittingly and uncritically misquoted and 
taken out of context, similar to Nazism's mistreatment of the theoretical ideas of major 
philosophers. Natural laws undergo mythological disfiguration by fascism. By turning 
reason into irrationality and pure absurdness, a praxis of a 'death of thousand times' is 
feasible 
.51 Reason becomes a myth that 
hypostatises fascist crimes. 
Stylistically, the rigorous symmetry of the film's image further reinforces the 
denaturalisation and instrumentalisation of reason. This geometrical balance is maintained 
by means of the three circles that structure the film and the motionless and discoloured use 
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of the camera. The bourgeois per-version of reason sets the theoretical prism of SaWs 
aesthetics that takes this per-version to the letter. Pasolini conveys a rather personal and 
radical view of fascism, addressing it to sadism directly: 
In sadism and in power politics human beings become objects. That similarity is my 
ideological basis of the film [ ... ] Marx defines power as the force that merchandises the 
human being. The exploitation of one man by another is a sadistic relationship. 52 
In contrast with Pasolini's Trilogia della Vita that eulogises the glory of corporeal 
pleasures, SalO' is a composite, scathing and bleak critique of fascist exploitation. 53 
Pasolini believed that fascism never abandoned the political stage in Italy and 
exploitation was sustained through the operation of neo-fascist groups and the 
predominance of neo-capitalism. The nexus of fascism with perversion in SalO' does not 
serve as a simple metaphor anymore, but as a literal equation between the two terms. 
Nevertheless, this literal synthesis of fascist exploitation qua perversion operates at the 
expense of its Sadean component. The fantasy of a sexual and sadistic debauchery for its 
own sake is the lining of Sade's writings, whereas in the filmic transposition of Salo', 
debauchery is predominantly an ideological action. Even though sexual acts and coercion 
are involved, these are divorced from any sexual gratification. They are behaviours as 
shallow and misanthropic as any other human interaction in an industrialised capitalist 
context. A sexual and violent economy counterfeits the political and financial economy 
of the State. However, the chasm between the two economies remains in the film. 
Perverse epithets regarding sexuality serve ideological purposes. But sexuality, in the 
sense of sexual difference, inhabits a non-ideological territory, which is nevertheless 
essential for political speculation and action. I elaborate this point further in the final 
chapter of this study. 
82 
Notes 
' See Sigmund Freud, "Group Psychology and the Analysis of the Ego" (1921) and "Civilization and its 
Discontents" (1930 [1929]), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, 
Vol. 18 and Vol. 21, respectively, trans. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth Press and the Institute of 
Psycho-analysis, 1953-1974), pp. 69-143. 
2 See Theodor Reik, The Compulsion to Confess: On the Psychoanalysis of Crime and Punishment (New 
York: Farrar, Straus and Cudahy, 1959 [1927]). 
3 See Ernest Jones, Psycho-myth, Psycho-history: Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis, Volume 11 (New 
York: Hillstone, 1974). 
4 "The Psychology of Quislingism" later appeared in The International Journal of Psycho-Analysis 22 
(1941): 1-6. 
5 Ibid., p. 242. 
' Ibid., p. 280. 
7 This is evident in the way Jones articulates his argument: "From my own psycho-analytical data I have 
come to the conclusion... " Jones, Psycho-myth, Psycho-history: Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis, Vol. 11, 
p. 280. 
' Ibid., p. 279. 
9 Ibid. 
'0 Ibid. 
" See Sigmund Freud, "Totem and Taboo" (1912-13), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 13, trans. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho- 
analysis, 1953-1974) pp. 1- 16 1. 
12 Jones, Psycho-myth, Psycho-history: Essays in Applied Psychoanalysis, Vol. 11, p. 281. 
" Ibid., p. 283. 14 Ibid. 
15 This shallow link between a characterological trait, such as submission to an autarchic paternal figure, 
and deviant forms of (unconscious) sexuality appears as a distinct category in the Authoritarian Personality 
scale some years later. In psychoanalysis, there is still debate on whether homosexuality belongs to the 
category of perversion or not. In pure structural tenris, homosexuality suggests an incomplete resolution of 
the Oedipus complex that qualifies it as perversion. 
16 See Sigmund Freud, "Psycho-Analytic Notes on an Autobiographical Account of a Case of Paranoia" 
(1911), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 12, trans. by 
James Strachey (London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1953-1974), pp. 9-82 (p. 66). 
17 See Money-Kyrle, Roger Ernle, Psychoanalysis and Politics: A Contribution to the Psychology of 
Politics and Morals (London: Duckworth, 195 1). 
I' Ibid., p. 54. 
19 See Theodor W Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Else, Levinson, Daniel J., and Sanford, R. Neritt, The 
Authoritarian Personality (London: Harper, 1950). 
20 See Theodor W. Adorno, "Introduction, " in The Positivist Dispute in German Sociology, ed. by Theodor 
W. Adorno, Hans Albert, Ralf Dahrendorf, Jfirgen Habermas, Harald Pilot and Karl R. Popper, trans. by 
Glyn Adey and David Frisby (London: Heinemann, 1976 [1969]), pp. 1-67 (pp. 55-56). 21 Ibid., pp. 54-55. 
22 For a discussion of Nazi rationalisation, see Tilla Siegel, "Whatever Was the Attitude of Genrian 
Workers? Reflections on Recent Interpretations, " in Fascist Ital and Nazi Germany: Comparisons and y 
Contrasts, ed. by Richard Bessel (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996), pp. 61-77. 
23 See Horkheimer, M., (ed. ), Studien iiber Autoritat und Familie (Paris: Felix Alcan, 1936). The work 
comprises a collaboration between Horkheimer, Fromm and Marcuse, each contributing with an essay. 
24 Taking into consideration the strict positivistic character of this research project and its focus on 
phenomena of prejudice, the Authoritarian Personality fits better with the objectives of socio-psychological 
research, than Critical Theory. 
25 Adorno, Frenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, p. 1. 
26 Ibid., p. 232. 
83 
27 This is something that reiterates Reich's ideas. See Wilhelm Reich, The Mass Psychology of Fascism, 
trans. by Vincent R. Carfagno, ed. by Mary Higgins and Chester M. Raphael (London: Souvenir Press, 
1970 [1946]). 
28 1 must note here that 'attitude' is not the same as 'action'. A political subject may be active or inactive. 
Above all, she employs an attitude which can be either positive or negative. 
29Adomo, Frenkel -Brun swi ck, Levinson, and Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, p. 16 1. " See Joel Whitebook, Perversion and Utopia: A Study in Psychoanalysis and Critical Theory (Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, 1996), p. 78. 
31 The fascist ethos, as reflected by projective mechanisms, is measured by indicating agreement with the 
following statement: "The sexual orgies of the old Greeks and Romans are nursery school stuff compared 
to some of the goings-on in this country, even in circles where people might least expect it. " A highly 
authoritarian person would show strong agreement with this statement, projecting sexual wishes which are 
considered to be inappropriate. 
32 Adomo, FTenkel-Brunswick, Levinson, and Sanford, The Authoritarian Personality, p. 170. 
33 Ibid., p. 24 1. 
34 More recently, socio-psychological research on stereotyping emphasises the role of 'social 
representations'. Moscovici, who points out the figurative and fixed core of 'social representations', seems 
to draw symmetry with the function of Lacan's imaginary. See Robert M. Farr and Serge Moscovici (eds. ), 
Social Representations (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984). 
31 See Slavoj Ziýek, Enjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out (London: Routledge 
2001[1992]), p. 230. 
36 Both 2i2ek and Adorno would disagree with such a simplistic definition of the radical subject as opposed 
to an identifiable external enemy (the capitalist or the fascist). 
37 See Hannah Arendt, The Origins of Totalitarianism (London: George Allen & Unwin Ltd., 1967 [195 1 
453. 
Ibid., p. 454. 
Ibid. 
40 Ibid., ftn, 159. 
41 Anecdotically, Eichmann refused to read Nabokov's novel Lolita, offered by an Israeli officer, because 
he thought of it as being "unwholesome. " According to Arendt, this incident reveals Eichmann's lack of 
spontaneity. 
42 See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil (New York: Penguin, 1992 
[1963]), pp. 287-288, quoted in Yaacov Lozowick, "Malicious Clerks: the Nazi Security Police and the 
Banality of Evil, " in Hannah Arendt in Jerusalem, ed. by Steven E. Ascheim (Berkeley, California, 
London: University of California Press, 2001), p. 215. 
43 It astonishes the frequency with which the filmic representation of fascism through perverse schemata 
appears in Italian post-war cinema. This might be related to the fact that fascism had already a long 
tradition in Italy where it first emerged, leaving an indelible and diachronic mark on its history. See Stanley 
G. Payne, The History of Fascism, 1914-1945 (London: UCL Press, 1995). 
44 Certainly, there are more than these three films to have narrativised the perverse parameters of fascism. 
For instance, Roberto Rosselini was the first to imply a link between Nazism and perversion in Rome, Open 
City (1945); nonetheless, that was a peripheral feature of the filmic text, while the films I selected inscribe 
this link in the central stage of their narrative. These films were also the first to create an imagery that 
explicitly eschewed perverse sexuality in fascist politics. 
45 Visconti says about the theme of his film: "Nazism was absolutely negative but in order to make a film 
about Nazism, just a small part should be taken, and I took one family. In this family, I wanted to unleash 
the lowest and the least noble instincts, and it is an example, Nazism is not there as a whole: Nazism also 
had other aspects, but I left them aside. " My translation of the original in French: "Le nazisme 6tait 
totalement n6gatif mais pour faire un film sur le nazisme, 11 faut prendre un petit fragment, etjai pris une 
famille, dans cette famille j'ai voulu d6chainer les instincts les plus bas, les moins nobles, et c'est un 
exemple, le nazisme n'est pas IA en entier: le nazisme a eu &galement d'autres aspects, mais je les ai laiss6s 
de c&6. " See Franz Gevandan, "Visconti le Magnifique, " Cinýma 76, no. 211 (1976): 73-99. 
46 Probably, the most (iriffamous film of this genre is 11sa, She- Woýf of the SS (1974) by Don Edmonds. 
47 In fact, Pasolini's film exposes more explicitly than other films the relationship between perversion and 
fascism, without defining a specific form of the latter. Notwithstanding the clear references to Mussolini's 
84 
fascism and Nazism, through militaristic images, Pasolini does not specify the type of fascism the four 
' signifies Mussolini's fascist regime. Pasolini libertines represent in the film narrative. Only the title Salo I 
wanted to expand his critique, so that it includes the growing neo-capitalist and neo-fascist tendencies both 
in Italy and worldwide, during the time of the film's release. Is it by chance that Pasolini decided to film 
Sa16 the year the fascist party gained its highest percentages in Italy's national elections, since the end of 
the Second World War? (Source: Stanley G. Payne, The History of Fascism, 1914-1945). 
" The technical aspects of the film remain outside the scope of my critique, since the aim is not to assess 
the artistic value of these films. My critical focus is the representation of the nexus between fascism and 
perversion as a message articulated within the cultural discourse. I take into account only technical details 
related to this message. 
49Ravetto notes: "By Oedipalizing fascism, these films suggest, like psychoanalysis itself, that desire can 
only be expressed as a form of sadism or masochism, and that fascist meaning, like all meaning, must 
predicated on sexual difference. And since fascism is considered an aberration, or a form of social 
perversity, it must also express itself as sexually perverse. This insistence in sexuallsing fascism not only 
keeps fascism alive in the hearts and minds of popular culture and its sexual imaginary; it also squelches 
more radical critiques of both sexual politics and fascist political economies (such as those of Pasolini, 
Cavani, and Wertmuller) in favor of the structural apparatus of repression. " See Kriss Ravetto, The 
Unmaking of Fascist Aesthetics (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 200 1), p. 95. 50 Ibid., p. 11. 
51 One of the four fascists assures that 'there is a way to kill someonefor a thousand times and that they 
willfind it'. 
52 From an interview with Pasolini taken by Gideon Bachman during the filming of Sal6. See Gideon 
Bachman, "Pasolini on de Sade, " Film Quarterly 29, no. 2 (Winter, 1975/76): 39-45 (p. 40). 
53 Pasolini's three previous films, Decameron (1970), The Canterbury Tales (1971) and Arabian Nights 
(1974), comprise his Trilogia della Vita. 
85 
3.1970s - 1980s: Neo-Freudian Perspectives 
3.1 The Chaos of the Creator 
Freud's early successors who applied the psychoanalytic discoveries to non-clinical 
contexts, often produced doctrinaire accounts, rigidly relying on the dominant Oedipal 
logic. Nonetheless, a new generation of Freudian analysts in the second half of the 
century reframed many of the traditional concepts by taking into account the implications 
of pre- or post-Oedipal development. In recent Neo-Freudian narratives which create 
links between fascism and perversion, there is a swerve from the interpretative monotony 
of the Oedipal paradigm to the scrutiny and the illumination of pre-genital influences in 
the psychic domain. 
From the European school of modem Neo-Freudians, Chasseguet-Smirgel is a leading 
name whose work on perversion expanded the psychoanalytic conception of the term, 
viewing it as an indivisible feature of psychic reality. It is known since Freud that, on the 
level of fantasy, perverse scenarios, both conscious and unconscious, operate in all 
psychic structures. I Chasseguet-Smirgel seems to re-address this point and chart its 
intricacy with other aspects of reality, not just for the individual, but also for the group. 
She links the notion of perversion to various frames, such as aesthetics, group psychology 
and political ideology, departing from its traditional conception as a disorder of the 
sexual instinct. From a wider angle, perversion embraces more than plain sexual 
behaviours and includes behaviours associated with creativity and innovation. Under the 
influence of pre-genital idealisations, there is a latent part in everyone's psychic structure 
founded on the disavowal of reality that resists the acknowledgement of sexual difference 
and the difference between generations. 
Disavowal is a mechanism resonant of a splitting of the ego, which seems to typically 
occur in perversion .2 According to 
Chasseguet-Smirgel, however, it is not sufficient to 
delineate the disavowal of castration as the main stipulation for defining perversion. Such 
a view would fail to notice the general pre-genital tendency all individuals share of 
disavowing and eliminating sexual differences. Some manifestations of this tendency are 
artistic expression and violent behaviour, as both reveal unwillingness to conform to a 
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reality of differences, where one has to sacrifice pleasure. Chasseguet-Smirgel poses the 
following rhetorical question: 
Shouldn't we associate historical ruptures which give an inkling of the advent of a new 
world, with the confusion between the sexes and generations, peculiar to perversion, as if 
the hope for a new social and political reality went hand in hand with an attempt at 
destroying sexual reality and truth? 3 
In this vein, perversion is a dimension that permeates the human condition, influencing 
social, cultural and political relations. From the perverse rudiments of our psychic 
texture, creativity emanates. The pervert takes the position of the creator, by dethroning 
the father from his domineering position of the law. An example of this creative process 
that passes through the subversion of the father is Sade. The Sadean pervert goes beyond 
the limits of the paternal universe and in its place, he establishes another chaotic and 
sadistic world impervious to any constraints, so that ultimately otherness is eradicated, 
which is the aim of the pervert. Thus, according to Chasseguet-Smirgel's postulation, the 
pervert takes a reactionary position against the father, aspiring to instigate a new law. 
As far as politics are concerned, Chasseguet-Smirgel sees all ideologies aiming at a 
common target: to persuade groups that they have the power to abolish development - by 
actualising an infantile dream of omnipotence and opening a window to infinity and the 
dethroning of death. Developmentally, after the first year of life, as early omnipotence 
declines and the ego ideal is formed from the residues of primary narcissism, the child 
has to face a dilemma that functions as the prototype for ambivalence. The child has to 
decide between recognition of the heteronymity of the world of objects or regression to 
an archaic stage, which encloses the perverse core of our psychic reality (the wish for 
sexual gratification through unification with the mother). According to this conception, 
the regressive tendencies of the ego ideal determine the perverse side of any subject. This 
is best exemplified by neurotic ambivalence, where the subject oscillates between the 
conformity to the paternal law and its 'perverse' fantasmatic transgression. 
Development means a constant effort to overcome obstacles set by difference. Life 
changes with each day, which is something that challenges and deprives the individual 
from personal pleasure, inserting psychic pain to everyday experience. Ideologies pledge 
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to put an end to this routine confrontation of difference and Nazism emblematised that. 
As the father is the authority that institutes difference, fascist/Nazi ideology attempted to 
expel his figure from the group and obliterate the superego which substitutes for paternal 
power. This rests on the regressive wish of the group as a 'brotherhood' to possess "the 
,, 4 mother in the regressive manner of primary fusion. The fascist leader's rhetoric does 
not originate in a position of identification with the father; it stems rather from a charisma 
in stirring up, on a collective echelon, the archaic wish of fusion between ego and ego- 
ideal. The role of the fascist leader is to promote this wish and thus sustain a regime 
which serves a narcissistic pre-genital illusion, that is, a perverse fantasy of a universe of 
non-difference. 
Together with the leader, the groups of people who comply with his illusory wishes are 
included in this perverse frame, revealing the ubiquity of perversity that Chasseguet- 
Smirgel discerns in psychic reality. The leader ratifies his power over his aficionados, by 
nurturing pre-oedipal perverse dynamics. 
[The leader] may be compared to the pervert's mother who makes her son believe that there 
is no need to wait and to grow up in order to take the father's role and possess the mother. ' 
Perversion is an act of disobedience, inasmuch as it opposes the authority of the Father. 
Through disavowal, something resists the recognition of the paternal phallus as the 
differentiating factor between the father and the mother. As a result, the pervert does not 
conform to the law of sexual difference and remains driven by a desire of omnipotence. 
The leader is there to evoke this desire. The ubiquitous perversity of the human condition 
is what goes against paternal authority, fostering an element of omnipotence that 
Chasseguet-Smirgel finds in all ideologies. 
As external schemes, ideologies form a projective stage, in which omnipotence comes 
into play and thus returns to the ego. Omnipotence is attested through scenarios of power, 
such as propagandistic messages which single out an external inferior enemy that 
begrudges the pleasurable edifice of the in-group. Behind all these phenomena, 
Chasseguet-Smirgel distinguishes a singular factor: the expatriation of the father and his 
substitution by chaos. 6 By breaking down the patriarchal dome and abrogating the 
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authority of the father, all revolutionary movements enfold perversion as their motive 
force. The force that fuelled the utopian world of Sade nourishes any revolutionary act as 
well. 
Put in this Sadean frame, any revolutionary movement christens a vision of establishing 
a new order, where all differences are recanted. For Chasseguet-Smirgel this entails the 
installation of a chaotic universe, alluding to the disastrous vision of fascism's new order 
as abetting evidence for her suggestion. The fascist militant's aspirations converged with 
the creative prospects of the pervert to reinstate early omnipotence as an ideal condition 
only to create chaos ultimately. To the degree that Chasseguet-Smirgel's psychoanalytic 
theorisation encompasses any radical act, the conceptualisation of the 'revolutionary' 
follows a perverse trajectory that violates and subverts the Oedipal dynamics, with the 
goal to found a world of non-difference. No matter whether 'revolution' comes from the 
extreme right or the extreme left, it anyway depends on the same underlying perverse 
processes. 
But can one be radical without giving vent to the perverse elements of his/her psychic 
reality? If not, then minority influence and any 'heretical' provocation of conventional 
codes regarding morality, ideology, culture, tradition and so on, is reduced to a 
manifestation of the perverse factor of psychic reality. The advocation of difference, in 
most cases, belongs to a minority which initiates a process of introducing novelty. 
Therefore, if this process is grounded on perversity, novelty and creation are a priori 
perverse matters. 
But what does the radicalism of the Holocaust have to say about the creativity of the 
'perverse' fascist? The only 'creative' process to be associated with the Holocaust was 
the construction of a technologically and organisationally proficient apparatus of mass 
production that resembled the manufacturing basis of the capitalist model, conventional 
and conservative in its basis. This means that either fascism was a pseudo-revolutionary 
movement that tried to conceal its conservative-liberal constitution or that revolutionary 
acts lack the creative perversity that Chasseguet-Smirgel discerned in Sade. 
This is better understood, if Chasseguet-Smirgel's conservatism is taken into 
consideration. As far as her psychoanalytic standpoint is concerned, although she 
elaborates the omnipresence of the perverse psychic factor, the Freudian principles 
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related to the role of the father in the Oedipal drama are underscored, as what secure a 
normative and lawful socio-political condition. However, Chasseguet-Smirgel 
disentangles Freud from the Marxist dialectics of the Frankfurt School and thus, her 
suggestions can be juxtaposed as the conservative antipode to the latter. Any 
infringement of prevalent moral maxims is an antagonistic and hostile act against the 
father. 
Therefore, contrary to Horkheimer and Adomo's view, conformity and submission 
appear to be constructive political attitudes, according to Chasseguet-Smirgel's 
theorisation. Unless the two terms underscore the acceptance of a democratic authority, 
any conformity with non-democratic authority figures, digressive of the existing paternal 
social edifice, is fused with perversity. In other words, as long as someone complies with 
the traditional political status quo, i. e. liberal democracy, s/he displays a healthy political 
attitude. As soon as s/he diverges from this given establishment, following a subversive 
type of political authority, such as fascism, her/his attitude is linked to perverse pre- 
Oedipal idealisations and (ultimately) pathology. Having said this, in the case of Nazism, 
was submission to Hitler's morality sustained by perverse components? Hitler ascended 
to power through democratic procedures, establishing an alternative morality, although he 
played the role of a paternal figure for German people. This exposes a contradiction 
which Chasseguet-Smirgel's thesis fails to resolve. 
Whitebook highlights the ideological antithesis between Chasseguet-Smirgel's ideas and 
the radical thought of Herbert Marcuse, who evangelised the utopian thesis of liberating 
7 
sexual polymorphism in the late Frankfurt School. Nonetheless, despite the mediating 
ideological chasm, a common thread appears to stitch the narratives of the two 
ideological opponents, linking utopian politics to perversion; two conflicting ideological 
perspectives have actually produced coterminous discursive statements that both lead to 
problems. An anti -authoritarian individual can express a liberal attitude towards 
sexuality, yet unconventional sexual practices involving aggression may form part of it, 
limiting the cathartic aspects of non-normative sexuality that Marcuse expected. 8 In other 
words, sadism cannot fall into extinction, even in an ideal, tolerant and liberating political 
system, simply because it naturally resides in the aggressive component of the drive, not 
related to ideology, although sadism, as a term per se is ideological and instrumental. 
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What is more, the pervert of Chasseguet-Smirgel's scrutiny is less a creator and more a 
re-creator. He deconstructs and constructs from the beginning an idealised chaotic world. 
But, since his deconstruction involves aggression, while his reconstruction leads to chaos, 
all types of perversion assume a destructive character, despite their diverse and 
multifaceted nature. 
Revolutionary movements, seen as regressive phenomena, are products of the 
idealisation of the archaic stages of development. But if emphasis is given to the 
regressive qua subversive tendencies of the ego ideal, the liability of the superego for 
these tendencies is neglected. Chasseguet-Smirgel exempts the superego from any 
aversive nuance, fallaciously considered to promote sanctioned social reality solely. In so 
doing, the superego is conceived as the aftermath of the resolution of the Oedipus 
complex through identification with the father. The father's power marks the terrain in 
which the Oedipal conflict is dramatised. As a seductive hero, the father calls for 
identification and at the same time, as a rival, he stirs up antagonism. 
Rebellion against the father defies the threat of his punishment which takes the form of 
guilt, after the institution of the superego. Following Chasseguet-Smirgel, the pervert 
who rebels against and transgresses the paternal-superegoic authority is not tormented by 
guilt, due to a pre-genital ideal that (re)fuses with the superego. Only through successful 
Oedipal identification, ideal ego and superego collaborate in setting up an austere circuit 
of guilt. Since the father's authority is transmitted to the superego, with which the ego 
ideal converges, Chasseguet-Smirgel considers superegoic guilt as a safety valve for the 
normative status of paternal power. Even the thought of defying the authority of the 
father and turning punishment against him is enough to evoke guilt and anxiety. Trying to 
break the cycle of guilt would only breed more of the latter. 
The superego plays the role of the guardian of the paternal law and guarantees the 
intactness of the paternal universe, which is regulated and mediated through the law. As 
if this universe represents the only reality, deviations from the superegoic axioms are 
ascribed to perverse tendencies. The father as the representative of the superego is 
recognised as the only authentic and sensible authority. 9 But this view is subject to 
bewilderment and misconception. The normative licit aspect of the superego is only one 
aspect of it and Chasseguet-Smirgel seems to disregard its primeval character, namely 
91 
Freud's conceptualisation of the superego as "pure culture of the death instinct" and "the 
representative of the internal world, of the id. "10 The aim of this superegoic primitiveness 
is to engrave a cavity of pre- or anti-morality in the ego. Therefore, the morality of the 
superego does not have a given indubitable value, as Chasseguet-Smirgel's view 
presupposes. Her conception of the superego and the id as antithetical intra-psychic 
forces, with the first promoting the stability and the stamina of the ego, is strongly 
conservative. 
This is because, despite her Neo-Freudian contributions, perversion is still a condition 
much defined on the basis of an austere Oedipal criterion. Without the paternal heritage 
of the superego, guilt appears to be absent from the pervert's universe. In this way, the 
acknowledgement of sexual difference becomes a question of morality. But it is difficult 
to exclude the pervert from the experience of guilt, since, apart from sexuality, he 
actually seems to fit quite well within the basic frame of existing morality. 
Even Sade's horrific literary acts, which function as the prototype for the classification 
of the perversions and the designation of sadism, were only recreated in the sexual 
scenarios of his written work with little resemblance to his actual life. 11 As a typical 
neurotic case, Sade indulged himself in fantasies fabricated around a persistent perverse 
thematic, something which definitely does not justify the exorbitant punishment Sade 
received: a total of 27 years in prison, an archetypal representation for any sadistic act 
and a proto-fascist emblematic figure. That was Sade's sentence, through which he 
liquidated the price for his literary libertinage. Sade's creative body of work did not 
originate in a perverse organisation, as Chasseguet-Smirgel proposes. It may be his 
ordinary neurotic structure subjected to repression and superegoic guilt that fuelled the 
perverse content of the fantasies Sade conveyed in his writings. 
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3.2 The Odium of the Feminine Abyss 
The names of Chasseguet-Smirgel, Joyce McDougall and Margaret Mahler represent a 
modem feminine force in psychoanalysis, whose contributions advanced the Freudian 
doctrine and influenced the psychoanalytic speculation of other authors. One such example 
is Klaus Theweleit's work Male Fantasies, which is deservedly considered to be one of the 
most groundbreaking works on fascism in Germany. 12 The author tackles the historical 
burden of fascism that seemed to have passed to 'repression' in post-war Germany, where 
any direct or public reference to Nazism was virtually absent. 
Theweleit produced an impressive narrative, based on an extensive study of 250 novels 
and memoirs of the German Freikorps, a proto-fascist military group upon which the S. A. 
(Sturmabteilung) and National Socialism built their power. The group consisted of officers 
who came out of the degrading defeat of Germany in the First World War. After 1918, they 
were engaged in constant belligerent activities (among which Rosa Luxemburg's execution 
is enlisted) receiving generous financial rewards. Eventually, the Freikorps came under the 
auspice of Nazism, bestowing the party with the presence of senior officials and avowed 
Nazi figures, such as Rudolph Hoess. 13 
Male Fantasies as a text attempts to elaborate a theory of fascism spanning from the 
past to the present. Theweleit treats the assemblage of popular literature in his work as 
the main source for exploring the fantasies, emotions and images that do not haunt the 
Freikorps only, but also the fascist, the Nazi and, essentially, the entire edifice of male 
dominance. In his reading of these male fantasies, Klaus Theweleit deploys a research 
approach that runs through psychoanalysis and archival analysis of material or theoretical 
ideas derived from cultural discourse. The theoretical standpoint regarding perversion that 
Theweleit adopts is derived from contemporary Freudian views, which relate fascism to 
pre-Oedipal patterns, like those developed by Chasseguet-Smirgel and Stoller. He 
perceives the fantasies of the Freikorps' militia, as being archetypical of the fascist or the 
despotic male and having their basis in pre-genital wishes. 14 
Creating a robust and galvanising narrative, Theweleit's analytical focus is on the desire 
of the fascist and its essential link to the mother, rather than the Oedipal father. War and 
destruction do not reflect an Oedipal desire to subvert the father and gain unconstrained 
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access to the love of the mother, but an archaic desire to abolish both parental imagoes. 
Through this psychoanalytic speculation, Theweleit maps out the sinuous entwining 
between the desire of the fascist and the fantasy of destruction of the mother that seems to 
uphold the urge to warfare. 
The perverse wish to eradicate the father and unify with the mother was not the sole 
determinant for the structure and the resulting violence of the Freikorps. More than that, 
the prevailing wish was to obliterate, together with the father, the mother as well. 
Maternal features of affection had to be eclipsed from the world of the fascist. The fascist 
male engages in warfare and violence as a response to the desire to annihilate the 
presence of the mother, both as an image and as an imago. 15 The supremacy of a 
corporeal image that rests on hardness, uttermost violence, muscular beauty and strict 
discipline fuels the main fantasy of the fascist and harbours his desire to erase the female 
maternal body. It is not hornoeroticism that brings the Freikorprs together, but the 
common desire to annihilate the figure of the mother and fon-n a rigid organic body of 
brutal masculinity, against the threat of the devouring feminine. 
Theweleit breaks off the tradition of the Frankfurt School's Freudo-Marxist accounts 
that produced popular slogans about utopian politics in the 1960s. For such accounts, 
fascism meant self-destruction, since it perverted the individual's critical reason. An 
authoritarian paternal imago suppresses and perverts sexuality, cultivating irrational 
attitudes, such as dictatorial obedience and submission. The intemalisation of this 
authority by the individual constitutes the Oedipal framework of the Frankfurt School 
approach. Nonetheless, Theweleit emphasises pre-Oedipal desires as indispensable 
elements of individuality, noticeably influenced by Neo-Freudian views. 
In this vein, the perverse core of fascism is not the result of an Oedipal 
misidentification, but the product of a primitive ego maintained by a sexualised 
mechanism against psychosis. Margaret Mahler's notion of separation -individuation is 
pivotal for Theweleit's analysis. Mahler introduced the term after years of analytic work 
with psychotic children, but Theweleit implements the logic of separation- individuation, 
in order to adumbrate a perverse condition that works as a defence against psychosis, 
rather than a psychotic condition per se. 16 Thus, according to his analysis, the Freikorps' 
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preoccupation with war served their wish to escape (to individuate themselves) from the 
hated image of woman and the body that enfolds her sexuality. 
As a source of fear for males, feminine sexuality intimidates the fragile egos of the 
fascist soldiers who see in the image of the woman the possibility of their annihilation. 
For Theweleit, German fascism was a perverse phenomenon grounded on violent 
defences against the psychotic threat of being gorged by the woman. So, rather than the 
expression of repressed homosexuality, fascism was a configuration of regressive 
violence against any affective display towards women. This is what solidified the fascist 
male's masonry. Under the perverse impact of his male fantasy, "women are robbed of 
their sexuality and transformed into inanimate objects. " 17 Within this misogynistic realm, 
Nazism appeared to be the most solid and violent example of the male fear of the 
feminine. The archaic ego of the fascist male soldier is reflected upon a crude desire, 
incapable of recognising otherness, that is, the acknowledgement and respect for the 
other's desire. The pleasure associated with the desire of the other undergoes repression: 
The focus of repression in the soldier male is the "desire to desire"; concomitantly, the core 
of all fascist propaganda is a battle against everything that constitutes enjoyment and 
pleasure. " 
By excluding pleasure from his universe, the fascist releases the amorphous and brutal 
rigour of his primitive desires, destructive par excellence. The perseverance of these 
desires is what produces the anti-erotic substance of fascism which prioritises the sensual 
experience of the body at the expense of contentment and enjoyment. This is why 
authoritarianism as the central axis of the critique of fascism in the Frankfurt School is 
abandoned in Theweleit's work, since it is not sufficient to explain the seductive 
components of fascist ideology that spring from a pre-Oedipal source rather than an 
Oedipal one, as authoritarianism suggests. Theweleit's narrative places the 
authoritarianism of the Frankfurt School outside its Oedipal conception, yet to the degree 
that both Theweleit and Frankfurt School thinkers highlight the pre-Oedipal canopy of 
the fascist's position, they circumscribe the archaic and perverse basis of all fascist 
movements. The point of demarcation is that Theweleit proceeds in an extensive 
exploration of this pre-Oedipal character, inquiring into their content as expressed by the 
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popular and propagandistic narratives of fascism, without revolving around the notion of 
authoritarianism, as a product of the absent identification with the Oedipal father. The 
lure of fascism stems from the odium and the fear of the female body that feeds its 
fantasmatic constructs of violence and aggression accompanying male dominance. 
Despite its inspired provocation regarding the callousness of male sovereignty and the 
unmasking of its fragile basis, Theweleit's narrative produces a feeble interlacing 
between gender issues, sexuality and the ferocity of fascism's barbarism. The blurring of 
the margins between Nazism, fascism, the military man and the male tyrant suggests that 
masculinity is formed by the fear and outre of the feminine as the image that haunts male 
fantasies and nurtures destructive impulses. In this tone, male domination is built upon a 
perverse basis. 
If the abhorrence for the feminine resides in its unrepresentable status and the 
concomitant horror, the lack of representation is not a sufficient exegesis for the 
destructive elements that Theweleit recognises in fascism as a defence against the former. 
Following Lacan, as Theweleit does in parts of his narrative, lack is not something that 
resides in the feminine solely, although paradigmatically embodied by it, but something 
that carves a lacuna at the centre of any identity, the fascist's identity, the masculine 
identity and so on. It can be excess or lack that circumscribes this lacuna; in both cases, it 
is something that agitates the subject, forming not only the basis for her hatred, but also 
the precondition for her ability to love, as I will discuss in the following chapters. 
Theweleit suggests that desire, in the service of Eros, can only grow through the 
intemalisation of the feminine, as a position that responds to gender differences in a 
respectful and warm, non-cruel manner. This means, the internalisation of the elements 
linked to the female body lays the foundation of the ability to love. What comes forth is 
once more the enigma that woman constitutes for symbolic reality. The very emptiness of 
the woman is what returns to the fantasy of the fascist disguised in the fonn of the 
C4 19 eternal feminine", as Ziz'ek notes. In psychoanalysis, the dark continent of woman is 
an allusion to her lack that cannot be taken into representation. So, in fascism the 
(mis)recognition of this lack is connected with the feminine, as renunciation of the male 
image of omnipotence, the superman. The image of the superman stands for no other than 
the omnipotent imaginary father. 20 In this way, the Nazi negates, but does not foreclose 
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the dead (symbolic) father. The fascist's father does not undergo repression and this may 
be the reason it has an uncanny effect: He returns as an animate cadaver with no distorted 
and horrific features, but with the image of the other, in a bureaucratic appearance, 
similar to that of the four characters of Pasolini's film Sa1O,. Fascism negates woman as 
one of the names of the father, which is different from the desire for her annihilation. 21 In 
this sense, the fascist desired not the eradication of the woman but her 'promotion' to an 
Aryan image in accordance with the Nazi project. In fact, the fascist treatment of woman 
resembles the radical feminist promotion of a female image as a replica of the grandiose 
imaginary frauds of man. Namely it bolsters male domination and the image of the 
vigorous superiority of man, which feminism opposes. 
Theweleit's approach does not tackle one pivotal component of fascism, namely the role 
of anti-Semitism in it. The extermination of the Jew, seen as a practice confirmatory of 
the granitite masculinity of the Nazi soldier, loses its distinctive and constitutive nuance 
for Nazi ideology and comes to reflect a broader gender issue, related to a deleterious 
fantasmatic retort to feminine sexuality. Such gender complexes bewilder fascism's 
ideological podium and its relevance with the allegedly other major type of 
totalitarianism, that of Stalinism, which is also accountable for similar atrocities and anti- 
Semitic barbarities. So, can we discern the desire of the dissolution of the mother's body, 
behind the dissolution of the Jews in the concentration camps? It is either the same male 
fantasy that sustains both 'totalitarianisms', neglecting their ideological incongruence, or 
else the Stalinist apparatus is not stamped by the same fantasy of dominative masculinity, 
which Theweleit considers to be the issue at the heart of fascist tyranny. Nonetheless, if 
male dominance was unequivocally promoted by fascism, Stalinism concealed it under an 
ostensible gender pluralism represented by the equality of the members of the party. 
Theweleit may be correct in his view of violence being related to male fantasies against 
the threatening unrepresentability of the feminine, yet it provides a general frame, which 
does not help with the understanding and the critique of the particular features of fascist 
ideology. What also needs to be pointed out is the position of women, during the third 
Reich, which was directly linked to motherhood. This means that the male fantasies of 
the fascists endorsed exactly the image that raised fear and antipathy in them. On the 
other hand, a number of women were employed in military and anti-aircraft units, office- 
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work or labour work. 22 Though not indicative of the favourable position of woman, yet it 
has something to say about the women that supported and actually voted for Hitler, 
despite the Nazi party's blatant anti-feminism. In what way is the emptiness of these 
women related to the fascist fantasy of the abolition of the feminine? 
Adopting a pseudo -revolutionary fagade, fascism aspires to subvert an old establishment 
by creating an ostensible new order, which is an oxymoron, since the latter resides in the 
same traditional patriarchal structures of power. On the whole, ideologies foster rigid and 
monolithic systems, either in new or recycled forms. It must be noted that they never 
succeed in abolishing desire (as an anarchic 'anything goes'), although a fantasy of post- 
desire, post-difference paves their political ambition. Historical fascism did not instate the 
perverse 'chaotic universe' that Chasseguet-Smirgel linked to the defilement of the 
paternal law and Theweleit to the obliteration of the female (matemal) body. The 
replacement of the paternal law was a futile and pompous rhetoric, destined to fail, for 
there can be no other law than the one the father embodies. Instead, we could say that 
fascism attempted to set up a different relation to the law -a non-patriarchal law - rather 
ineffectively, as it duplicated the same patriarchal system which ad definitionem excludes 
the feminine dimension. 
In their construal of fascist phenomena, Chasseguet-Smirgel and Theweleit re-articulated 
and de-centred Freudian ideas from the Oedipal problematic, focusing on pre-genital 
underlying processes. Perversion, as a pre-genital condition, is an inherent and distinctive 
component of human reality, where Chasseguet-Smirgel attributes Nazi violence, as a 
result of disavowal of differences and a consequent subversion of the father. For 
Theweleit, the fascist wishes to abrogate the mother's feminine hypostasis, implementing 
perversion as a defence to psychosis. Although femininity is addressed, Neo-Freudian 
accounts offered only a disjointed fathoming of the latter, without eschewing the 
supremacy of the Oedipal father. This suggests a predicament for psychoanalysis that 
Lacanian theorists have tried to resolve. 
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4.1990s: The Surfeit of Fascist Jouissance 
4.1 The Lacanian Perspective 
So far, the exploratory spectrum of this study provided a retrospective and informative 
panorama of the versatile discursive arguments about fascism and its links to perversion. In 
recent theoretical literature, Slavoj Ziz'ek and Juliet Flower MacCannell drew on Lacanian 
psychoanalysis as a critical medium for dissecting post-modem theoretical currents or 
lifestyles, as well as modernist considerations. ' Both scholars treated issues related to 
fascism, in a meticulous and fertile implementation of Lacanian concepts. Yet, despite their 
erudite appeal, the readings of Ziz'ek and MacCannell on fascist politics have recourse to 
the psychoanalytic knowledge on perversion, which is far from being unproblematic. Even 
if perversion has something to say about fascism, what does fascism have to say about the 
category of perversion? The mystification, regarding the relation of the two notions, 
remains unresolved. 
Lacan's psychoanalytic theorisation views the suffering and the solace of the subject as 
states bound to language. As soon as the subject enters the realm of the signifiers, she loses 
immediacy with materiality. 2 The fact that the subject uses language is an attempt to 
master this early loss (the fading of physical unmediated proximity with the material 
world) and articulate an ecumenical truth about her existence. 3 Nonetheless, the truth 
remains incomplete, since this aim depends on symbolic means. This irreversible and 
unrecoverable loss, thereby, carves a lacuna in the representations of and by the subject. 
There, in this vacuum, the kernel of what Lacan calls the real resides, resisting 
symbolisation. This is a painful constant for the subject, but also the source of her desire. 
The subject's raison d'itre evolves around reinstating this real order of immediacy lost 
forever, a loss that gave its place to desire, which is the effect of the lack etched on the 
subject the moment she speaks and begins to circulate in the realm of the signifiers. 
The position the subject occupies in the signifying chain, i. e. signifiers that represent her, 
determines the relation of the subject to the real which takes the form of a nostalgic 
J. Oul . ssance. Due to its ample meanings, the French term typically remains untranslated in 
English, referring to the enjoyment - the closest English translation - that the subject 
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experiences as an extraordinary combination of pleasure and pain, every time she 
approximates the real kernel of her existence. This unrepresentable co-occurrence of 
pleasure and suffering commonly hypostatises the paradoxical adherence of the neurotic to 
his/her SymptoM. 4 Language, as the modus operandi of the subject for tackling the real, is 
accountable for this strange co-occurrence. Jouissance is beyond the signifier, yet caused 
by the latter, which permits instantaneous access solely. 
Lacan's conception of subjectivity evolving from a central lack, a constitutive lack that 
gives rise to desire, forms an essential theoretical pedestal for MacCannell's and ZiZ'ek's 
suggestions about the role of ideology in relation to this real kernel and the desire of the 
subject. The potential relation between the fascist and the pervert in terms of accessing 
J. Oul . ssance is the epicentre of the narratives that I discuss in this section. In a typical 
Lacanian description of the perverse subject, unrestrained jouissance is not something 
renounced by the symbolic, so the pervert constantly transgresses the symbolic limit in 
search for it. The pervert does not acknowledge castration and thereby does not bind 
hislherjouissance to the phallic signifier. 
4.1.1 The Eradication of Oedipal Ethics 
In a number of texts, Juliet Flower MacCannell has produced a narrative that exposes the 
5 
relation of fascist politics and ethics to the central Lacanian notion of jouissance. The 
relation to realjouissance is what determines the structure of the subject, as a neurotic, a 
psychotic or a pervert. In this theoretical context, MacCannell formulated a dialectic of 
fascism, extending the modernist work of Horkheimer and Adorno, with whom she 
appears to agree on the catastrophic consequences of the bourgeois infringement and 
appropriation of the Enlightenment. The principal ideals of Liberte, Egalite and 
FraternW were severely instrumentalised and all this time, have remained unfulfilled. 
For MacCannell, the dominant Oedipal model of society that prevailed after the 
Enlightenment holds the culpability for this failure. Maintained by male despots, who 
MacCannell calls "malevolent clones, " the Oedipal system of society took the form of a 
.6 raternal structure of society sadistic Other (superego) Fascism 
is an aberration of the E 
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which concurs with the liberal capitalist order that Horkheimer and Adomo cauterise in 
7 
their work . National Socialism and fascism are not disorders of "patriarchy" (the relation 
to the ancestor and the prime position of the father in traditional societies), but deviations 
from the modem democratic form of fraternity. This fraternal political structure founds 
the regime of the sons, which is nothing but "patriarchy" reshaped. 8 The Nazi Holocaust 
was a decisive historical occurrence for re-evaluating familial relations. It endorsed the 
aggressive narcissistic ends of the fascist to take the place of the parent and become the 
surviving master who replaces "the weak and feeble parents for good. "9 In this regard, 
fascism was a pathological deviation from the granite basis of fratemal/liberal democratic 
ideology and the core of Oedipal ethics. 
In Totem and Taboo, Freud ascribes the rudiment of social organisation to the mob of 
the brothers who succeeded their despotic father's power, after they cannibalistically 
devoured him and reconstituted his dominant figure by the creation of God (a stem moral 
superego). 10 As a result, the regime of the brother came into existence, by abolishing a 
totalitarian paternal micro-establishment and inaugurating a more pluralistic one. This 
nascent pluralism regulated the economy ofjouissance, so to say, the enjoyment of the 
mother, previously held by the father. All brothers could gab a limited piece of this 
jouissance, strictly defined by law. This reveals a proto-democratic organisation of social 
relations in the fraternal Oedipal society. 
Fascism appears as a breach in this model, in analogy with perversion that violates the 
Oedipal law. MacCarmell draws the deviating and destructive for traditional parent-child 
relationships character of fascism. " She suggests that fascism strives for "maternal 
jouissance, " that is, the enjoyment rooted in the primordial unrepresentable evil Thing, 
i. e. the source of the maternal voice/superego. According to her argument, "The fascist is 
on the way to ajouissance not restricted by the word, by the ethical framing of excess 
and lack. " 12 Thisjouissance unrestrained by the signifier is commonly associated with 
the pervert who en*oys the symbolic; he refuses to sacrifice and confine hisjouissance to J 
symbolic boundaries. Similarly, the fascist surpasses Oedipal phallic jouissance. 
Nevertheless, the feminine position towards jouissance also moves beyond the phallic 
signifier. The woman does not come under the auspice of the paternal constraint of the 
phallic word, going as far as to sacrifice herself to unlimited jouissance. This suggests a 
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thorny parallel with the fascist who ostracises the paternal 'despot' in his barbarous Will- 
to-Jouissance. Confronting the risk of turning these two parallel positions into a 
hazardous equation, MacCannell locates the difference in the woman's efforts. Despite 
her deviation from the function of the phallic signifier, the woman still tries to relate her 
jouissance to the signifier; she tries to talk about it. This means that she does not disavow 
the phallic signifier like the pervert does, which explains why she is not placed 
completely outside the phallic function, on the side of unlimited fatal jouissance - 
something that would turn her into a callous figure. 
On the side of unlimited jouissance, death lies and this is where the fascist position is 
located. Nazism was an aggressive act against Oedipal ethics, as it attempted to instate a 
condition of unlimited jouissance. Therefore, Nazism comprises a negative ontological 
example for re-examining traditional ethics operating on familial relations: 
It [Nazism] unwittingly enabled us to do away with our wish to do away with our parents 
and thereby "freely" enjoy. It did so by undoing the stricture that the sexual drive is never 
open to consciousness, the Oedipal stricture. The aggression against the parental relation 
was so fierce on the part of fascism that it could not help but open our eyes to that parental 
relation-that it was a relation to US. 13 
In line with MacCannell, as our post-modem world departs from Oedipal ethics, part of the 
current ethical reconstruction has its origins in the Nazi extremities. But where does the 
erasure of the Oedipal substratum of parental relations situate the fascist regarding the 
Other, if not in a perverse position? 
In her elaboration of fascist ethics, MacCannell appears to map out a perverse relation of 
fascism to jouissance, which also insinuates a perverse relation to the Other. 14 Based on 
psychoanalytic conceptualisations of perversion and Lacan's ethical speculation in 
Seminar VII, MacCannell juxtaposes the ethics of the fascist with the ethics of femininity, 
alluding to Eichmann as an emblematic figure for demarcating the two ethical attitudes. 
Taking the relation to jouissance as the defining criterion, MacCannell draws the 
difference between Eichmann's perverse route to jouissance and the feminine pathway 
towards the latter. 
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Eichmann personifies the bureaucratic banality of Nazi officials that Arendt considered 
as the source of Nazi barbarity, claiming that evil is banal. 15 During his trial in Jerusalem, 
the Nazi administrator of the 'Final Solution' not only exonerated himself by advocating 
his apathetic subordination to the orders of the Fiffirer as a simple executive tool, but also 
attested his faithfulness to the Kantian ethical imperative as the main principle that 
guided him in his life. He went as far as to summon up extensive extracts from Kant's 
Critique ofPure Reason in order to convince the court for his pro-Kantian posture. 
MacCannell treats his claim as an example of fascism's perverse implementation of the 
Kantian doctrine. Assisted by Lacan's logic in "Kant with Sade" 16 and Hannah Arendt's 
theorisation about the banality of evil, 17 she conceives Eichmann's ethical attitude as 
commensurable to the argument that sees Sade as the truth of Kantian ethics. 18 The 
banality of Eichmann and the apathy of Sade are compatible manifestations of a common 
position, where both turn themselves into the objects of the invocatory drive (the voice of 
the Fiffirer, in Eichmann's case), which means that the divisive character of subjectivity, 
namely, lack or the recognition of otherness, is eradicated. 
Therefore, Eichmann and Sade occupy the same perverse frame in terms ofjouissance, 
which is different from feminine jouissance. Although the woman slips away from the 
phallic function, she still tries to discover channels for relating her jouissance to the 
symbolic and manage to speak about it. Both the fascist qua Sade and the woman are not 
fully inscribed in the symbolic, for their structures are marked by a nucleus that persists 
and goes beyond symbolic boundaries: this is the object a, the remainder of lost 
J. oul . ssance. The pervert situates himself in the position of the object of the drive, whereas 
the woman tries to pertain herself not to this object, but its lack, namely the phallus, 
without fully succeeding in this. There is a surplus enjoyment in both positions and 
MacCannell demarcates them, pointing towards the new possibilities the feminine 
position opens for ethics. 
MacCannell draws a parallel between Arendt and Lacan, as each fleshes out the 
perverse synecdoche of rigidly adhering to an ethical edict. She argues: 
Lacan found the implications of Kant's maxims - the voice within - scandalously close to 
Sade's. Arendt, looking at a different kind of perversion, found Adolf Eichmann's self- 
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proclaimed inner sense of his own "duty" a "version of Kant for the household use of the 
little man. "9 
From perspectives, Arendt and Lacan somehow relate perversion the 'malfunction' of the 
Kantian ethical duty and its Enlightenment reasoning. Behind the face of the bureaucrat, 
perverse sexuality is the fulcrum of his commitment to the ethical decrees of the system. 
Sade's Will-to-Jouissance elevated to the level of an absolute Kantian duty (a universal 
will) is commensurable with the fascist's will, which acquires a universal status as the 
Will-oflthe-Fiihrer- In accordance with Kant who postulated that only a universalised 
maxim could constitute an ethical duty, Eichmann, as well as other Nazi officers, was 
identified with the will behind the maxim that decreed their duty, that is, Fiffirer's will. 
Eichmann's action was guided by a single ethical edict: "Act in such a way that had the 
,, 20 Fiffirer known, he would approve. 
The fascist ethical maxim did not simply demand Eichmann to unconditionally obey 
orders as his duty, but also to identify with the will of the one who expresses it. His 
assertion that, on his part, he held nothing against Jews further evinces the Kantian basis 
of his attitude. It purports to have no pathological motives (personal interests such as the 
loathing of the Jews) influencing Eichmann's actions. The fascist atrocities can be 
thereby understood as the veracity of Kantian ethics, in analogy with Sade's perverse 
ratification of the latter. 
Nevertheless, there are a number of difficulties with MacCannell's account. The 
'different type of perversion' that Arendt identified in Eichmann never becomes lucid in 
the text, while the question emerges whether every subject who claims an obdurate 
obedience to a moral law is a potential (or actual) Sadean pervert. Eichmann's perverse 
adherence to the Nazi law suggests a thorny postulation which requires first the 
clarification of a basic problem with Lacan's argument. What is at stake is Sadean 
instrumentalisation, namely, the reduction of the subject to the object of the Other's 
J. oul . ssance, a position permeated by apathy. An oxymoron comes forth, since this 
position also engrosses the pervert's jouissance, a motivating force for the pervert that 
contradicts his apathetic instrumental isation. The subject who undertakes this 
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instrumental function does not focus only on the Other's jouissance, but also on her own 
jouissance, both clenched in the same position. 21 
MacCannell's theorisation about fascism is an alteration of Lacan's construal of the 
Sadean fantasy, which is the inverse of the matheme of fantasy: $ <> a. 22 As it happens 
with Sade, the fascist reverses the fantasmatic relation to the object a and instead of being 
the subject himself, he transforms into the object of the invocatory drive (a <> $). The 
fascist becomes the object of 'maternal jouissance'. 23 Nonetheless, by no means can this 
be taken as an unequivocal and definite criterion for identifying perversion. First, because 
it is a structural description particularly bound to the Sadean fantasy, without being 
replicated anywhere else in Lacan's work or having a particular reference to the 
perversions. Taking the position of the object does not constitute a canonical definition of 
the pervert. Without clear elaboration of these intricacies, the reasoning of "Kant with 
Sade" cannot be generalised, as it is not an argument of a given explanatory value. Lacan 
never claimed that the Sadean reversal of fantasy describes the position of the pervert. 
Furthermore, MacCannell does not sufficiently canvass the transgressive nature of 
jouissance (the modus operandi of the Sadean fantasy) and its relation to Eichmann's 
clinging to the law. How does transgression occur by the very obedience to the law? It is 
true that the law in itself generates excess, but it is something MacCannell needs to 
clarify. The comparison of fascism with femininity, in terms of access to jouissance, 
reveals in both cases a surfeit of enjoyment. In the woman, this reflects a metaphysical 
experience, whereas, in the fascist, the surplus ofjouissance, i. e. the excessive character 
of the atrocities committed, acquires a morally transgressive character qua perversion. 
However, even if the woman tries to fasten herjouissance to the phallic function, unlike 
the pervert, it is precisely this surplus ofjouissance that frames both the feminine and the 
perverse position. Moreover, given that lack and excess are tautological concepts in the 
Lacanian corpus, in what way did Eichmann as a pervert embody the lack in the drive 
and how is it different from embodying the excess of the feminine? Despite 
MacCannell's effort to separate the two, one thing remains: both the pervert and the 
woman bear upon ajouissance beyond the limits of the symbolic, where common moral 
designations become impaired. Thus, if the fascist assumes a foreign, meaningless 
jouissance, this renders opaque the line of demarcation between its perverse fabric and 
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female enjoyment. Sheila Kunkle writes about the meaninglessness of the fascist 
jouissance: 
And so, the "banality" of the Nazi Order, the very bureaucratization that allowed a sort of 
distance from the moralising of actions, brought its own libidinal impact; that is the 
torturers and killers experienced an enjoyment from their brutality by the very fact of being 
44meaningless. 1124 
But as far as the Nazi bureaucrat is concerned, my view is that he enjoyed his brutal 
exploitations for the very fact that they were meaning-ful, in the sense that they served a 
moralising function in accordance with the Nazi ideological vision. Even the Holocaust 
had a real meaning for the fascist, since he truly believed that the extermination of the 
Jews was a 'necessary evil' for the rise of the Aryan ideal. As I will argue later in the 
present study, this ideal substantiated the law and the identity of the fascist. For this 
reason, it is unlikely that Eichmann conveyed a "need for empty signifiers, " as 
MacCannell characteristically writes. 25 Signifiers are always empty per se, but for the 
Nazi officer, Hitler was the provider of a fantasmatic certainty that filled up this 
emptiness. 
Rather than an ostensible symmetry in the accomplishment of the Kantian duty between 
Sade and Eichmann, it is more a dissymmetry that describes their moral duties. The 
Sadean subject ascribes the sought-for jouissance to the Other's Will, an abstract, 
faceless and imperceptible source. This renders Sade's fantasmatic site Kantian, since 
Kant's originator of the law is as abstract as the Other is. Hence, Lacan postulates that 
Sade is Kant. In Eichmann's Kantianism, the categorical imperative takes a form that 
serves the will of the Fiffirer, as MacCannell notes. Hitler stands as a visible enunciator of 
a law that, consequently, cannot acquire a universal status. Inasmuch as this law serves 
the particular interests of the Fiffirer and the zealots of Nazi ideology, the will behind the 
law is not subjectless. Furthermore, the disinterestedness that accompanies the 
performance of the ethical duty - another point of similitude with Sade and the 
chimerical apathy the Sadean pervert displays when he inflicts pain to others - is 
recanted. 
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Sade as the 'perversion' of Kant is precisely what it literally means: a sly twisting of an 
ethical attitude which has the potential to sustain evil. Zupanc'ic' has effectively 
demonstrated this 'perverse' twist, arguing that Sade actually hides himself behind the 
apathy of the ethical duty, only to get rid of the responsibility for his action. 26 Without in 
effect eradicating his pathological interests, Sade formulates a pseudo-Kantian duty that 
makes it incongruous with the authentic Kantian ethics. Yet, Zupanc'ic' appears to agree 
that such pseudo-Kantianism is essentially perverse. In that sense, Eichmann is not a 
pervert because of the 'Kant-with-Sade' prism that MacCannell takes, but because of his 
pseudo-Kantianism. 
If Kantian ethics were nothing but a Sadean scenario, the fascist atrocities would have 
been clearly assigned to a perverse context. Sadean heroes derive sexual jouissance from 
the dismemberment and the execution of their victims. It is difficult to see fascist 'heroes' 
ceding in a similar jouissance. German fascism's bureaucratic form may invoke Kantian 
ethics, but it is not compatible with Sadean apathy. Based on Arendt's parallelism of 
Eichmann's bureaucratism with Kant's disinterestedness, MacCannell adds the Sadean 
dimension, ignoring its sexual underpinning, which seems to further mystify the relation 
of fascism to perversion. 
MacCannell employs the term 'bureaucratic genocide' in order to denote the threat 
arising from an ethical system, where will is attributed to people, like in Fiffirer's case. 27 
This is an application of Kantian axioms which links perversion to a condition of 
decomposing effects for society and intensely embroils it with criminological issues and 
morality. I do not discard the possibility and the risk that arise, once the will behind 
ethical decisions is ascribed to individuals or a group of people. Rather my emphasis is 
laid in the risk of fixing perversion upon this particular form of ethics, as well as upon the 
potential calamitous consequences of its application. It is not only a moralising 
conservatism that benefits from disowning such ethics as perverse, but also, more 
unpromisingly, the field of ethics is sexualised. 
MacCannell argues that the genocidal programme never went on paper because of 
44 practical reasons. , 28 She hypothesises that if the programme had a written edition, the 
international community would have rallied against Nazism, much earlier than the 
Second World War. But did 'practical reasons' really influence the administration of the 
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extermination programme in the concentration camps? One must bear in mind that for the 
Nazi such a programme never became a symbolic reality; it was never a 'genocidal 
programme'. Although 'Final Solution' stands for massacre, the term was only included 
in the Nazi glossary in 1941-1942. Before this late period, Nazism favoured the term 
6resettlement' and it is not clear whether its use served as a plaster for the execution of 
Jews, at that point. 29 The general warfare is more likely to have amplified the perception 
of the Jew as the principal adversary who needed to be annihilated, like any other enemy 
on the battleground. So, it is difficult to see the Jewish 'genocide', as a plan 
accomplished by Nazis reduced to objects of the voice of the master, without their own 
personal interests involved. If they did not take action, they believed their own welfare 
was at stake, along with their Fatherland's integrity. 
More to the point, the initial Nazi programme configured the vassalage of the Jew, so 
that the inferiority of the latter compared to the primacy of the Aryan ideal is sanctioned. 
Even if the Holocaust did not take a written programmatic form, the principal anti- 
democratic, anti-Semitic and imperialistic programmatic principles of the Nazi party 
were known and written, as early as 1920.30 The international community took action 
only after 1939, in the final period of Nazism, when the party's principles became legal 
reality and formed a systematic policy which culminated in the cataclysm of the Second 
World War. Furthermore, when mass graves of executed Polish soldiers, among them 
Jews, were discovered, the massacre was deliberately attributed to Nazism, despite 
evidence inculpating Stalinism Definitely there were more Nazi officers, apart from 
Eichmann, of similar bureaucratic ethos, for whom the Rihrer's will counted the most. 
The ethics of "Kant with Sade" would effortlessly describe them. It is tempting to 
interpret a bureaucratic system with such a massive catastrophic impact, impossible to be 
inscribed in the symbolic, as a perverse application of the Kantian axiom. But inevitably 
such an interpretation entails Lacanian reductionism. 31 
If the Sadean fantasy is an imaginary repercussion of male domination, which 
contextualises fascism, this contests the feminist ethic that MacCannell sees as a 
promising field for contemporary ethical speculation. However, the main characteristic of 
the Sadean fantasy is the crossing of the borders of a monolithic and tyrannical law. 
Would not this be subversive of male sovereignty then? In our post-Oedipal era, as 
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MacCannell notes, it is a necessary task to scrutinise the function of perversion as a 
category in politics if not in clinical practice. 32 The logic of perversion, as it stands in 
clinical psychopathology, can be of little help in producing a comprehensive account of 
political phenomena of a significant historical impact. Instead of discarding the pervert, 
by using depreciative designations, it would be more prolific to explore the implications 
of the subject carrying the perverse epithet for a world of post-Oedipal ethics. 
Linking perversion to deviation from the patriarchal institution of social relations, which 
fascism never really defied, is a misleading simplification and a segregating act against 
the subject labelled as pervert. Traditional forms of patriarchy under no circumstances 
encompass and integrate the so-called pervert into their social fabric. As I argue in the 
last part, the pervert finds a way to compromise his desire of boundless jouissance with 
the limits of the law of the father. Rather than a direct confrontation with patriarchy, the 
pervert takes a mediating position, setting a compromise between the feminine and the 
masculine posture vis-d-vis jouissance. This is his/her answer to the question of sexual 
difference. Precisely because this forms a conventional and, at the same time, 
contumacious attitude, perversion has been conjoined in politics both with conservative 
authoritarianism and rebellious subversion. 
I convey my support for MacCarmell's view about the need to encourage a post- 
patriarchal ethic that goes through the compass of feminine ethics. Perversion may not 
open a feminine pathway to jouissance, but it is still an attempt to resolve the feminine 
enigma. The pervert proffers himself as the object that completes the woman, namely he 
becomes the imaginary phallus, as a presence that fills woman's lack. This can lead to 
useful insights regarding the debate on post-Oedipal ethics and, as I put forward later in 
the present study, the pervert, by taking the position of the object, breeds anxiety not only 
in the woman, but also in the male dominant socio-political edifice in general. 
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4.1.2 Fascism's Disavowal of the Real 
Among the most celebrated names in contemporary social theory, over the last two 
decades, has been that of Slavoj Ziz'ek, whose prolific and polychromatic body of work 
has proffered one of the most splendidly fabricated critiques and theories of ideology. 
Despite being regarded at times as a post-Marxist, Ziz'ek himself situates his rhetoric in a 
continuum with traditional Marxist thought. But it is not simple to resolve Zi2ek's 
relation to orthodox Marxism, considering the elusiveness of locating his stance within a 
particular political frame all the years of his international scholar presence. As Sean 
Homer notes, the ambiguity of Ziz'ek's orthodox Marxist position is accentuated by his 
scholastic and systematic employ of Lacan. 33 In Homer's words: 
For 2i2ek, it is the Lacanian notion of the Real that separates his project from both post- 
Marxism and classical Marxism. If post-Marxism asserts the absolute irreducibility and 
particularity of political struggles to any single determining instance - the inherent 
contradictions of the capital, for example - Lacanian psychoanalysis argues precisely the 
opposite. 34 
Without doubt, the cogent interlacing of Lacanian theorisation with Hegelianism 
manifests Ziz'ek's prowess in articulating a highly pertinent critique of ideology for our 
epoch, but whether this comes from a position of Marxist orthodoxy or a position of a 
Lacanian doctrinaire who monitors Marxist politics is an open question. 
Through this Lacanian prism, Ziz'ek sees subjectivity as fragmented and decentred, 
considering its subordinate status to the unsurpassable realm of the signifiers. The 
acquisition of a consummate identity dwells in impossibility, inasmuch as it is bound to 
desire, provoked by a lacuna which is impossible to fill up. Thus, for ZiZ'ek, socio- 
political relations evolve from states of lack, linguistic fluidity and contingency. What 
temporarily arrests this fluid state of the subject's slithering in the realm of the signifiers, 
giving rise to her self-identity, is what Lacan calls point de capiton. The term refers to 
certain fundamental 'anchoring' points in the signifying chain where the signifier is tied 
to the signified, providing an illusionary stability in signification. 35 In this context, 
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ideology is conceptualised as a terrain of firm meanings, determined and comprised by 
numerous points de capiton. 36 
The real is the central Lacanian concept that ZiZ'ek implements in rhetoric. He 
associates the real with antagonism (e. g. class conflict) as the unsymbolisable and 
irreducible gap that lies in the heart of the socio-symbolic order and around which society 
is formed. As Ziz'ek argues, "class struggle designates the very antagonism that prevents 
the objective (social) reality from constituting itself as a self-enclosed whole. , 37 This 
logic is indebted to Laclau and Mouffe who were the first to postulate that social 
antagonism is what impedes the closure of society, marking thus its impossibility. 38 2i2ek 
expanded this view and associated antagonism with the notion of the real. 
Functioning as a hegemonic fantasmatic veil, ideology covers the lacuna of the 
symbolic, in the form of a fantasy, so that it protracts desire and hence subjectivity. On 
the imaginary level, ideology functions as the 'mirror' that reflects antagonisms, that is to 
say, the real unrepresentable kernel that undermines the political. Around this emptiness 
of representation, the fictional narrative of ideology, its meaning, is to unfurl. The role of 
socio-ideological fantasy is to provide consistency to the symbolic order, by veiling its 
void, and to foster the illusion of a coherent social unity. 39 
Nevertheless, fantasy has both unifying and disjunctive features, as its role is to fill the 
void of the symbolic, but also to circumscribe this void. As Ziz'ek notes, "the notion of 
,, 40 fantasy offers an exemplary case of the dialectical coincidentia oppositorium . On the 
one side, it provides a "hallucinatory realisation of desire" and on the other side, it evokes 
disturbing images about the Other's jouissance to which the subject has no (symbolic or 
imaginary) access. In so reasoning, ideology promises unity and, at the same time, creates 
another fantasy, where the failure of acquiring the anticipated ideological unity is 
ascribed. 
Pertaining to Jacques Derrida's work Specters of Marx5 where the typical ontological 
conception of the living is seen to be incomplete and inseparable from the spectre, 
41 ' 
namely, a ghostly embodiment that haunts the living present, ZiZ'ek elaborates the 
spectral apparitions of the real in the politico-ideological domain. He makes a distinction 
between this 'spectre' and 'symbolic fiction', that is, reality per se. Both have a common 
fantasmatic hypostasis, yet they perform antithetical functions. Symbolic fiction 
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forecloses the real antagonism at the crux of reality, only to return as a spectre, as another 
fantasy. This dual fantasmatic process fuels racist acts, like anti-Semitism, insofar as it 
reveals a disavowal of real antagonism and a solidification of this disavowal by means of 
another fantasy, such as the fabrication of the "conceptual Jew. " The Nazi community 
embodies this fantasmatic structure, where the "conceptual Jew" suggests the disguised 
spectral form in which the real returns. 42 
Ideology runs through disavowal, as far as it seeks its actualisation by projecting 
inherent inconsistencies, namely, antagonistic relations, to an external embodiment (e. g. 
economic factors). This process succumbs to a perverse logic, inasmuch as it suggests a 
disavowal of real antagonism and thus an ideological disabling of symbolic split 
(castration): 
What we are thus arguing is not simply that ideology permeates also the alleged extra- 
ideological strata of everyday life, but that this materialization of ideology in the external 
materiality renders visible inherent antagonisms that the explicit formulation of ideology 
cannot afford to acknowledge. It is as if an ideological edifice, in order to function 
4normally', must obey a kind of imp of perversity, and articulate its inherent antagonism in 
43 the externality of its material existence. 
For ZiZ'ek, fascism appears to illustrate at best this perverse feature of ideology. He 
repeatedly alludes to fascism, Nazism and 'totalitarianism' in many works, yet this does 
not form a consistent, linear and progressive narrative. Nevertheless, these allusions 
suffice to give a perverse nuance to fascism. Ziz'ek often refers to the figure of the Jew as 
what plays a fetishistic role for the fascist and conceals the lack in the Other. 44 In his 
article "The Fetish of the Party, " where ZiZ'ek contemplates on the role of the political 
fetish in Stalinism, he juxtaposes the latter to Fascism. If for Stalinism the 'Party' is the 
fetish, for fascism it is the Jew; he embodies the exorbitant surplus, the real residue of 
fascist ideology that undermines its actualisation. 
[ 
... ] [In Fascism] the Jew functions as a 
fetish that masks class struggle and comes in its 
place. Fascism struggles against capitalism and liberalism, which are supposed to destroy 
and corrupt the harmony of the society as "all organic" where particular "states" have the 
function of "members, " that is to say, where "each and everyone has his natural and 
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determined place" (the "head" and the "hands"). Fascism thus tries to restore a harmonious 
relation between the classes in the framework of an organic all, and the Jew incarnates the 
moment that introduces a discord "from outside. " The Jew is the surplus that "disturbs" the 
harmonious cooperation of the "head" and the "hands, " of "capital" and "labor. 3 -A 5 
The fetishistic functioning of the Jew solidifies fascist ideology and reveals its perverse 
core. Fascism disavows the Jew, as the delegate of capitalist power and, at the same time, 
the grime of the social stratum, associated with the low classes. 46 Nazism, in particular, 
fabricated a perverse fantasy around the malevolent Jew, seen as the incarnation of the 
obscene Other who sets up conspiracies against the Aryan nation, while he indulges 
himself in impure unrepresentable enjoyment. 47 In order to maintain its utopianism, 
Nazism, unable to confront the real of antagonism, projected it to the presence of the Jew 
as the obscene Other. By attributing Germany's financial crisis to the figure of the 
exploiter Jew, the Nazi managed to hide the inconsistencies of his ideology. Put in terins 
of disavowal, the Nazi knew very well that the Jew was not the source of evil, but at the 
same time he continued to believe that he was indeed the sardonic personification of 
malice for the Gen-nan nation's wealth. Although the Nazi was aware of this manipulative 
strategy and the inveigled opposition to the Jew, at the same time he really believed the 
Jew was the source of his misfortune and therefore his principal adversary. 48 
Since its introduction by Freud in his paper on "Fetishism, " the standard psychoanalytic 
conception of disavowal suggests the failure to recognise sexual difference that marks 
perversion. 49 What is disavowed is the perception of the mother's lack of penis as the 
primary differentiating factor between the sexes. The perception of the absence of penis in 
the mother contradicts the belief that she actually has one, which means her lack and thus 
her desire are not acknowledged. The pervert stands against subordination to the symbolic 
law, the phallic function, which requires the acceptance of castration. 
Ziz'ek has also demonstrated how contemporary liberalism disposes the conditions for 
the emanation of new 'totalitarian' forms that do not derive their power from their dour 
opposition to the permissive cornucopia of late capitalist societies. 50 Present 
fundamentalist acts do not weave any austere prohibitions that could 'save' the subject 
from the exorbitant freedom and sybaritism of contemporary social relations. It may be 
that the 'totalitarian' master's commands request self-sacrifice and dismissal of pleasure 
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in the name of a greater cause, yet his power resides more in a concealed decree to 
partake in an act of unimpeded transgression. 
The 'totalitarian' master asks people to relinquish pleasure and to sacrifice themselves 
for a higher value, in favour of a dark God, as Lacan notes. 
51 In this regard, the master 
defers (moral) punishment and urges the community towards an "unconstrained 
,, 52 transgression. The subject of the community is allowed to transgress common moral 
prohibitions, without any punitive upshots overhanging. Thus, someone can even perfon-n 
homicide, as long as this act complies with the axioms of the 'totalitarian' master. 
This condition fosters fascist 'totalitarian' formations; but it differs from compulsive 
obedience that provides libidinal satisfaction to the authoritarian individual, as typical 
Freudo-Marxism would suggest. For Ziz'ek, this obedient attitude follows more the logic 
of 'repressive desublimation'. 53 As we saw earlier, the Frankfurt School introduced the 
term, referring to an essential 'totalitarian' deployment. The implicit decree of the 
'totalitarian' master ordains: 'You may! '. By obeying it, one can enjoy all the things s/he 
had to abandon in his/her subservience to the law. Not very different from the superegoic 
command: 'Enjoy! ', ZiZ'ek discerns the perverse circuit that repressive desublimation sets 
54 
up, as the superego dictates precisely what it meant to prohibit and punish . 
In a 'totalitarian' system, an ethnic over-identification suffices to abolish the validity of 
liberal society's morals. This reveals, according to Ziz'ek, the shallow differentiation 
between duty and pleasure. 55 Despite the hedonism and permissiveness that perforate 
present social relations, the subject is not free. Restrictions and regulations still 
systematise her social behaviour and permissiveness itself functions as a concealed type 
of confinement for the subject. 'Permissive' societies decree pleasure as a duty, whereas 
in 'totalitarianism' duty becomes the valve of the subject's pleasure. 56 
In this regard, ideology works in a (false) transgressive manner, inasmuch as it brings 
members of a community together through identification with a transgressive type of 
enjoyment. Transgression in psychoanalysis has been regarded as the typical strategy for 
extracting jouissance in perversion. 57 In that context, the crystallisation of Nazism as a 
coherent ideological formation lies on the articulation of a decree that requests collective 
identification on the basis of some shared guilt, followed by its fetishistic disavowal. The 
first axis that brings Nazi community together is a fantasy of solidarity, "the same 
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solidarity-in-guilt adduced by the participation in a common transgression. , 58 The second 
axis of the Nazi fantasy is sketched by the transgressive practices that its members are 
entitled to. The torture and elimination of the Jew is part of this Nazi 'false 
transgression'. 
Consequently, all transformations brought by the Nazi 'revolution' were nothing but 
pseudo-changes. The underlying fantasy of Nazism remained intact, holding a safe 
distance from the real . 
59Nazism did not come anywhere near the real kernel of its 
identity in its performance as a reformative political movement. Ziz'ek explains this by 
discerning the role of negativity in ideology, applying a fundamental dialectical idea to 
his rhetoric: Hegel's notion of 'inner negativity', according to which "an entity is 
negated, passes over into it opposite, as a result of the development of its own 
potential .,, 
60 Fascism fails to efficiently negate liberal capitalism's very negation: the 
antagonisms that reside in the latter. Rooted in these antagonisms, fascism is not the 
external antithesis to liberalism, but precisely its intrinsic negation. Fascism is the 
"inherent self-negation of capitalism. ,, 61 
As an internal force operating in capitalism, fascist negation is the outcome of 
capitalism's attempt to regulate any disjunctive element that appears in its ideological 
territory and threatens its power. In periods of crisis, capitalism remains intact, by 
producing fascism as its self-negation. The negation of antagonism is reflected in the role 
of disavowal; the later manifests the negativity of the perverse structure and appears to be 
the main mechanism in the ideological veiling of the real. 
Through disavowal, the fantasmatic layer that sustains fascist mastery promises to 
eradicate the opposition between the bourgeois capitalist and the 'enslaved' proletariat, by 
providing a guarding master, with a strong unifying will. However, always something 
disturbs its vision: 
There is always a surplus of the "invisible hand" that contradicts the design of the Master. 
The only way of recognizing this surplus is (for the fascist whose "epistemic" field is that 
of the Master) to again "personalize" the "invisible hand" and imagine another Master, a 
hidden master who in reality pulls all the strings and whose clandestine activity is the true 
secret behind this anonymous "invisible hand" of the market, i. e., the Jew. 62 
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Despite its explanatory aptitude, the reading of the capitalist Jew as the "Invisible hand" 
of the hidden master is inconsistent with his fetishisation, as described in the previous 
paragraphs. As another master who undermines the ideal vision of the fascist master, the 
Jew cannot be conceptualised as occupying both the position of the fetish, that is, the 
object a, and the position of the one who usurps the object, that is the master. If the Jew 
represents a master that contravenes and conspires against the fascist project, what we 
have is a discourse where the fascist master tries to conceal his lack/castration by 
imagining another competitive master, another authority that limits his access to 
jouissance. Rather than a perverse process, this contours more an 'ordinary neurotic' 
response to difference (unless the master places himself in the position of the object, as 
the Sadean pervert does). 
The general use of disavowal as the a priori ideogram of perversion may constitute an 
incandescent illustration of the fascist phenomenon, but it ultimately mystifies the latter. 
ZiZvek needs to clarify and demarcate the perverse function of fascism from the perversity 
of all other ideologies. If 'false transgression' and 'fetishistic disavowal' do not 
characterise the formation of a fascist community solely, then every community is 
formed in a proto-fascist manner or fascism is as perverse as any other ideology. From 
this perspective, fascism is not merely a fraction of past 'totalitarianism', but a perpetual 
current and one must expect its occurrence at some point again. Although I agree with 
this view, what needs to become clear is whether fascism will never disappear, because of 
the perverse features of ideology or subjectivity in general. 
Can we distinguish ideologies, based on the fetishisation of different embodiments of 
the same unknown factor, namely, the object a? When ZiZ'ek draws a difference between 
fascist ideology and Stalinism, he applies a certain topological logic, by tracing the 
disturbing kernel (antagonism) in different apparitions. If for fascism, the Jew is the 
embodiment of the real, for Stalinism that would be the Party itself. 63 However, there are 
many ideological divergences between different versions of fascism; it would be difficult 
to attribute them simply to different apparitions of the object or reduce them to anti- 
Semitism as the common thread that links fascist groups, originating in disavowal. 
Is disavowal the only way to take cognition of the party, the Jew, the immigrant and so 
on? If all these embody the surplus element that marks the lack of the symbolic, this 
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excess is always fetishistic, always perverse. Considering that the 'sublime object of 
ideology' is responsible for perverse jouissance through false transgression, as it is the 
case with fascism, this may as well mean that perversion and ideology are tautological 
notions. As far as the understanding of fascism is concerned, this seems to have a great 
explanatory power, yet Ziz'ek needs also to demonstrate how this knowledge contributes 
to the understanding of the notion of perversion and what its implications are. 
As far as disavowal is a negative force in psychoanalysis, this negativity associated with 
ideology also percolates the notion of perversion. It is not only this negative relation to 
the real which is essential in politics, but also the positive elements of the identity that 
emerges from imaginary processes of identification. The latter may involve repression, 
negation or disavowal of the real; they are all constructive processes of building a certain 
identity, which are not fundamentally negative. My critique of Ziz'ek's view of ideology 
does not reject the lack, the emptiness that he recognises in the crux of social and 
political relations, but the prioritisation of disavowal as the organising factor of ideology 
and indicative of a negative perverse operation. 
An argument that resides in disavowal cannot really capture the diverse relations of 
power and domination that operate in the field of politics and the array of identities that 
mediate social relations. Social identities depend on identification with various master 
signifiers and images. Thus, if these identities rely on imaginary processes, through which 
they acquire their positive (fantasmatic) content , ZiZek's emphasis on the real neglects the 
formative role of the imaginary for political praxis. The centrality of the notion of the real 
that substantiates Zizvek's resourceful theorisation is also what attenuates its implications 
for political action. The real is a negative force, inasmuch as it thwarts any attempt to cover 
it. In this vein, it is impossible for ZiZ'ek's political proposal to acquire "any positive 
content and thus reduces the political act to one of dissidence and opposition, " as Homer 
notes. 64 
The problem is that ZiZvek inventively informs us, about the impossibility and the 
negativity, namely, the real, around which social relations become possible, yet his 
enlightening theoretical suggestions never quite make it in the political arena as a guiding 
scheme for action. Homer draws upon this limitation of Zi2ek's theorisation, which may 
form an influential and adroit critique of ideology, but when it comes to the question of 
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political agency, his Lacanian rhetoric stumbles upon the lack of any contemplation of the 
political synecdoches of his work or any schematic groundwork for social and political 
praxis. 65 Moreover, considering that the real cannot be historicized, ZiZ'ek leaves 
unresolved the inability for psychoanalysis to historicize socio-political phenomena and 
thus form a more pragmatic basis for political action. In addition to these limitations of the 
notion of the real in Zizvek's work, Roberts and Joseph point out its inadequacy in 
explaining the structuring of capitalism. 66 Despite its ontological status, the real fails to 
bridge the fissure between human reality as determined by biology and socio-cultural 
reality. Thus, the notion of the real enables us to contemplate the structuring of "our 
relation to capitalism, " rather than the structuring of capitalism in itself. 67 
Furthermore, Stavrakakis points to another inconsistency present in ZiZvek's work, as far 
v 
as the distinction between deconstructionist and Lacanian positions are concerned. 68 
According to Ziz'ek, the deconstructionist conceptualisation of lack and finitude posits the 
latter as "the limit of ethico-political action" and any attempt to defy lack is 
pessimistically associated with evil. However, Ziz'ek counter-argues that evil resides in 
,, 69 the a priori acceptance of finitude without considering the aspect of "divine miracles. 
Stavrakakis is critical of Zizvek's connection of the notion of lack to deconstruction, while 
emphasising the Lacanian basis of its logic. In The Sublime Object of Ideology5 Ziz'ek 
underpins the lacking status of the Other in Lacanian theory, yet in later texts he 
associates lack with deconstruction. 70 Stavrakakis interprets this shift as an attempt to 
insert certain optimism in his implementation of Lacanian theory for endorsing of radical 
politics. 
Yet this 'purification' from negativity is not sufficient for solidifying ZiZwek's theoretico- 
political suggestions. The question of whether the resolution of postmodern pessimism 
goes through "the utopian disavowal of lack and negativity in political discourse" is 
raised .71 This suggests a problem in terms of 
differentiating 'false transgression' that 
results in the reproduction of the law from a 'real act' that successfully re-articulates the 
socio-symbolic order. 
Following Zizwek, ideology provides the fantasmatic means to an unconscious and 
instantaneous access to jouissance; it is an instrument of excavating jouissance in the 
symbolic. Thus, was it a perverse fantasy and disavowal that made the fascist cross the line 
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and commit his atrocities? It is difficult to contemplate ideology and fascist barbarity 
without taking into account another factor, central to socio-political research: power and its 
relation to mastery. Power, as the pillar of the political, may play a decisive role in 
transforming ideology to a system of domination and sustaining it. This field has never 
been a focal point in ZiZ'ek's critique of ideology (perhaps because it operates more in a 
symbolic-imaginary frame than a real one, as I will be arguing in the next part). 
A political programme that needs to be developed as an antithesis to dominative power 
mechanisms requires a plan that clearly sketches power dynamics and their link to 
ideology. Ziz'ek takes power as a prerequisite for defining ideological space. 72 However, it 
seems to me that the symbolic space of ideology is pre-fabricated and power is what turns 
it into a proper fantasy of domination, as soon as this narrative is taken under the canopy of 
undisputable certainty. Therefore, ideology is not the legitimising factor of domination, but 
power sanctions a pre-existing ideology turning it to domination. With regard to the 
disavowal of the Jew, the main perverse aspect of the fascist ideology, the belief that the 
Jew was indeed the source of malevolence for Germany, contradicting the knowledge that 
he was not, operated in the fascist discourse before it became a dominant system. It was an 
ideological belief long before the Nazi party came to power. 
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Part 1: Conclusion 
The first part of this study explored the chronological unfolding of a narrativised theme: 
the relation between fascism and perverse types of sexuality. Theoretical works from social 
theory, psychoanalysis and political philosophy, elaborating issues on ideology, Nazism, 
fascism and totalitarianism, constituted the core of my endeavour to illustrate the habitual 
allusion to the problematic perverse glossary in their exegeses, traced from the early 1940s 
up to today. 
For leftist views, perversion is something inherent to the logic of capitalist commodity. 
Taken by the Frankfurt School, this view frames fascism as a self-destructive perversion of 
rationalism in Western society. Due to repression or suppression of the natural instinct, 
perverse sexuality is materialised in authoritarian irrational non-sexual practices. This is 
best exemplified by the Nazi tortures. As part of the Freudian leftist view, Reich's 
narrative is close to the thought of the Frankfurt School. According to his narrative, 
fascism is grounded in the perverse expression of malformed biological instincts, which 
were previously subjected to capitalist repression. 
But if the Freudian left saw in psychoanalysis a revolutionary thrust congruent with 
Marx's ideal, one cannot say the same about the orthodox Freudian interpretation of the 
fascist phenomenon. Conservative in its basis, Jones's narrative perceives fascism as a 
response to the rapid technological, scientific and social transformations of the Western 
world. The latter opens a way to perverse regressions that destabilise the Oedipal basis of 
society. More recently, Chasseuget-Smirgel seems to agree with this view. She interprets 
Nazism as an example of the Sadean obliteration of the paternal law of society, whereas for 
Theweleit it is more the maternal imago at the epicentre of this obliteration. The fascists' 
male dominant vision is a response to the odium of the maternal body with which they are 
perversely fused. 
Finally, the Lacanians abandoned pre-Oedipal-centred arguments by incorporating in 
their contemplation the role of factors such as the real and jouissance. MacCannell 
proposes a perverse relation of fascism to jouissance with a catastrophic impact on 
traditional ethics of the good, whereas Zizvek sees perverse elements percolating various 
aspects of ideology and 'totalitarianism', fascism and Nazism. 
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My intention, through this critical overview, was to clarify the multitude of theoretical 
configurations that operates in narratives that, either conspicuously or between the lines, 
associate fascism with the category of perversion. To that purpose, I tried to put across the 
inherent inconsistencies of each text, so that the thorny ramification of their arguments 
becomes lucid and set a discussion on the need to proceed to a novel scrutiny of the 
discursive conundrum that the casual approach of fascism through a perverse prism 
constitutes. What came forth was that, since fascist ideology was materialised as a 
historical phenomenon, a growing number of discourses entreated various theoretical ideas 
in order to provide an adequate explanation of this historical contingence. 
From the early accounts of the exponents of the Frankfurt School and the psychoanalytic 
school to the works of contemporary thinkers in social theory, fascism was dissected in its 
diverse constituents. Still no representative account of fascist ideology has been produced, 
yet a common sediment that remains after different types of theoretical distillation of the 
phenomenon is a link to perverse features. An underlying sadomasochistic structure, a 
sadistic subversion of the paternal law or the obliteration of the feminine body, a variation 
of Sadean morality, an ideological product of perverse disavowal are some of the ideas 
blended in the melting pot of fascism. 
Having questioned each of these ideas, the following part of my elaboration will cast a 
shadow over this extensive 'perversification' of fascism that goes through psychoanalysis. 
This enables me to revise suggestions articulated from within the field of psychoanalysis 
and proceed to a novel theorisation of perversion. 
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PART 11 
Discourse 
Introduction: 
The Domination of the Fascist and the Sadean Master' 
2 Lacanian concepts have been widely used within the field of ideology critique. Yet, a 
basic problem with the implementation of psychoanalytic concepts for this purpose is that 
they can become, in themselves, a certain ideological narrative rather than offering the 
means for dissecting ideology. A Lacanian critique of ideology has to evolve from an 
extra-ideological position. In this regard, the analysis of the connection between fascism 
and perversion should elucidate an ideological phenomenon from a psychoanalytic 
perspective, without using the psychoanalytic theory on perversion as a way to defend 
and re-integrate views coming from either rightist or leftist perspectives. It may be that 
ZiZ'ek ingeniously rearticulates Marxist-Leninist critique via a Lacanian-Hegelian prism, 
but is his rhetoric extra-ideological, when, alongside original psychoanalytic suggestions, 
ZiZ'ek's work also sets a theoretical basis for a new radical left? 3 If the Lacanian corpus 
serves as the plinth of a Marxist resistance to capitalism, does this lead to an 
advancement of Lacanian theory or to a self-serving application of it? Before 
psychoanalytic insights on perversion are applied to specific ideological conditions, such 
as fascism, we have to answer the question of who benefits from this intersection. Is it 
psychoanalysis or ideological indoctrination? 
The point of demarcation of the present analysis is the disengagement of psychoanalysis 
from a discursive contextualisation that follows a specific ideological orientation. It is not 
a critique of fascism. There is no vantage point in the present elaboration that allows a 
more sophisticated account of the phenomenon. It is more a critique of the 
implementation of psychoanalytic concepts as an unsurpassable bastion for such 
accounts. In other words, the aim here is not the articulation of a psychoanalytic 
explanation of the fascist phenomenon. The focus is more on the statements enunciated 
by narratives which inject perverse sexuality to fascism. These statements are analysed 
on the level of discourse, what organises the subject's reality. 
In the present part, the notion of discourse that I implement coincides with its Lacanian 
conception that does not negate a reality outside discourse; rather it underpins the 
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inaccessibility of this reality, as it belongs to the level of the real. This is the discourse of 
the unconscious that only psychoanalysis can elucidate, as an intellectual tool that goes 
beyond discursive limits. If we move beyond discourse, where no ideology operates, 
psychoanalysis can bestow us with a capacious view of the factors that ground the 
association of fascism with the category of perversion. Such a linkage is inadequate in 
explicating the fascist phenomenon, as far as its ideological parameters and its barbaric 
practices are concerned. 
There is a common denominator behind fascist ideology and its historical atrocities that 
has to be re-examined; this is the transcendence of a certain limit, an excess that cannot 
be captured by existing narratives. But what is this excess and what is its status? To 
interpret it as a deviation from the norm seems to favour the use of negative terms 
(perversion is one of them), regardless of whether one alludes to sexuality or socio- 
political issues. In the space of the present writing, I discuss the limits that the pervert and 
the fascist appear to surpass, challenging the idea of deviation. In this vein, the 
contradiction and the impasse of identifying the fascist with the pervert is exposed, as a 
critique of the narratives that draw this association. Behind contradiction, the 
troublesome character of the Lacanian real, the unsymbolisable kernel of our subjectivity, 
as ZiZ'ek characteristically says, is brought forth in an attempt to increase awareness of 
the numerous ways the real intervenes in the individual and collective life of the subject. 4 
The real that lies under symbolic reality obstructs a singular account of historical 
phenomena, revealing the impossible and the risks of capturing and fully positivising it. 
This analytic effort underscores a central argument: rigid use and common references to 
psychoanalytic ideas, which have not yet reached a certain consensus and remain highly 
contentious and intricate, as is the case for the theory on perversion, tend to bewilder 
instead of explicate socio-political phenomena. Arguments woven within the 
psychoanalytic discourse fail to capture the picture of fascism, inasmuch as they rest on 
the ambiguity which surrounds the explanations of perversion. Psychoanalysis, despite its 
highly systematic and explanatory insights regarding neurosis and psychosis, has not 
been so far effective in fon-nulating an unequivocal account of perversion. Moral 
implications, the lack of a standard clinical picture and the ubiquitous presence of so- 
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called perverse traits in non-perverse psychic structures explain partially the complexity 
that surrounds the notion of perversion. 
It is hard not to wonder if 'perverse', as a designation in clinical, political, cultural or 
even psychoanalytic discourse, serves as a substitute for the Lacanian notion of the real: 
the space of impossible truth. The tern 'perverse' appears as a signifier for any parasitic 
condition that escapes firm symbolic meaning. But considering that the quintessence of 
subjectivity, namely desire, is founded in a lack ungraspable by signification, then 
4perverse' designates the status of all desiring subjects. In fact, one of the shrewdest 
psychoanalytic observations is that desire emanates from infantile 'perverse' sexuality. 
Judith Feher-Gurewich notes the adjacency between desire and perversion: 
In Lacan's view, perversion is akin to desire per se. For him, as for Freud, human desire 
itself is perverse, insofar as it defies the laws of adaptation and survival found in the 
animal world. ' 
With regard to a common analytic conception, the category of perversion bears on the 
excessive element of sexuality which escapes the phallic function and cannot be 
incorporated into symbolic reality. To that effect, perversion is considered transgressive 
of coded sexual behaviours that serve normative or reproductive purposes. 
Had not the Oedipal organisation of desire gained a certain privileged status in modem 
society, that is the sovereignty of the phallic constitution of desire, excess might have 
come under a different label. Psychoanalysis shares the responsibility for this, together 
with the major institutions of society. Consequently, any act that deviates from this 
Oedipal organising pattern receives the perverse designation, just to mark the supremacy 
of the organisation and a denouncement of any element which is not part of it; any 
element that fails to undergo repression. One problem with this definition of perversion, 
following a strict Oedipal logic, is that so-called perverse scenarios operate in the 
fantasies and the language of all subjects. Even if the subject does not act them out, that 
is to say, she does not perform these scenarios within a symbolic space, the 
phantasmagoria of perverse sexual acts fuels desire and dramatises an excessive, yet 
pleasurable enjoyment, in so long as it remains in fantasy. 
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' Parts from the following chapters can also be found in Antonios Vadolas, "The Perverse Domination of 
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5. Power and Mastery through the Lacanian Prism 
5.1 The Conflux of Lacanian Psychoanalysis and Discourse Analysis 
So far in the present study, my allusions to the notion of discourse were related to the 
theoretical framework that shaped the production of each narrative included in my 
critique. For the remaining parts, my analysis revolves around the logic of discourse as 
conceived by Lacan and its paradigmatic application into socio-political analysis by 
researchers such as Stavrakakis and Laclau (especially in his late work). The latter's 
reading of hegemony set the basis for the implementation of Lacanian theory in discourse 
analysis. 
In Hegemony and Socialist Strategy, Laclau and Mouffe developed a discourse theory 
that expands the frame of discourse analysis, so that it embraces all social practices and 
elucidates the formation of social systems and subjective identities. 1 This initiated an 
unbroken effort to apply discourse analysis to the field of social research in a highly 
comprehensive and systematic way, integrating components from Marxism, post- 
structuralism and psychoanalysis and revising previous suggestions. Specifically, Laclau 
and Mouffe abandoned the dichotomy between the discursive and the non-discursive, 
while criticising Foucault for retaining it, in spite of its inconsistency. Such a dichotomy 
is insubstantial or else it is possible only as the product of articulation within a discursive 
frame. This is because "every object is constituted as an object of discourse, insofar as no 
object is given outside every discursive condition of emergence. ,2 Discourse is a 
"differential and structured system of positions, " that is, it involves the articulation of 
meanings comprised by linguistic and non-linguistic elements. 3 Language is entrenched 
in practices and materiality, so it is not possible to separate them, but only to perceive 
them as strongly interlaced. Moreover, there is strong homology between discursivity and 
the incomplete character of social systems. All systems of meaningful practice rely upon 
discursive exteriors that partially constitute such orders, while potentially subverting 
them. 4 
Meanings have a relational character, bound to the ellipsis of a stable centre and the 
impossibility of obtaining a society perceived "as a sutured and self-defined totality. ,5 if 
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the latter was possible, identities would achieve fixity, belonging to a single discursive 
frame, and conflict would concern different elements of the same discourse. 6 In this 
regard, social meanings attributed to any objects and practices are subject to context and 
contingency. The discontinuity imposed by the lack of any fixity of meaning founds the 
political terrain, enabling a permanent renegotiation and re-creation of social meanings. 7 
The field of politics acquires a possible and necessary character through the ongoing 
challenging of the hegemonic status of meanings that relatively prevailed in preceding 
political schemata. Meanings are re-articulated in novel signifying sequences, as part of a 
dialectics and rhetoric that defends their validity and extends their social acceptance. 8 For 
Laclau and Mouffe, a radical democratic ideal emerges from the persistent "politicization 
and re-politicization of the social, as well as the institution of more egalitarian and 
progressive identities and relations. "9 
Already in their early elaboration of discourse, Laclau and Mouffe have recourse to 
Lacanian theory: they conceptualise discursivity as being dominated by nodal points that 
coincide with Lacan's points de capiton, that is, the signifiers, the words that form a knot 
of relatively definite meanings in discourse and establish identity: 
The impossibility of an ultimate fixity of meaning implies that there have to be partial 
fixations - otherwise, the very flow of differences would be impossible. Even in order to 
differ, to subvert meaning, there has to be a meaning. If the social does not manage to fix 
itself in the intelligible and instituted forms of a society, the social only exists, however, 
as an effort to construct that impossible object. Any discourse is constituted as an attempt 
to dominate the field of discursivity, to arrest the flow of differences, to construct a 
centre. We will call the privileged discursive points of this partial fixation, nodal points. 
(Lacan has insisted on these partial fixations through his concept of points de capiton, 
that is, of privileged signifiers that fix the meaning of the signifying chain. This limitation 
of the productivity of the signifying chain establishes the positions that make predication 
possible -a discourse incapable of generating any fixity of meaning is the 
discourse of 
the psychotic). 10 
Laclau and Mouffe were the first to accentuate the theoretical valence of the point de 
capiton (the 'quilting' point) that Ziz'ek expanded later in his work. 
" As signifiers float 
within a certain discursive context, losing their traditional meaning, a master signifier 
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intercedes providing a certain point of fixation that redefines the identity of signifiers 
within the signifying chain. 
Laclau's gradual congruence with the Lacanian cogito is amply indebted to his 
constructive dialogues with Slavoj Ziz'ek. After Ziz'ek's critique of the view of 
antagonism as originating in incompatible subject positions, Laclau reformulated the 
discourse theory initially developed in Hegemony. The early conception of antagonistic 
relations, according to ZiZ'ek's critique, entails the expectation of their ultimate 
transcendence following a final emancipatory goal, such as the deposing of the 
4capitalist' by the 'Proletarian': 
Where here is the ideological illusion proper to the subject-position? It lies precisely in 
the fact that it is the 'capitalist', this external enemy, who is preventing me from 
achieving an identity with myself: the illusion is that after the eventual annihilation of the 
antagonistic enemy, I will finally abolish the antagonism and arrive at an identity with 
myself. 12 
Laclau and Mouffe's argument fails to discern that what is negated in social antagonism 
is always-already negated; what social antagonism negates is not the fullness of 
subjectivity, but the division of the subject that generates her efforts and expectations to 
obtain a complete identity through identificatory acts. 13 Therefore, Laclau and Mouffe's 
discourse theory succumbs to the ideological illusion of completing identity through the 
enemy's defeat. Yet the rival other stands for nothing else than the "externalization" of 
the subject's insurmountable division ("auto-negativity"). 14 
Stavrakakis delineates the shifts in Laclau's theorisation, underscoring its significance 
for bringing Lacanian psychoanalysis to discourse theory. 15 The first major change marks 
a departure from the conception of subjectivity as different subject-positions, in 
Hegemony, to the conception of the subject as lack, in New Reflections. 16 This follows 
from the acceptance of the constitutive division that characterises subjectivity and its 
implications for the theory of identity. It is because of this fundamental and inerasable 
lack of identity that the subject experiences the need to identify with something. Such a 
theorisation of identity as a process of identifications opens the possibility of reflecting 
on the bond between the subjective and the objective domain. 17 As Stavrakakis notes, the 
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lacking status of the subject that constitutes her as such comes to occupy the space of 
where her essence was previously situated. The strength of Lacanian psychoanalysis lies 
in the fact that it is not inscribed in an essentialist frame that reduces the social to the 
individual level; this is what makes possible the convergence of psychoanalysis and 
socio-political analysis, considering that only part of the subject's lack can be 
ephemerally "filled with socio-political objects of identification. " 18 The focus of 
psychoanalysis is not only the void that marks the lacking status of the subject, but also 
what covers this void and accounts for its endless reproduction. In Stavrakakis' words: 
Lacanian theory is equally concerned with the objective level, the level of the ob ect of j 
identification per se (Lacanian categories such as the Real, the Symbolic and the 
Imaginary encompass the whole of human experience and not only the so-called 
"subjective" level, and, of course, concepts such as fantasy, the Other and object petit a 
display thoroughly "objective" logics without leading, however, to any kind of 
objectivism). 19 
In line with this view, my analysis focuses on subjective lack and 'objective' relations 
involved in mastering lack, always in relation to the question of fascism's pertinence to 
the category of perversion. For Lacan, the subject is a social subject from the moment of 
her constitution, when she emerges in the field of the Other. By dissecting the ways 
discourse affects the subject and its catalytic role in the formation of inter- subjective ties, 
as it enables desire to circulate, Lacanian psychoanalysis and discourse theory coincide. 
Yet, this does not mean that the irreconcilable relation of psychoanalysis to discourse 
theory is dissolved, as Homer notes; in his view, the conflux of the two fields is nothing 
more than "a mere displacement. " 20 
Whether Lacanian psychoanalysis and discourse theory can ideally converge is an 
ongoing debate and even if the issue remains unresolved, there are fruitful discussions 
emerging from it. It may be that Laclau first opened this new dimension of Lacanian 
psychoanalysis in his discourse analysis, yet through the critical suggestions of names 
such as Z'iz'ek, Homer and Stavrakakis, psychoanalytic ideas in social research have 
evolved. Rather than a reflexive application of Lacanian theory, my analysis 
encompasses these critical views, aware of the new possibilities and the limitations of 
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applying psychoanalysis into the field of socio-political research. in spite of the common 
ground with Laclau, my implementation of the Lacanian discourse also marks a 
discrepancy with his approach, especially at its early stage in Hegemony. In this vein, I 
recognise the importance of the notion of the point de capiton (or the master signifier), 
yet my priority is set on the analytical thrust of notions such as the object a, the phallus 
and the quintessential Lacanian notion of jouissance, which do not form the basic 
glossary for Laclau. For example, Glynos and Stavrakakis argued that Laclau's work 
does not engage with the category of jouissance, while Ziz'ek has demonstrated its 
essential role in ideology and politics, discussing phenomena of fundamentalism and 
racism or the Nazi fantasy. 21 
Likewise, in exploring the link between fascism and perversion, my emphasis is laid on 
the concept of jouissance and desire (the real and the symbolic). This means that the 
question of the real is there, like in Laclau, but it is linked to the enjoyment lost forever, 
as the main differentiating factor between subjective positions. The perverse position and 
the fascist position are two nominal divisions that suggest a different type of enjoyment 
from the ordinary 'normal' subject. Of course, jouissance itself cannot be divided; 
precisely because it escapes any attempt for a comprehensive symbolic classification and 
representation. Yetjouissance divides our symbolic categories and this is manifest also in 
psychoanalysis, since it is our access to real jouissance that determines our position as a 
neurotic, pervert or psychotic. One can privilege imaginary, symbolic or real means in the 
acquisition ofjouissance, reflecting his/her structure. 
Based on these 'divisions of enjoyment', I develop my critique, asking whether the 
fascist follows the pervert's pathway to the gaining ofjouissance. If discourse regulates 
jouissance, it is a valuable tool for analysing socio-political concepts such as ideology 
and power in relation to the clinical designation of perversion. Glynos and Stavrakakis 
note: 
Given that our own jouissance is structured around how we think the Other takes its 
jouissance, and given that jouissance sustains our public official discourse, we 
immediately see the significance of categories. From this perspective, it is possible to 
articulate political theory with praxis by linking the critique of ideological discourse with 
12 
an etbico-political shift that parallels the Lacanian 'crossing of the social fantasy'. 
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My perspective coincides with Glynos and Stavrakakis's application of Lacanian theory 
into socio-political analysis, emphasising the implications of the symbolic and the real 
register, that is, the level of the signifier and the level ofjouissance, respectively. Rather 
than a drastic dissymmetry, however, Laclau aligns himself with Glynos and Stavrakakis' 
approach, despite their criticism. 23 He reiterates the main points of his theory of 
hegemony that accentuate the impossibility of any complete symbolic identification or of 
an object that could fill the constitutive lack of the subject. There is no definite 
hegemonic link between "the signifier of fullness and the various objects incarnating it, " 
because of the incommensurability of the anticipated jouissance and the one which is 
24 achieved . 
Laclau underlines the parallel flowing of his ideas to those of Glynos and Stavrakakis, 
noting that his understanding of discourse is not that of "something restricted to the 
linguistic conceived in its narrow sense, but a relational complex of which enjoyment is a 
constitutive element. , 25 Within this discursive frame that I contoured here with regard to 
its inventive and fluid character, its restrictions and contradictions, I develop my own 
psychoanalytic suggestions in the field of socio-political analysis. 
5.2 The Discursive Framework of Power 
This chapter's discussion commences with an exploration of the notion of power and its 
implications for defining the fascist and the perverse position in discourse. Is it a shared 
position the two terms occupy? If so, to what extent power relations that obviously 
characterise fascism as an ideology, resonate perverse relations? What is at stake is the role 
of perversion, as an operative category, in the understanding of socio-political conditions, 
as well as in the deciphering of the enigma of subjectivity. The concept of power may be 
the crux of political science, yet by no means is conspicuous or given that does not need to 
be equivocally defined. Therefore, a clarification of the notion of power is indispensable. 
Nevertheless, a recollection of the political, philosophical and sociological accounts of 
the notion, over the years, would require a separate research effort. In the space of the 
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present analysis, a number of theoretical remarks about power aim to provide an overview 
of its basic conceptualisations, demonstrating that power is neither self-evident nor a sheer 
object of empirical investigation. From a commonsensical perspective, the reins of power 
are formally held by official state institutions and authority figures. But a reference to 
sorneone9s power always involves his/her relation with another term. This indicates that 
power is inscribed within the discursive field of intersubjective communication, something 
that reflects its relational hypostasis. A communicative act entails an underlying power 
relation. For this reason, I focus on Michel Foucault's theorisation about discourse and 
power, before developing a Lacanian conceptualisation of the two interrelated notions. 
Early attempts to define the term are found in Aristotle's Politics and centuries later in 
the work of Machiavelli, Hobbes and Locke. 26 With the decline of the great empires, in 
the late I 9th and early 20th century, and the emergence of modem national states, the 
notion of power obtained a restored interest for theorists. The germinal sociological 
domain of the time forwarded a conception of power as someone's ability to inflict 
his/her will on others, in spite of any form of resistance. 
According to Weber, "Power (Macht) is the probability that one actor within a social 
relationship will be in a position to carry out his own will despite resistance, regardless of 
the basis on which this probability rests. , 27 In this regard, one exercises power by 
manoeuvring controlling stipulations that may involve coercion or various threats 
towards others who are therefore forced to succumb to his will, despite their own 
opposing interests. Weber also drew a distinction between Macht (power) and Herrschaft 
28 (domination, authority). Domination entails a minimum of compliance and voluntarism, 
in a social milieu of myopically obeying commands. Weber's definition is essential, 
bringing power to its scientific exploration and its relation to formal organisations. He 
produced a graspable and inclusive account of power, yet his definition of the latter is 
rather general. 29 
Even after Weber's original work, analyses of the notion of power remained sporadic 
until the 1960s, when the introduction of Marxist thought to academic circles initiated a 
fervent scrutiny of power phenomena. 30 It was in this decade and the 1970s that Foucault 
became arguably the most influential name in the philosophical elaboration of power, 
considering the pervasiveness of the term in his momentous body of work. 
137 
Exploring the surfacing of 'disciplinary society' in modem society, Foucault fabricates 
an extensive theorisation of power, with ample applications. 31 He analyses the discursive 
channels that produce power, espousing a post-structural prism that does not obey a 
materialist logic. Power is not materialised as a commodity, which one can acquire, 
accumulate or dispense. Rather it has an omnipresent, impersonal and dislocated 
character, impossible to circumscribe and centre it within a certain context. 
Power is everywhere; not because it embraces everything, but because it comes from 
everywhere. And 'Power', in so far as it is permanent, repetitious, inert and self- 
reproducing is simply the overall effect that emerges from all these mobilities, the 
concatenation that rests on all of them and seeks in turn to arrest their movement. 32 
Foucault contemplated power as a camouflaged effect of discourse; Rather than being 
imposed over subjects, power is disseminated and penneates subjectivity through the 
composite arteries of discourse. Power regulates the complex network of human 
relations, as a mechanism of submission and domination that imbues every aspect of 
human life that has to do with overcoming any type of resistance. 33 Power does not inhere 
to particular subjects of a certain superior standing; rather it is the artefact of deeds and 
interactions (shaped by discourse) that endow subjects with authority. Their relation to 
other subjects is what ascertains their power. 
One needs to be nominalistic, no doubt: power is not an institution, and not a structure; 
neither is it a certain strength we are endowed with; it is the name that one attributes to a 
complex strategic situation in a particular society. 34 
Foucault departs from traditional juridical views of power as being fundamentally 
negative, limiting or repressive. 35 His model conceptualises power as being essentially 
productive, regardless of any restrictive or prohibitive forms it may take. In this regard, it 
produces the subject's behaviour, sentiment, cognition and ultimately subjectivity itself. 
36 
It guides the subject as to what identity, moral code, manners and so on she must assume. 
For that to be effective, power presents 'truth' in various frames which enable the subject 
to make some sense of her living. Institutions founded by discourse support a body of 
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knowledge that produces power, that is to say, it has an effect on the perception, the 
cogito and the performance of the subject. 37 Thus, Foucault recognises a knowledgeable 
notion of power, since it is not ascribed to a natural source, but it is symbolically 
constructed. 
Solid and shared systems of knowledge are woven around beliefs that produce and 
sustain power. The stronger the embracing of the validity and verisimilitude of the ideas 
promoted by belief systems, the more rigid and dominative their effect is. Because they 
consolidate everyday, commonplace knowledge, by means of providing a figurative and a 
corporeal frame to the representatives of this knowledge. 38 The ideas of these systems of 
knowledge appear to represent absolute 'truths', acquiring a normalizing valence that 
regulates and dominates the subject's cogito, standpoint and praxis. The efficacy of 
power is augmented and reproduced, as long as subjects in such a way encompass 'truth' 
in their rhetoric or practices that willingly abide by self-discipline. Thus, power operates 
anytime, anyplace through everyday actions that reproduce discursive hegemony. 
The discursive constitution of power is manifested through its regulative control over 
the subject's body and soul. According to Foucault's famous statement, "Power is the 
effect and instrument of political anatomy. The soul is the prison of the body. , 39 In a 
reversal of the typical theological contemplation, it is the soul that dominates the body as 
the outcome of discourse, rather than the other way around. The body is subjected to the 
prevalent discursive doctrine of power, so perversion, for instance, constitutes a category 
that refers to a deviation from prevalent discourses which determine normative sexual 
practices. Knowledge, produced by discourse, defines normative and deviant behaviour, 
legitimate and illicit actions, moral and depraved attitudes and so on. 
No distinction operates between subjects who receive the effects of power and subjects 
who do not. Foucault views power as pervasive and ingrained in all subjective 
interactions based on language, without a distinction between loci of power and non- 
power. Everyone inscribed within a certain discursive context is subjugated to the effects 
of power, reproducing and expanding them through their daily actions. The multiple 
effects of power may appear as enduring, but, in reality, they are perpetuated, as long as 
the subject's praxes reproduce the 'truthful' knowledge of a dominant discourse. 
Therefore, power does not have an obdurate soundness, since another discourse that 
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envelops 'truth' may appear to question it. This is why power cannot be concretised nor 
reduced to any objectifiable entity, but rather manifests itself as a terrain of struggle. 
Nevertheless, Foucault's conceptualisation of power as a ubiquitous discursive force 
bears upon a common criticism that questions its explanatory thrust. 40 If power pervades 
and shapes all social relations, then its dominative effects are extended even to rhetoric 
and praxes produced within a liberating discursive frame that endorses humanistic credos 
about emancipation. 41 Foucault's cogitation differs from theories that stress economic 
factors, when defining power. Yet, he disregards the dynamics of intersubjective 
communication that escapes the boundaries of discourse and the limits of language. In 
other words, Foucault neglects the subject of the unconscious; rather he reduces the 
subject to knowledgeable and articulated stipulations. However, subjectivity, due to its 
unconscious constitution, transcends the symbolic space of language and therefore power. 
In the following section, power is related to this unconscious dimension, through its 
psychoanalytic scrutiny. 
5.3 The Circuit of Power 
Power may be a fundamental concept in the field of politics and ideology, yet in 
psychoanalysis the absence of any elaboration of the concept, even from 'psycho-political' 
works, is striking. The only name, for whom power formed a pivotal axis for his 
psychoanalytic theory, is that of Alfred Adler. 42 Nonetheless, Adler used the terni as an 
alternative to Freud's centrality of sexuality, limiting power to complexes of superiority 
and inferiority. Therefore, a more thorough and prismatic elaboration is required, in line 
with contemporary psychoanalytic views. 
If we dissect the rudimentary elements that sustain ideological modes of power, we can 
elucidate the unconscious economy that determines their hegemony and expose any 
possible connection with existing clinical categories. With regard to this hypothesis, the 
aim of my psychoanalytic discussion of power, in the present and the subsequent sections, 
is to excavate its role in politics and particular ideological contexts, such as fascism, and 
reveal any links to perversion. 
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My intention is not to dismiss previous accounts, but shed light on a different dimension 
of power that moves away from traditional accounts, encompassing the psychoanalytic 
dimension. Psychoanalysis can illuminate the closed circuits that power produces, apropos 
of the divided subject, enmeshed in power networks. Despite the overall ellipsis of an 
extensive psychoanalytic account of power, a Lacanian conceptualisation of the term is 
feasible. There is substantial theoretical resourcefulness in Lacan's ideas on discourse that 
may further elucidate some basic aspects of power, i. e. its intersubjective and relational 
hypostasis. 
From a psychoanalytic angle, the closest one can get to the notion of power is through 
exploring the role of the phallus, as what traditionally represents authority and dominance 
in the socio-symbolic register. It may be that power has been long associated with so- 
called phallic objects (e. g sceptres), but, in reality, this perception is misconceiving for at 
least two reasons. First, it continues to misconstrue the phallus as what corresponds to the 
male copulatory organ. 43 Second, phallic symbols cannot capture the essence of symbolic 
power, that is its ubiquitous and non-visible status. 
As an alternative to this unproductive view of the phallus, Lacan's theorisation about the 
44 latter links the phallus primarily to the symbolic, as the signifier of lack. It is the 
signifier which on the level of discourse acquires a unitary value and installs the symbolic 
register for the subject. In this manner, the phallus is linked to mastery, given that the 
unitary function of the (phallic) signifier is assumed by the master signifier (SI) which 
represents the subject as subject. 45 Lacan delineates the relation of the phallus to the S, in 
Seminar XY, where he elaborates the famous formulas on sexuation. He argues that the 
phallus is "incarnated in the S1, which of, all the signifiers, is the signifier for which there 
is no signified, and which, with respect to meaning (sens), symbolizes the failure 
thereof , 46 The phallus substantiates the master signifier, in such a way that identification 
with the phallic signifier also suggests identification with the S1. The phallus is the 
primary signifier that institutes and together with the master signifier, as its counterpart, 
hierarchises the socio-symbolic order. In this regard, power inheres to the hegemonic 
status of the phallic/master signifiers. The phallic signifier qua S, organises and controls 
the signifying process, signs and concepts, in tune with the function of the master 
signifier. 
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The acceptance of the phallic signifier as the master regulates an essential symbolic 
process, insofar as the subject's constitution depends on her symbolic identification with 
the signifier of the symbolic father's authority, namely the paternal phallus or the Name- 
of-the-Father. The SI is concomitant with the role of the Name-of-the-Father - the 
signifier of lack S(O) - where the subject is alienated. 
47 According to Fink, "the S(O) 
stands in for a signifier that is neither ready-made nor pr6t a porter, and represents the 
forging of a new master signifier. ý48 Only then, the subject accepts the law of the 
signifier (the Law), the representative of which is considered to be the father. This 
symbolic process enables the subject to develop her identity, as symbolic order and 
meaning acquire fixed status only in relation to the phallus and its synergy with the S, 
and the Name-of-the-Father. 49 
According to Philip Hill, power relations proceed from the early relationship between the 
infant and its mother. 50 There is a foundational dissymmetry in this dyadic relationship that 
sets the basis for the inequalities of power later in life. The infant is powerless in relation 
to the speaking mother, whose possession of language suggests a superior powerful 
position. She subjects the powerless infant to her desires and demands, deriving her 
enjoyment from it. It is an early master-slave dialectic which is constitutive of subjectivity, 
since only through this subjugation to the (m)Other's power (the production of meaning 
through the signifiers) the subject can assume her sexual identity. 51 The child has to enter 
the socio-symbolic order, to become an 'effect of the signifier', and follow the laws that 
organise it. The signifier sets up power relations, insofar as we all have to subordinate 
ourselves and sacrifice the early imaginary unity with the mother, as we enter the 
symbolic. 
The emergence of the subject marks the prime moment of the exercise of power and this 
is the power of the Law. The symbolic father, the Name-of-the Father, is the agent of 
Law's power, as "the paternal metaphor demands the sacrifice ofjouissance, " according to 
StavrakakiS. 52 The ostracism ofjouissance (castration) instates the signifier, giving rise to 
the subject and engendering the anticipation of fullness (lost forever). In this context, 
castration is an "act of power. , 53 It inscribes a lack and, concomitantly, generates desire. 
The symbolic basis of power differs from its imaginary inscription that encourages 
antagonism and the obliteration of the other. It imposes the order of a master or else the 
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field of the Other that makes social coexistence possible. The phallic signifier qua S, is 
there to serve the desire to desire, which is also the source of power, inasmuch as the 
desideraturn emerges as an initial elocution: "I wish... " 
Thus, subjectivity and the formation of identity are contingent on the power the signifier 
54 imposes over the subject . In this regard, power refers to a symbolic process and inheres 
to the signifier. The master, as the subject who embodies the signifier, proffers his body 
and comes under the aegis of the signifier. He links his existence to the signifier 'One', 
what, according to Lacan, stands for the signifying order. 55 The phallus comes to represent 
the wholeness of being, 'the One' and the power that controls the excess (the drive) of 
desire. This reveals the power of the signifier, since it is through its unifying conformation 
that the master procures the mastery over his body. Nevertheless, the mastery of desire is 
elusive, inasmuch as it requires the repudiation ofjouissance, namely the excess that marks 
the division of the subject (precisely what the master tries to conceal). Indeed, according to 
Lacan's elaboration of the master's discourse, as I will elaborate later in this part, 
jouissance is assigned to the side of the slave. A homeostatic status of desire's satisfaction 
should be maintained, which means any excess is disallowed. 
In this vein, the S, concurring with the phallus, forms the signifier of power, that is, the 
control of the satisfaction of desire. Phallus and mastery are tightly interlaced and 
condensed into a symbolic segment, the primary signifier. What accentuates the common 
operation of the phallus and the S, is that they appear to enfold the 'truth' of the subject's 
existence, regardless of the ellipsis of any supreme guarantor of their truthful status. This 
means that the supremacy of the phallic/master signifier is totally arbitrary and the same 
is applied to its power. Following Lacan's elaboration on the master signifier, in the late 
1960s and the 1970s, the S, is nonsensical and meaningless; it is only through its relation 
to other signifiers (S2) that acquires its function in the signifying chain. 56 
The S, has to be in force for meaning to be produced, otherwiseS2s are unpinned and 
disorganised. in that sense, the phallus as the S, is also the primary point de capiton. 
Inasmuch as symbolic communication suggests a metonymic slithering in the realm of 
the signifiers, trying to master lack, the phallus becomes the fundamental anchoring point 
that pins the endless circulation of the subject in the signifying chain. 57 Thus, the points 
de capiton constitute moments of fixity in discourse, functioning as the 'signifieds' that 
143 
make discourse meaningful for the subject. By means of being repressed or 'veiled', the 
phallus operates in discourse and makes signification possible, as it Is the 'signified' that 
lies behind all signifiers. 58 The signification of the phallus does not mark only lack and 
the desire to fill it, but also the very fullness of being. As the primary point de caption 
and S1, the phallus is the signifier that stands for completeness and unity; yet, at the same 
time, it represents the ellipsis of those qualities. 
Power cannot be placed outside discourse, since it always requires two terms; it reveals 
itself in a relational manner, as we saw in Foucault earlier. The master/phallic signifier is 
dominant, as long as it produces S2, knowledge. The prioritised pre-eminence of S, 
accounts for all power relations, since knowledge, roles and identities in society are 
shaped and organised by the sovereignty of the master signifier(s). It is more appropriate 
to speak about identification, rather than identities, that may involve either an image or a 
signifier. 59As such, identifications are always incomplete, they are failed attempts to 
recover the pre-symbolic fullness of being. The implications for politics would be a 
system to dwell in the place of the master signifier, deriving its power and domination 
from the latter. Each political system wishes to establish a universal order, but of course 
this is an impossible task, as long as this wish lies in a particular master signifier(s), 
functioning as the phallus for this system. 
As ZiZ'ek notes, the phallic function obeys the logic of an oxymoron, since it is what sets 
the limit in the symbolic order and, at the same time, lays the conditions for its 
transgression. 60 In Lacan's formula of sexuation, the phallus represents the castration of 
the Other, the Other as lacking. In Zviz'ek's words, "the Phi, the signifier of the phallic 
power, phallus in its fascinating presence, merely gives body to the 
impotence/inconsistency of the Other. , 61 The signifier of the Other's castration, the $, 
marks the impossibility of a complete Other. What is more, the phallus binds this 
impossibility to an exception, a position which absconds castration and thus abides by no 
prohibition to jouissance. Excessive jouissance is prohibited by the phallus, yet its 
unfeasible locus is constituted by the phallic presence as what escapes it. This 'beyond' is 
best embodied by the primordial father and the feminine position, as two exceptions 
which affirm the rule, namely the phallic function. 62 Power is determined by the phallic 
144 
limit (embodied by the master) and its prohibited transgression (embodied by the woman 
and the primordial father). 
As Ziz'ek applies Lacan's logic of sexuation to the field of power, he perceives public 
power as a terrain of phallic function that enmeshes the subject in a paradoxical 
condition: the subject identifies with the symbolic locus of power, namely, the Law of its 
phallic function, but this identification remains fractional, inasmuch as the subject sets 
forth an exception to its universality, by contravening the Law. 63 Conversely, public 
power dilutes the universal propel of the phallus, by forwarding a complete identification 
with the Law, thus imposing the latter as limit. The phallic supremacy of the master 
signifier weaves the symbolic lining of power, but also its limit. 
5.3.1 The Role of Fantasy in Power 
The master's powerful position is not sustained through symbolic means solely. In order 
to conceal its paradoxical relation to the Law, power resorts to an imaginary agency that 
assists and supplements its symbolic architecture, considering that symbolic structures, 
such as the phallic/master signifier, are ad definitionem incomplete. The symbolic 
register is constituted by an excess which undergoes repression. The primordial father's 
excessive enjoyment, his omnipotent power, has to be renounced in order for effective 
signification to take place. Nevertheless, precisely because it is never abandoned, but is 
repressed instead, excess fosters fantasmatic scenarios about the fullness of being that 
goes beyond the finitude of the signifier. 
The phallus as a signifier emanates from the repression of the excess of the father. 
Together with the primordial father, the woman is one of the names of the father which 
stands for excess. 64 But if woman subordinates her excessive jouissance to the 
domination of the master, namely, the domination of the phallus (she tries to relate it to 
the signifier, to find the words to denote it) the pervert does not sacrifice excess for the 
sake of the phallus. The pervert stands neither subservient to the signifier nor beyond the 
latter, he stands in both positions at the same time. 
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This draws him close to the position of the master, who also does not repudiate excess, 
inasmuch as he envisions a state of fullness. The differentiating boundary between the 
two is the phallus. The master aims to relate fullness to the phallic signifier; in a similar 
fashion, he demands woman to relate herjouissance to the signifier, whereas the pervert 
aims to reach fullness beyond the phallic signifier, since he is never identified with it as 
the master is. The pervert embodies the phallus as an imaginary object, so he does not 
search for it, while the master embodies the phallus as the signifier of castration, which 
means he always searches for the imaginary means to restore its supremacy. In this 
regard, the pervert's act undermines any type of authority, which explains the animosity 
he confronts in every masterful context. 65 
The search for fullness capsizes the idea that power belongs entirely to the symbolic 
order which may suggest that the more one is incorporated into the symbolic, the more 
power s/he acquires. ZiZ'ek takes a different angle, arguing that the exercise of power, 
more than relying on symbolic grounds, "it always involves a residue of the non- 
symbolized real (in the guise of the unfathomableje ne sais quoi which is supposed to 
account for the Master's charisma). 5566 According to this logic, power unfolds around a 
master, whose unconstrained enjoyment reflects the structural excess of the exercise of 
power in itself. In other words, the very identification with a symbolic system of power is 
what produces excess. The more one identifies with the phallic/master signifier, the more 
this produces an excess transgressive of the function of the signifier, approximating the 
real. Power breeds a real surfeit and tries to eradicate it, precisely by simulating it. 67 
My view is that the "total Master, q168 who assumes this real surplus, constitutes a 
necessary fantasy for any power apparatus organised by master signifiers (thus, acquiring 
a phallic eminence). Male dominance, for example, can be interpreted as a system 
assisted by a fantasy of omnipotence. Only through this fantasmatic route, such a 
symbolic system can conceal its incomplete and vacant status and maintain the absolute 
value of the phallic S1. This is what I consider as the fantasy of power, as far as it 
comprises a motive force for the subject who exercises power. Power seeps through all 
aspects of subjectivity, as Foucault argues, but it acquires meaning, only because there is 
a locus in the subject that remains devoid from symbolic meaning. 69 Power is structured 
and obtains meaning around something that does not exist. This empty place is occupied 
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by fantasy, which can be an ideological scheme, a perverse sexual scenario or anything 
that asseverates the recovering of an excessive prohibited enjoyment. This fantasmatic 
operation produces images of fascination or identification which set power relations in 
motion. 
From a Freudian perspective, the origins of power rest in the subject's desire to recover 
the omnipotent narcissistic condition of the first year of life: the illusory unity between 
the infant and its mother who provided satisfaction to its needs. The desideratum's aim is 
to master the lack that carves the subject's early omnipotence. Lack emerges, after the 
first object cathexes, when separation occurs together with the realisation that there is a 
world external to the subject's body and not always responsive to her needs. This 
desideraturn sustains power and vice versa, bringing fantasy into play. 
Fantasy provides a stage for the fulfilment of desire. It augurs a condition where the 
lacking status of the Other is recanted, bringing 'back' the lost fullness, the limitless 
enjoyment of the Other. The fantasy of power is focused on the lost jouissance of the 
Other; what the Other lacks and remains incomplete. This is why power aims at recovering 
thejouissance, once belonged to the subject or the nation and was stolen by the Other, as 
7 ZiZ'ek has demonstrated. 0 The search for jouissance renders any relationship subject to 
power. Of course, fullness is something that fantasy creates, since the Other's locus is 
incomplete ad definitionem. The Other is constituted as lacking, insomuch as it ensues 
from the castration ofjouissance, its prohibition imposed by the law of the symbolic. 
Thus , instead of filling the lack of the Other, 
fantasy veils it; it is an operation that does 
not complete the Other, but it is enough to constitute a defence against the castration of the 
latter and raise the illusory expectation of completion. 71 The fantasmatic stage is occupied 
by scenarios that configure the recuperation of the lost object of desire. But being nothing 
more than a stage, fantasy, in effect, marks the lack of the Other, precisely by screening the 
missing object. This means that fantasy serves desire by promising exactly its elimination. 
Rather than covering lack, it is more appropriate to say that fantasy makes lack more 
bearable by staging the object. The non-existence of the object can be tolerated, when 
fantasy veils it. As Stavrakakis notes, this fantasmatic operation has a total character, 
extensively regulated by the imaginary, that is, the register of subjectivity which is 
fundamentally absolute. 72 
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The role of fantasy in mobilising the subject towards the retrieval of lost jouissance 
constitutes the motive force behind symbolic power. Since power relies on the synergy of 
the master signifier with the phallus, fantasy proffers a guarantee for the supremacy of 
the phallic/master signifier and fosters the illusory certainty about the efficacy of the 
symbolic to represent all. In other words, fantasy is there to disguise what the master fails 
to see: the hollowness of his signifier and thus, his power. A closed circuit is set up, 
between the phallus and its fantasmatic support that hypostatises power formations. 
Power does not come from everywhere nor it emanates from knowledge; yet it 
circulates and permeates intersubjective relations, as Foucault has suggested. Power is 
formative for all types of socio-political relations, but it cannot be personalised and 
included into a certain knowledgeable frame, because there is always something that 
escapes from its discursive locus. The power of the phallic position imposes and, at the 
same time, transcends the limit of the law. Power is a product of discourse, but rather 
than being an aftermath of knowledge, it seems to rise from what generates and controls 
this knowledge, namely, the master's phallic authority to whom institutions of knowledge 
conform. Knowledge is already subordinate to the power of the phallus, a signifier of 
absolute value, and its underlying fantasy. 
All power relations are mediated by these two factors: the phallic master and the fantasy 
he promotes. In the sphere of the political, power produces ideologies as fantasmatic 
contexts for the possibility of a harmonious and prosperous society. 73 Stavrakakis notes: 
Every political promise is supported by a reference to a lost state of harmony, unity and 
fullness, a reference to a pre-symbolic real which most political projects aspire to bring 
74 back 
. 
But given fantasy's dual character, there is a positive and a negative side in it. On the one 
hand, it constructs a content that promises the accomplishments of the goals of power 
(the impossible task of satisfying desire and completing the other) and on the other hand, 
it circumscribes a condition that thwarts power's aspirations. Ultimately, fantasy 
maintains lack by becoming "a simulacrum of what in the order of the signifier resists 
Signification, that is to say the real, of what represents itself as loSt.,, 
75 In this regard, the 
subject implements fantasy to screen her ongoing desire of regaining her fullness lost 
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forever. 76 With fantasmatic omnipotence as its motivating fulcrum, power promises to 
fulfil what the subject cannot succeed in doing on her own: the erasure of her desiring 
status by providing the object. 
Therefore, power occupies the two sides of the law, its normative moral side and its 
4profane', 'perverse' (excessive) side. This explains the common view that sees every 
power mechanism as indistinguishable from corruption and deception, i. e. its 'dark side', 
in line with ZiZ'ek who demonstrated how the law sustains itself through illegal 
enjoyment. 77 More than a paranoid idea, it is a reflection of the fantasy's dualistic 
character, which nurtures power's subsistence. Sanctioning totalising and unrestricted 
fantasies, power goes beyond the normative arena, in the sphere of the 'perverse' and the 
'obscene'. Due to this absolute fantasy, each power institution is aware of the other side 
of the law, but this has to be disguised. Hence, perversion appears as a designation for 
what exceeds the norm without having the authorisation or the eulogy of power. 
Fabricating ideological fantasms around fullness, power exploits the desire of the 
subject and consequently the law of desire, since it imposes the latter as its limit, just to 
transgress it. Power transgresses the law precisely because it tries to evade, through 
fantasy, the limitations of the symbolic and the incomplete identification with the 
signifier (disregarding the fact that identification is never complete). What justifies and 
holds this evasion is the object a, that is, the remainder of lost jouissance which is 
screened in fantasy. Since the object a itself escapes symbolisation inscribed as either an 
excess or lack in the symbolic, power, which runs after the object, similarly exceeds the 
symbolic or engraves a lack in it. The object a is the residue ofJouissance, which is left 
after the subject enters the symbolic function. In this fashion, the object ofjouissance is 
an effect of the symbolic and it is there to coalesce the impossible prohibited real with 
desire. According to Stavrakakis, "the object perforins a symbolic function (supporting 
the lacking fullness of the symbolic) by promising an imaginary mastery of the 
impossible real. q178 As long as the object subsumes the prohibited jouissance (the fullness 
of being) it lets desire circulate around it consistently. 79But the object a and the phallus 
as the primary signifier without signified occupy two different positions in discourse. The 
phallus is inscribed in the symbolic (as SI), whereas the object has real (predominantly) 
149 
and imaginary qualities. For this reason, the two should not be equated, even though there 
is a complementary relationship between them. 
Both the phallus and the object support desire by promising an encounter with the 
castrated real but the phallus is a promise in which the symbolic dimension is dominant 
(since it is seen as an answer to the disintegration of imaginary unity) while what is 
dominant in the object is the real as lacking this is again the symbolic dimension) and 
being represented by an imaginary fullness. 80 
The phallus and the object a underscore the failure of signification: the first is an 
absolute, yet empty signifier, while the second is the unsymbolisable kernel that comes to 
occupy this very emptiness. In this regard, the real object resides in the space the phallus 
cannot symbolise; it is what undercuts the supremacy of the phallus, by posing a 
'beyond'. At the same time, the object a is what substantiates the phallus, in its function 
as the signifier of castration. 
What erroneously occurs in discourse, with implications for politics, is that the absolute 
value of the phallus is interchanged with the totality of the object a, a condition of 
regaining fullness. In this case, the phallus is reduced to an object, the imaginary phallus, 
as the effect of power. Namely, it sanctions the practices of power which suppose to aim 
towards a completed Other, by regaining the object. The problem is that the object a 
tackles ajouissance the phallus prohibits; thus, when power equates the two, it endorses a 
contradiction, an illusion that excessive enjoyment can be subordinated to the phallus. 
In political power, when the object is linked with the phallus as its positivisation, an 
oxymoron emerges, insofar as the phallus functions as the signifier for lack and as such it 
must remain empty, in order for desire to circulate. By linking the signifier to various 
objects, power exploits desire and instates a symbolic-imaginary circuit which ultimately 
violates the law and legitimises the excesses of power. If we apply that to types of power 
held by liberalism, as the master signifier, one sees how this exploitation of desire 
operates, considering the perpetual manufacturing of products, around which social and 
personal welfare is enfolded. 
After all, do not advertising and marketing commodify an imaginary process of 
elevating an ordinary object to the level of the real object? 
81 A washing powder, a car, a 
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bank company and any other commodity acquire the status of objects which cause desire, 
promising its satisfaction once somebody attains them or, literally, purchases them, since 
the guarantee of desire's satisfaction in liberalism always comes with a price. The 
multitude of these fantasmatic apparitions of the object sustains the dominance of the 
master and the supremacy of the phallic signifier (liberal capitalism in this case). The 
excessive enjoyment associated with the object feeds the fantasy of delivering to the 
Other Its lost jouissance which can complete It and recant the division of subjectivity, 
forming a unity among subjects. 82 
The subject creates fantasmatic scenarios and sets them against the background of 
symbolic reality's limitations. Fantasy is a sine qua non for the subject's existence and 
the circulation of her desire; it comprises the motive force behind the desire to be desired. 
Power exploits this force, so that it instrumentalises desire or obtains the other's desire, 
through oppressive means. Even if I am not desired, the exercise of power enforces or 
better usurps the desire of the other. It is enough for the other to pretend s/he desires me, 
in order to fill me withjouissance. 
Millions of people worshipped leaders of 'totalitarian' regimes, in a conflux of 
exaltation with feelings of rage and repulsion. One of the most chilling moments in recent 
history was the televised execution of Nikolae Ceauýescu, the last Romanian communist 
leader. By the end of 1989 and just four days prior to his death, Ceau§escu held a mass 
rally in front of the Central Committee building (euphemistically named as the House of 
People) that was propagandistically portrayed as an unprompted act of support towards 
his leadership, following an upheaval in the town Timiýoara. As Ceauýescu hailed the 
thousands of people gathered, extolling the accomplishments of the socialist revolution, 
soon exultation turned to booing, while the wrath of the assembled audience erupted 
against their leader. This episode led to further turmoil and a generalised revolution that 
culminated in Ceau§escu's execution, after a three-day mock trial. 
The incident marks the role of power in disguising the lack of desire. Power is 
'totalitarian' and hubristic, when it comes down to its fantasmatic parameter. Ceauýescu's 
fantasy of power encompassed the arrogance of the primordial father in Totem and 
Taboo, which, ultimately, turned to become the hubris that drove the brothers of the 
horde to the cannibalistic slaughtering of their father. 
83 In other words, his attempt to 
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embrace excess through his phallic mastery, ultimately failed. The ideological fantasy 
that Ceauýescu implemented cracked apart, revealing the Other's lack. 84 
The inevitable schism between the imaginary domination of the ego and symbolic 
difference is defied by the master signifier that sanctions ideological schemata of power on 
the premise of reconciling the two, imaginary bliss and symbolic emptiness. But the Other 
of language always remains incomplete, disturbing narcissism from finding completeness 
in an image. Nonetheless, fantasy always resists this painful realisation, in so long as it 
relies on an image perceived as durable and coherent. 85 This underlines the narcissistic 
status of power. 
But within this narcissistic context, fantasy also nurtures an archaic fear: the fear of 
fragmentation, the mark of which is carried by the object a, as the missing object that 
disturbs narcissism. The fantasy of power seduces the ego of the subject, exploiting the 
profoundly narcissistic wish of instating a dominant and proficient ego. Power promises to 
satisfy desire via imaginary means (a fantasy of unification with the object of desire) that 
cultivate an image associated with an ultimate Good. The law secures the Good, which 
means every fantasy of power makes sure that pleasure is met, even when someone 
exceeds its limits, where s/he stumbles uponjouissance. 
The fantasy of power touches the impossible realm ofjouissance, but it does so from a 
safe vantage point. The fantasmatic certainty, provided by the master, builds a safe 
pleasurable milieu, where the subject can find her seýf, her ego as a varnished reflection. 
Otherwise, the space ofjouissance unleashes uncertainty and anxiety, as one approximates 
the unknown and unrepresentable factor of the real. Even when one surpasses the 
boundaries of the symbolic, power makes sure that the intactness of the law remains. It 
offers a fantasmatic locus of identification for the subject that functions as certification for 
the desire of the Other. If you follow the Good of power, then you meet the desire of the 
Other, yet this is a cultural and knowledgeable Other. 
To reiterate the main concept of this section, power has been theorised as the closed 
circuit enacted by the master signifier and the phallus, when the two converge in the 
dominant position in discourse. Assisted by fantasmatic scenarios, the master promises the 
regaining of the object the Other lacks. Power's implemented fantasy supports reality, 
since it regulates the relationship with the other as object a. 
86 We are never unified with the 
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other, yet fantasy appears to suggest that unification is not impossible. This is the aspect of 
fantasy that power exploits, which inevitably leads to the exploitation of desire. 
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The Lacanian Discourse' 
6.1 The Four Discourses 
When one approaches fascism as a symbolic category, as a system that organises the 
circulation of the signifiers in a certain social setting, the question of the operating 
discourse is raised. The fascist principles imbue and hierarchise social relationships, 
influencing speech and overall communication. Psychoanalysis, as a critical tool, makes it 
possible to contemplate the organising terms of the fascist discourse and discourses on 
fascism. Not only does psychoanalysis supplement the understanding of other discourses, 
but it also augments the vigour of its theories, by constantly reappraising ideas applied 
either to the clinic or to social theory. 
With regard to the goal of critically elucidating the discursive incongruence between 
fascism and perversion through psychoanalysis, recourse to Lacan's model of the four 
discourses is essential, since the primary focus is on collective phenomena that shape 
social bonds. Lacan did not develop a schema of a distinct perverse discourse, although the 
perverse subject is inscribed in the field of the Other. This means he can relate his desire to 
the Other and form social relationships. As a problematic omission, this further mystifies 
the notion of perversion, since one has to rely on the model of the four discourses that 
regulate social bonds between neurotic subjects, strictly speaking. If the absence of a 
discourse of the pervert constitutes a paradox, it is not the same for psychosis, where the 
subject does not operate within discourse. The psychotic subject does not address the other, 
which means difference is not acknowledged at all. The subject is one with the Other, who 
exists, in psychosis. When it comes to the pervert, the latter tries to make the Other exist 
through the other. In a common psychoanalytic perception, the pervert has the knowledge 
about the lack in the Other, but he disavows it and tries to conceal it. 2 If we reduce fascism 
(a type of social bond) to a perverse structure, it becomes difficult to match fascism to one 
of the four discourses, given the absence of the perverse discourse. Does such a discourse 
exist and if it does so, what is fascism's pertinence to it? What is the prevalent discourse in 
fascism? 
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The significance of Lacan's theorisation about discourse lies in the identification of a 
number of possible symbolic forms, through which the unconscious reveals itself in the 
intersubjective milieu of communication and configuration of social ties. Language does 
not involve only one individual, but always entails the presence of another subject with 
whom there is an exchange of messages through signification. This interaction, through the 
formation and interchange of messages, is shaped by discourse and, ad interim, is 
independent or goes beyond the borders of discourse. 
Language is a prerequisite for discourse. Without introduction to the system of language, 
the subject remains in a pre-subjective position and makes no effort to communicate; all 
communication is organised by instinctual behaviours that lack the multiplicity of 
meanings inaugurated by language only. Discourse fabricates the context of the symbolic 
and imaginary world of the subject, the borders of which are engraved and constantly 
defied by death, trauma, violence, anxiety, sexual act and the like. 
These are the gaps that evince the impossibility of discourse to encompass everything in 
the signifying chain. The function of the signifying chain is always a 'dys-function', due to 
the obstacle of these gaps that resist symbolisation and reveal the dimension of the real in 
discourse. This is the most important element in the Lacanian discourse. The real goes 
beyond language, manifesting itself as lack or excess, i. e. what is without words, around 
which desire circulates. 3 Symbolic communication only marks an occasion in discourse; 
truth continues to operate outside the capacity of language and seeps into social relations. 
Within the limits of discourse, it is possible to interact and relate to other subjects due to 
language. As Stavrakakis puts it, "it is exactly because total communication is impossible, 
because it is exposed as an impossible fantasy, that communication itself becomes 
possible. 4 
Lacan delineates four discourses that describe the relation of the subject to the real: the 
discourse of the Master, the discourse of the University, the discourse of the Hysteric and 
the discourse of the Analyst (see table 1, p. 160). For each of them, Lacan develops a 
corresponding schema, an algorithm. A rotation of a quarter turn determines the structure 
of each discourse. Three fundamental terms operate in each discourse: the signifier, the 
subject and the object. But the signifier never has a singular status. By nature, the signifier 
is defined as the difference between two terms: darkness as opposition to light, cold as 
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opposition to warm, good as opposition to evil and so on. Thus, as far as the signifier is 
concerned, we a priori deal with a signifying chain of two terms: the master signifier (S 1) 
and the knowledge (S2) that originates from the signifier. Therefore, we have four terms in 
each discourse: SI, S2, the split subject ($) that results from the relation of one (the master) 
signifier to another and the object a or the surplus of enjoyment (a), occupy four different 
positions that determine the type of the discourse in function. The four positions are 
summarised as follows: 
impossibility 
The agent The other 
truth production/loss 
impotence 
These positions remain fixed for all discourses. Only the terms that occupy these positions 
shift for a quarter turn, in each discourse. On the two horizontal sides, above and under the 
schema, Lacan posited two disjunctions in intersubjective communication: impossibility, 
seen at the upper side of the schema, and impotence, seen at the bottom. Both disjunctions 
underline the fact that desire cannot be completely deciphered; communication, as far as it 
speaks desire, remains incomplete and impossible. The position of the agent is the 
dominant position. In the position of production, the most innovative element of Lacanian 
discourse is found; this isjouissance, bound to the signifier and knowledge. 
In Seminar XVII, the relationship between jouissance and knowledge is articulated for the 
first time. Lacan states that "knowledge is thejouissance of the Other', 5 and it is precisely 
what Jacques Allain-Miller calls discursive jouissance. 6 Discourse is the intersection of the 
signifier, knowledge and jouissance. The emergence of the signifier introduces the 
symbolic terrain of the Other and, at the same time, sets up thejouissance located in the 
Other: "the signifier is the cause of jouissance [ ... ] the signifier is what puts an end to 
i. oul . ssance. 517 The knowledge produced by the signifier initiates a repetitive alteration 
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between the three: signifier, Other and knowledge. The return ofiouissance marks the limit 
of knowledge and vice versa. 
Knowledge is what causes life to stop at a certain limit on the way to jouissance. For the 
path towards death - this is what it is a question of, it's a discourse on masochism - the 
path towards death is nothing other than what is called jo uissance. ' 
Knowledge is what maintains subjectivity and keeps at bay the fatal finale of jouissance, 
namely the death of the subject. The previous conception of jouissance, as the artefact of 
transgression, 9 is abandoned in Seminar AVII. There5 Lacan theorises about jouissance on 
different grounds and conceives it as the product of discourse, the surplus of articulation, 
"a falling into the field of something that is the order ofjouissance -a bonus. " 
10 
Table 1: Lacan's Four Discourses 
The discourse of the Master 
S, 4 S2 
$ a 
Ae discourse of the University 
The discourse of the Hysteric 
S, 
S2 
The discourse of the Analyst 
S2 a a 4 $ 
S, $ S2 H S, 
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6.2 The Position of the Fascist and the Pervert in Discourse 
The first formalised discourse that Lacan introduces in Seminar XVII is the discourse of the 
Master. The master signifier, the S1, occupies the dominant position, but the symbolic 
prominence of the signifier is totally arbitrary and absurd. In the name of this supremacy of 
the signifier, the master asks for obedience, without any justification. One must obey, 
because it has to be so. The power of the master is indisputable and uncompromising. 
Based on this power, derived from the signifier, the master decrees the other to obey him. 
The other is not just the receiver of the master's edict; he is the slave that genuflects the 
master, but, in effect, the slave is the one who possesses knowledge(S2)- 
The master is ignorant and indifferent towards this knowledge, inasmuch as his only 
concern is to be served and obeyed. What troubles him is to secure the productivity of the 
system, by making the slave work ceaselessly for him, for his jouissance. Therefore, the 
knowledge about how to increase and maintain the productivity of this system belongs to 
the slave who works for the master. In the place of production, the surplus element of the 
discourse, the object (a) appears as the product of the slave's exertion. The master 
appropriates this surplus value of the slave's labour, whereas the slave is not in a position 
to enjoy the surplus enjoyment he produces. 
The discourse of the master is behind any ideology. Lacan develops the rationale of this 
discourse, based on a Marxist theorisation about labour as the force that produces a surplus 
value, appropriated by the capitalist. The master has to present himself as if he is certain 
and assertive regarding the ascendancy of the power his phallic signifier represents, as we 
previously saw. Because the dominance of the master signifier(s) is what sustains and 
solidifies his power and commands. The fantasy of power serves the sovereignty of the 
master signifier(s), disguising its lack. The master, as representative of this indisputable 
power, is non-lacking or, more precisely, he presents himself as if he escaped castration. 
Of course, the master is divided by the signifier, he is subjected to the Other, like any other 
subject. However, this division is concealed and occupies the position of Truth. The master 
must conceal his divided status and hence his desire. 
If we had to isolate the prevalence of a particular discourse in all ideological forins of 
power (capitalism, communism, fascism and so on), that would be the discourse of the 
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master. The master dominates the discourse, since he sets its foundation. The discourse of 
the master produces the object a, which the master confiscates and enjoys, although he 
presents himself as if he does not do so. This occurs because surplus jouissance is the very 
perverse element of discourse that cannot be incorporated into the social order, since it is a 
disorganising and agitating factor, circumscribing lack. Therefore, the subject of obedience 
never finds the sought-forjouissance. The master displaces the surplus factor to the enemy, 
who is supposed to steal this enjoyment, as Z'iZ'ek suggested. 11 
Otherwise, the master disguises it under a negative camouflage (e. g. political and 
moralistic narratives of perversion that designate surplus jouissance as evil) or a positive 
mask (e. g. the endless and ever-growing list of material objects in capitalism that promise 
the experience of that jouissance). But the subject is the one who produces this extra- 
enjoyment; it is the residue of obedience to the master's symbolic law. 
The death-coveting element in fascism, which is linked to jouissance, is the real 
production, the surfeit, of the obedience to a strict law. The obedience to the laws of the 
master/Fiffirer that demanded the extinction of the Jew opened up the floodgate of 
jouissance, the bloodshed that indelibly sealed the history of the Second World War. The 
unsymbolisable character and the immensity of the atrocities gave rise to an unbearable 
jouissance, experienced as disgust, fear, wrath and so on. The samejouissance fuelled the 
collective guilt that followed the atrocities; guilt functions as an alarm call that notifies the 
subject that the law is leaking and it has to be either restored or totally abandoned. 12 
The master/fascist usurped the surplus enjoyment produced by the execution of the 
commands, associated with the atrocities of the war. As soon as the fantasmatic edifice of 
Nazism fell, the arbitrariness of its master signifier(s) (e. g. Aryanism) and the divided 
status of the master emerged. The painful realisation of the fallible status of the law of 
Nazism 'hystericised' the German other who demanded a new sufficient master. In the 
discourse of the master, the other never attains his/her jouissance, but constantly moves 
from obedience to hysteria, setting in motion a continuous recycling of masters. German 
people needed a trustworthy master, since Hitler represented the ultimate signifier of 
German potency and its detrimental refutation led to distrust towards other masterful 
discourses. The phantasm of repeating the same mistake, as with Hitler, haunted German 
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people for decades. It was not an easy task for post- 1945 masters to persuade the people 
about the superiority of the novel signifiers they represented. 
By turning the previous algebraic structure for a quarter, a second discourse is put 
together, with the four symbols rearranged in different positions. A new type of social 
bond emerges that aims to fill the lack of desire, by contouring a knowledgeable object. 
This is the territory of the university, the 'sacred' temple of knowledge. This time the 
dominant position is taken by theS2which replaces the supremacy of the arbitrary master 
signifier with the supremacy of knowledge. Knowledge dominates discourse 
commanding its eternal reproduction. This command is addressed to the surplus value of 
the object (a). In other words, knowledge focuses on the vindication of the surplus 
jouissance, produced by labour activity. This dominative knowledge is different from 
psychoanalytic knowledge, inasmuch as the latter is inscribed within a "discourse of 
love" which revolves around the "nothingness" of the object a. ' 3 Psychoanalysis 'hunts' 
the object a, precisely what cannot be reduced to absolute knowledge, and this 'hunting' 
is what renders the psychoanalytic discourse a discourse of love. 
The agent of the discourse is still in fetters. Knowledge may be dominant, but only due 
to the assurance provided by the master, who rests perdu in the position of Truth and 
whom the agent serves. 14 The hidden master is there to give his pledge to the subject who 
knows that she will avoid castration, ambiguity, anxiety and division, through knowledge. 
The more one learns, the more s/he reaches completeness. Alas, it is unfortunate for the 
subject to actually find herself in the opposite position, by succumbing to the infinite 
empire of knowledge. The more one knows, the more signifiers one has at his/her 
disposal, the more divided s/he becomes by them. 
Therefore, the struggle for filling up the gap of desire is doomed to failure that leaves a 
rather bitter taste: the perpetual multiplication of desire misled by various objects that 
suppose to satisfy it. This would explain, for example, the vast amount of research 
produced nowadays, in various academic fields of psychology. All scientific research 
disciplines produce theories or point out practices, interventions, techniques, cognitive 
skills, emotions, etc. (often contradictory one to the other, depending on the master, i. e. 
the theoretician or the scholar, whose ideas organise the research) that all suppose to 
advance the quality of life of the subject. As a result, today, more than any other time, the 
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subject is multilaterally split and encumbered by different identities, roles and lifestyles, 
without achieving the promised quality. 15 
instead of desire getting its satisfaction through knowledge, the researcher or the subject 
of knowledge in general, is left only with a 'paraplegic' desire. The more 'hypertrophic' 
knowledge becomes, the more desire is ossified. Desire remains unfulfilled in the 
discourse of the university. Knowledge hypothecates desire. The object a, in the position 
of the other, remains unutterable, because of an unsurpassable structural limitation: the 
object a is impossible to be symbolically represented. In that way, in the position of the 
production, the subject encounters her importunate division, continuing to resist it, 
through the acquisition of more knowledge, without being able to identify the master. 
Because the relationship between the subject and her master signifier is that of 
impotence, the subject never knows who she is and what she wants. 
Knowledge is a central component also in the discourse of the hysteric, but it is the 
reverse of the university discourse. It is not articulated as certainty generated by the 
concealed master signifier(s), but as a demand for knowledge, addressed to the master 
signifier. The dominant position of the discourse is occupied by the divided subject who 
interrogates the other as a master. The hysteric wants the master to justify the supremacy of 
his non-sensical signifier, by producing knowledge that speaks about the division of the 
hysteric subject. Therefore, in the position of production, knowledge asS2 iSfound. 
But, since the lack of the subject reigns in the dominant position, the knowledge of the 
master is incapable of filling this lack. The latter is always accountable for the perpetual 
conflicts and the questions the hysteric holds in relation to her division. In this way, what 
is maintained is desire and what remains veiled is the object (a) of desire that occupies the 
position of truth. The hysteric becomes feverish and excited, through the provocation of 
the Other. The knowledge, the answer that she receives from him constitutes her 
jouissance as the loss in the field of production. In this case, knowledge is not the medium 
forjouissance, as it is for the master or for the university. Knowledge is the means for 
justifying lack, so that the latter is sustained. It is important to preserve lack, for this is 
wherejouissance is situated. 
Given the absence of a discourse of the pervert, if we had to incorporate the pervert into a 
specific discursive system, what would this one be? It seems more appropriate to place the 
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pervert in the same discursive structure as the hysteric, rather than the master, where the 
fascist is placed. 16 Sadism, masochism, voyeurism, exhibitionism and so on are considered 
as 'deviations'; yet in the discourse of the hysteric desire itself deviates from the position 
of the object a, the object-cause of desire, which remains inaccessible on the level of 
impotence. This 'deviation of desire' marks the discursive position of both the pervert and 
the hysteric. The object a, occupying the position of truth, is responsible for any deviation 
from the law of the master. Whatever knowledge the Other endows the hysteric with, 
whatever scenarios the Other asks the pervert to perform, desire always remains insatiated. 
Object a is the perverse core of subjectivity and, as far as it resists the master signifier, it 
always maintains its deviant and excessive character. 
Perverse desire, obsessive desire and hysteric desire can be taken into the same discourse. 
The division of the subject 'hystericises' all subjects, whose lack introduced by language is 
translated to desire of the Other. The pervert, similar to the hysteric, wishes to maintain 
this lack in the Other, because his existence depends exactly on this lack. But lack for the 
pervert means jouissance, whereas for the hysteric it means law. The perverse ritual is a 
constant effort to fill up this lack in the Other, which always fails, leading to a vicious 
cycle that disavowal only partially describes. 
Disavowal marks two moments in the pervert's effort to meet the desire of the Other. 
First, it allows the pervert to be aware of the lack in the Other and second, it thwarts the 
acknowledgement of this lack. These two types of knowledge co-exist, but I believe, in 
such a way that one, actually, triggers the other. The moment desire returns as the ending 
of the pervert's jouissance, another struggle begins to extinguish this return which marks 
the realisation and the maintenance of desire, the lack in the Other. The result is the same 
as in the discourse of the hysteric. The difference is that the hysteric requests knowledge, 
so that she relates herself to the law, whereas the pervert seeks knowledge to transcend the 
law and relate himself tojouissance. Yet, both the hysteric and the pervert are stuck in the 
impossibility of fulfilling desire. 
The pervert is dominated by the Other, no more and no less than any other ordinary 
neurotic subject, inasmuch as desire is always the desire of the Other. The power of a 
perverse fantasy is derived by this dominant position of the Other. This is different from 
fascism, which obtains its power through a totalising fantasy that seeks for the domination 
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of the Other. Through the absolute value and the domination of the master signifier, the 
fascist tries to manipulate the desire of the Other. Fascism produces a fantasy of 
domination, whereas perversion produces a fantasy that searches for a way to escape 
domination. The pervert vetoes the conformity to the ideal signifier(s), proffered by the 
master. For him, priority is not given to the signifier, but tojouissance. 
The fourth algebraic formula Lacan juxtaposes to the other three discourses is the 
discourse of the analyst. According to Lacan, this discursive type is not limited to the 
analytic experience solely: 
If we characterise a discourse by focusing on what is dominant in it, there is the discourse 
of the analyst, and this is not to be confused with the psycboanalysing discourse, with the 
discourse effectively engaged in the analytic experience. 17 
The subversive element that demarcates the discourse of the analyst from the discourse of 
the dominant master is that lack occupies the dominant position. This means that no type 
of 'prefab' knowledge or master signifiers occupy the locus of desire. Quite the opposite, 
desire suggests a position that questions and provokes knowledge, so that the divided 
status of the subject comes to light. The analysis of dreams, lapsuses, parapraxes and free 
associations that comprise the main psychoanalytic armoury leads to the realisation of the 
splitting of the subject between conscious and unconscious. A new master signifier is the 
dead end of the other's associations. The analyst has to assist the other to associate the new 
master signifier with other signifiers, in a dialectical manner. 
Psychoanalysis deploys the power of the cause of desire, in order to bring about a 
reconfiguration of the analysand's desire. 18 
With the exception of the discourse of the analyst, all other discourses accentuate and 
cement their power, the fantasmatic basis of which is revealed by the strong and 
autonomous ego that they try to build and maintain. Psychoanalysis, by putting forward the 
gap, the lack in the subject, questions and provokes the dominance of the ego. Alongside, it 
challenges the power of the S, that fuels the fantasmatic efficiency of the ego, by forging 
an absolute identity (symbolic identification). 
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Of course, the four discourses of Lacan do not exhaust all possible types of relations that 
found intersubjective ties. According to Fink, Lacan's intention was to develop a more 
expanded formalisation of discourse, on the grounds of the fantasy that the subject 
promotes, when she speaks or communicates through other symbolic means, apart from 
speech. 19 As examples, one can think of Lacan's attempts to theorise about the structure of 
fantasy in perversion or phobias. In any case, this does not mean that there has been a 
separate phobic, obsessional or perverse discourse formalised. In the absence of such 
discourse, it becomes rather problematic to discuss the intersubjective implications of 
phenomena related to one of these notions. Moreover, perverse fantasy, perverse psychic 
structure and perverse discourse do not necessarily coincide. Fantasy is a fundamental 
aspect of discourse, whereas the psychic structure of the subject does not restrain her in a 
particular fixed discourse. Under certain conditions, the subject can shift from one 
discourse to another. 
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Three Masters, Three Systems of Domination 
7.1 Discursive Systems of Power 
By alluding to Lacan's four discourses, my intention was to evince the discursive 
incongruity between fascism and perversion. Unlike the pervert, caught up in his ceaseless 
and repetitive acts and scenarios, the fascist takes a position in discourse which produces a 
definite fantasy of domination. This serves the power of fascism's master signifier, 
breeding the illusory certainty of seizing the phallus. 
The pervert is dominated by the Other, inasmuch as he serves the Other's jouissance, 
whereas the master seeks for domination of the Other. The master derives his power from 
the signifier (the phallus), yet he positivises the lack of the Other, around an object (a), and 
makes the slave work, in order to postpone the acquisition and, eventually, extinguish the 
missing status of the object and the concomitant lack in the Other. For example, as Ziz'ek 
demonstrated, the fascist master constructed the figure of the evil Jew to substantiate lack. ' 
The obliteration of the Jew, but also the vassalage of the non-Aryan on the supremacy of 
the Nazi edifice, would secure the prospect of a complete Aryan Other. Desire would be 
desiccated, which is impossible, of course. 
But, in exploring perversion's relation to discourse, another point needs explication. This 
is the dissymmetry of the Sadean fantasy with the perversions, in their common conception 
(i. e. sexual deviations). Sadean philosophy, as it is conveyed in works such as The 120 
Days of Sodom, is not just a catalogue of all possible perversions; rather than this 
simplifying perception of Sade's work, Sadean philosophy constructs a utopian system, 
which clinicians, like Krafft-Ebing, obscurely, reduced to mere perverse activity. In his 
discourse, Lacan never likened explicitly Sade with a formalised theory on perversion. It is 
unfair to reduce Sade's imaginary system to the precursor of fascist barbarity and perverse 
sexuality. 
Lacan's ideas in Seminar VII and "Kant with Sade" fuelled platitudinous views on 
perversion. 2 Instead of reciting them, it would be more appropriate to isolate, for a while, 
Sade from this 'perversology' and juxtapose his philosophical system to two other 
discursive systems introduced here: 'Oedipalism' and 'totalitarianism'. Regarding them as 
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separate masterful discursive systems, my analysis draws again on Lacan's four discourses 
as a valuable tool for dissecting the relations that organise the three systems. 
My argument suggests that all three reflect opalescent organisations of the discourse of 
the master. In the dominant position, we find three different ideals that represent the master 
and they claim to pack Truth into a message they address to the other, the one who obeys 
the system; three different packets, three different ideals about the impossible articulation 
of desire. Thus, setting the focus of this section, the three systems are discussed, on the 
basis of law and language, as the crux that formalises the relationships within each system. 
The second factor that provides the consistency for each system is the notion of power 
that regulates a closed circuit between signifier, fantasy and desire. Earlier in the present 
part, it was argued that power has a symbolic hypostasis, insofar as it inheres to the 
sovereign phallic signifier. Yet it implements fantasy (as an 'imaginarisation' of the loss) 
that solidifies the certainty that the lost object is retrievable. 3 From this perspective, power 
bestows the fantasmatic support of relationships operating in each system (for example, 
money, weapons, certificates of knowledge, whip and the like are the products of the 
'imaginarisation' of loss and therefore their possession has become identical with the 
possession of power, with the possession of the phallus). 
Writing this, loss takes us to the most rudimentary element of each discursive system. 
This is the dimension of the real. I associate each system with the real, in the way Ziz'ek 
has recently re-elaborated the notion, since his early works. According to his reading, the 
4 
real can be seen in a triadic form: as symbolic Real, imaginary Real and real Real. In my 
view of Ziz'ek's distinction, the real is not divided into three different 'reals', but rather is 
approximated on three different levels. The symbolic Real is a structure derived from pure 
material signifiers, empty from meaning or signification. The imaginary Real is the 
inexplicable 'something', ingrained in the world of appearances. It is the void, around 
which the allure of the image is formed and something of the unsymbolisable sublime 
comes forth. Finally, the real Real is not just a structure of the real, but the ultimate limit, 
where one encounters horror, namely, the unbearable traumatic Thing. 
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7.1.1 The Oedipal System 
There is one simple reason to begin with the Oedipal system: it is the system, reflecting the 
main, ordinary (neurotic) and normative organisation of liberal or social democratic 
societies. Freud developed the theory of the Oedipus complex, as the definitive ban to 
infantile sexuality, by studying the familial relationships of Western individualist social 
contexts. His conceptualisation of social dynamics was a variation of the relationships 
found in the family. The early interchanges with the mother and the father are formative 
for the emergence of power relations, which will later mark all social relations. The father 
introduces the phallic signifier which prohibits the enjoyment of the mother and so it fuels 
the fantasy of regaining it. In the Oedipal paradigm, we have the crucial relationship 
between the father and the son. The father holds the reins of power (the power to punish- 
castrate or the imaginary role of the father, in Lacanian terms), while the son has to 
become the successor that drives this chariot of power. The Oedipus complex is largely a 
question of power, encompassing prohibition, law, obedience and punishment; yet all these 
relations are mediated by fantasy, in order to effectively regulate the child's position 
regarding the Thing (the Mother, as the archaic unrepresentable object of desire). 
The boy has to repress a certain kind of knowledgeljouissance, that is maternal 
jouissance, in order to resolve the conflict. Therefore, a complete Oedipal organisation 
resides in repression and the solidification of a superego that says: "enjoy, as little as 
possible. " This is the law that keeps the subject in safe distance from the Thing. It is the 
paternal (not necessary patriarchal) law that maintains our subjectivity. Not only does the 
law maintain our fantasies and desires, but it also preserves our 'neuroticism'. This is why 
the real of this circuit marks its presence in the profuse perverse fantasies of most neurotic 
and ordinary subjects. This is the imaginary Real, in its versatile fantasmatic apparitions 
and images in the subject's life. 5 
It was Freud who mapped out the basis of the Oedipal system first. In Totem and Taboo, 
he wove a modelling of the initial social organisation around the myth of the primordial 
father, derived from his previous analysis of the Oedipus complex. 6 The myth is well 
known: the brothers of the primal horde kill and devour their father, as a result of the 
overgrown hatred against him. The father was the despotic and powerful figure who had 
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exclusive access to the jouissance of the Thing, the mother, forbidding his sons from 
partaking in this type of enjoyment. But mother was not constituted as the desired object, 
until prohibition by the father was established. Prior to such prohibition, this primordial 
community was a world without difference. After the brothers had committed their crime 
and given expression to their hatred, the love feelings for their father turned hatred into 
remorse, into guilt. The totem substituted the father as well as the creation of God, Freud 
argued. The initial totemic religion was a product of guilt. 
Nevertheless, what Freud did not say is whether the sons, actually, slept with the mother 
(like the actual Oedipus did), the sacred and forbidden feminine figure of the horde that the 
father had usurped. In that case, the sons would have violated the law of the Thing and 
satisfied both incestual and aggressive wishes. But is there any way back to lack once 
those primitive wishes are fulfilled? As Zupanc'ic' has shown, as soon as one crosses desire 
s/he enters the realm of the impossible, the territory of the drive. 7 With regard to Oedipus, 
Zupanc'ic' suggests that he did not assume the responsibility for his destiny; similarly, the 
Oedipal basis of current liberalism thwarts responsibility for its actions (e. g. economic 
inequalities), with the difference that it does not identify with its lack, its symptom, as 
Oedipus did. In this context, it is difficult to dare the impossible and reorganise social 
relations. Instead, liberalism is perpetuated. 
There are implications of Freud's myth for politics. Joel Whitebook connects the readings 
of Totem and Taboo focused on the murder of the omnipotent Father with conservative 
thinking, whereas the egalitarian facet of Freud's essay is discerned in the pact of the 
brothers who thwarted omnipotence. Cornelius Castoriadis punctuates the importance of 
the Oedipus complex for the mythical basis of democratic and egalitarian politics, by 
putting emphasis in the child's repudiation of the drive that supported infantile 
omnipotence and fuelled its incestuous and aggressive wishes. 8 In this way, the child 
realises its decentred status, when it confronts the law of symbolic reality, heteronymous to 
the drive. 
Re-instating the authority of the primordial father, the leader assumed a political and a 
religious role, setting up a patriarchal society. He took away the 'sin' from society, but he 
needed to represent the lost prohibition and the penalising power of the father. In other 
words, paternal power needed to be restored. Thus, the leader/master occupied a position, 
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from where he could punish and use violence, as a medium of his power, in order to 
preserve the imaginary good of his mastery. He castrates, by presenting himself as if he is 
not castrated. Punishment, as a castrating tactic, is the supporting agency of any system of 
domination. The master makes the slave work, due to continuous and looming threats of 
punishment. In this way, the idea of the good is maintained, by the existence of another 
suprajudgmental position, that of God, who punishes and expresses his will through the 
moral law. 
As far as social rules and moral code are concerned, law and God occupy the two sides of 
the same coin. We do not have to go back a long time, in order to find examples of 
hyperbolic cults of leaders that ascribed a god-like image to authoritarian political figures. 
This 'equation' with God is actually an equation with His unrestrained power to punish. 
The possibility of imposing a punitive law is what augments the potency of authoritarian 
leadership. 
Personality cults have been associated frequently with leaders such as Adolf Hitler, 
Joseph Stalin, 9 Mao Zedong and more who fabricated an infallible dominative image. 
Public and private spaces were ornamented with their visual representations, while their 
exaltation by mass media or artistic creations was an imperative. In this manner, the 
powerful posture of these leaders was magnified to a pious image of absolute virtue and 
laud. Thus, the cult of personality is an exploitative political strategy that aims to secure 
the legitimacy of the leader to punish, in spite of oppressive policies which may challenge 
his 'paternal' authority. 10 But when a representative of paternal authority identifies with 
the authority itself, we move from 'Oedipalism' that limits and represses real excess, to 
'totalitarianism' that, more than simply repressing it, negates excess and transforms it into 
a punitive force. 
7.1.2 The Totalitarian System 
For the second system of my elaboration, I implement the designation 'totalitarian' as the 
typological label conditioned with references to such diverse oppressive regimes as 
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Nazism and Stalinism. Totalitarianism has a sinuous and profoundly ideologised history as 
a term, before becoming the cliche notion that has been overused in the last 15 years. 
Since its first use in 1923 by the opponents of Italian Fascism, the term has been 
associated with different ideological fields. Although initially a caustic reference to 
Mussolini's authoritarianism, the latter included the totalitarian designation in his rhetoric 
in order to denote the voluntary will that upheld the fascist movement (the 'fierce 
totalitarian will') and the all-embracing spirit of the fascist state. " Nevertheless, in Soviet 
Russia, the term never acquired a general positive connotation and Stalin considered it as 
relevant to Italian and German fascism, although Hitler as well did not espouse its use. 
Yet, under the influence of anti-Nazi expatriated German intellectuals, the West 
maintained the general meaning of totalitarianism for alluding to Nazism. In this regard, 
Italian fascism presaged the imminent transpirations in Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia 
that set the conditions for the full surfacing of the current notion of totalitarianism: 12 the 
shared characteristics between the Nazi and the Stalinist regime, such as hyperbolic 
interventionism and accretion and power, illimitable administration and control. The two 
regimes formed the pattern for the distillation of the prevailing meaning of the notion, after 
the end of the Second World War. They represented states that regulate all aspects of 
socio-political relations, in public and private sphere, assisted by propagandistic 
ideological messages and the cultivation of fear among people. 
Largely configured by German scholars, exiled to the United States, the concept of 
'totalitarianism' received an academic currency and recognition, but that was repercussive 
of a liberal standpoint. Despite the anti-fascist use of the term in the 1930s and the 
contention regarding its relevance to Stalinist Russia, liberal academics employed the 
concept of totalitarianism for dissecting phenomena in communist political systems, often 
associated with Nazi atrocities. ' 3 Two were the major works that defined the liberal 
conceptual landscape of totalitarianism, during the Cold War years: Carl Friedrich and 
Zbigniew Brzezinski's Totalitarian Dictatorship and Autocracy which outlined the main 
features of totalitarianism 14 and Hannah Arendt's Ae Origins of Totalitarianism which 
constituted a philosophical analysis of the preconditions that fostered the rise of totalitarian 
regimes. Arendt included Nazi Germany and Stalinist Russia in the same framework, as 
commensurable totalitarian schemata that aimed at the abolition of the state. 15 Another 
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influential, yet controversial work is Karl Popper's Ae Open Society and Its Enemies 
which juxtaposes liberal democracy to totalitarianism. 16 All these works adumbrated the 
current context, as well as the controversy, around the notion of 'totalitarianism 
Slavoj Ziz'ek confronts the conceptual equation of totalitarianism with both Nazism and 
Stalinism, as undifferentiated political regimes and castigates narratives, like Arendt's, as 
accountable for the current misapplication of the term. He considers totalitarianism as a 
concomitant rightist notion that functions as a melting pot for discrepancies between 
historical manifestations of fascism and communism. It reflects a futile theorisation that 
supports the current liberal-democratic sovereignty, assuming the role of an ideological 
ccstopgap. "l 7 Rather than a stimulant for our cogito, the concept of totalitarianism functions 
as an ideological soporific and an "antioxidant" that ambuscades free radical dialectics and 
secures the hegemony of the liberal democratic discourse. 18 Thus, ZiZ'ek proceeds to a 
polemic of the use of the notion of 'totalitarianism', focusing more on the need to 
differentiate Nazism from Stalinism and confront their unequivocal equation. 
My use of the term is not directly linked to these two regimes, but rather underscores the 
possibility of any masterful condition to turn into a close oppressive system. This 
possibility is open also to liberal democracy; my alluding to totalitarianism does not 
originate in an ideological posture that presents liberalism as the antidote to fascism and 
communism. Ziz'ek is right to point out the bewilderment of such distinct phenomena by 
Western intellectuals that dates back to Arendt's work and the introduction of the term 
c totalitarianism'. 
Having said this, my view is that the incongruity between fascist and Stalinist 
phenomena is so conspicuous that it cannot be simply surpassed by the (mis)use of a 
typological term or any naYve tendency to equate the two. Moreover, the renunciation of 
the term 'totalitarianism' would only serve as an attestation of the insufficiency to expose 
the differences between fascism and communism. The consistent use of the term 
'totalitarianism' by Z'iz'ek - even though he puts it in brackets - seems to support this 
suggestion. If nothing, this is indicative of Z'iz'ek's familiar oscillating gesture, according 
to which he repudiates certain notions, although himself repeatedly makes use of them. 19 
Thus, the present elaboration employs the notion of totalitarianism in order to denote its 
amplitude of meanings, rather than a fixed meaning opposed to liberal democracy. Its use 
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is closer to the idea of totalising certainty about the closure of society, an aspiration 
cultivated by every system of mastery. I maintain the central idea of totalitarianism as 
referring to an inclusive administration of all aspects of social and private life of the 
subject. However, the focus is not on drawing a line of demarcation between liberalism 
and regimes of modernity, but on describing a process regulated by power and discourse 
that reflects both similarities and differences between political systems. 
In this vein, my attempt is to reveal the self-subversive effect of the concept of 
'totalitarianism' as used within the liberal democratic discourse, which favours 
'Oedipalism' according to my previous argumentation. Liberal capitalism can shift into the 
'totalitarian' system by extending its existing repressive strictures. The possibility of a 
totalitarian bureaucratic capitalism is not eliminated, especially when its current globalised 
vision runs through upward accretion of wealth and their power. In our epoch, 
multinational companies increasingly magnify and expand their power in the international 
terrain, controlling economy and influencing policies. This growing reification of social 
relations, cultivates the ascendance of an economic 'oligarchy' of exorbitant wealth. 
Probably, Castoriadis was quite right in his view of the Soviet Russia as comprising an 
exaggerated version of capitalism; It set a system which revealed the common basis of the 
Soviet Union with Western societies, with the first forming a more esoteric "bureaucratic 
totalitarian capitalism. , 20 
Repression is the modus operandi of the Oedipal system and the generator of a series of 
apparitions of the real through unutterable images (the sublime of visual arts, for example). 
The rigid augmentation of repression, which maintains the imaginary real, flows into a 
state of 'over-repression' that changes the circuit of jouissance, in its relation to the law. 
The law's edict shifts and takes the form of this decree: "Enjoy this little (a) as much as 
possible, " which means that the imaginary element of the real does not operate anymore. In 
its lieu, the real accompanies certain empty symbolic codes and practices, like fascism's 
'Final Solution', for instance. 
This is the symbolic real, which curves the symbolic, or I would say it perverts the 
symbolic. The supposed perverse maxim "Enjoy! " is limited to specific orders of the law. 
One should find his or her unlimited jouissance in the obedience of these strictures of the 
law. There is over-identifi cation with the law. 21 There is not just repression of Oedipal 
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knowledge, but also negation of this knowledge. By inventing numerous anonymous 
signifiers, similar to the 'Final Solution', the Nazis tried to negate the truth of the 
massacring in the concentration camps. This is how the system of totalitarian oppression is 
organised, which in the case of fascism asks for the execution of the Jew as an act 
promoted by the law. It is a law that calls for over-identification with the authority that 
permits thejouissance of obedience to the master. 
Knowledge (S2) in totalitarianism is denounced; actions, such as the burning of books or 
austere policies against critical thinking, in favour of natural and physical activity, reveal 
this. Among other intellectual movements to have been vilified by totalitarianism, 
psychoanalysis was deplored by both Nazism and Stalinism. Knowledge was seen as the 
limit to the jouissance of the people. Scientists in the Stalinist order were the slaves, 
working for thejouissance of the master, the communist party. But it was not an effort to 
produce knowledge about jouissance, but a way to ensure jouissance. 22 The repetition of 
the fascist and Stalinist crimes was driven by the desire to break the limit of knowledge 
and ensure the master signifiers (the superiority of the Aryan race or communism, 
respectively) met their end: to satisfy desire, which is of course impossible. 
For the fascist, the fantasy that fuels his Will-to-Power is the image of the Superman, as 
the narcissistic image of perfect physical wholeness and dynamism that any German 
should identify with. What fantasy injects to power is the necessary consistency and 
certainty of the law, which points towards a certain good. This good takes the place of the 
object, as an imaginary embodiment of the real, which is presented as the true and divine 
thing. State power must take a position of certainty, regarding the supremacy and 
truthfulness of this good. It has to show that it possesses the knowledge and the means to 
secure the good. For this reason, the subject of power cannot show signs of guilt, if the 
latter is seen as the experience of something 'gone wrong'. The good, as dictated by the 
despotic (imaginary) father, can only be right and this is what power has to promote. 
Otherwise, if guilt is recognised by power, what is renounced is the absolute righteous 
value of the supreme good. This becomes corruptible, since it cannot keep its promise and 
fulfil desire; something escapes from its supremacy. 
Narcissistic omnipotence leaves no space for polyphony in desire. Nevertheless, the 
multitude of desire's transformations is something that marks the impossibility of desire to 
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reach satisfaction, which is also what stamps the impossibility of the totalitarian fantasy; 
because totalitarianism is rooted in the omnipotence (the absolute mastery of desire) 
ingrained in every ideological fantasy of power. If totalitarianism inhabits desire for lost 
omnipotence, it is desire for non-difference at the same time. Driven by this narcissistic 
force, totalitarianism abolishes democratic pluralism. It manifests itself as a political 
movement that sternly advocates its eminence compared to other parties and promotes an 
ideal that promises to recover society's "organic unity and eliminate any division and 
disharmony; with totalitarianism the dawn of 'utopia' is never too far away, " Stavrakakis 
points out. 23 
Totalitarianism can take different forms, depending on their fantasmatic content, their 
underlying ideology. Any ideological content of power aims to veil the common unknown 
factor that exceeds all moral and clinical designations, namely the real. Totalitarian 
ideologies attempt to mask the real with imaginary constructs, that is 'totalised 
representations' about omnipotence. 24 The fantasy of non-difference is delivered as a 
fictional construct (ideology) providing consistency and certainty to any system of 
mastery. Yet, when ideology is fused with the impossible (in other words, with what 
hypostatises it), totalitarianism occupies the political lieu as a system of omnipotence. 
Ideology merges with the fantasy of domination found in the upper level of the master's 
discourse, on the level of impossibility. 
For totalitarian power, the impossible (real) lies tangible in everyone's reach, in symbolic 
reality, as the phallus comes to embody this real; but as soon as someone reaches out for 
this symbolic real, its failure to grasp it emerges. The subject grasps an empty fantasy. 
Fascist imperialism and the execution of the Jew were attempts to capture the impossible, 
the fullness of being as feasible conditions. But the more the impossible is fused with 
fantasies and utopian ideals, the more barbarous the realisation of the failure to capture it 
appears to be. 
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7.1.3 The Sadean System 
The third system is defined by the literary works of marquis de Sade. But it must be noted 
that the Sadean system should not be regarded as perverse per se. Sade as a historical 
figure fits better the first system of repression. Given that his writings are anything but 
commensurate with his normal life, Sade is an ordinary neurotic who obsessively 
compiles the abundance of his fantasies. He tried all his life to decipher the imaginary 
real of his fantasies, to find the signifiers to describe it. 
The system Sade created in The 120 Days of Sodom is of neither repression nor 
oppression. The Sadean system comes closer to the idea of utopia, as a subversive system 
of the real Real . 
25 The dominant position in the discourse of the Sadean master is taken 
by signifiers, which are not empty, but over-charged withjouissance. In the totalitarian 
system, the real is disguised behind meaningless signifiers. In Sade, this very 
meaninglessness becomes the unbearable meaning of his master signifiers, which renders 
his system utterly subversive. For example, 'dismemberment', 'ceaseless tortures' and 
'repetitive death' organise a system of domination that simply cannot exist. It is defacto 
6u-topian', as it dwells in the dimension of the real. It is a subversive system sustained by 
a subversive fantasy of power. The fantasy of the Sadean subject encompassing the real, 
in its absolute, chaotic, diabolic and interminable form, marks the impossibility of this 
masterful system. 
The notorious Sadean fantasy of the indestructible body that maintains its beauty 
eternally, through perpetual torments does not renounce unity. If the unity of the image is 
eradicated in Sade's writings, unity as a recycled substance and bacchanal energy is 
maintained. This substance is thejouissance of the body as an interconnected mass, where 
the boundaries between the organic and inorganic are blurred. Enjoyment sutures the 
severed parts. For this reason, the Sadean fantasy is incompatible with totalitarian power 
which always reveals itself through a polished image of unity and a final goal (e. g. the 
'Final Solution'). In Sade, there is no end, but eternity and infinity. His system does not 
seek so much accumulation of jouissance as diffusion of jouissance. In this respect, it is 
not the eradication of differences, as we saw it is for Chasseguet-Smirgel, 
26 but more the 
confirmation of differences, in an anarchic and fragmented mode. As far as it relies on 
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fantasy, even Sade delineates a space ofjouissance that forms an oxymoron: it percolates 
the symbolic and, in spite of its dissolving effects, the signifier does not fade in excess, but 
rather captures it. 
The fantasy Sade fabricated in his writings, illustrates power relations not Per se 
perverse, but characterised as such by an a posteriori moral designation determined by 
Oedipal power: the fantasy (castration of jouissance) that the master promotes. 
ideological narratives prevaricate the acknowledgment of Sade's radical thrust that 
imbues his discursive system, by denouncing it, as the inspiring source for the atrocities 
of Nazism. This ideological tactic aims to conceal political responsibility and guilt under 
the veil of perversion. It circumscribes the common ideological approach that disguises 
the real component, operating in politics. This is why current capitalism cannot be seen as 
advancement, compared to preceding systems. As Kunkle notes, commenting on ZiZ'ek: 
In contemporary conditions with the loss of symbolic prohibitions and the increasing 
presence of the superego command to enjoy beyond interdiction, we end up with the 
ultimate paradox of the overlapping of transgression and the norm, and this means 
perversion is less shocking and subversive. 27 
If the real Real also characterises perversion, which one of the two 'reals' is responsible 
for the perverse designation? This would simply divulge the paradox and the failure of 
perversion as a designation. Does the pervert really instrumentalise himself for the 
Other's jouissance? Does he really cross the limit of the pleasure principle? The Other's 
jouissance in Lacan has a pleasurable connotation and this is understood, when one sees 
the Other as pointing towards a certain good, the ideal of the master signifier, that bans 
excess. In the case of the Sadean heroes, sadistic or masochistic pain takes the form of a 
good, having a transaction value. In the space of the Sadean system, pain is pleasurable. 
If the sadistic ritual serves a good, desire is put in a waiting list. This is similar to the way 
Lacan sees power's morality, declaring: "As far as desires are concerned, come back 
later. Make them wait. , 28 
Freud supports this point, when he argues that dominant power gives expression to the 
drive through aggression. This occurs in relation to a certain law and gives an outward 
expression to the death drive. Yet pleasure is derived from the expression of the sexual 
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drive. Freud seems to recognise the bond between the outbound expression of the drive and 
the notion of power by stating: 
The libido has the task of making the destroying instinct innocuous, and it fulfils the task 
by diverting that instinct to a great extent outwards - soon with the help of a special 
organic system, the muscular apparatus- towards objects in the external world. The 
instinct is then called the destructive instinct, the instinct for mastery, or the will to 
power. 29 
The filmic transposition by Pasolini of the fascist system of Sa16, where Mussolini's 
regime is identified with the Sadean system, fails to represent the real domination of the 
Sadean master, but it succeeds in capturing the barbarous domination of the totalitarian 
system. The film does not work as a representation of perverse sexuality, because it is 
basically a film on domination. The system of SalO' lacks perverse sensualism; instead, 
harsh images of sexual exploitation dominate the spectacle. 
The film does not succeed in elevating fascism at the echelon of the Sadean real Real. 
Thus, fascism remains within the totalitarian context of the symbolic real . 
30 As Z'i2ek has 
demonstrated, one (positive) side of the fascist fantasy serves the cramming of the 
emptiness of the Aryan ideal, so that jouissance stems from this ideal only. The other 
(negative) side of this fantasy, serves the same purpose: to fill an empty ideal that demands 
the obliteration of the non-Aryan outcasts, with Jews first in line. 31 As a result, the 
symbolic reality established by the fascist law is the procurator of hisjouissance, which is 
and and empty of any sensationalism or erotic passion. 32 
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Part 11: Conclusion 
By implementing the logic of the four discourses that Lacan outlined in his Seminar XVII, 
the goal of this part's critical analysis was focused on the type of discourse that better 
describes fascism and questions its link to perversion, at a systematic level. Narratives 
about fascism create implicit or explicit discursive links of the phenomenon with 
perversion. Put in Lacanian terms, fascism constitutes a discourse that forwards perverse 
desire. 
The first step was to differentiate these two notions by implementing the Lacanian 
theory of discourse and to situate the fascist and the pervert in dissimilar positions, 
regarding the social bonds they form. Each discourse produces a certain fantasy that 
serves power, that is, the circuit ratified by the phallic signifier as embodied by the 
master. Fantasy secures the domination of the master and the phallus, promising the 
satisfaction of desire. At the level of fantasy, it is very difficult to distinguish the lines 
that dichotomise the power of the fascist from that of the pervert, since they both strive 
for the same goal, to make the Other complete, non-lacking. Power serves desire and 
desire is always the desire of the Other (both objective and subjective genitive). 
Nonetheless, at least, one factor makes fascism and perversion incompatible and this is 
domination. Fascist power is assisted by a fantasy of domination. In all its forms there is 
an inferior other, a slave that has to work for the fascist's jouissance. This was elucidated 
by the discourse of the master. It is necessary to take perversion into a different discourse 
than the fascist and Lacan theorisation about discourse served this aim. Thus, in the 
present analysis, perversion was related to Lacan's discourse of the hysteric, challenging 
the crossing boundaries between neurosis and perversion. 
By connecting ideologies to the fantasmatic constructs of power that the master 
discourse produces, I attempted to put forward an elaboration that disengages 
psychoanalytic research on concepts under development (such as perversion) from their 
casual linking to ideological issues. Psychoanalytic research should be conducted within 
the discourse of the analyst, exploring the lack inherent to all forms of subjectivity. 
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PART III 
Ethics 
introduction: 
imagine the Law: Domination and the Ethics of Desire 
Having explored the discursive framework of fascism's relation to perversion, here the 
main axis of my critique intersects with the debate on the ethical issues raised by 
historical fascism. Once again, we find allusions to the category of perversion, which 
appears to be an explanatory tool for analysing not only irregular sexual behaviours, but 
also fierce socio-political acts that challenge existing morality. The psychoanalytic 
exploration of ethical questions is an essential task which can elucidate unconscious 
processes. Lacan states that the status of the unconscious is not ontological but ethical, 
namely beyond being and the underlying causality that Freud discerned in it. ' Just as the 
unconscious marks a trans-individual terrain outside the subject's grasp, similarly ethics 
is a field beyond materialist conceptions of good and evil. Thus, by applying 
psychoanalysis to the question of ethics, my aim is to emphasise its primacy in the study 
of the unconscious and its resistance to the ontological sovereignty of Western 
philosophy that relates ethics to the ontological domain. 
The Second World War and the Nazi atrocities comprised the fulcrum for a radical 
reconsideration of contemporary ethics in an attempt to comprehend the failure of ethical 
principles to sustain the social edifice. It is a failure that calls for a retrospective 
assessment of ethics. In an unexpected fashion, the thought of Sade would be the focus of 
philosophical speculation and the starting point for a reappraisal of traditional morality. 
Contrary to such morality, the eighteenth century writer came to embody the brutality and 
the abhorrence that could be derived from an ethical attitude, revealing ethics' potential 
for evil. 
The ethical scrutiny of the historical atrocities of fascism and the Holocaust has struck 
on a paradoxical, yet astonishing affinity between the thoughts of Kant and Sade, 
expounded by several prominent scholars. 2 Horkheimer and Adorno were the first to 
draw the parallel between the Enlightenment philosopher's thought and Sadean cruelty. 
Years later, Lacan made another allusion to the subtle link between the two. 3 This link is 
the epicentre of the present part's critique, as my critique unfolds around the postulation 
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that the fascist crimes were an ontological example of the fulfilment of Kantian ethics, as 
well as the truth of Sade. If the fascist atrocities constitute the legacy of Sade, whose 
name for many, accurately or not, is synonymous with perverse sexuality, inevitably 
Kantian ethics and fascism are endowed with a rather perverse aura. 
In order to explore this hypothesis, I further expand the previous discussion on 
Eichmann, 4 but in line with the objectives of this part which focuses primarily on ethics 
and the rather uneasy question, regarding the executions the Nazi officer conducted: Did 
Eichmann follow his duty, embodying Kant's moral thesis? Considering the evil caused 
by the performance of such duty, this ironical Kantian position paves a morality qua 
Sade's resemblance to Kant. We saw earlier MacCannell's argument that Eichmann's 
Kantianism actually reflects his perverse structure, amounting to the validity of Lacan's 
theorisation in "Kant with Sade. "5 This indicates something cunning about Eichmann's 
ethical duty, which I take as representative of the National Socialist duty and explore 
whether it was its perversity that caused the unforeseen and irrevocable atrocities modem 
European history witnessed. 
Was fascist catastrophe something originating in the position of the fascist, a position 
charged with an enjoyment not to be abandoned in the name of the neighbour, in other 
words, in the name of otherness? The lack of acknowledgement of the law of otherness 
(Difference) brings us to the standard view of perversion in psychoanalysis. 
Nevertheless, a narrative that singles out a perverse core in fascism turns an ideological 
formation into a regressive structure, considering perversion's relation to early narcissism 
and infantile sexuality. What does regressive mean in the field of politics, if not the 
prevalence of an omnipotent narcissistic fantasmatic position? One of the points to be 
elaborated in the present part is the way omnipotence intertwines with totalitarian politics 
and fascism in particular, exploring its relation to perversion. Imagining a rigid law, 
which is not lacking, sets up a system of domination that alternates between violence and 
fantasies of grandeur. Thus, a logic that passes from the fantasy of omnipotence to 
perverse scenarios will form the vector for my reappraisal of ethical propositions in the 
field of psychoanalysis. 
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Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: Tavistock, 1992). 
4 As pointed out in the first chapter, in his trial, Eichmann said he had nothing personal against Jews; on the 
contrary, he was even sympathetic towards them. However, he had to perform his duty as a Nazi officer, 
conducting the execution of Jewish people. The radical aspect of Eicbmann's statement lies on the startling 
banality and bureaucratic nature of it. Never before have a bureaucratic ethics been associated with evil, 
something that led Hannah Arendt to the conception of the notion of the banality of evil, after her interview 
with Eichmann. See Hannah Arendt, Eichmann in Jerusalem: A Report on the Banality of Evil, (New York: 
Penguin, 1992 [19631). 
' See Juliet Flower MacCannell, "Facing Fascism: A Feminine Politics of Jouissance, " in Lacan, Politics, 
Aesthetics, ed. by Willy Apollon and Richard Feldstein (Albany: State University of New York Press, 
1996), pp. 65-99 and "Fascism and the Voice of Conscience" in The Hysteric's Guide to the Future of the 
Female Subject (Minneapolis, London: University of Minnesota Press, 2000), pp. 138-139. 
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8. Sade with Kant and Eichmann 
8.1 The Kant in Sade 
In 1795, Sade published one of his principal works, Philosophy in the Boudoir, a book 
that came after several years of imprisonment and a number of scandalous incidents of its 
auteur that often troubled the French magistrates. I It is in this work that Sade weaves the 
model of his 'aberrant' morality. In the 'fifth dialogue' of the Philosophy, one finds the 
illustrious pamphlet "Yet Another Effort, Frenchmen, If You Would Become 
Republicans, " where Sade develops his 'sinister' ideas about religion and manners. 
Eight years earlier, in 1787, Kant wrote Ae Critique of Practical Reason, a major 
philosophical oeuvre, which expanded Kant's contribution in the terrain of ethical 
speculation. Kant's ethical stance is defined by one's obedience to a supreme ethical 
categorical imperative impervious to any heteronomous will, that is any ethical attitude 
determined by hypothetical imperatives and laws instituted by someone else. 
The pioneering element of Kantian ethics was that it moved beyond the common 
perception of a predetermined supreme good, since such a perception involves a 
heteronomous content. What is ultimately valued in Kant is not the good but the law. For 
him, "there is only one moral good, defined as an act accomplished in conformity with 
duty and strictly for the sake of duty, " as Zupanc'ic' notes. 2 By this token, Kant became 
the first philosopher to swerve from traditional ethics of the good. Leading a new ethical 
paradigm beyond good, Kant would have been astounded to find the affirmation of his 
ethical edifice in Sade's philosophy of evil and virility. 
Horkheimer and Adorno made a critical effort to draw a line of comparison between 
Kant and Sade in their pivotal work Dialectic of Enlightenment, bracing their dialectical 
critique of Western culture. 3 For the two authors, Sade is not a brutal uncivilised mind, 
but primarily an intellectual, whose literal world presages Western civilisation's 
catastrophic turn, after the French Revolution. The liberal model that prevailed in 
Western society usurped and severely distorted the Enlightenment principles. Liberalism 
is camouflaged in Kantian reason, so that it conveys an ostensible continuity with 
Enlightenment tradition; it promotes an ethical attitude of unconditional obedience to law 
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as the supreme value qua Kant, in order to preserve its hegemony. The perverse figure of 
Sade is the bourgeois prototype for the appropriation of Kantian logic that culminated in 
capitalist domination and the disastrous rise of fascism. According to Kant, all personal 
egotistic interests must be denounced, as external restrictions to an ethical act that 
confonns to a universal ethical duty. Sade's philosophy posits an analogous duty, which 
decrees the quest of pleasure for the sake of pleasure, indifferent to any barriers that 
impede the strict performance of this duty. In that sense, the moral law must be abolished 
as restrictive to the supremacy of the corporeal pleasure of the master. 
A similar subversion inheres to Kantian thought, since the Enlightenment philosopher 
4 loathed a morality that was determined by egotistic and sentimental interests. The only 
thing that is valued is the ethical duty itself and the very supremacy of the duty boycotts 
sentimentality. In both Kant and Sade, the unyielding character of the ethical maxim 
defines an icy duty that recognises no other legality than itself. The ethical law leaves no 
space for sentiments; the ethical subject is a cold performer of her duty. 
Nevertheless, for Horkheimer and Adorno, the renunciation of any authentic and 
humane disposition unveils the cold basis of the market relations that a materialistic 
society attempts to conceal under a cloak of emotionalism. 5 The perverse scenes of 
Sade's writings are snapshots of an emotionless capitalist life and reified social relations 
that lie under the veil of p seudo- sentimentality and intellectualism. Sade removes this 
veil, revealing the vain emptiness of bourgeois rationality. Thus, his libertinage, along 
with Kant's moral philosophy, exemplifies, at best, the hidden apathy and remoteness of 
bourgeois morality which instrumentalised any type of activity, even sexual behaviour. In 
so long as sexual pleasure is reduced to an indifferent motorized activity, it serves 
domination. 
The instrumentalisation of Kantian thought endorsed Nazism, as the mythological 
disguise and expansion of liberalism. 6 In this light, the ethics of pure practical reason has 
been a catastrophe, since Kantian rationality, rather than harmonising social relations, 
became the pedestal for the growth of fascist barbarity. For Horkheimer and Adorno, 
Sade is the emblem of this catastrophic system that perverted the Enlightenment reason. 
Sweeping the limits of pleasure and morality, Sade configures a system of mere 
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exploitation which is self-subversive per se, namely it converts the aura of Enlightenment 
to a destructive and evil energy. 7 
In spite of the ostensible incompatibility of the philosophies of Sade and Kant, their 
unexpected congruence in Horkheimer and Adorno's work laid the cards for similar 
works to follow. Years later, Lacan recited the link between Sade and Kant, in a more 
radical and unorthodox fashion, arguing that the first constitutes the truth of the latter, in 
,, 8 his seminal essay "Kant with Sade. 
Serving different purposes from the critique of the Dialectic, Lacan contemplates the 
relation that embraces this heretical couple, initially when he discusses the ethics of 
psychoanalysis in Seminar VII, between 1959 and 1960. According to Lacan's ethical 
speculation, psychoanalytic practice must repudiate any pre-fixed idea of 'the good' 
shared by the analyst or the analysand's ego. If the analyst forwards his good, the analytic 
process is transformed into a narcissistic confirmation of his/her ego. Neither the 
analysand's idea of the good benefits the analytic process, inasmuch as his/her suffering 
reveals incongruence between desire and the good maintained by his/her ego. 
The last chapter of the seminar on ethics begins with this question: "Have you acted in 
conformity with your desire? "9 For Lacan desire is singular; there is just one desire 
instead of desires in the plural. Desires are nothing more than metonymic manifestations 
of one primordial desire: the desire of the primeval Thing lost forever. Ethical is any act 
which conforms to the desire of the actor and therefore gains the status of a universal 
principle, disengaged from the sphere of egotistic interests, since desire goes beyond the 
level of the good. 10 So, an ethical act encompasses judgement implicitly or explicitly, for 
which desire is taken as a canon. 
The desire of the subject is exalted and acquires the status of a universal maxim, a duty 
the subject has to perform at any rate, just like Kant's ethical duty. Desire as the 
obdurate maxim constitutes the only valid ethical law and this is what renders the ethics 
of psychoanalysis Kantian at stake. Psychoanalysis must remain outside the normative 
field of each culture and the goods/ideals it endorses. In order to illustrate this, Lacan 
alludes to Antigone as the ethical heroine and an archetype for psychoanalytic ethics; it is 
an allusion that still causes contention regarding its validity. 
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Lacan continued to elaborate and revise his theorisation about the ethics of desire, as 
Zupanc'ic' points out. In Seminar VII, Lacan conceives the moral law as "desire in its pure 
state, " but in Seminar X1 he places the drive as the ultimate goal of analysis, without 
however the question of desire losing its centrality. 11 Zupanc c 'i' ingeniously demonstrates 
the implication of desire and drive for ethics. The two are not so much incompatible as 
formative of a continuum. Desire constitutes a defence, a 'compromise formation' against 
the real enjoyment of the drive. 12 In order for the subject to enter the realm of the drive, 
she needs first to cross the boundary defined by her desiring status. ' 3 
In Seminar VII, Lacan has recourse to Sade as the embodiment of Kant's ethical 
universal axiom, according to which a moral attitude is accomplished by a condition of 
apathy, that is, the expulsion of all egotistic sentiments. 14 Egotistic interests are 
'pathological' and they should be sacrificed in the name of the universalised axiom; the 
universal moral law itself is the supreme good. This is a pure ethical attitude according to 
Kant which becomes commensurable with the pervert's sacrifice of enjoyment in the 
name of the Other's enjoyment. 
In 1962, when Lacan writes "Kant with Sade, " he expounds this relation between 
Kantian ethics and Sadean fantasy. Based on the treatise "Yet Another Effort, 
Frenchmen... " 15 Lacan reads Sade's philosophical crux in the form of a maxim of a 
supreme value, just as Kant enunciates the categorical imperative. ' 6 Sade's anti-moral 
maxim is the absolute rule that ensures the right tojouissance. The rule is: 
I have the right of enjoyment over your body, anyone can say to me, and I will exercise 
this right, without any limit stopping me in the capriciousness of the exactions that I 
might have the taste to satiate. 17 
The Sadean maxim enables Lacan to illustrate the division of the subject manifested in 
the axiomatic values that determine her discursive position; that is the subject of the 
enunciation (the particular I) and the subject of the statement (the universal me). This 
means that the subject who speaks in the maxim is not Sade; the 'I' at the beginning of 
the sentence belongs to the 'anyone' of the sentence and not to Sade. This 'anyone' is the 
Other that takes the place of the subject of the enunciation, whereas Sade takes the place 
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of the statement, namely he personifies the enunciation, through the object of the 
sentence: 'me'. 
The division between the subject of the enunciation and the subject of the statement is 
commensurate with Kant's stipulation of an identity caught up between the supremacy of 
a universal law and the distinctive position of the legislator. Sade exemplifies the ethical 
priority of the subject of enunciation. For him all other subjects are nothing but the 
mediums to accomplish his purpose, which is to make the Other exist and the place of 
enunciation to be occupied by Nature. 
What other than Nature's voice suggests to us personal hatreds, revenges, wars, in a 
word, all those causes of perpetual murder? Now, if she incites us to murderous acts, she 
has need of them; that once grasped, how may we suppose ourselves guilty in her regard 
when we do nothing more than obey her intentions? 18 
If the supremacy of the law conforms to a wry analogy with the Freudian superego, then 
Sade appears to be the envoy of Kantian ethics. By admitting blind obedience to one 
single demand of the Other (Nature), the imperative 'Enjoy! ' in its absolute superegoic 
dimension, as Lacan suggested, the Sadean subject instrumental i ses himself in order to 
meet the demand and transposes his divided status to the victim. 19 The blatant and 
uncompromised obedience to the Other's demand resembles the apathy that accompanies 
the submission to the categorical imperative of Kant: 'Do your duty! ' The superego 
decrees always-another duty for the subject to pursue, succumbing to its rigidity that 
evokes the stiffness of the Kantian duty. The ferocious character of the superego is 
manifest in the relentless demands on the subject, who is caught up in a vicious cycle of 
austere obedience to the law and her incapacity to meet those demands. The more the 
subject adheres to the letter of the law the more the superego tightens its noose around the 
subject through the instrument of guilt. 
There we have the formation of a paradoxical couple, where morality and anti-morality 
have a common denominator: Sade's cruel sexual ordeals are in accordance with Kantian 
ethics. On the basis of this speculation, where Sade's fundamental axiom is equivalent to 
Kant's ethical dictum, Lacan argues that it is Kant with Sade and not 'after' or 'and', 
wishing to emphasise the continuance of their thought that occupies the two sides of the 
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same coin. In this manner, Lacan adumbrates the perverse lining of Enlightenment, since 
one finds in Sade the 'repressed' truth of Kant. 
Lacan is influenced by Horkheimer and Adorno's argument, despite the fact that he does 
not allude to their work . 
20 Having taken a different pathway, Lacan thus reaches a similar 
conclusion to that of the authors of the Dialectic of Enlightenment. In the Dialectic, Sade 
accomplishes Kantian ethics better than Kant, forming a negative antipode to the ethical 
philosophy of the latter. Instead of its affirmation, Sade twists the Kantian reason of 
Enlightenment and he submits it to a dystopic subversion. Nonetheless, Lacan argues that 
Sade crystallises the truth of Kant's reason. They are both occupants of the same positive 
axis solidified by a relation of complementarity rather than by dichotomy. 21 Sade is not 
the perversion of Kant, but more the necessary supplement for understanding the latter. 
Lacan's argument appears to suggest that Sade is the truth of Kant. 
Probably, this claim is not as 'outrageous' as its reverse form. If Sade reveals the truth 
of Kant, then it can also be argued that Kant is the truth of Sade. In that case, the problem 
with this coupling is perspicuous, as the ethical subject's counterpart is the Sadean villain 
and perversion comes to emblematise the truth of Kantian ethics. The latter comes to 
sanction torture and exploitation. 
8.2 (Pseudo) Ethics of Domination 
For Kant it is not essential to bind the ethical maxim to the particular person who 
enunciates it; quite the opposite, the one thing that counts is for the moral law to be 
obeyed and its supreme value is related to the absence of a particular enunciator. Since 
the moral law possesses an impersonal character, the ethical command originates from no 
obvious source. On performing this duty all egotistic sentiments are eliminated; all but 
one fundamental sentiment which Kant does not fail to notice: this is pain, as the 
quintessential experience of the ethical duty. Accomplishing your duty for the sake of it 
leaves pleasure aside and paves the way for an ethical attitude of constant torment. 
This prerequisite appears to be accomplished by the libertinage exalted by Sade. In the 
Sadean universe, the experience of jouissance becomes its canopy, as pain is 
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superimposed on pleasure. With Sade as a main reference in the Ethics seminar, Lacan 
introduces the term 'transgressive jouissance'; this is where pleasure andiouissance are 
severed and the two states are no longer synonymous. 22 To enjoy the transgressive 
character ofjouissance means to surrender oneself to more pain. Pain is a component of 
jouissance, which rises above the limit that the pleasure principle inflicts. The latter 
functions on the basis of the law of homeostasis. By keeping excitation to an optimum 
low level, pleasure is obtained. The symbolic law ensures the preservation of this 
optimum level, by proscribing any excessive excitation, since it commands the subject to 
"enjoy as little as possible. , 23 Nonetheless, this limit is often crossed, since it cannot be 
strictly charted, and the subject finds herself in a gorge, over-flooded with excitation. 
The notion of jouissance, during the years that followed the Ethics seminar, became 
equivalent to the experience of both pleasure and pain as a single packet. Jouissance is 
tied to the impossible, forming a copula between death and libido. 24 Sade gives pain its 
privileged position, something that brings him on the side of Kant. The exchange of 
unremitting torments dominates the Sadean system stretching its boundaries from finitude 
to infinity, from pleasure tojouissance. 25 Pleasure easily lapses giving way to pain, as the 
permanent inhabitant of the subject's existence. 
Let us proceed to a scrutiny of the ethical status of the Sadean executioner, when he 
exploits Other people's pain and humiliation. Sade's heroes personify and substantiate 
the ethical duty. To say that Sade's world principally enfolds jouissance means that the 
pursuit ofjouissance becomes a painful ethical duty for the Sadean hero that carries him 
beyond the realm of pleasure. But is it possible to swing the pendulum towards the 
opposite direction and see pain as a subversive idiosyncratic tactic to gain pleasure in 
accordance with the subversive flavour of Sade's system? It is contentious whether we 
are dealing with a painful Sadean duty qua Kant or with a Sadean ploy of gaining 
pleasure out of pain that cannot acquire a universal eminence. The relation between the 
Sadean world and jouissance, as its basic constituent, diverges from the rectilinear 
relation that characterises the Kantian subject and the ethical maxim. 
What is to be elaborated in the following sections is a counter-argument to the ethical 
affiliation of Sade to Kant. Given its Sadean connotation, transgressive jouissance has 
been thought as the modus operandi of the pervert's jouissance. Is it the transgression of 
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the law that brings jouissance to the sadist and the fascist? Were the fascist atrocities the 
product of following desire as an ethical maxim of supreme value? 
8.2.1 The Sadean Imaginary Ethics 
The Sadean subject acts in accordance with an imaginary law. Sade imagines the law as a 
structure that has a certain limit which he crosses, yielding to enjoyment. Of course, it is 
something that Sade can only claim in his writings, where he invents new signifiers to 
denote transgressive and destructive jouissance, since he never crossed the limit of 
fantasy in his actual life. The peculiar virtue of crime, that is, evil sought for evil's sake 
(what Sade calls the Supreme-Being-in-Evil)26 all indicate thejouissance one encounters, 
when he transgresses the law: 
27 All those duties are imaginary, since they are only conventional . 
Once you concede me the proprietary right of enjoyment, that right is independent of the 
effects enjoyment produces; from this moment on, it becomes one, whether this 
enjoyment be beneficial or damaging to the object which must submit itself to me. 28 
It cannot be denied that we have the light to decree laws that compel woman to yield to 
the flames of him who would have her; violence itself being one of that right's effects, 
we can employ it lawfully. Indeed! Has Nature not proven we have that light, by 
bestowing upon us the strength needed to bend women to our Will? 29 
The term that seems to describe the Sadean pervert's relation tojouissance and his "right 
of enjoyment" is instrumentalisation. According to Lacan, the Sadean executioner renders 
himself an instrument of the Other's jouissance, 30 taking the position of the enunciator of 
the ethical maxim that Lacan articulates in "Kant with Sade. 1531 In The 12 0 Days of 
Sodom, we find an illustration of a similar instrumentalisation: 
When Nature inculcated in him the irresistible desire to commit crime, she most 
prudently arranged to put beyond his reach those acts which could disturb her operations 
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or conflict with her will. Ha, my ffiend, be sure that all the rest is entirely permitted, and 
that she has not been so idiotic as to give us the power of discomfiting her or disturbing 
her workings. The blind instruments of her inspirations, were she to order us to set fire, 
the only crime possible would be in resisting her: all the criminals on earth are nothing 
32 but agents of her caprices... 
By becoming an instrument of the Other's enjoyment (Nature), the Sadean pervert serves 
the Other's Will-to-Enjoy. Nonetheless, such an interpretation of perversion places the 
pervert in the position of the servant and disregards his ownjouissance that opposes the 
universality of the ethical maxim. The Sadean executioner may maintain the rigidity and 
the uncompromising character of the ethical duty, yet he links it to his own particular 
interests, in other words to his fantasies. This is something that contradicts the idea of a 
universal ethical duty, from which one derives no personal pleasure, but unconditionally 
obeys it, regardless of what the consequences for oneself may be. If the Sadean 
executioner is personally interested in the act he perfonns, in line with his fantasies, his 
apathy is not the manifestation of an ethical attitude, but more the acting out of a cruel 
fantasy. 
Consequently, the Sadean subject, as well as the ordinary pervert, fails to reduce himself 
to a mere object. As Zupanc'ic' notes, it is impossible to eliminate all pathological interests 
in a Kantian ethical act, without crossing the limit of the Other. 33 This means that neither 
the Sadean nor the ordinary pervert can totally reduce themselves to an object, since the 
desire of the Other is still there. In my view, a hint of hypocrisy inheres to someone's 
offering of her/himself as an instrument for the Other's enjoyment; because her/his own 
enjoyment resides precisely in the instrumentalised position s/he takes. Surprisingly, 
Lacan does not seem to discern this contradiction, when he schernatises the formula of 
the Sadean fantasy. 
Nevertheless, this fantasmatic structure embraces the potentiality for evil and cruelty, 
when someone places him/herself in the position of the executioner of the categorical 
imperative. Zupanc'ic' notices the problem of such instrumentalisation, pointing out its 
pseudo-Kantianism or what she calls the 'Sadean trap'. 34 Distancing herself from the 
Kantianism that Lacan discerns in Sade, yet maintaining Lacan's argument on the 
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pervert's instrumentalisation, Zupancvic- states that the perverse subject who ascribes his 
jouissance to the Other is hiding behind the law: 
The Kantian subject cannot escape the Real involved in unconditional duty by hiding 
behind the image of his fellow-man - but neither can this subject hide behind his duty, 
and as an excuse for his actions. [ ... ] On the contrary, the subject is fully responsible for 
what he refers to as his duty. The type of discourse where I use my duty as an excuse for 
my actions is perverse in the strictest sense of the word. " 
For Zupanc'ic', perversion is a condition that misappropriates Kantian ethics, since it uses 
the Other as an excuse for its ethical fagade. The Sadean subject ascribes the perfon-nance 
of his action to a necessity (e. g. Nature); he presents himself as the sheer instrument of 
the Other's will, but not because he wants to. The Sadean pervert disavows his own 
personal interests (desire) and hence responsibility, becoming the marionette of a superior 
power. As ZiZ'ek puts it, in agreement with Zupancic, the pervert would extract 
jouissance through his very exoneration for the act he performS. 36 The sadist, for 
instance, would find enjoyable the idea of imposing pain on the other being fully aware 
that it is not him who accounts for this action, but the Other, whose will the sadist serves: 
This position of the sadistic pervert provides the answer to the question: How can the 
subject be guilty when he merely realizes an 'objective', externally imposed necessity? 
By subjectively assuming this 'objective necessity' - by finding enjoyment in what is 
imposed on him. 37 
This is precisely what Kantian ethics proscribes: the summoning of the law, as a 
subterfuge for satisfying personal interests. The Sadean pervert mistreats Kant's 
fundamental lie for setting his ploy. When the subject claims to 'have no other choice' 
but to perfon-n a duty that violates the rights and the good of her fellow-man, she acts 
against "freedom and ethics, " taking a position of enunciation that constitutes, according 
38 to Kant the fundamental lie (proton pseudos). This lie always has consequences; the 
sense of guilt and fallibility are permanent counterparts of the ethical subject that mark 
her status even when her act is compelled by an imperative force. The Other sets the 
ultimate boundary for the subject's pathological interests, which means a genuine ethical 
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act (a 'successful' act) inevitably affects the Other. The Sadean pervert is finn and 
categorical about his tortures being imposed against his own interests and he is himself 
supposed to perform a painful duty. But Zupanc'ic' defines perverse ethics as the act that 
uses Kant's imperative as an excuse. Someone may attribute his/her intention to harm 
another person to his/her action, by justifying it as his/her duty. In that case, s/he hides 
behind the duty, in spite of Kant being categorical about the ethical subject's obligation 
to assume full responsibility for what s/he considers to be his/her duty. 39 This means 
Kantian ethics is not Sadean in its core. Kant forbids the position of the Sadean 
executioner, considering its incompatibility with the position of the ethical subject. 
Thus, the theme of instrumentalisation in perversion is problematic, as it is not 
necessarily indicative of the indifference that accompanies the obedience to the ethical 
duty. The famous Sadean apathy is far from being affin-native of the fundamental iciness 
that accompanies the performance of the Kantian duty. As Ziz'ek notes, their 
incommensurability does not lie in the fact that Sade embodies brutal apathy, while Kant 
leaves a humane crevice that allows empathy for our fellow being. 40 Quite the reverse, it 
is the Kantian subject who fully and methodically assumes apathy; she is 'effectively 
cold', in contrast with the sadist's fraudulent apathetic coldness that enables him to 
perform his tortures. 
Departing from Lacan's argument, Ziz'ek and Zupanc'ic' correctly, I believe, disengage 
Kantian ethics from the Sadean fantasy. Yet, for both, Sade still exemplifies a perverse 
position, which has been occupied by bureaucratic fascists such as Eichmann who, in 
tune with the pseudo-Kantianism of the Sadean subject, attributed the responsibility for 
his executions to the will of the Fiffirer (the Other). 
But it seems to me that there is a difference here from the position of the ordinary 
pervert. If the pervert is a pharisaic ethical mimic who does not assume the responsibility 
of his actions, how can we explain the fact that he has to pay for the consequences of his 
transgression? The Nazi subject operated within a system secured by the presence of a 
master, while the pervert is always an outsider; he cannot bring his existence under the 
auspice of a master. In other words, he is fully aware that his actions are penalised, just as 
Eichmann was certain that his actions would be rewarded by his master. 
199 
The pervert is aware of the legal consequences of his actions and the punishment he 
receives, which may indicate that he embraces guilt as expiation for his sexual 
misdemeanour. I believe that the punishment of the pervert is intrinsic to his act, not 
because he surrenders to a transgression of the law, but because he cannot complete his 
act. Of course, this does not mean his act is ethical, since I consent with Zupanc C 'i"s 
suggestion that pathological interests are not totally eliminated in the pervert, like in any 
other ordinary ('neurotic') subject. This means that guilt is there, contrary to fascism, 
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where it is denounced . 
Considering the fraudulent position of the Sadean executioner, we can say that the 
Sadean pervert, in reality, instrumentalises the Other. He uses the latter for staging a 
fantasy from which he actually derives enjoyment through an ostensible self- 
instrumentalisation. Less a servant and more a master who possesses knowledge about 
how to make the law complete, the Sadean pervert simply instrumentalises the Other. By 
overturning the abstract status of the Other, tying it to the particular other, the pervert 
renders the Other the pedestal of any possible torment, marking It with the stain of the 
division of the subject. The pain the victim expresses is the pain of the Other, the former 
is the embodiment of the latter. The subject, who confronts the pervert's act by appearing 
startled, appalled or speechless, unleashes the jouissance that fills the Other (and the 
pervert, according to my argument here). 
When the Sadean libertines articulate the worst possible blasphemies against God, it 
seems to be a constitutive and an integral part of their libertinage. Blasphemy is a sine 
qua non element of Sade's sexual scenarios, because it eliminates the status of the Other 
as the curator of difference. The Sadean subject treats the Other for his own end; he 
reduces the Other to an instrument of his own pleasure, which is the opposite of Lacan's 
argument. The Sadean executioner lacks the respect that Kant recognises in the Other, 
reminding us to treat our fellow being as an end-in-itself. This is epitomised by the 
alternative formula of the ethical maxim Kant articulated: So act that you treat humanity, 
whether in your own person or in the person of another, always at the same time as an 
end and never simply as a means. 42 An individual should never be the means, but the end 
of an ethical action. The Sadean pervert tortures the Other by turning the latter to an 
instrument of his pleasure rather than proffering himself as an instrument for the Other's 
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jouissance. The ethical duty demands that all pathological personal interests, propensities 
and satisfactions must be sacrificed to serve the universal maxim. Yet, as Zupan6ic' 
suggests, the definitive boundary of the subject's pathology does not reside in the subject, 
but in the Other. 43 In Lacanian terms, the pathological interests of the subject, her desire, 
are bound to the desire of the Other. 
Lacan's argument about instrumentalisation is ineffective, in front of the executioner's 
pleasure, tied to the infliction of pain and torture onto the Other. The action is not guided 
by an impersonal but a personal valence, that is to say, it reflects the egotistic interests of 
the sadist, the fantasies that impel his tortures, through which he serves thejouissance of 
the Other. Essentially, the Sadean pervert wants to deceive the other and usurp his/her 
jouissance, rather than proffering it to the Other. 44 
Taking this into account, it is more appropriate to speak about the Sadean 'master', 
rather than the 'pervert'. The Sadean ploy identifies the other with the locus of the Other, 
which suggests a discrepancy with the universality of Kantian ethics, as Sade reduces the 
impersonal character of the ethical maxim to a discernible source. The jouissance of the 
torture is attributed to the Other, but Its place is occupied by the victim, a specific 
physical presence. For Kant, the ethical maxim is transcendental of any material 
substance, which seems to be compatible only with the abstract status of the Other. 
Clairwil in Juliette enunciates a fantasy that conveys his personal interests and pleasure: 
I would like, Clairwil answered, to find a crime which even when I had left off doing it, 
would go on having a perpetual effect, in such a way that so long as I lived, at every hour 
of the day and as I lay sleeping at night, I would be constantly the cause of a particular 
disorder, and that this disorder might broaden to the point where it brought about a 
corruption so universal or a disturbance so formal that even after my life was over I 
would survive in the everlasting continuation of my wickedness. 45 
Clairwil, as a Sadean master, does not want to abolish his individual pathological 
interests for the sake of a universal ideal, but more to reduce the universal to the 
particular, the corruption for which his name will be acknowledged. Furthermore, a 
Propos of the executioner's relation to pain and humiliation, as the only sentiments that 
Kant acknowledges when one follows one's duty, neither the Sadean nor the fascist 
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executioner embrace these sentiments, as they are imposed on the other. The executioner 
transfers the painful experience of the duty to the Other ("I have to perform this act"). 
Seen as a system of domination, Sade's world is organised in a similar mode as the 
other two systems elaborated earlier ('Oedipalism' and 'totalitarianism'), insofar as they 
all necessitate a master to dominate discourse. The ascendancy of the phallic/master 
signifier forms the ideal that substantiates the structure of any system, since it generates 
idealised visions, namely, fantasies that concretise the system. Yet different masters 
organise these discursive systems, assisted by divergent fantasies, on the basis of which 
Sadean organisation is distinguished from totalitarianism. Their idealisations delineate 
different approximations of the real. The ideals that support the edifice of Sade's moral 
philosophy of pain are themselves hollow, but the fantasy of a destructive Nature 
qualifies and empowers them. 
My friend, it is from Nature rou6s obtain the principles they put into action; I've told you 
a thousand times over that Nature, who for the perfect maintenance of the laws of her 
general equilibrium, has sometimes need of vices and sometimes of virtues, inspires now 
this impulse, now that one, in accordance with what she requires; hence, we do no kind of 
evil in surrendering ourselves to these impulses, of whatever sort you may suppose them 
to be. 46 
Sade is concerned less with inventing new ways to access jouissance and more with 
developing new methods of maintaining and perpetuating jouissance, in other words evil, 
prioritised as the supreme Good. Only the enduring dominion of evil jouissance would 
satisfy Nature and give some tranquillity to the Sadean master's mind; the main goal 
would be for jouissance to dissolve the symbolic and ultimately turn against itself 
However, if jouissance has to be prolonged, in perversion, this is not because of its 
recognition as a supreme duty, but as a condition that keeps desire out. It is possible to 
isolate perversion here from its Sadean contextualisation, arguing that perverse action is 
not driven by the superiority of a duty to jouir; it plays more the role of the deterrence of 
desire, which is the limit the so-called pervert wishes to cross. Rather than defining or 
embodying perversion, Sade employs it for the accomplishment of his duty: the 
dominance of jouissance. Nevertheless, for the ordinary pervert, jouissance never 
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acquires a masterful position that commands its accomplishment as an absolute duty. In 
the position of the master in discourse, we find the pervert's division, as previously 
elaborated, andjouissance constitutes his defence to desire, which is the reverse of what 
the neurotic does, for whom desire is a defence against jouissance. 47 Despite their 
opposing aims, at the end, desire/division is perpetuated in both the pervert and the 
neurotic, as I argue further in the final part. Inasmuch as desire for Lacan is associated 
with a defence against jouissance, it loses its raw transgressive force and becomes a 
"compromise formation. " Stavrakakis notes: "Even in perversion, where 'desire appears 
by presenting itself as what lays down the law, namely a subversion of the law, it is in 
, 48 fact well and truly the support of a law' . 
Evil in Kant suggests a deviation from the absolute renunciation of pathological 
interests (desires), as the categorical imperative decrees. Evil does not stem from the 
apathetic obedience to an universalisable law; rather it emerges, when the ethical stance 
of the subject favours a pleasurable good marked by personal desire and not by an 
unyielding obedience to the moral law. Thus, the subject needs to take the responsibility 
for choosing her ethical posture between pleasure and the apathy of the law. 
However, a nagging problem surfaces in relation to evil. In spite of the absolute 
character of the categorical imperative, anything can come under the claim of forining a 
universalised duty. Zupanc'ic' emphatically notes: "For how am I to decide if the 'maxim 
of my action can hold as a principle providing a universal law', if I do not accept the 
presupposition that I am originally guided by some notion of the good? , 49 So applying a 
universalised moral dictum is not enough. One has to identify with the will behind this 
dictum. Kant delineates a categorical ethical duty that requires not only the subject's 
conformity with it, but also her conformity to be the sole 'content' or 'motive' of her 
action. Only then is she released from the pathological elements of her will. 
This is Kant's transcendental subject, whose fundamental emptiness, brings her close to 
Lacan's conception of the subject as decentred . 
50 As Zupanc'ic' points out, Kant makes a 
distinction between form and pure form, as the form which is 'outside' of any content; 
this does not suggest that pure form is entirely empty, insofar as it provides forin only for 
itself, but it is entirely a surplus. 51 This Kantian articulation suggests an ostensible 
dissymmetry with Lacan, inasmuch as the surplus is conceptualised as a form, whereas 
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for Lacan it is an object. But Zupanc'ic' elucidates a deeper consensus between the two. 
Kant defines the 'genuine drive' of the will "in terms of pure form as an absence of any 
Triebfeder, " that is, the ellipsis of any drive which characterises the ethical act proper. 52 
By the same token, Lacan defines desire "precisely as the pure form of demand, as that 
which remains of demand when all the particular objects (or 'contents') that may come to 
satisfy it are removed. Hence the objet petit a can be understood as a void that has 
,, 53 
acquired a form. For Kant, pure form, what is devoid of any motive, itself must 
become a force that motivates the action of the subject, whereas for Lacan the emptiness 
of the object a leaves the demand always for another object, becoming, in this fashion, 
the motive force for desire's circulation. 
Here, Zupanc'ic' demonstrates the paradox of Kant's thesis, since the categorical 
imperative must form the only motive and causal factor for the subject's adherence to it, 
regardless of the fact that the imperative does not reflect any pleasurable conditions that 
may qualify it as a cause and motive for the subject's action. 54 In other words, the 
imperative is expected to meet the criteria for embodying causality, when it is essentially 
isolated from any pathological foundation, i. e. what hypostatises causality in subjectivity. 
8.2.2 Eichmann's Perverse Ethics 
For the fascist, the picture is different from the Sade's vision of utter destruction. The 
ideological amalgam of fascism envisaged a world of rejuvenated nature. The Nazi ideal 
supported a palpable desire to restore the potency and leadership of Germany. For this 
reason, desire was not to be excluded, but to be purified and become clean from the 
contaminating influence and obscenity ofjouissance. 55 Evidently, Nazism revealed a type 
of particularism -a certain fantasy that guided its action - that does not converge with 
Kantian ethics. 
As I discussed earlier, MacCannell's applied the "Kant with Sade" prism to the analysis 
of Eichmann's ethical attitude. Discarding all personal interests, even his alleged 
sympathy for Jewish people, Eichmann contributed to the fascist atrocities with nothing 
more than the accomplishment of his bureaucratic duty. 
56 Nevertheless, the duty he 
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declared is linked to a visible source of lucid personal interests. The central authoritarian 
figure of Hitler, fabricating the ideology of National Socialism (in Mein Kampj), is what 
promoted a certain fantasy of good that set the ambitious plans and visions of German 
rebirth. Just as it happens with implicit or explicit racism and fundamentalism, there is a 
master who embodies an absolute (phallic) ideal which is rendered universal, by 
disregarding intersubjective difference. 
Rather than acquiring a universal value, the ideal of the master eradicates the 
universality of the maxim, since it is linked to personal interests. Hitler turned this ideal 
to the rudimentary constituent of the new Gen-nan identity, the good that secures this 
identity. The primary interest of Nazi officers was the realisation of this good, which 
means Eichmann did not simply follow the orders of a superior source, but discerned in 
Hitler the valid patronage of a seductive good, the pre-eminence of 'Fatherland'. After 
all, it was Eichmann's interests, writing for the anti-Semitic newspaper Der Sturmer that 
gave him the recognition by the Nazi party and his position in the security office. The 
role of the executioner was his prize and he found a purpose in serving it at his best 
without questioning its futile character. 
At the time, for a great number of people it was unthinkable to perceive 'Fatherland' as 
a signifier without any supreme value in itself. 57 Stavrakakis notes that what sustains the 
coherence of a large group of people is the leader (from Freud's perspective) or "an idea 
occupying the position of a point de capiton, a common point of reference. , 58 It is the 
point of capiton or else the master signifier that forges unity and as soon as it is recanted, 
this unity dissolves. The master signifier that supported the domination of fascism was, 
like any other signifier, totally arbitrary, fake and contingent. But 'Fatherland' had to 
present the opposite qualities, namely that its supremacy is given and undisputed. 
Hitler envisaged a new order, which hardly appeals as a new world of ethics, since it 
was nothing but one more myth, a fantasy that hypostatised the imperialistic aspirations 
of Nazism and supported a traditional idea of good. As early as 1920, the programme of 
the Nazi party rejected the Treaty of Versailles and declared the right of Germany to deal 
with other nations. 59 Of course, there was no justification for this right, apart from the 
imaginary supremacy of the German race. One must bear in mind that the rise of German 
fascism is not a historical contingency but also a reaction to interwar politics and the 
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humiliation that Germany endured by the great political powers of the time after the 
degrading Treaty of Versailles. The treaty declared Gen-nany as solely responsible for the 
First World War and opened the way for Allied armies to occupy its soil, leaving only the 
debris of the nation's previous wealth. 
In the context of rising nationalism after 1920,60 the timing was propitious for Hitler to 
build a new German identity which was intended to fill the lacuna of the historical 
narrative of Germany. Global socio-economic conditions during the years of Depression 
also favoured the ambition of the nation's rebirth. The economic nadir of the late 
twenties, repercussive of the crack in liberalism's blossoming, alongside the decline of 
the old empires and the rise of revolutionary movements, created a general atmosphere of 
malaise. As Stavrakakis notes, "it was mass unemployment, misery and anxiety 
(especially of the middle classes) that led to Hitler's hegemony, to the hegemony of the 
,, 61 Nazi utopian promise. The fiction of the Other was severely mistrusted and Nazism 
emerged as a violent challenge to the Other that led to the increase of its power after the 
1930 election. The victorious ascendance of Nazism to power was an indication that the 
fascist fantasy seized the desire of the German people, whether voluntarily or against 
their will. 
But it is necessary now to clarify the theoretical distinction between the fascist, the 
Sadean character and the pervert. The fascist is not in solidarity with the Sadean hero at 
least on the level of fantasy. What the first seeks is the dominance of a supreme good 
associated with the ascendancy of a certain identity. Nazism's avowed purpose, for 
instance, was the Aryan race to prevail in a powerful German nation/state, which would 
eventually conquer the rest of the world. 62 The barbaric acts that followed and culminated 
in the Second World War inscribed the field of the impossible, without defying the 
impossible; Nazism employed a chimerical fantasy to cover it. In line with Z'iZ'ek's view, 
rather than traversing the fantasy, in what would have been a genuine ethical act, the Nazi 
act was intrinsically restricted by the deadlock of its utopian project and the subsequent 
negation to relinquish the fantasy that sustained this utopianism. 63 The rage and the 
violence of the fascist emerged from thwarting the inherent impossibility of his 
regeneration project. The first step for reconstructing the identity of the Aryan German 
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was to bury the bones of the old system. Catastrophe was necessary for the German 
rebirth. 
We are promoting catastrophic policies, for only catastrophe -that is, the collapse of the 
liberal system- will clear the way for the new order [ ... ] Every weakening of the system 
is good, very good for us and our German revolution. 64 
Among the delegates of the old, traditional and firm system, Jews were first in line to 
become the target of Nazi violence, as the malformed part of the organic unity of Nazism. 
"The Jewish-capitalist world will not survive the twentieth century, " Hitler predicted in 
1939, fusing anti-Semitism with liberalism, as the main target of what he sought to 
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abolish . The fascist atrocities of the war had an immense cost on the Jewish people, but 
the rage was not limited solely against the Jewish community, but also against anyone 
who was an obstacle to the accomplishment of the Nazi imperialistic project. Jews were 
not only the real blots in the identity of the Nazi German, as Ziz'ek suggested, but they 
also represented more than anything else the inherent limit of the fantasmatic core of 
fascism, that is, the Aryan image of the superman. 66 
Seen as contemptible delegates of a different symbolic system, Jews, together with other 
heterogeneous populations also isolated in concentration camps, such as gypsies, 
prostitutes, homosexuals, people with disabilities and more, embodied precisely the 
unsurpassable aperture between the Nazi imaginary representation and its symbolic 
refutation, namely difference. The extinction of Jews served the purpose of restoring the 
omnipotent image of the German, upon which the new identity would be erected. A fixed 
meaning was associated with a rigid image, because phallic mastery secures its 
omnipotent ascendancy only on an imaginary basis. The Jew functioned as the external 
embodiment of an internal limit to this identity; that is the falsification of fantasy by 
symbolic reality. Their extinction, their death was a real solution for the Nazi, serving an 
ultimate good. 
As Ziz'ek has noted, Jew was the partial object (a) for Nazism. 67 This means that the Jew 
embodied a real excess that the symbolic fabric of Nazism could not incorporate. The real 
surfeit of the object needed to be isolated in order to maintain the meta-identity of the 
new German. Since excess is neither eradicated nor absorbed by the symbolic, the Nazi 
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encompassed it through fantasy, converting the real into the energy that fuels fantasy (the 
staging of the object in fantasy). The annihilation of the Jew served as the affirmation of 
the superiority of Nazi identity. Between the construction of an imaginary identity and its 
symbolic appraisal, the object a emerges as the copula, the undifferentiated object that 
interlocks the imaginary and the symbolic synapses. 68 ZiZ'ek says that what bridges the 
distance between an imaginary expectation and its symbolic falsification is the surplus 
embodied by an agent, the object a: 
The distance between what we wanted to achieve and the effective result of our activity, 
the surplus of the result over the subject's intention, is again embodied in another agent, 
69 in a kind of meta-subject (God, Reason, Jew). 
By attacking the object a, as a regressive result of the occurred schism with the Other, the 
German fascist wanted to fabricate a new identity that concealed castration, the 
possibility of another degrading treaty. But rather than eliminating the object, fascism 
situated it exclusively in the realm of pleasurable fantasies, concealing the Other's 
castration. The Other of fascism is not there as a curator of meaning, but as a presence 
marked by the opposite role: to offer a signifying canopy that maintains and disguises the 
very meaninglessness, the absurdity of the law of Nazism's totalitarian system. The 
bureaucratic language that gave birth to signifiers such as the 'Final Solution', in order to 
represent the atrocities, divulges an Other who occupies the sphere of the empty signifier. 
The bureaucratic and cold tone of the fascist speech refuses the other. 70 
Sade and the fascist occupy a similar discursive position of mastery, but they are two 
antagonistic masters, since their ideals are incompatible and conflicting. In his writings, 
Sade expresses rage and prioritises pain, torture and murder. Nevertheless, crime is not 
valid because of the supremacy of an aristocratic powerful identity, but because of the 
supremacy of evil itself that the Sadean hero willingly serves. Evil, as the supreme good, 
is self-destructive and definitely not reproductive. This means that it will eventually turn 
its evil against itself. The act of sodomy in Sade's work is the epitome of the antithesis to 
reproduction and the affirmation of the death of the human race. 
The domination of the Sadean hero aims at nothingness, an empty space ingrained by 
evil. But he wants to give an ontological status to this nothingness by engraving it onto 
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the individual, an act that can only lead to death. Death is what defies the Sadean fantasy, 
as the inherent frontier to the sine die upholding of evil. For Sade, death, instead of a 
solution, suggests convolution of his philosophical speculation of the supreme value of 
evil, because together with death as a limit, desire re-surfaces. The ire of the Sadean hero, 
the unfolding of the death drive from the collision of the imaginary to a symbolic limit, 
gives birth to the Sadean notion of the second death: the extinction of the symbolic order 
itself as the triumph of evil and its infinite torment over the other. Yet the object a is not 
refuted; it is what emerges from the fissure between Sade's fantasy and its symbolic 
revocation. The object a is the key to unlock real jouissance, but it ends up perpetuating 
desire instead. The object-cause of desire is also Sade's evil object. 
In this regard, the fascist and the Sadean pervert secure different conceptions of the 
good, diverging from the position of the ordinary pervert. For the latter, the primary 
interest is in the sexualisation of a body that remains intact and never loses its potency. 
He does not wish to eradicate the symbolic, but to transform it into an enjoying register. 
Therefore, he accepts a certain limit, namely desire, to the infinite access tojouissance, 
which is not to say he is not bothered by this restriction. But it is a similar nuisance as 
with the neurotic's position, who tries to ostracisejouissance from the symbolic, although 
his desire prompts him tojouir. This explains why the pervert does not take his posture as 
an opposition to the masters and institutions that regulate socio-symbolic relations. He is 
not an activist or someone who implements sexuality to deliberately subvert a certain 
political system. 
For Sade, despite his graphic perverse illustrations, the body's potential for sexual 
pleasure is the last thing that interests him. The body constitutes more a corporeal field 
for infinite access to jouissance. The scenes of the crimes do not mark the end of the 
Sadean orgy, but rather the opposite. The dissolution of the body is where everything 
begins and where divine beauty is attained. 71 In the case of Nazism, the dissolution of the 
body of the Jew is the validation of the finitude of the Jewish society. Leaving no traces 
of the body is the closing scene for the 'Final Solution' of Nazism. 
Here we have the construction of what Zupanc'ic' calls the 'image of suffering', namely, 
the general yet essential ideological strategy of creating an image that aims to conceal an 
act that goes beyond strict confines, an act that has an "unfamiliar, 'out-of-place' 
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effect. , 72 A real act is structurally 'evil, ' insofar as it opens the dimension of the 
impossible; this is what ideology veils under an image of 'radical evil' that prevents the 
subject from tackling the impossible real. 73 In this regard, the image of the Jew 
conspiring against the German nation and causing malice presents the impossible act (the 
acceptance of the Jewish other) as suffering. This image secures the Good of Nazi 
ideology which has nothing to do with the act. The genuine ethical act requires the 
recognition of this 'extimate' locus of our being which is fundamentally empty, without 
concealing it under the mask of a "Good larger than the good of those affected by our 
actions. , 74 
Parallel to the extinction of the Jewish population, one can evoke and juxtapose the Nazi 
experimentation on eugenics. The 'good' gene ascertains the longevity and prevalence of 
the Aryan image. The reproduction of the 'good' gene gives corporeal eternity and life in 
the fascist ideal. 
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9. Ethics and Guilt 
9.1 The Dilemma of Guilt 
The sense of guilt is the most accessible state that marks morality and a distinctive 
feature of subjectivity. Only the subject of language can experience guilt as an indivisible 
and ubiquitous feature of the (moral) law. In this regard, guilt can be a valuable thread for 
exploring Sade's relation to Kantian ethics and its implication for fascism and perversion. 
Conventionally, psychoanalysis regards perversion and psychosis as 'guilt-free' 
structures, counter to the neurotic condition, where guilt constitutes a constant torment. 
The reason for this is a unitary conception of guilt as the heritage of the resolution of the 
Oedipus complex, something that the pervert and the psychotic never accomplish. Thus, 
the way guilt or its supposed absence operate in each structure may have something to 
say about the desire of the subject in relation to the Other, which is exactly what 
determines her structure. It is not fortuitous then that Lacan links guilt, as the distillation 
of moral experience, with the ethics of desire. At the epicentre of his theorisation, in the 
late 1950s, we find guilt associated with the end of analysis, as the subject has to "assume 
his guilt and/or his constitutive [symbolic] debt. "' In Seminar VII, Lacan makes a vital 
remark on guilt and its part in ethics, noting that guilt is found whenever someone has 
betrayed his desire, that is, s/he stepped back to the safety of the moral law: 
In the last analysis, what a subject really feels guilty about when he manifests guilt at 
bottom always has to do with - whether or not it is admissible for a director of 
conscience- the extent to which he has given ground relative to his desire. ' 
What I call "giving ground relative to one's desire" is always accompanied in the destiny 
of the subject by some betrayal - you will observe it in every case and should note its 
importance. [ ... ] something is played out 
in betrayal if one tolerates it, if driven by the 
idea of good - and by that I mean the good of the one who has just committed the act of 
betrayal - one gives ground to the point of giving up one's own claims [ ... ] Once one 
has 
crossed that boundary where I combined in a single term contempt for the other and for 
oneself, there is no way back. It might be possible to do some repair work, but not to 
undo it [ ... ] the only thing one can 
be guilty of is giving ground relative to one's desire. 3 
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Lacan turns the tables, regarding the traditional conception of guilt as the consequence of 
transgressing the moral law, in favour of a voluptuous desire. The very loyalty to the 
moral law is what causes guilt, indicating a 'betrayal' of desire. In this view, it is 
erroneous to exclude guilt from the subject of perverse desire. Rather than something that 
either inhabits the subject's experience or not, depending on her structure, guilt comes 
together as a single packet with the law and its incomplete status, its failure to satisfy 
desire. 
So, what is guilt? Disengaging the notion from its strict Oedipal resonance, my 
dissection of its essence (the pervasive sense of failure that dominates the subject) 
conceives guilt as the eternal repetitive failure to cross all the way to the recovery of the 
lost Thing. Therefore, it does not originate so much in the subject's adherence to the 
traditional moral law, as Lacan's quotation suggests, but more in her realisation that she 
came close enough to the fulfilment of her desire, only to step back for fear of losing her 
desiring status, in other words her subjectivity. 
The safety of the moral law alleviates guilt, but it does not erase the scars of getting too 
close to desire, where the Thing lies. The interplay of guilt with law is decisive for the 
ethical status of the subject. Guilt does not adumbrate an accomplished act, a route the 
subject crossed until its very end. It rather marks a certain point in a pathway that 
approximates the realisation of desire. There one encounters guilt, as beyond this point, 
the path bifurcates and the subject needs to make an ethical choice: to move either 
backwards or forwards apropos of desire. 
The confrontation of an ethical dilemma explains the reason why guilt is always 
experienced as stasis, an inert condition, which demands from the subject to move in 
order to eliminate it. This is the perpetual movement of the subject and her desire, 
functioning as a centrifugal force. As soon as she stops, guilt returns to assess the 
subject's movement, as a calculus for her proximity to desire. The tormenting sense of 
apapria (amartia, sin), of having done something wrong, without knowing what the right 
thing to do is, reveals the ethical dilemma of guilt. 
The subject has come to confront the real of her desire and she suffers for that. The 
dilemma that now emerges is whether to follow an imaginary or a symbolic resolution to 
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this state of suffering. The subject can consummate jouissance (through imaginary 
means) or accept the limit of the law, if she decides to maintain her desire to desire. 
Otherwise, the desire not to desire has only one real resolution: the pathway that leads to 
death. This pathway chalks the real dimension of guilt: the unbearable real that inhabits 
the crux of the subject's existence. 
But following death would be nothing more than succumbing to the demand of the 
drive. 4 Freud interlocks guilt with the drive, by claiming that unconscious guilt 
constitutes a need for punishment. 5 This is a primarily biological conception of guilt and 
punishment, insofar as need is bound to the notion of the drive and comes before Oedipal 
guilt. 6 Being the result of a certain quantity of aggression, a derivative of the death drive, 
turned inwards, the need for punishment renders the subject the target of the death drive. 
if aggression releases the death drive outwards, against others, guilt, as need for 
punishment, directs the drive towards the ego. 
Apart from Freud, Klein canvasses the early nexus of the drive and guilt more notably in 
her elaboration of the depressive position in child development. 7 In the second half of the 
first year of life, the infant believes it annihilated the mother's good breast and 
experiences guilt for the first time, a state that requests the reparation of the good breast. 
Creativity in later life is a constant struggle to repair this early loss. Freud and Klein 
make it clear that guilt has a primitive origin, namely the reservoir of the undifferentiated 
drive, where the unrepresentable Thing resides. In this regard, it is difficult to distinguish 
guilt from the function of the death drive. As far as it refers to aggression turned 
inwards, 8 guilt moves towards self-annihilation. 
Every time we give priority to desire without going all the way, stopping at a certain 
point, guilt sets in as a self-punitive force that tempts us with obliteration. We want to 
annihilate ourselves, for we got too close to desire, without crossing all the way to its 
impossible satisfaction. We left the door half-open, without entering the chamber of 
desire which is empty par excellence. If guilt is the result of not following desire, this is 
because the subject betrayed it for a deceiving moral principle that secures the 
consistency of the other (as an eidolon of the subject's ego). If guilt touches the real core 
of subjectivity, as the approximation of the Thing, then a relation with the other two 
registers, the symbolic and the imaginary, can be drawn. The disturbing insistence of the 
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Thing marks the impossibility to represent all. 9 The failure of representation makes all 
imaginary attempts to fantasise the Thing crash on their symbolic refutation. 
How does the subject respond to guilt and what is its significance for her ethical status? 
One type of guilt is dominated by an imaginary condition, this is the fantasy of the father- 
castrator, the Oedipal fantasy of castration that Freud elaborated. The imaginary suggests 
a resolution of guilt by prioritising the existence of a complete, absolute law, without 
pitfalls, namely an imaginary law. This requires the adherence to a fantasy of the law's 
ability to satiate desire (a fantasy promoted by power), a law that could serve the ultimate 
desire not to desire, which is impossible of course, since this scenario is always 
repudiated by the symbolic. 
A type of guilt originating in an imaginary law does not relish this internal 
impossibility, rather the opposite. It drives the subject towards a fantasy that affirms the 
possibility of bringing back the dead father to life. Confronted with the impossible real, 
the insurmountable difference induced by the symbolic, fantasy collapses and guilt 
emerges as the recognition of the law's incompleteness. Pain, vulgarity and hate are 
among the states that mark the subject's experience of guilt. In this regard, guilt breaks 
the pleasant imaginary screen of the subject and makes her confront what has been 
excluded from her imaginary constitution; it reinstates the suffering of being, the 
constitutive lack as Zupanc'ic' suggests. 10 
A state of suffering for the ego, a crack in its imaginary form, is the view of guilt that 
Freud articulates in the last two chapters of his late masterpiece Civilization and its 
Discontents. " For Freud, the sense of guilt (or unconscious need for punishment) 
emanates from aggression turned inwards, jeopardising the ego with annihilation. This is 
evident in the clinical condition of depression, where guilt, remorse and self-reproach are 
some of its main features. But what really occurs in the depressive subject, what s/he 
really suffers from is a painful betrayal of desire. The imaginary screen that supports the 
ego of the subject has been cracked, leaving it exposed to the other side of the window. 
Behind the window glass, the depressed subject enjoys staring at the world outside. 
Once the window is open, anxiety resurfaces signalling an approximation of the real. 12 
Suicidal attempts of the depressive, such as falling out of the window or cutting his/her 
wrists, reflect the fracture of the imaginary, crossing its edge to where the real lies. This 
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act opens a hole in the Other, in line with Zupanc'ic"s analysis, letting the drive to 
penetrate. 13 Some of the painful guilt is released in this way from the depressive's ego or 
better from the rapture of her ego. 14 Guilt remains, even when the window is closed or the 
subject convalesces from a suicidal attempt. Because the depressive came contiguously to 
the realisation of her desire, only to return to the imaginary deceit of her ego and a 
sanctimonious morality that betray pure desire (the desire of excess). 15 
The dimension of the real (the realm of the drive) is pivotal in the way guilt is 
experienced. Rather than being synonymous with the drive, guilt appears as the 
unexpected ambiguity and thus a barrier to the ultimate realisation of desire, which would 
be the unification with the drive. It is a static point that both paves the way to pure desire 
and also diverts it so that drive encircles any other object but the object of desire., 6 The 
definitive limit the subject needs to cross, as Zupanc'ic' suggests, is the Other. 17 Only if 
she assumes the guilt of the Other's incompleteness, as a symbolic locus, she can 
penetrate the obstacle of desire, namely, its maintenance as unfulfilled, and move towards 
its essential goal, the embracing of the drive. 
In Lacan, guilt is associated with symbolic castration and the Name-of-the-Father. 18 
Thus, guilt requires the acceptance of the dead signifier, that is, the incompleteness of the 
law and concomitantly the incompleteness of being. Symbolic guilt is a memento of 
castration and asks the subject to make an ethical decision: either to recognise 
incompleteness and search for the missing phallus or to follow a fatal completeness 
towards death. 19 In some young children, we find a condition where speech disappears 
without an obvious reason, despite its previous non-nal onset. Contrary to psychosis or 
autism, the child decides not to speak. At a later point, the child may start using speech 
again normally. This symbolic rupture shows a resistance on the part of the child to bring 
its existence under the aegis of the symbolic law. From the moment language appears, the 
subject emerges together with her mortality. Life unfurls around the incomplete 
foundation of the subject's existence. No matter how painful the admission, the subject 
has to tolerate castration and symbolic guilt, because only then meaning can be formed 
and attached to life as a signifier. 
Zupanc'ic' states that "guilt, in the sense of symbolic debt, arises when the subject knows 
that the Other knows; , 20 the Other knows It does not exist. The subject becomes guilty at 
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the instant when the desire of the Other becomes the desire of the subject, in other words 
the moment when lack and castration are accepted. Rather than plain self-knowledge 
about the subject's deed, it is a sort of "surplus-knowledge, a knowledge to which the 
desire of the subject is attached. " This means that knowledge is dislodged from the "place 
of its enunciation" and this is what engraves the tragic dimension of the Oedipal drama. 21 
Since birth, Oedipus is deprived of knowledge and thus of the desire that exempts him 
from the guilt (as a symbolic debt) of parricide and incest. 
Yet this does not suggest that Oedipus has no responsibility for his destiny. With regard 
to Oedipus, Zupanc'ic' fabricates an original elaboration of his sense of guilt. 22 Oedipus' 
tragedy does not rest on his guilty status, but rather the reverse, the fact that he renounces 
guilt and "identifies with his blindness, " namely, his symptom. 23 His blinding resembles 
the end of analysis, where the subject, having traversed her fantasy (the stumbling block 
of the imaginary), becomes the subject of the drive and not of desire; she identifies with 
her enjoyment, rather than with her desire. 24 
This process, however, suggests an objectification of the subject that needs to be 
clarified and distinguished from the pervert's identification with the object. In 
psychoanalysis, the aim is not to follow the drive, but to re-organise our position, our 
signifiers, in relation to it. This means that the supremacy of the symbolic and of desire 
are never really abandoned, which is basically the aim of the pervert, who imagines an 
infinite access to the drive. 25 After all, do not both drive and desire fail to meet their 
goal? They never acquire full satisfaction. Guilt is the evidence of this failure, showing 
that the subject accepted a lawful position, after failing to complete her desire in its pure 
form. 
Freud views the Oedipal conflict as the determining factor for the secondary fon-nation 
of guilt, after its primary configuration as a need for punishment. Oedipal guilt functions 
more as a regulatory mechanism between desire and drive. This is what accounts for the 
neurotic dimension of guilt, impressed by ambivalence, namely the persistence of the 
excess of the drive and desire as the barrier to its fulfilment. It is the instant where guilt 
makes its decree clear: you shouldfind an efficient way to pay off the symbolic debt, make 
the law complete or remain incomplete. 
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The acceptance of castration is the only possible compensation for this inerasable debt, 
whereas its disguise under fantasmatic cloaks maintains the omnipotence of the 
imaginary father. The imaginary perception of the father that the subject holds, sustains 
his absolute dynamism, as the father himself is not castrated in his access to jouissance. 
The subject adheres to an ideal father figure who functions as a form of identification for 
the master. 
As soon as a third person is introduced into the narcissistic relationship, there arises the 
possibility of real mediation, through the intennediary, of the transcendant personage, 
that is to say, of someone through whom desire and its accomplishment can be 
symbolically realised. At this moment, another register appears, that of law - in other 
words Of gUilt. 26 
Lacan sees law as the register of guilt. The possibility of a real mediation, introduced by 
the intervention of the father in the archaic and profoundly narcissistic dyad of the child 
with its mother, makes guilt and law emerge. Both originate in the real. Guilt as a product 
of a fierce crime became the prerequisite for the law's existence. 27 The origins of the law 
rest on a violent crime, the result of the outbound channelling of the death drive, which 
then became repressed as a result of guilt. At least this is what we learn from Freud's 
myth of the primordial father. When the brothers of the horde slaughtered and devoured 
their father, the enjoyment they undertook gave rise to the law. Rising from the ashes of 
the jouissance of the brothers' cannibalistic act, the experience of guilt tormented the 
brothers' horde and led them to the invention of the law, as a way to rehabilitate the 
father's authority. 
A law was needed to ostracise the obscene jouissance their mouth tasted. The father was 
devoured and returned through the mouth as a law, a spoken prohibition (the Name-of- 
the-Father), instead of a prohibition imposed physically. Thus, if we try to situate the 
occurrence of guilt, this would be somewhere between the pits of jouissance and the 
foundations of the law. Jouissance 'or' law? The mediating conjuncture is the space guilt 
occupies. 
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9.2 Enjoy Guilt! 
The law sanctions one main stipulation, this is the preservation of the desiring status of 
the subject. It commands 'Never give up your desire! ' resisting the alluring and 
obliterating effects of a sadistic superego that goes the opposite way, towards the 
elimination of desire intrinsic to its commandment 'Enjoy! ', as Lacan describes it in 
Seminar XY. 28 Identification with the superegoic command ('Enjoy! ') fuses the superego 
with a fantasy of jouissance. In that case, the superego and guilt as its agent do not 
operate anymore. Nonetheless, the subject may take another direction and return to the 
safe distance of the law. Guilt suggests a point of ethical choice, where the subject has to 
decide whether she moves onwards or backwards a propos of her desire. 
The matrix of guilt dwells in the superego. On its dark, vicious and destructive side, the 
superego is hostile to desire. It does not support desire but a contrario enjoys the eternal 
suffering that desire's betrayal causes to the subject. When the subject follows desire, her 
way to real enjoyment is disrupted, conforming to the law, which does not fulfil, but 
maintains desire. Because too close to desire the subject limps, as she loses her 
consistency. At the same time, the weight of guilt becomes unbearable, as the subject 
confronts the law's insufficiency, its lack. The superego induces guilt, whenever the 
subject takes a step closer to desire, but eventually betrays it, by retreating to the safety of 
the law. 29 The weight of guilt brings in mind the myth of Sisyphus. The eternal repetitive 
punishment of Sisyphus suggests that it is the inexorable pervasive sense of guilt that 
ultimately matters and provides justification to the burden of our existence. The stone 
Sisyphus drags is the burden of desire's impossibility to be fulfilled, its eternal failure 
that sustains guilt. 
If the sovereignty of the superego in the pervert decrees the dissolution of desire by any 
means ofjouissance, then this involves a fantasy, digressive from its expected function. 
Typically, fantasy is the pillar of desire, but the pervert fantasises meeting the dimension 
where desire is eliminated. Yet this still constitutes a desire, but it aims at an eternal 
condition of no desire, a condition of jouissance. Does this mean perversion is the 
adversary of desire? Not quite. The pervert reverses desire, yet still maintains it in this 
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negative reverse form, perhaps, justifying Freud's statement about perversion being the 
reverse condition of neurosis. 30 
Only Sade really opposes himself to desire. The Sadean fantasy is self-annihilating; it 
functions as the screening of a desire that aims at destroying itself. 3 1 The final goal for 
Sade would be not just to erase the law that maintains desire, but also to erase his image 
from the mirror. Every time desire returns, the Sadean pervert bursts into blasphemy and 
hostility: 
And now Curval himself returns, grumbling between his teeth and swearing that all those 
dratted laws prevent a man from discharging at his ease [ ... 
]32 
The Sadean hero does not stop at transgression, although the pervert, as well as the 
neurotic, does. Sade would be happy only when the law disintegrated, unleashing 
jouissance from its restraint. Perversion is just one case of circumventing the point of 
castration, of approximating the other, but not otherness. The pervert chooses jouissance 
or better the desire not to desire, but never covers all the way to the realisation of this 
desire; the door stays half-open. The pervert occupies the position of the object-cause of 
desire, which means he does not renounce it, but incarnates it. In contrast, the Sadean 
master, like any other master, incarnates the signifier. 33 
Precisely this betrayal of desire brings the pervert to the realm of guilt, contrary to the 
traditional psychoanalytic view that sees guilt, perceived as the heritage of the resolution 
of the Oedipus complex, absent from the perverse universe. The presence of guilt marks 
the contradiction in the pervert's relation to desire; desire andjouissance never meet, but 
the pervert, as well as the neurotic, is tormented by this impossible idea of uniting the 
two. In perversion, this contradiction is reflected by disavowal (what accounts for a 
splitting of the ego), whereas in neurosis it takes the form of ambivalence. 34 The pervert 
wants to protect himself from desire, whereas the neurotic wants to protect himself from 
jouissance. 
Both the pervert and the neurotic betray desire and the sense of guilt mystifies the 
ethical decision that one has to take. Going all the way to jouissance, uniting with the 
primitive and brutal Thing is an ethical act. Only then, the desire not to desire finds its 
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pure actualisation, something that Lacan figures in the sublime icon of Antigone. 35 Any 
subject defying the ethical question, regardless of her psychic structure, also defies 
castration. 
The subject's relation to castration is not only indicative of her structure, but also of her 
ethical posture. A subjective position which is not held back by castration, but instead 
acknowledges and painfully contravenes it, is ethical. Yet this renders the subject neither 
a pervert nor a psychotic. A common fulcrum pushes all subjects towards jouissance, 
since this driving force is desire, in its pure form - that is, its non-metonymic, non- 
symbolic form. This is the point where desire meets the death drive, where the dilemma 
of guilt is resolved by choosing jouissance rather than the law. Guilt paves the free way 
to enjoyment. 
In a meticulous exploration of causality and freedom, Zupanc'ic' draws on Kant for 
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whom guilt is a disguised manifestation of the subject's freedom. Guilt is an essential 
indicator of the latter owing to its contradictory nature; namely it persists even when the 
subject knows that a certain action that generates it was not the outcome of her own will, 
but was imposed as "natural necessity. , 37 By giving up the question of what (object) 
generates this guilt, the subject experiences guilt as freedom, this is the pressure of 
fteedom: 
Guilt is the way in which the subject originally participates in freedom, and it is precisely 
at this point where we encounter the division or split which is constitutive of the ethical 
subject, the division expressed in 'I couldn't have done anything else, but still, I am 
gUilty. 38 
For Kant, causality is strictly regulated by the Other, a source that can neither be reduced 
nor controlled by the subject. Yet the subject who comes to be aware of her vassalage on 
the Other and is prepared to abandon it, divulges a "crack in the Other, " where Kant 
locates the subject's autonomy and freedom. This is where Lacan's assertion that "There 
is no Other of the Other, " meets Kant's suggestion that there is no Cause of the cause. 
39 
Inscribing the autonomous status and the freedom of the subject in this suggestion, guilt 
arises as the affinnation of autonomy and freedom, as it implies that the subject could 
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always have acted otherwise. Guilt marks the free territory that actively implicates the 
subject in "causal necessity. AO 
Indeed, guilt demarcates the freedom of the subject, but as I have argued, guilt manifests 
itself in a fon-n of a decision the subject has to take. Guilt suggests a leak in the law, in its 
absolute causal character, which leaves the divided subject with two options: either to 
follow the law or to abandon it completely (The first opts for a restorative effort, whether 
by imaginary and/or symbolic means, while the second opts for a real transgression). This 
dilemma circumscribes the ethical status of the subject and her freedom .41 Had it not been 
for guilt, desire would never be endured. It would have either been fulfilled or perpetually 
obfuscated by imaginary cloaks. Guilt takes the form of a dilemma, because it is rooted in 
the ethical choice the subject has to make. 
Nevertheless, can defiance of the law be a sufficient ethical criterion? Since not all 
subjects follow pure desire as a duty, what is it that restricts desire from its real-isation? 
The strongest antistatic principle is probably imaginary narcissism, which maintains the 
certainty of desire's absolute fulfilment, without succumbing to the drive. This is the 
imaginary resolution of guilt that betrays purejouissance, pure death drive. The desire of 
eternal jouissance is screened in narcissistic fantasies the content of which is dominated 
by perverse scenes. Narcissism banishes the recognition of the Other, reinstating the real 
Other, the surveillant of jouissance. Nonetheless, being incompatible with narcissism, 
purejouissance is left aside, unless it is infiltrated by the imaginary. 
The only way to be infused by narcissism is through fantasy, 'imaginarising' the real 
Other. In the core of perverse fantasy, one finds exactly this 'imaginarisation' of the 
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real. The narcissistic component found in all fantasies and its imaginary hypostasis, 
cannot bearjouissance, but only pleasure. The imaginary, as the pillar of the ego, strives 
to maintain its consistency through fantasies. The dissolving effects of jouissance are 
filtered and distorted by the imaginary so they stay unrecognisable and inactive; this 
means the subject can only tolerate pleasurable jouissance through her fantasy. Zi2ek 
notes: 
The Imaginary level is governed by the pleasure principle. It is striving for homeostatic 
balance, and the symbolic order in its blind automatism is always troubling this 
homeostasis; it is "beyond the pleasure principle. " When the human being is caught up in 
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the signifier's network, this network has the mortifying effect on him: he becomes part of 
a strange automatic order, disturbing his natural homeostatic balance. 43 
If the aim of the imaginary order is to reinstate homeostasis and achieve unity with the 
primordial Thing, then any disruptive element that perturbs this homeostatic balance must 
be excluded. The main 'nuisance' for the imaginary is created by the symbolic order as 
the symbolic law induces desire, while the imaginary rigidly and stubbornly requires its 
satisfaction. 
But if law means guilt, the latter is antagonistic to any narcissistic fantasy. As 
previously elaborated, power produces such a fantasy that promises a system of self- 
sufficiency and completeness. 44 Therefore, bearing in mind its narcissistic support, it is 
possible to argue that power ostracises guilt. The prevalence of the imaginary is 
something that we encounter in Sade. The obscene and tyrannical superego overpowers 
and takes over the law commanding the Sadean hero to transgress it. When the superego 
replaces the law, are we in the realm of perversion? The cruelty of the superego rests on 
the guilt with which it burdens the subject. In this sense, guilt is the essence of the 
superegoic attacks; this is how the superego, as equivalent to the Kantian law, reveals 
itself. 45 Guilt is the only unambiguous apparition of the law. Seen as the upshot of the 
superego, guilt conspires with the death culture of the latter. If the Sadean superego 
occupies the same place as the Kantian law, a paradox emerges. But if the superego's 
stabs are responsible for the ubiquity of guilt, then the unyielding character of the 
superego as an ethical maxim is at stake; guilt leads to a bifurcated pathway that 
digresses from the absolute nature of the maxim. 
The superego in its absolute character (as pure death drive) commands only one 
direction: lethal enjoyment; this means that the indecisiveness inherent to guilt does not 
conform to superegoic absolutism. The ethical maxim must not result in guilt, because 
the latter is a sign of a leak in the universality and supremacy of the maxim, a certain blot 
in its omnipotence. If guilt divulges the erroneous basis of the ethical duty, then the 
superego, as the matrix of guilt, cannot substitute the Kantian duty. In the Sadean 
universe, guilt is transformed into blasphemy; it takes the fon-n of wrath against the Other 
who perpetuates desire. But once guilt is erased, the superego becomes impotent. 
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The superego commands an enjoyment that the subject is unable to bear, because the 
subject gets too close to jouissance, where the unbearable Thing resides and the o/Other 
breaks down. The subject then needs the law so that desire can restore the subject's 
integrity and consistency. Yet by keeping a safe distance from the Thing one may stand 
so far back that the subject results in an interminable apostasy and distance from desire. 
Because as far as desire is concerned, the subject is always too close or too far, never at 
the right place. 
46 
This means that the superego never ceases punishing the subject with guilt for either 
enjoying too much or too little. Guilt is the extract of jouissance in the symbolic, the 
painful sense that accompanies our experience of having done something wrong. There is 
no better illustration of this than in the characters of Kafka and Dostoevsky. The 
experience of guilt is the symbolic reminder that at the end of the road lies death and 
what it leaves is an incomplete state of existence for the subject with which she has to 
come to terms. She has to bear it or use it as a crutch. 
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10. From Imaginary to Democratic Ethics 
10.1 Violent Utopianism 
The good ofsociety before your own good 
Nazi party slogan 
By implementing a fantasy that promises the means to satisfy the subject's desire, power 
endorses and commits itself to the service of a certain good. The character of the good 
must reflect an ideological nuance harmonic with power. The good is a fictional object, 
that is to say, a fantasy par excellence that supposes the accomplishment of desire. Thus, 
fantasy serves and sustains power relations; this is because power needs a moral law that 
echoes the phallic supremacy of the master and fuels the desire of the subject. But the 
realisation of the good does not achieve the fulfilment of desire but its eternal repetition 
and maintenance, because desire's satisfaction lies outside the domain of Good and the 
goods, according to Lacan's witticism in Seminar VII. 1 
Lacan defines an ethical position that opposes utilitarian and Christian ethics, in tune 
with Kant. Zupanc'ic' notes the symmetry between the ethical speculation of the two, as 
they both posit the ethical act, in the realm of impossibility, beyond any type of good, 
namely, in the dimension of the real. The ethical act is neither inscribed by the (socio- 
juridical) law nor by its mere transgression. 2 For Kant and Lacan morality per se is 
inscribed within impossibility, namely the "demand for the impossible, " rather than the 
possible accomplishment of a certain Good, as traditional ethics proclaims. Lacan notes 
that the desire of the subject does not reside in the service of goods; rather than reaching 
satisfaction in power, desire is continually perpetuated. 
[ ... ] Part of the world has resolutely turned in the direction of the service of goods, 
thereby rejecting everything that has to do with the relationship of man to desire -it is 
what is known as the postrevolutionary perspective. The only thing to be said is that 
people don't seem to have realized that, by formulating things in this way, one is simply 
perpetuating the eternal tradition of power, namely, "Let's keep on working, and as far as 
desire is concerned, come back later. 113 
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This is the futile character of all forms of power as far as desire is concerned. Power 
promises the satisfaction of desire, only to mislead and relinquish it at the end. The 
satisfaction of desire is always partial, but power does not acknowledge this, for such an 
admission would suggest that power's supreme ideal, its phallic constituent, has a partial 
value. The ideals a master proclaims, filtrated by a fantasy of gratifying desire, sustain 
the notion of the Good and the goods. But as Stavrakakis suggests, "what lies beyond the 
successive conceptions of the good, beyond the ways of traditional ethical thinking, is 
their ultimate failure, their inability to master the central impossibility, the constitutive 
lack around which human experience is organised. 994 An ideal is a defacto admission of 
the impossibility of desire to find full gratification, since it is nothing more than a 
signifier that captivates the desire of the subject. In this regard, an essential skill for the 
good master is the ability to galvanise the metonymic cycle of desire and make it flow 
over fantasmatic valleys. 
The antithesis between the unifying aspirations of the imaginary and their symbolic 
repudiation reflects the antagonistic relation between power and guilt. The first has 
recourse to the sphere of fantasy, since it promises to quench desire's craving by 
proffering an ultimate good, incorruptible and divine. Towards the opposite direction, 
guilt serves to remind us the unattainable satisfaction of desire by the (moral) law, 
according to Lacan's twist of the traditional view of guilt as the outcome of transgression 
of the good. Lacan links guilt not to transgression but the credence one gives to the goods 
of power. Instead of the good alleviating guilt, it actually magnifies the latter, because the 
good drives the subject to a digression from the authentic course of her desire. 
[ ... ] On the far edge of guilt, insofar as it occupies the field of desire, there are the bonds 
of a permanent book-keeping. 5 
Guilt is a rehearsal of the incomplete status of subjectivity; it underlines and maintains 
the lack of the subject, whereas power and its good try to disguise lack. This antagonism 
between guilt and power is not surprising, considering the master signifier's absolute 
character to which power adheres. A master of guilt would appear as accountable for an 
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apapTia (amartia, sin), a fallacy, which would reveal his lack of the phallus, outstripping 
him of any symbolic power. But an erroneous status renders the master signifier invalid, 
because it reveals the divided, incomplete and erroneous standing of the master. The 
master has to hold on to the signifier of his power. As long as guilt is on the side of the 
servant, the master's reliability remains intact and his signifier appears to be capable of 
accomplishing its goal. 
But this does not constitute an ethical attitude, for which symbolic guilt needs to be 
acknowledged. The fascist excluded symbolic guilt as incompatible with the supremacy 
of the ideal that he served, rendering his position pseudo-ethical. Power punishes due to 
privation (a lack in the real), which is different from symbolic lack (castration). 6 Sade, on 
the other hand, does not include guilt in his universe, at least not associated with a certain 
law. By breaking down all laws, symbolic guilt lacks the condition of its emergence. The 
imaginary takes over and this is where guilt is transformed to the essence of Sade's moral 
philosophy: the self-annihilating force, the evil that obliterates the ego and alongside its 
debris, evil eradicates itself. This is another point of departure from Kant's ethical duty 
which recognises symbolic guilt, despite its contradiction with the absolute character of 
the ethical maxim. 
But are we ultimately left with an ethics of no viable good, an ethics of finitude? Alain 
Badiou objects to such a nihilistic perception of ethics that negates cogito, as he claims to 
be the case with contemporary ethical discourse and the so-called 'return to ethics'. This 
is the focus of his critical rhetoric on the question of ethics and the problem of evil. 7 
For Badiou, the ethical is not defined based on abstractions (Man, God, the Other), but 
based on concrete situations. Thus, he renounces the generalised use of the notion of 
ethics today as the province of human rights that defines man as a victim who should 
8 
protect himself from Evil .A consensual ethical view based on the recognition of 
Evil is 
problematic, since all attempts to establish unity among people in the name of a positive 
notion of the Good constitute the actual origins of Evil. 
This is related to the latest denunciation of every revolutionary programme, negatively 
characterised as 'utopian', in order to denote its potential for inducing the horror of 
totalitarianism. In this vein, the will to promote and establish the Good, defending values 
such as justice and equality, is considered to be a force that generates Evil. For Badiou, 
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this pedant view is demoralising, since it impedes the vision for any act transformative of 
the existing order; it limits a political programme to an ethical commitment that concerns 
the ostracism of an a priori perception of Evil. The proscription of Man as immortal to 
imagine the Good and organise an effort to collectively open a horizon of new 
possibilities and effectively fracture the established order is equated with forbidding him 
humanity per se. The ethics against Evil encumbers its consideration of "the singularity 
of situations as such, which is the obligatory starting point of all properly human action. "9 
Such ethics succumbs to an ideological conservatism that sanctions nihilism and man's 
finitude; its abstract and general character grips any reflection on the singularity of 
situations. Rather than a general perception of man as a victim, the ethical concerns the 
formation of enduring axioms fitting to singular and detenninate processes that Badiou 
calls 'processes of truth': 
What I will call, in general, the 'ethic of truth' is the principle that enables the 
continuation of a truth-process - or to be more precise and complex, that which lends 
consistency to the presence of some-one in the composition of the subject induced by the 
process of this truth. "' 
Badiou proposes an ethic (rather than ethics) of the singular truths. This ethic endorses a 
greater affirmative cogito that characterises humanity and Man as Immortal. Thus, there 
is no a priori perception of Evil; the latter is identified through our radical efforts to 
break with conservative parameters towards new possibilities and the positive aptitude of 
Man for Good. 
What Badiou considers as an authentic ethical discourse is the ethics identified with 
truth processes (truths and not a general truth embodied by an ethical maxim, such as that 
of Kant). Like Lacan who speaks about the ethics of psychoanalysis, we can only speak 
about an ethic particular to a situation, letting its truth emerge. Badiou states, "There is 
only the ethic-of (of politics, of love, of science, of art). "' 1 The aim of the ethic of truths 
is not to form a safe panoply against an external and radical Evil; neither it is guided by 
the aspiration of establishing an abstract Law that would regulate all human relations. 
Badiou says that the ethic of truths attempts to deflect Evil, "through its own fidelity to 
truths" and the recognition that Evil lies underneath these truths. 12 
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The ethic of truths requires a necessary supplement an irreducible force that breaks with 
the existing order of things, what Badiou calls the event; this is the equivalent, if we can 
say so, to Lacan's notion of the real. The evental supplement has as its effect the agony of 
the not-known which is associated with desire, in line with Lacan. Desire is inaccessible 
to knowledge and formative for the subject of the unconscious. Badiou interprets Lacan's 
decree "do not give up on your desire! " as the fidelity to the "vanished" event, to our 
44own seizure by a truth-process. " 13 In Badiou's terms, the ethic of a truth can be 
articulated as follows: "Do all that you can to persevere in that which exceeds your 
perseverance. Persevere in the interruption. Seize in your being that which has seized and 
broken you. " 14 A truth that passes through the subject 'breaks' her; it incites an excess 
beyond herseýf 15 In the ethic of a truth, there must be an encounter, which is 
commensurable with an 'ethic of the Real', since the real for Lacan is only momentarily 
accessed on the level of an encounter. 
The ethical maxim provides consistency through one decree solely: 'Keep going! ' 
[Continuer! ]. 16 But this consistency is maintained, as long as you 'keep going' in the 
direction of the real, of what you have encountered; in other words one must show 
fidelity to the real. 17 Fidelity is broken once you break with the "break which has seized 
you, " namely the process of truth. In that case, the truth process is abandoned for 
returning to what Lacan called the 'service of goods'. 18 This suggests an irreversible 
betrayal that constitutes one type of Evil "made possible by a truth. "19 If we can put it in 
Lacanian tenns, this is the betrayal of desire, in its pure real dimension; something that I 
associated with guilt. As Badiou notes, "the Good is Good only to the extent that it does 
not aspire to render the world good, " that is, it does not make the world digress from the 
20 consistency of the ethic of a truth, the ethic of the Real . 
10.2 The Punitive Ideal 
Power, defined as the circuit enacted by the domination of the phallic/master signifier, 
interweaves an ideological (fictional) narrative with fantasy, in order to provide an 
imaginary cloak for the subject and consistency in the two signifiers. The mediation of 
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fantasy turns the signifier into an ideal. This idealisation is far from what psychoanalysis 
aims, as we saw previously, since "psychoanalytic ethics is clearly not an ethics of the 
ideal or the good as in the case of traditional ethics. The ideal, as master signifier, 
,, 21 belongs to the field of the ideological or even the utopian. In the name of this ideal, the 
exercise of violence as a form of punishment is legitimised. But it is not solely from the 
content of its narrative, its myth, that a certain ideological form of power, like fascism, 
derives its aggressive and violent character. The extent and the ways these ideals clash 
with reality are manifested in the exercise of violence. 
As far as violence may reflect the regressive character of a certain ideology, it is not so 
much the content of the ideological narrative that triggers regression, as the masterful 
position of the leading delegate of any ideology. It is not the unconscious manipulation of 
the unconscious by the master that massifies the people, as Adorno suggested, but the 
strategy with which the master promotes a comprehensive fantasy. Fantasy is always 
regressive; inasmuch as it propels the action of the subject, the latter is subject to 
fantasy's regressive effects. Although the identification with the master signifier (a dead 
letter) is a symbolic identification, the master who embodies it, conceals the emptiness of 
the signifier by pinning it on a certain fantasy. 
The master obscures castration, but this differs from the pervert's posture which does 
not acknowledge castration. For the dominant master, power is stretched to infinity with 
the use of a fantasy that suggests that castration can be undone. An imaginary law 
sustains the altitude of power's ambitions. The master always ascribes power to himself 
and, in order to maintain this belief, he employs a fantasy of omnipotence, which means 
the position of the master is supported by a regressive fantasy. The condition of 
omnipotence may tickle the subject, as it operates under all psychic structures, but only 
the psychotic recovers the omnipotence of lost jouissance, precisely by losing 
subjectivity, the relation to the Other. For non-psychotic subjects, the desire to identify 
with an omnipotent image that resists castration is present in their fantasies. 
The consistency of the discourse of the master is sustained by an imaginary narcissistic 
omnipotence, which turns it into a discourse of domination due to the categorical 
character of the ideal (the phallus) the master incarnates. Omnipotence leaves no space 
for symbolic guilt; in its place, punishment produces an epiphenomenon of guilt. As 
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shown splendidly by Kafka's writings, punishment induces guilt on the subject for no 
obvious reason, giving an empirical dimension to something that does not exist, namely, 
a complete law. For instance, God is a punitive god. Through punishment, the signifier of 
God acquires its arch-meaning. Ev apXý qv o ýoyo,;, in the beginning there was Logos 
(discourse): the true discourse, as a matrix that generates meaning. God is full of 
meaning, but he experiences no guilt, because guilt is what empties out meaning 
implying lack. 
Domination is inseparable from punishment. By using violence as a punitive practice, it 
ensures the commitment to the good, as if an ethical duty is performed. But a world of 
Kantian ethics would not require punishment, if a universal law were the supreme 
guiding principle. Punishment, as a hostile moralistic act that feeds the fantasy of 
omnipotence, becomes the legitimate route for aggression against anyone who renders the 
ideal of power contentious and empties out its meaning. It is very rare in politics for a 
leader to admit he was wrong, concerning his ideological fantasmatic vision. In that case, 
punishment, as the backbone of the law's superiority and integrality, would be rendered 
arbitrary and ineffective. The letter of the law has an absolute character and requires a 
master that possesses the ability and potency to decree and punish the transgressors of the 
law. In this way, the master does not present guilt as the cause of the law, but as its effect. 
Domination authorises a tyrant whose ideal is supposed to complete the Other. 
Stavrakakis points out that an ethical position determined by "the fantasy of harmony 
applied both to the subject and to the social is not compatible with democracy, rather it 
,, 22 can reinforce 'totalitarianism' or 'fragmentation' .A Kafkaesque type of totalitarianism 
enacts an imaginary law, not because the law of the symbolic father is repudiated, but 
because it is thought that his authority would be restored through imaginary means and 
his law would be completed. In totalitarian fantasies, the image of the omnipotent 
(imaginary) father is archetypal for condensing the possible omnipotence, the excessive 
j. Oul . ssance, of a regime, like Nazism. 
Nonetheless, the imaginary law of Sade does not serve this purpose. The image of the 
father has to be stripped from any emblem of authority and become impotent. The fantasy 
of ultimate pleasure in evil is what substantiates the system of Sade. His philosophy goes 
against any type of law, for laws are the modus operandi of the tyrant and contradict the 
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natural supremacy of evil. The fantasy of evil, which takes over and eventually destroys 
itself, is the ultimate fantasy of jouissance for Sade. Totalitarianism blinds itself to the 
emptiness of the superego-style demands of the imaginary law, which is different from 
Sade's position who genuinely identifies those gaps, but still links them fantasmatically 
to the actualisation of ultimate evil. He also gives it a name: Supreme Being-in-Evil, in 
analogy with the Supreme Being (God). Sade does not want to cover the void, but to 
magnify it, so that it eventually erases the symbolic register. Again, this reveals the 
discrepancy between the Sadean subject and perversion as a category, considering that 
the ordinary pervert wishes to maintain lack, because this is where his enjoyment springs 
from. 
According to Badiou, there are three manifestations of Evil, against which the ethic of 
truths is opposed to: first, it may have the meaning of 'simulacrum' or 'terror' related to 
an event that convokes the plenitude, rather than the void of the earlier situation. Second, 
a 'betrayal' of fidelity is another name for Evil and the third name is the identification of 
a truth with total power, what Badiou considers as 'disaster'. 23 Nazism embodies the 
second type of evil, as it displayed fidelity to the simulacrum, which is another name for 
the 'exercise of terror. ' 24 As Badiou puts it: 
When a radical break in a situation, under names borrowed from real truth-processes, 
convokes not the void but the 'full' particularity or presumed substance of that situation, 
we are dealing with a simulacrum of truth. 25 
The name is a trace for the event (the signifier that comes to represent the real) which 
remains in the situation after the event vanished and guides fidelity. Nazism borrowed 
names given to the major political events of modernity, such as 'revolution' and 
4 socialism'. Despite the ostensible congruence with these events, the point of 
demarcation is National Socialism's vocabulary of "plenitude, or of substance" which 
does not refer to the fundamental for the situation void located at its core, but to what is 
organised around it, that is, the "stable multiples of the situation. , 
26 Nazism aspires to a 
revolutionary act that would fulfil the 'true destiny' of the German community, namely, 
its ecumenical dominance. This reveals the particularism to which National Socialism 
succumbs, since it ties the 'event', the radical break it promises to bring, to the particular, 
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the welfare of a certain group of people. In this regard, the 'event' rather than ushering 
into being the void of an earlier situation and the name for it, it hypostatised its plenitude 
and "not the universality of that which is sustained, precisely, by no particular 
characteristic (no particular multiple), but the absolute particularity of a community, itself 
rooted in the characteristics of its soil, its blood, and its race. , 27 
Only fidelity to the event that "relates to the particularity of a situation only from the 
bias of its void" can be regarded as authentic. 28 A contrario, fidelity to a simulacrum 
"regulates its break with the situation not by the universality of the void, but by the 
closed particularity of an abstract set [ensemble] (the 'Germans' or the 'Aryans qy, 29 
V What Badiou argues, in proximity with ZiZvek's argument about the Nazi fantasy, is that 
in Nazism the void re-surfaced through the prioritisation of one particular name, that of 
the 'Jew'. Despite other names, such as the Gypsies, the mentally ill, homosexuals, 
communists, the name 'Jew' was "the name of names, " as it is linked with revolutionary 
universalism; it is related to "what was in effect already void [vide] about this name - that 
is, what was connected to the universality and eternity of truths. 1130 
This conception of the 'Jew' in Nazism is close to ZiZ'ek's theorisation who points out 
that the 'Jew' is the signifier that stands for the unrepresentable real. 31 Furthermore, 
Badiou's view of Nazism as a case of fidelity to a simulacrum underpins the evil of 
particularising the universality of the void, what cannot be represented, which is the real, 
for Lacan. The simulacrurn then in Lacanian terms could be associated with the plenitude 
of the master signifier(s), namely, ideals which are privileged in discourse as 
representative of the lost real. But this real is disguised by fantasy and the certainty of the 
master. 
10.3 The Violence of Particularism 
The political terrain is mediated by the interplay of laws. New laws and governments 
replace previous ones, each time shifting the master signifier. But one thing that cannot 
fluctuate is symbolic lack. Totalitarianism tries to conceal lack by promoting the 
imaginary acquisition of an absolute Good. Difference and lack are not acknowledged, 
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but reduced to an instrumental function: they are perceived as the obstacles to the 
actualisation of power's good. 
Power can claim that desire lies in this good, legitimising the use of violence as a way to 
overcome any barrier to the accomplishment of this desire. In this vein, the categorical 
character of the fantasy of domination exploits the desire of the subject. By promising to 
accomplish the absolute good beyond reach, power incorporates the real in violent forms. 
The use of violence in order to erase the stain of the real is the main political strategy for 
totalitarian regimes. It envelops the real in a mystifying wrap presenting brutality and 
violence as the necessary evil for mastering it. Violence is camouflaged under 
punishment, endorsing the annihilation of the enemy - the one who is thought to be the 
enemy, the one who enjoys more by stealing myjouissance, as Ziz'ek has suggested . 
32 
Despite the ideological mosaic that seems to describe best the ideas of all fascist 
programmes, a common feature is their ideological endorsement of the use of violence. It 
was a way for historical fascism to conceal the invalidation of their utopian ideal. Instead 
of recognising aggression as the result of their fascist imaginary aspirations collapsing, in 
the face of impossibility, rather they ideologised and turned it into a part of their utopia. 
The further ascent of fascism to power gave violence the character of practical 
affirmation of omnipotence. The Nazi doctrine was not the only one that thoroughly 
embraced Hitler's principles of institutionalised violence. Neo-fascist groups also divulge 
their affiliation with violence seen as a sanctioned method of certifying power, mastery. 
But violence should not be connected solely to fascism, as an extreme case of a radical 
and deviating political movement that seized power. Fascism affirms the violence, 
intrinsic to any mechanism of domination. 33 
Violence and law are synonymous with the exercise of power. Freud noted that violence 
and law originate from the same source. 34 The prohibitive and punitive force of the law is 
the product of a violent act. If the law substituted the loss of the father, then superegoic 
law leads to the repetition of thejouissance of the primordial crime, since superegoic law 
aims at abolishing the law of desire. Prohibition generates crime and crime generates 
guilt resolved by imaginary (the impossible as possible) or symbolic (the impossible 
always remains impossible) means. In the sense of the repudiated death drive turned 
inwards, guilt sets up a law that functions as the other side of desire, its repressed truth. 
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The law (and together subjectivity) emerges as a signifier, after the repression of the 
Thing, and constantly tries to master the real effects of the latter. 35 
The violence that accompanies every mechanism of domination originates in the 
debility of the master to recognise that the phallic signifier which stands for his ideal is 
dead and empty. The gap that opens between the symbolic and the imaginary of the 
master triggers the superego in its very death essence seeking completeness, through 
fantasmatic scenarios (Sadean, fascist or other scenarios of domination). These do not 
constitute ethical attitudes, as far as they rely on a particular fantasy and disregard 
otherness. Although the recognition of Otherness is not sufficient for accomplishing an 
ethical act, it is an essential premise of an ethical gesture. 
One of the early scenes in Pasolini's SaI6 illustrates the identification with a punitive 
superego. After the abduction of the victims, the four fascists conducted a sort of 
audition, before making their final selection. When Renata, one of the female victims, is 
brought in front of the fascist libertines, they remain indifferent to the sight of her nudity 
and celestial, undamaged beauty. Only when the girl falls on her knees and, in tears, 
pleads the fascists to punish and kill her, the fascists get fascinated and aroused by this 
spectacle, 36 In a synchronic mechanical movement, resembling erection, they get on their 
feet. Renata expresses guilt for the death of her mother who tried to save Renata from the 
fascists. The experience of guilt opens a gap in the symbolic-imaginary continuum and 
from this gapjouissance overflows. The girl cannot bear the springing jouissance and she 
is desperate for a fantasy that could veil her 'nudity' and humiliation. But this fantasy is 
on the side of the libertines, who are called to play the dual role of the superego. 
However, they leave the gap open unveiling it, instead of covering it, because their 
jouissance rests there. In this way, they induce the corruptive evil, the real lack, to an 
ideal form; they hold the role of the agent of privation. 37 Before Renataý the libertines 
rejected another girl for missing a tooth. The lack in that case was already there, which 
means their imaginary corruptive role was refuted. 
The more the subject is burdened with guilt, the stronger and more voracious the 
superego becomes. 38 The superego originates in the gaps of the symbolic, the gaps on 
which the subject stumbles, fraught with guilt. The ferocious character of the superego 
resides in its guilt that drives the subject towards imaginary deceptions of covering the 
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gaps in the law. The superego is 'pure death drive', 39 marking the lacuna of the symbolic, 
but from a different angle, it is also responsible for the imaginary fillings of this empty 
space. By filling these gaps with fantasies, the superego is not tamed, but on the contrary 
it becomes more vicious, regarding its demands from the subject. Only the acceptance of 
the emptiness of the superegoic demands and the vacuum they originate from may ease 
the oppression of the superego. This requires the subject to use language in order to 
articulate what she cannot represent. In this way, she can approach the limits of the 
symbolic and revise the signifiers that organise her existence. 
Zupanc'ic' reveals the risk of instrumentalisation of Kantian ethics when the categorical 
imperative is equated with the superegoic demand. Any ideology can implement this 
view in a manipulative manner, presenting "its own commandments as the truly 
authentic, spontaneous and 'honourable' inclinations of the subject. v)40 The fantasmatic 
scenarios implemented for cramming the symbolic gaps fasten the law of the superego to 
the particular, a fixed image, that of the omnipotent father-castrator. His autarchy is 
totally imaginary and resembles the rigidity of the superego. This omnipotent father- 
castrator functions as the 'imaginarisation' of the real essence of the superego: the father 
who prohibits jouissance by means of castration and the father who has boundless access 
to jouissance. 41 It is an 'imaginarisation' that brings back the despotism of the primordial 
father, which is something that is a substitute for instead of constituting a law. The 
primordial father is lacking an image; nobody can represent him. He is the father of the 
drive, that is, the superego: it castrates but itself escapes castration, it knows no 
boundaries. 42 
Power offers an image to the primordial father, as part of the fantasy the master 
endorses. For instance, the imaginary and ideal father is engraved in visual 
representations of God or in statues of political leaders. 43 Conventions and rituals that 
dominate politics endow the image of the leader with apathy, so that he gives the 
impression of eliminating desire, becoming an agalma (statue) that Lacan associates with 
the object a. 44 This is because the father of the horde was an agalma, in that he had no 
desiring status. In politics, the fantasised aggressive-punitive position of the father, who 
has to impose the law of castration, is the image that feeds the fantasy of power. The 
father is the first one to be imagined as a punitive figure and the master comes to take his 
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place. As an image, the father-castrator seduces and/or calls for identification; in other 
words his image is linked to personal egotistic interests. But it is impossible for any 
subject to take over this omnipotent position completely. If this image has a particular 
interest for the individual, then the ethical duty decreed by this imaginary source cannot 
acquire a universal status. 
The law of the ideal father supported the utopian 'Fatherland' of Nazism. The first law 
the Third Reich introduced was the recognition of Reichsburger, the citizen of pure 
German blood as the supreme degree of humanity. 45 The law aimed at bringing the dead 
father back to life, through a flesh and blood image linked to Aryan identity. In this way, 
the law of guilt induced by the dead father of the symbolic is emasculated. Only the type 
of power that accepts the castrated status of the master signifier, in other words that the 
father is dead, recognises symbolic debt. The superiority of the law has to be recognised 
by the subject, because it is the backbone of her existence. 
An ideal law gives a reason to live and become as complete as the law asks me to be, 
and power is there to show me the way towards completeness. An imaginary condition is 
formed then that more than filling the subject with hope, exploits the latter by making her 
believe in myths and believe in her-seýf, the solidity of her ego. Thus, the imaginary 
consistency of the subject is based on the recognition of power's ability to consummate 
the law and punish any deviation from it; this is the power one attributes to the imaginary 
father, the father of privation. 46 
In order to justify the imago of the father-castrator who deprives rather than castrates, 
the fascist needed to induce a real lack and did so, by eliminating the body of the Jew. 
Taking the form of an unbearable and irreversible punishment, such an 'imaginarisation' 
of the real helped the Nazi officer to solidify obedience to his authority and the Aryan 
ideal, inasmuch as German people did not perceive the execution of the Jew as a futile 
practice. Anyone who believed in the power of Nazism also believed that the superiority 
of the Aryan signifier could really eliminate the lack embodied by the Jew. Nevertheless, 
the real is not lacking, no matter how many Jews are executed. What the Nazi failed to 
discern was the futility of his master signifier which cannot be completed, despite its pre- 
eminence. 
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10.4 The Totalising Imaginary Dystopia 
Seen in a wider constellation of totalitarian systems of domination, 47 where the knot 
between power and violence is manifested, fascism embodies the totalising amplification 
of the imaginary condition. This condition gives birth to the most egregious fon-n of 
fantasmatic utopia, which subordinates the moral law to the constitutive elements of 
power (the master signifiers that organise ideology and its fantasmatic core). 
Domination, as far as it supports the idea of the presence of an omnipotent father, never 
constitutes an ethical choice. There is an ideal which is linked to welfare and happiness, 
despite the fact that Kantian ethics does not pledge such a thing. Against happiness, 
Kantian ethics presupposes pain, in the performance of the duty. The imaginary 
expansion of domination overflows and exceeds the boundaries of the law; yet for the 
imaginary register, beyond the pleasure principle, there is more pleasure, breeding an 
absolute fantasy of mastery and domination. Pain is excluded as incommensurate with 
omnipotence. 
Kant's system is about obedience to a supreme maxim, to a subjectless principle. 
Acknowledging the law as the supreme symbolic structure, the ethical maxim is not 
linked to a specific figure or an image. This could be the faceless Other of Lacan, 
supporting the "Kant with Sade" argument. But the picture is different. The master, as the 
incorporator of the maxim, has to be obeyed. He particularises it, limits it in an I, his ego, 
which is profoundly determined by fantasy. Fantasy is a repercussion of the personal 
interests of the ego, which is a misleading and unreliable source, insofar as the "ego is not 
a master in its own house" and does not speak itself. 48 Language always comes from 
elsewhere, i. e. the locus of the Other. But the ego acts as if it were autonomous, deriving 
its power from knowledge. Contrary to fascism, Sade goes against the ego, considering 
his polemic against any type of institutional tyranny of knowledge and in particular that 
of Enlightenment reason. 
A system of domination requires the obedience of the subject to a visible, discernible 
authority. A fantasy model, in the service of power, inaugurates a circuit of obedience, 
based on imaginary punitive properties we recognise in the master. In order to establish 
his authority, the master redeems the imaginary guilt of the people, whose love and hate 
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towards him replicate the two poles of the ambivalence found in the relationship with the 
father. Obedience to power is not the same as doing one's ethical duty. Every system of 
power takes conformity and obedience as basic prerequisites, not so much as duties, but 
as an attitude connected to personal interest and wealth. The patriotism and fanaticism 
subjects display stem from entertaining the belief that their national identity is superior to 
that of others, as Ziz'ek has been demonstrating in his work. Historically, the examples of 
conformity and obedience in totalitarian regimes generate some rather arduous questions. 
if totalising imaginary laws dissolve rather than promote socio-symbolic reality, what 
makes subjects obey them? 
Taking Pasolini's Salo' as an example again, without doubt the apathy of the fascists is 
not the sole aggravating aspect of the film. Probably, what is more outrageous is the 
young victims' lethargic obedience to their barbaric laws that eventually leads the victims 
themselves to corruption. The victims seem to be drained from all vital energy and 
captured in a fatal apathy. Pasolini stated prior to the film that his intention was to cause 
no pity for the horrific ordeals the young victims undergo. 49 By representing 
victimisation as a state of utter inertia, Pasolini encompasses a controversial view that 
sees responsibility lying not only on the side of the oppressor, but also on the side of the 
victim. 
The most controversial ontological example of what Pasolini portrays is the Holocaust. 50 
Stormy debates surround the inactivity Jewish victims displayed, during their ordeals in 
the concentration camps. The victims appeared to maintain a rather docile attitude, 
passively enduring their execution. The psychological theory of Learned Helplessness 
has been seen as a satisfactory explanation of the phenomenon. 51 But helplessness 
originates not in the pain the real induces, but in the imaginary that aims at pleasure. 
Since the imaginary cannot achieve pleasure, at least the subject tries to remain apathetic 
staying away from more pain and dreaming of pleasure. The problem of course is that 
pain always returns. The more one excludes it, the more it comes back in its real savage 
form. Rather than ratifying a motivating utopia of liberation, the victims relied on a 
passive imaginary veiling of dystopia that cast a shadow over their future. 
Whenever a dominant figure becomes the ambassador of the ethical maxim, we enter a 
sphere of violence, decisionism and particularism. This is because the universal is limited 
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to the particular: the image of the omnipotent master and his egotistic interests, namely 
the maintenance of the supremacy of his ideals. The ethics of desire can easily fall into 
the decoy of the particular, which suggests a pseudo-Kantian particularism. The object of 
desire can be disguised under numerous fantasmatic veils of particular interest for the 
subject, in other words it is easily concealed by the fantasmatic apparitions of the object 
a, the object-cause of desire. 52 Giving priority to the object a is not the same as following 
desire. But as soon as the imaginary collides with symbolic reality, aggression results 
from the realisation that one has to sacrifice the object, which exists only in fantasy, in 
order to function adequately in the symbolic. During the formation of the ego in the 
mirror stage, aggression accompanies the identification with the image. 
In any case what the subject finds in this altered image of his body is the paradigni of all 
forrns of resemblance that will bring over on to the world of objects a tinge of hostility, 
by projecting on them the manifestation of the narcissistic image, which, from the 
pleasure derived from the meeting himself in the mirror, becomes when confrontating his 
fellow man an outlet for his most intimate aggressivity. It is this image that becomes 
fixed, the ideal ego, from the point at which it stops as ego ideal. 53 
According to standard developmental logic, Lacan's mirror stage coincides with the anal 
period, as described by Freud, who observed the nihilistic and destructive tendencies 
arising, alongside the child's sacrifice of the anal object (an imaginary object) in order to 
please a symbolic demand (the parental demand for the child to defecate). This imaginary 
process, where the image is formed as a projection of an egotistic-narcissistic cathexis, 
using Freud's terms, is drilled by the signifier and the omnipotence of the first is 
eradicated by the mortality the latter introduces. The death the signifier induces, takes the 
form of guilt as a symbolic debt, a memento of the law's (and thus the subject's) 
incompleteness. The subject's sense of guilt as the reminder of incompleteness facilitates 
the exercise of power, by determining an a priori passive attitude towards it. 
Nonetheless, guilt has to be an active force of responsibility, what marks the freedom of 
the subject, as Zupanc'ic' has suggested in her work. 54 In that way, the subject sees pain as 
an integral part of desire and not the expiation for not obeying a certain fantasy. Neither 
should pain be a type of good of supreme value, as it appears in Sade. Whereas, in the 
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first case, guilt as responsibility acknowledges the void of the symbolic law, in the 
second case, an imaginary dome overshadows it. As stated earlier, guilt is manifested as 
stasis, but this does not suggest a passive condition; rather it is a stasis that calls for a 
certain action, a decision for performing a certain ethical gesture. 
There is one (psychotic) way to escape guilt that runs through the abrogation of the 
Other. Although some suggest a psychotic structure for Nazism, psychosis is far from 
what substantiated the utopian ideals of totalitarian regimes. 55 The master of totalitarian 
domination excluded guilt from his edifice by ascribing the responsibility of a violation 
of the moral law to the Other (God, Fatherland). In this way, an imaginary enunciator of 
the law is singled out that exempts the subject of the enunciated from guilt and its painful 
parameter. The statement of the enunciator then is linked to the particular interests of the 
subject of the enunciated, the executioner of a fantasmatic model. 
In totalitarianism, the subject of the enunciation is given priority, but there is a 
concealment of the division of the subject of the enunciated. The two must congregate; 
the master becomes the carnal demonstration of the abstract enunciation. The master of 
power searches for the ideal gaze of the omnipotent Supreme Being, an ideal point in the 
locus of the Other (the all-seeing eye of God), from where he wishes to be seen. From 
this ideal point, the suffering that guilt induces is absent. The moment the master believes 
that he occupies this locus, seizing the supreme gaze, he takes the role of the 'object-ive' 
apathetic legislator, since his desiring status has been eliminated. Hitler's absolute power 
illustrates this point: 
Adolf Hitler is Germany and Germany is Adolf Hitler. He who pledges himself to Hitler 
pledges himself to Gen-nany. 56 
This is how Rudolf Hess, the deputy leader of the Third Reich, inaugurated his speech at 
the Nuremberg rallies in 1934. Hitler occupied this ideal space; he was the law, which 
flagrantly expunges the Kantian law as the ultimate utopianism. He was the tyrant that 
Sade's philosophy is opposed to. 
Not only Sade, but even the ordinary pervert would not serve the ideal master as his 
Other, since for the pervert the Other is also incomplete. It is the perverse act that makes 
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the Other complete. The master, who incarnates the phallic signifier, identifies with the 
absolute power of the fullness of being that the phallus indicates as what is beyond its 
limit. With the support of an omnipotent fantasy which attempts to complete this 
identification, the subject takes the dominative position of the imaginary father, an 
invincible presence who imposes his will and punishments. 57 In this regard, the castrated 
status of the symbolic phallus is recanted. The master takes the place of the superego, as 
Ziz'ek has demonstrated the link between the two; 58 this means that the superego is linked 
with a figure of domination and loses its impersonal character that renders it 
commensurable with the Kantian maxim. 
In domination, the relationship with the Other is mediated by the imaginary. From this 
position, the master believes that 'everything is possible' and this becomes the main 
principle that regulates his relation to the Other, rendering his relationships dominative 
and exploitative. In that case, as it is found in totalitarian political systems, the object a, 
the product of the discourse of the master is sacrificed in the name of a fantasy of 
omnipotence. As the remainder of the real and the marker of the gap in the symbolic, the 
object a must be erased in the name of the unity that a political fantasy promises and the 
master embodies. As far as the so-called pervert occupies the position of the object, this 
explains his segregation by any discourse of domination in politics. A system of 
domination relies on the totalising value of the master signifier, something that the 
pervert does not acknowledge. 
The dominant master therefore wishes to unfetter the imaginary from any symbolic 
restriction, so that it encompasses the whole of the real and disables the fatal effects of 
the latter. This means the cornucopia ofjouissance that divides the symbolic and marks 
its castration has to be concealed under an imaginary cloak. The upper half vector in 
Lacan's completed graph of desire (Figure 1, p. 246) describes this division. It is this 
vector that the master of domination wishes to put out of action. 
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Figure 1: The Completed Graph of Desire 
Once the real, as the excess that undermines the symbolic, has been rendered inactive, 
absorbed by imaginary omnipotence, the dominant master adopts a relation to the Other 
that can be thought of as i(a) <> $. The subject of mastery identifies with the ideal image 
in the mirror that supports the identification with the ideal signifier. 
The first words spoken (le dit premier) stand as a decree, a law, an aphorism, an oracle; 
they confer their obscure authority upon the real other. Take just one signifier as an 
emblem of this omnipotence, that is to say of this wholly potential power (cepouvoir tout 
en puissance), this birth of possibility, and you have the unbroken line (traite unaire) 
which, by filling in the invisible mark that the subject derives ftom the signifier, alienates 
this subject in the primary identification that forms the ego ideal. '9 
Ideal ego and ego ideal become two sides of the same narcissistic position, sustaining a 
vain omnipotence that exorcises the fatality of the real. The three dimensionality of being 
is transfigured. An amplified imaginary takes over the other two dimensions. The 
symbolic, real and imaginary registers are no more equally perimetrical. The subject 
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identifies with the ideal reflection in the mirror, this is a flat image, since the subject 
cannot surmise what lies behind it and cannot represent the back view of herself. The 
other is needed, as another point of reflection, to recognise me as a three-dimensional 
lacking being and to take the position of gazing at myself that I cannot occupy. But 
otherness presupposes the recognition of the incomplete image, the emptiness of it, which 
is something the subject of domination tries to camouflage under narcissistic fantasies. 
Towards this goal, power fervently embraces rapid technological advances. When it is 
not applied to the construction of war weapons, technology is largely used by the media 
or else the industry of the image. Its use aims at the production of a pellucid image, as 
'objective' as it can get. But what lies beyond this objectivity is not reality, but the 
concealment of its lack. 
This is the reason why the particular in systems of political domination is external, 
having an observable status. The field of politics in itself is dominated by imaginary 
duality. For example, if in the past this duality was expressed in terms of East vs. West / 
Communism vs. Capitalism, today it has been transformed to Judeo-Christian democracy 
(e. g. United States' blessed nation) against Muslim fundamentalism. Suffice it to recall 
all propagandistic campaigns that display images of solidarity and unity that bring 
members of the same group together against an external threat. There is always a 
particular external threat that threatens unity (e. g. Muslim terrorism). This is the negative 
force that blemishes the lustre of the ego, i. e. the repressed real, and of course, it does not 
come from outside; rather the real is fantasmatically particularised as external, whereas it 
belongs more to the sphere of extimacy. 
As I will elaborate further in the final part, particularist violence originates in the 
negation of the real fragmented status of the subject, a negation of the object a. This 
means symbolic guilt, as what cuts off something from the real, is also negated. What 
remains intact in the ethics of particularism or else the (pseudo)ethics of the system of 
domination is the internal coherence of the system procured by the universal, the absolute 
character of the fantasy of power. This imaginary coherence is impressed in the statues of 
leaders. Statues stand for the imaginary promise of unification with the Thing, evoking a 
sense of awe, certainty, coherence and eternity. They solidify the excess the law cannot 
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absorb. As a speaking subject, the leader is divided, but as a statuesque figure, he 
condenses the impossible and infinite jouissan ce. 
Politics deploys strategies to eradicate symbolic guilt, in order to maintain its underlying 
fantasmatic pattern (a complete image and a complete law are possible). Symbolic debt 
says that 'everything is not possible' and this admission takes ambiguity, uncertainty, 
ambivalence, pain and anxiety as prerequisites for a political strategy that touches the real 
(without tying it to instrumental fantasies) as a terra incognita of infinite possibilities 
(knowledge, respect, comprehension of Otherness). According to Stavrakakis, the 
incomplete status of the Other, "the emptiness in the locus of democratic power, " is the 
catalyst for the creation of novel political directions that move beyond the imaginary 
decoys of past utopias. 60 Democracy proffers points de capiton which organise society 
around a fundamental lack, an admission of the antagonism and disharmony, without 
cramming it with positive fantasmatic content. Thus, the possibility that opens in 
democracy is the symbolic encircling of real lack through the signifier of the lack of the 
Other as the prioritised point de capiton. 61 In this case, the point de capiton, the 
democratic master signifier, does not sanction domination, since it is aware of its 
constitutive emptiness and its relational character (with other signifiers) that accounts for 
its meaning and power. 
As a way to accomplish a genuine democratic ethos by 'encircling the real', Stavrakakis 
proposes the idea of sublimation which refers to a process that creates "a space for the 
unrepresentable within representation. iý62 Sublime democracy could posit the field of 
politics as the 'art of the impossible', characterised by an ongoing effort to 
"institutionalise within political reality, within the field of political institution, the 
110 moment of the impossible, the political modality of the real . 
Without failing to notice the equivocal status of the notion of sublimation in Lacan and 
its imaginary quality, what Stavrakakis endorses is the symbolic encircling of the real as 
a feasible goal for a political programme that promotes an ethical attitude based on no 
ideals; this does not suggest an anarchic psychotic alternative, but a political agenda 
which rather than endorsing the absolute supremacy of master signifiers, cultivates the 
awareness of their lacking status. 
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In place of masterful absolutism, the subject finds the real of her symptom, namely, the 
real enclosed in a symbolic form, rather than the real Real or its imaginary covering; As 
V Ziz'ek points out, so-called 'real democracy', defined as a pure harmonious system 
without any 'malfunction', would be just another name for non-democracy. 64 Thus, apart 
from sublimation, Stavrakakis proposes the identification with the social symptom (what 
emerges within ideological discourse as the hindering factor for achieving harmony in 
society) as another democratic prospect. 65 For totalitarianism and anti-Semitism, 
'democracy' and the 'Jew' comprise their symptom respectively. 
Democracy's different goal, as Stavrakakis suggests, must be the identification with the 
symptom, where one also identifies with the impossibility to represent all. 66 Democracy's 
identification with the symptom is manifested through the electoral system, for each 
election brings forth the antagonism around which society evolves and traverses the 
fantasy of social unity; it instates ambiguity, "lack at the place of the principle of societal 
organisation. , 67 In this way, democracy surfaces as a challenge and an antistatic force 
against any totalising imaginary dystopia or the hegemony of certain master signifiers. As 
Stavrakakis puts the matter: 
In order to have a non-totalisable relation to the Other we must relate -identify - with the 
lack in the Other and not with the Other per se. 68 
The radicalisation of democracy can only be the result of a continuous ascesis, it depends 
on our ability to move beyond the Scylla of conformity and the Charybdis of utopianism 
and maintain, in the fullness of time, our distance from both of them. 69 
It is not sufficient to endorse an ethics founded on the acknowledgment of the real 
(Otherness, difference) and its structural causality solely. Thus, Stavrakakis points out 
two strategies that tackle real causality: one that forwards a defensive evasion of real 
causality, a strategy sanctioned by traditional ethics. A second more defying strategy 
orward the encircling consents with ZiZ'ek's conception of the ethics of the real and puts f 
of the real, namely, the "symbolic recognition of the irreducibility of the real and an 
attempt to institutionalise social lack. 1970 The encounter with the real, in its pure excessive 
essence, without veiled by imaginary means, fractures the dominant socio-symbolic 
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relations, as it breaks down the absoluteness of the master signifier and accepts the 
phallus not as the signifier of power, but as the signifier of lack (which is the 'power' of 
desire). The encounter with the real can therefore pave the way to a genuine 
revolutionary praxis, inasmuch as it undermines and re-organises the symbolic. 
This can be a fruitful application of the ethics of the real and the impossible, as refined 
by Zupanc'ic'. This is why the fundamental gesture for a democratic politics must not 
simply recognise symbolic difference, instead of engraving it in a field of competition, 
but encircle the very unrepresentable core of difference, its failure to be taken into 
signification. Inasmuch as domination is determined by the imaginary, it projects 
antagonism to an 'external' factor, that is, the object a that exposes the truth of the Other 
(the impossibility of becoming complete), as Ziz'ek has shown in his work .71 The factor 
that embodies this impossibility is denounced after it receives the designation 'perverse'. 
The pervert is excluded by power because he displays the impossibility of the symbolic to 
find completeness. This will be the focus of my argument, in the next part. 
Notes 
1 See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII. - The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, 
ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: Tavistock, 1992), pp. 228-230. 
2 See Alenka ZupanW, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan (London: Verso, 1999), p. 58. 
Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VII. - The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, p. 318. 
See Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 129. 
Lacan, The Seminar ofJacques Lacan, Book VIP The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, p. 318. 
See Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, (London: Routledge, 1996), 
fp. 150-152. 
See Alain Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, trans. by Peter Hallward (London: 
Verso, 2001), p. 3. 
8 Ibid., p. 13. 
9 Ibid., pp. 14-16. 
10 Ibid., p. 44 (emphasis in the original). " Ibid., p. 28. 12 Ibid,, p. 91. 13 Ibid,, p. 47. 14 Ibid. 
is Ibid., p. 49. 16 id., p. 52. 17 Ibid., p. 79. 18 Ibid., p. 80. 19 Ibid. 
250 
20 Ibid., p. 85. 
21 StaVTakakis, Lacan and the Political, p. 128. 
22 Ibid., p. 129. 
23 Badiou, Ethics: An Essay on the Understanding of Evil, p. 71. 
" Ibid., p. 77. 
25 Ibid., p. 73. 
21 Ibid., p. 68. 
27 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. 
21 Ibid. p. 74. 
30 Ibid., p. 75. 
31 See Slavoi 2i2ek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London: Verso, 
1994). 
32 See Slavoi 2i2ek, Tarrying with the Negative: Kant, Hegel, and the Critique of Ideology (Durham: Duke 
University Press, 1993), especially chapter 6. 
33 As drawn earlier, this emphasises the possibility for the Oedipal system that maintains liberalism, to 
implement violent policies in order to secure its domination. 
3' Freud writes about the two terms in his reply to Einstein's letter. "Why War? " (1933[1932]), The 
Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 22, trans. by James 
Strachey (London: Hogarth and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1953-1974), pp. 199-215. Through a 
Lacanian prism, violence is a condition stirred up by the imaginary that does not recognise guilt, whereas 
the law, as a symbolic structure, emerges from the realisation of guilt; law is there to alleviate guilt, the 
painful experience ofjouissance, the insurmountable void, but it is not effective in doing so. 
5 See Slavoj 2i2ekEnjoy Your Symptom!: Jacques Lacan in Hollywood and Out, London: Routledge, 2001 
1992]), p. 18 1. See also Lacan, The Ethics of Psychoanalysis, 1959-1960: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, 
pp. 83-84, where Lacan discusses the relation of the Law to the Thing. To the extent that desire is always 
the desire of the Thing (loss), we could say that desire is by default necrophilic. 
3' This punitive position is probably what Henry Kissinger suggests, when he says, "Power is the greatest 
aphrodisiac. " In other words, power tacklesJouissance. 
37 See Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis (London: Routledge, 1996), p. 
62. 
38 See Slavoj Zi2ek, "Kant with (or against) Sade, " in The biek Reader, ed. by Elizabeth Wright and 
Edmond Wright (Oxford: Blackwell Publishers, 1999), pp. 283-301. 
39 See Sigmund Freud, "The Ego and the Id" (1923), The Standard Edition of the Complete Psychological 
Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 19, trans. by James Strachey (London: Hogartb and the Institute of Psycho- 
analysis, 1953-1974), p. 53. 
40 Zupan66, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan, p. 1. 41 The term 'imaginarisation' has been used in seminars of the New Lacanian School in London, alluding to 
an imaginary encompassing of the real. 42 One must bear in mind that the drive is a linguistic and not a biological effect. The real father is the 
biological father, the agent of castration, but not the castrator. The biological father of real omnipotence 
does not exist, as far as his power is derived from language. The biological father is told to be a father. See 
Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, pp. 61-63. 43 Suffice it to recall the icons of Orthodox churches, where God is represented through a gentle senile 
image, with long grey hair and beard, meek and merciful expression. This image is also quite similar to the 
Baba of Hinduism. Baba, meaning father/saviour, is considered a respected religious man, a saint. 44 See Jacques Lacan, Le Sýminaire, Livre VIII. - Le Transfert, 1960-1961, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller 
(Paris: Seuil, 1991). 
45 See James Taylor and Warren Shaw, A Dictionary of the Third Reich (London: Grafton Books, 1987). 46 In Freud, the father succumbs to guilt, as the result of the superego's ordains. 47 Here, the Sadean fantasy is considered a product of a subversive system of domination, the domination of 
the real Real. 
48 See Sigmund Freud, (1917) "A Difficulty in the Path of Psycho-Analysis, " The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 17, trans. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth 
Press and the Institute of Psycho-analysis, 1953-1974), pp. 139-143 (p. 143). 
251 
49 See the previous chapter. 
50 The designation "Holocaust" is doubtful in its own right, insofar as it is fallacious. The term indicates a 
complete and absolute extermination of a nation, which did not really occur, despite the vast monstrosity of 
the atrocities. 
51 See Seligman Martin E. P., Helplessness: On Depression, Development and Death (San Francisco: W. H. 
Freeman, 1975). 
52 Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, pp. 124-126. 
53 See Jacques Lacan, tcrits: A Selection, trans. by Alan Sheridan (London: Routledge), pp. 339-340. 
54 Zupan66, Ethics of the Real: Kant, Lacan, especially chapter 2. 
55 See Money-Kyrle in the first chapter. 
56 The statement belongs to Rudolf Hess. Taylor and Shaw, A Dictionary of the Third Reich, p. 15 1. 
57 The imaginary father is the agent of privation who deprives the subject from its symbolic phallus. This 
means, he inscribes a lack in the real, a lack of lack, insofar as the symbolic phallus is the signifier of lack. 
See Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, pp. 150-152. 
" See Slavoj 2iýek, The Ticklish Subject: The Absent Centre of Political Ontology (London, New York: 
Verso, 1999), pp. 390-391. Totalitarianism is not a product of psychosis, since it is organised around a 
symbolic figure, a master that embodies the autarchic character of the superego, that is, the omnipotence of 
the master. His embodiment of the superego is fortified by the belief that be possesses the ideal knowledge 
of eradicating desire. 
59 Lacan, tcrits: A Selection, p. 338. 
'0 StaVTakakis, Lacan and the Political, p. 138. 
" Ibid., p. 163. 12 Ibid., p. 132. 63 Ibid. 
64 See Slavoj 2i2ek, The Sublime Object of Ideology (London: Verso, 1989), p. 148, cited in StavTakakis 
Lacan and the Political, p. 140 
61 Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, p. 133. 
66 Ibid., p. 133, p. 134. This view concurs with 2iiek's idea about traversing the social fantasy. 
67 Ibid., p. 136. "If we need elections every once in a while it is because we accept that the hegemonic link 
between a concrete content and its incarnation of fullness has to be continuously re-established and 
renegotiated. " 68 Ibid., p. 139. 69 Ibid., p. 140. 70 Ibid., p. 130. 
71 2i2ek, The Sublime Object of Ideology. 
252 
Part III: Conclusion 
In this part, I endeavoured to disengage perversion from the ethical debate regarding 
fascist atrocities and their relation to Kantian ethics. The Sadean imaginary edifice is 
understood as a system of domination, as it was outlined in the previous part, different 
from the totalitarian system of Nazism, as far as fantasy and ideals are concerned. Both 
systems are incongruent with Kant's prioritisation of the moral law that requires an 
unyielding and indifferent adherence to the letter of the law, as an ethical duty. 
To the extent that the performance of the Kantian duty must not originate in personal, 
egotistic interests, but in the enunciation of an impersonal abstract maxim that can 
acquire a universal status, both systems have failed to accomplish this duty. This is 
because the Other in both cases is reduced to an external particular source that serves the 
interests of the fascist or those of the Sadean subject that differ in terms of the master 
signifier and the concomitant fantasy that each system rests on. Specifically, the Sadean 
libertines' efforts serve the imaginary goal of an ultimate evil that sweeps everything just 
to destroy itself at the end, whereas the Nazi fascist imagines a supreme Aryan nation that 
imposes a new universal order. These two goals are determined by fantasies that reflect 
personal desires; therefore, they cannot acquire a universal status, as ethical duties. 
When an imaginary condition prevails filtering the perception of otherness, violence 
inhabits the world of politics, because the gaps of the symbolic are crammed with 
fantasy. The object a that marks this gap has to be concealed. Thereby, the so-called 
pervert who identifies with the object exposes the gap that power tries to cloak. Only in 
this way, power can promote an ideal (the master signifier) that can complete the Other. 
For this reason, the pervert's position is dissimilar to that of the power of domination. 
The dominant master instrumentalises the Other (reduced to an other) as the imaginary 
overtakes the symbolic. 
The sense of symbolic debt (i. e. symbolic guilt) that would hypostatise the Kantian 
ethical duty is absent in domination. The acceptance of castration and the dead status of 
the signifier are the limits of the symbolic, where one blunders upon death as the 
fundamental truth of existence. More than clinging to the certainty and the particularism 
of a fantasy of a supreme ideal that dominant power promotes, the subject has to come to 
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terms with symbolic death. This is the acceptance of a central lack, namely, the empty 
status of desire, that goes through the recognition of the desire of the Other and a real 
excess that cannot be absorbed by the latter. More than simply acknowledging it, a 
genuine ethical act would require identification with this excess. 
C% 11 ý, -T 
PART IV 
Politics 
introduction: 
Politics and the Embodiment of Jouissance 
Two suggestions weaved the argumentative core of the last two chapters: First, the fascist 
does not occupy the same discursive position as the pervert and second, the fulfilment of 
Kantian ethics does not go through the Sadean route of perversion. Zupanc'ic' has 
demonstrated that Sade's Kantianism is nothing but a perverse ploy that veils 
responsibility under apathy. Yet, contrary to Zupanc'ic', my view is that perversion is a 
condition that little has to do with the Sadean system and even less with fascist ethics. 
Even if one agrees that the Nazi administrative body established an anti-morality 
grounded in Kantian principles, it is difficult to explain this in terms of perverse 
functioning. Nazism obtains its hegemonic status through its master signifier, whereas the 
pervert is beyond any hegemonic context, precisely because he does not embody a 
signifier, but its very lack, the object a. If the discursive copulas between fascism and 
perversion are not effective, the nagging question left is whether there is any gain for the 
understanding of the category of perversion, when the latter becomes the main frame of 
reference for the discussion of extreme ideological phenomena and, particularly, 
total itari ani sm(s). 
The philology of perversion in psychoanalysis needs a critical reconsideration. Together 
with a novel scrutiny of the theory, perversion needs to be reappraised on the basis of its 
casual use in the interpretation of socio-political phenomena. Sado-masochism, fetishism, 
repressed homosexual tendencies are some favourite terms taken from the sexological 
lexicon of perversion in order to explain the flourishing of last century's fascism. 
This part of the present study reflects on the vertiginous intoxication of fascism with 
perverse traits and its persistence in contemporary politics. At best, the notion of 
perversion has been implemented to describe and understand the excess found in certain 
types of behaviour that move beyond the norm. At worst, perversion turns out to be the 
stigmatising label for whatever behaviour does not fit with traditional schemata of power, 
in the Foucauldian sense here, as institutionalised bodies of knowledge. In any case, a 
breach in the unity of the social edifice is likely to be considered as a perverse act, not 
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only because it suggests transgression (this is something that the law can easily identify 
and restore), but also because it unveils the structural limitations of the law. The 
undermining character of the impossible can be easily labelled as perversion. 
Therefore, the labelling of the pervert does not simply serve the purpose of producing 
another nominal category. More than the name of a dubious clinical or moral category, 
the epithet 'perverse' facilitates the segregating practices of an authoritarian norm. The 
marginal space where the pervert is placed by institutionalised authorities reveals less the 
risks that he brings about and more the manipulative and totalitarian character of 
authority. It is not difficult to realise the streak of stubbornness with which society 
refuses to abandon 'perversion' as a designation, contrary to the use of the other two 
major clinical designations of neurosis and psychosis, which is on the wane. 
The advocates of the view of perversion as social malice draw on the anti-non-native 
character of perversion, transforining it into an anti-social and anarchic notion. More than 
a capitalistic strategy of pathologising difference, the notion of perversion is apolitical 
per se and thus when the designation is used in order to denote opposition to values and 
the ideological purposes, perversion is subjected to an instrumentalisation by any 
ideological form of power. Having just a poor crop of evidence for the hollow anti-social 
elements of the pervert, it seems to be enough for a system of power to create an anti- 
democratic, anti-patriotic and anti-revolutionary image of the pervert, conditional on the 
dominant ideological frame through which power manifests itself. 
Inevitably, the politics of fascism are sexualised, while the category of perversion 
embodies an ominous type of sexuality, even for the current and supposedly tolerant 
democratic edifice, becoming a source of misinterpretation and solecism. But non- 
normative does not necessarily mean anti-normative. By insisting in the use of perverse 
terms, accounts that claim an objective understanding of fascism attempt to conceal the 
gaps that render them ineffective. Inasmuch as they do not accept the impossibility of 
objectively capturing the phenomenon of fascism, they disguise it under the masking of 
perversion, which serves ideological purposes and maintains the expectation of a 
complete explanation of fascism. For instance, fascist atrocities are explained in ten-ns of 
sadistic tendencies. 
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Without operating inside an ideologically sterilised frame, the psychoanalytic clinic has 
produced a remarkable body of knowledge on perversion, yet quite limited in comparison 
to the research in the other two typical psychoanalytic categories, namely neurosis and 
psychosis. Inasmuch as this knowledge is widely and copiously applied to extreme 
political conditions or violations of political laws, psychoanalysis succumbs to a synergy 
with a system that attempts to marginalize the so-called pervert. Even worse, 
psychoanalysis appears to be resistant to the idea of reappraising vague and problematic 
theoretical suggestions. Rather than fostering rigid scholasticism, psychoanalytic 
knowledge on perversion must form the podium upon which novel theoretical 
explorations regarding the 'perverse condition' could be initiated. A scholastic doctrine, 
as far as it conforms to an established and inflexible apparatus that ostracises any 
incommensurability with the general normative ethos in society, itself functions in a sort 
of 'proto-fascist' fashion. Perceiving the pervert as a destabilising factor for their 
hegemony, power mechanisms proclaim his untreatable and obdurate condition that 
needs close monitoring and control. 
The main argument elaborated in the present part shifts from the discursive constructs 
about the fascist pervert to the 'fascist' outlook of discourses on perversion, recognising 
the need to proceed to a relinquishment of the prosaism. that regards the category of 
perversion as social menace. My argument sees the so-called pervert as the subject that 
raises anxiety in authority figures and avatars of consolidated institutions, where I will 
also include the analyst. The uncomfortable position of anxiety caused by another 
subject's blatant digression from the normative sexual modality or morality leaves no 
space for negotiation. By labelling the subject a pervert, anxiety is given a name and a 
cause, without itself being openly confronted. In an endeavour to confront this label and 
encompass the tolerance of anxiety, as a basic psychoanalytic aim, I propose an 
alternative term for referring to the subject typically described by perverse designations. 
In contradistinction with the ordinary subject, ' namely the subject that conforms to the 
prevalent normative socio-political schemata, I will refer to the extra-ordinary subjeCt, 
2 
mainly as a way to accentuate the excess he embodies, this extra constituent to 
ordinariness, that becomes the source of provocation and anxiety for the institutional 
basis of society. 
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if we rely on the moralistic view of perversion as what breaks the law and the social 
nonn by failing to acknowledge the desire of the Other, the issue of perversion cannot be 
detached from the field of clinical research and criminology. This is because, to a certain 
degree, an act departing from the prevalent norm is characterised as perverse, implying 
the manoeuvre of a hidden jouissance with which this act has been charged. 
Nevertheless, in reality, what becomes obvious is the autarchic and authoritarian attitude 
towards jouissance, displayed by all forms of power. Power serves a particular Good that 
needs to be protected from the corrupting effects ofJouissance. The maintenance and the 
security of the provision of the Good and the goods or else commodities, as Lacan plays 
with the term in Seminar XII, account for the 'fascist' exclusion of jouissance from the 
social body. 3 Provocative per se, the acquisition of perverse jouissance has been 
associated with all marginal divisions of a society that has never sufficiently justified this 
marginalisation. Therefore, the validity of all discursive accounts that divide jouissance 
into perverse or/and fascist is in question. 
Notes 
' That is, the subject of a typical, non-pathological neurotic structure. The distinction between the ordinary 
and the pathological neurotic subject is not unproblematic, but the critique of the tenn goes beyond the 
scope of this part. 
' There are places in the present part where I refer just to the extra-ordinary, omitting the term subject, in 
order to draw an analogy with the designation 'pervert' and avoid exposing the reader to the fatigue of 
repeating the word 'subject'. 
3 See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book VIP The Ethics of Psychoanalysis 1959-1960, 
ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Dennis Porter (London: Tavistock, 1992), pp. 218-230. 
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11. Beyond the Fascist Utopia 
11.1 The Dark Veil of Fascism 
Confusion and misjudgement of the genuine character of fascism revolves around its 
eroticisation through perverse sexuality. Such a methodical misinterpretation amplifies 
the shortage in the consensus regarding the constitutive elements of historical fascism and 
reveals its elusive core that cannot be grasped either by leftist or liberal historians. There 
is an ongoing debate among the latter about whether fascism was the extreme 
manifestation of bourgeois despotism or the negation of liberal democracy. 
Yet this does not mean that there is no common ground between theoreticians. A 
general admission is shared, since Horkheimer and Adorno's acerbic criticism of fascism 
in the Dialectic of Enlightenment: the fascist encroachment and (mis)appropriation of the 
Enlightenment principles and the ideals of the French Revolution. I Nevertheless, the 
belief in fascism's perverse character is in itself a 'perverted' approach to the 
phenomenon and incongruous with rationalism. Fon-ning less an effective critique of 
fascism and more an inadvertent support for the latter, such discursive links entail a 
seduction by the fascist ideology's imaginary web, woven around ideas of power, 
violence and pagan romanticism, the main purpose of which is precisely to blur the 
absence of a well-defined political planning and profile. 
In post-First World War Germany, National Socialism discerned the influence of such 
utopianism over the youths and the intellectuals of the time and systematically cultivated 
the dark romantic image of superman, a kind of anti-Christ (not as a satanic figure, but as 
a hero opposed to any religious belief). For Nazism, Aryanism replaced religion. Against 
the Judeo-Christian dogma, National Socialism rigorously persecuted the Catholic and 
the Protestant Church, in favour of the icon of the fallen: 
The cult of the fallen was central to Fascist liturgy. Fascism created its own cult of 
martyrs and its own immortality for the fallen through public ritual and an attitude of 
collective transcendence. ' 
260 
The cult of the fallen manifests the desire of the Nazi Other, in its demanding, voracious 
and superegoic form. It is the 'dark God' of sacrifice that Lacan linked to the horrors of 
Nazism, in Seminar X1 .3 The pagan and vitalist ideas demanded an alternative morality 
that clashed with the humbleness and the sense of guilt of the Judeo-Christian dogma. 
Fascist morality endorsed the 'new man' as an unrestrained type of (super)man motivated 
by an innate power of superiority. Placed within a dark frame of power and fascination, 
the fallen was celebrated for his departure from the kingdom of guilt, as what condemned 
man to mortality, doubt and lack. 
It is this Nazi fascination with the cult of the fallen that I believe contradicts the 
suggestion that the Jew embodied a modem antichrist for Nazism. In my view, Nazism's 
hatred for the Jew, as well as other anti-Semitic manifestations, was fuelled by the 
solidity of the Jewish religious system and the claim of being 'God's favourite'. It was 
the positive content of the Jewish fantasy (The Jewish identity) that fostered the 
animosity and the antagonism of the Nazi fantasy, against the Jew and his religion. 
Instead of accepting guilt as the premise for immortality in another life, the fascist 
believed in secular immortality, achieved through physical vitality. 
The Nazi experimentation with eugenics illustrates at best the intriguing vision of 
producing a post-human race that is pure and enduring. The search for knowledge that 
characterises contemporary genetics was absent, but somehow knowledge was there 
already subordinate to the master signifier or else the Nazi ideal; it just required the 
proper means for its application. Nazism's ideal was augmented by one image: the Aryan 
superman whose natural power is endowed with corporeal perfection. The realisation of 
this ideal laid down the basis for the destructive utopian politics of fascism. 4 In hi s 
discussion of the nihilistic character of contemporary ethical discourse, Badiou alludes to 
the example of euthanasia and notes Nazism's preoccupation with it, as with 'bio- 
ethics'. 5 Euthanasia reflects the contradictory essence of ethics that eulogises eudemonia 
and the dignity of living, yet conveys enthralment with death, without encompassing it in 
its thought. Badiou argues: 
Fundamentally, Nazism was a thoroughgoing ethics of Life. It had its own concept of 
'dignified life', and it accepted, implacably, the necessity of putting an end to undignified 
lives. Nazism isolated and carried to its ultimate conclusion the nihilist core of the 
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'ethical' disposition once it has at its disposal the political means to be something other 
than prattle. 6 
The example of Nazism and euthanasia reveal the peril of setting state commissions on 
'bio-ethics' and the contradiction that inheres to contemporary ethics: it is simultaneously 
"fatalist and non-tragic, " since death suggests an inassimilable agony, yet it is 'dignified' 
by becoming a discreet affair, losing its painful and intolerable character that would 
disturb the idea of living-well. 7 In Badiou's words, the ethical discourse "allows death to 
6go about its business', without opposing to it the Immortal of a resistance. ,8 The 
contemporary ethical discourse serves a 'conservative desire' that endorses the current 
stipulations of the Western status quo that amputate the prospect of a future of universal 
value and a 'murderous desire' that renders the claimed mastery of life to mastery of 
death. 9 
Today, within a sweeping atmosphere of 'anything goes', the fiction of the Other is in 
severe crisis and this means that the Other, as the benefactor of the subject's pleasure, 
malfunctions. ' 0 The demand of the Other is not imperative anymore. The corrosion of the 
power of the Other as lacking does not lead to any liberating results, but rather facilitates 
a regression to fantasmatic phenomena of omnipotence. As the subject moves away from 
a symbolic questioning of power, she relapses into an egotistic narcissistic conception of 
it. 
The problem arises from the obsession with the knowledge of the absolute Good, which 
belongs to the domain of imaginary impossibility. This obsession supports the nihilism of 
the ethics that defines Man in terms of happiness, as Badiou suggests. " Commonly, when 
the founding idea of politics is canvassed, the upholding of ecumenical welfare comes up 
as the main theme. The political domain is organised on the basis of the pursuit of a 
sovereign Good. As if this good is something graspable and definable, political authority 
always speaks on its behalf. It comes as no surprise then to see this Good failing, 
inasmuch as it stands for nothing but the object a. This little object-cause of desire can 
only be staged through imaginary means. The moment one comes too close to it, the 
object falls and fails to satisfy desire. The field of politics is doomed to such failure. The 
sovereign Good belongs to the imaginary order that hypostatises political fantasies. Such 
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fantasies lay out an unreliable and faltering pathway, since they propel the subject 
towards endless misidentifications of the object and concurrent antagonisms. 12 
This imaginary continuum is what the presence of the so-called pervert disturbs. 
Reducing himself to a mere object, the pervert refuses to screen the object solely in 
fantasies. He rather takes it on the symbolic stage, materialising and passing it to corpo- 
reality. But the corpo-reality of the object needs to be disguised, as far as it marks the 
truth of subjectivity; this is the failure of the object to fill the Other's lack, opening the 
possibility of the monstrous primitive Thing's return. Refusing to play this game of 
deception, the assumed pervert incarnates the object and exposes the unbearable Truth of 
subj ectivity. 
11.1.1 From Perversion to Subversion and Back 
A romanticised view of perversion discerns in the latter a revolutionary or a subversive 
thrust that can lead to political changes, either positive or negative. From the atrocities of 
the Second World War to the recent violence linked to terrorism, abolitionist praxes and 
revolutionary acts against the predominant status quo eradicate the continuity of the 
historical stream and bring the subject in confrontation with the real. Nevertheless, the 
ascription of any subversive element in politics to a perverse pivot constitutes a futile 
tactic, since it implies that novelty in politics runs through perversion. This is inaccurate 
and stamps innovation with a negative label. 
The perverse label, moralistic per se, is affixed to any propensity to break off the 
normative chain 13 and expose the void that inheres to the body of sanctified knowledge 
shared by the majority. On the one side, knowledge serves the purpose of a monolithic 
and inflexible power mechanism, which favours the maintenance of a fantasy of unity. 
On the other, moralistic propositions offer nothing but pseudo-infinity of desire, which is 
linked to a recurrent metonymy of the 'One' through coded types of actions that suppose 
to actualise it. ' 4 
Unless it is perceived as a subtle strategy of eulogising prevalent power apparatuses, the 
labelling of the pervert is a practice that adds little to the deciphering of the transgressive 
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idiom of the subject who receives the label. Especially, if one considers that the so-called 
pervert, before his marginalisation due to labelling, did not detach himself from the 
institutional corpus of society, in spite of his provocative deeds, then there is little 
difference from the ordinary subject who han-noniously acquiesces with the officious 
social and political institutions. This shows that perversion as a pathological and negative 
designation simply fails to describe the subject characterised by it. 
For this reason, I find it more appropriate to allude to the so-called pervert, as the extra- 
ordinary subject, who is sufficiently ordinary to comply with the main establishments, 
principles and values of social order (this is why, for example, I would not associate a 
serial killer with perversion, for the mere reason that the extra-ordinary subject displays a 
basic respect of fundamental human rights), yet not ordinary enough for an ideologico- 
political system to integrate him into its fabric. 
The logic for using this designation is the extra element the subject adds to his access to 
jouissance. The so-called pervert, as the incarnation of this phallus, embodies something 
more than phallic jouissance, i. e. the enjoyment the phallus permits and the master 
regulates. Perverse enjoyment relativises the hegemony of the latter and opens the way to 
the derogatory and deviant label of perversion. The phallic signifier is the primary point 
de capiton and the signifier of power, as embodied by the master. 
In the point de capiton a particular signifier is called to incarnate a function beyond its 
concreteness, it is 'emptied' from its particular signification in order to represent fullness 
in general and be able to articulate a large number of heterogeneous signifiers. 15 
Rather than an empty signifier, the pervert embodies the phallus as an object, in its real 
and imaginary dimension that undermines and exceeds the limits of the symbolic. Apart 
from the point de capiton that solidifies a certain socio-political edifice, Stavrakakis 
discerns the signifier that stands for what limits and undermines the latter, that is, "the 
signifier representing, within our fantasmatic scenario, the excluded real. 
06 Both 
signifiers are empty par excellence, yet the 'signifier of exclusion' embodies 'pure 
negativity' as it counters the function of the point de capiton, namely, the shared point of 
reference that comes to incarnate the "universality of a certain group or collectivity, as a 
representative of the pure being or the systernaticity of the system. 1,17 As an illustration of 
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the role of the two signifiers, we can say on Ziz'ek's tracks that 'Nazism' was the point de 
capiton of fascist Germany, while the 'Jew' was the signifier that stood for the real. 
In this respect, one of the enduring signifiers used by past and contemporary socio- 
political reality in excluding the destabilising dimension of the real, is the 'pervert'. Yet 
the problem is that the 'pervert' does not belong to a 'foreign body', as Jews were for 
Nazi Germany, but he is part of the same organic whole which is organised by a common 
point de capiton. This is the most terrifying aspect of 'perversion': I see myself reflected 
in the other, perceived as part of a continuum, a unified whole; but my idol reflected in 
the 'perverse' other becomes fragmented and repulsive, due to the unexpected jouissance 
that he makes me confront. Precisely because the so-called pervert appears to 'betray' the 
harmony of the socio-political order and therefore to undermine any fantasmatic 
ideological programme of maintaining an organic unity, he undergoes stringent 
segregative and punitive practices by the power of phallic mastery. 
Both the point de capiton and the empty signifier of exclusion in socio-political 
relations are indispensable for setting up and organising a certain symbolic- fantasmatic 
system. The master holds the role of the point de capiton, while the empty signifier is 
vacant of any concrete content; thus, since it stands for the ungraspable real, it functions 
as an objet petit a. 18 In that sense, 'perversion' as an empty signifier of the excluded real 
assumes the role of the evanescent object. Its isolation from the socio-symbolic edifice 
serves the coherence of the latter and the hegemony of the master signifier. 
The extra-ordinary subject has never really jeopardised the stability of entrenched 
constitutions, over the years. He never maintained such an antithesis to the prevalent 
socio-political status quo that would endanger it with decomposition. Rather the 'pervert' 
occupies a real space, the gap of the symbolic, exposing the lack in the Other and hence 
Its desiring status. It is not a strategy that refutes the law. The pervert's wishful thinking 
is to make desire and jouissance meet, to bring law and desire in unison. Even in 
perversion, desire is not there just to subvert the law, but also to sustain it. It is the very 
conformity of the pervert that gives rise to the sexual scenarios he implements. The 
pervert wants to be the one who completes the law, yet the one, the other, who 
personifies the memento of the incomplete status of the law, the object a that 
circumscribes its structural gap, overruns the space of desire and fills it up with 
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jouissance. Conceptually different from the pleasure the law seems to guarantee, 
jouissance "is the name for a dimension of unnatural suffering and punishment that 
inhabits human pleasure, a dimension that is possible only because the body and its 
satisfaction are constitutively denatured, always already bound to representation. "' 9 In 
perversion, as in neurosis, the law plays a dual role: it allows access to unlimited 
jouissance, but it also puts an end to thisiouissance. 
If there is something that we now know about the pervert, it is that what appears ftom the 
outside as satisfaction without restraint is defence, is well and truly the bringing into play, 
into action of a law in so far as it restraints, it stops, precisely the path of this 
jouissance. 20 
The so-called pervert or else the extra-ordinary subject does not radically contravene the 
prevalent socio-political principles; on the contrary, he finds himself quite adjusted to the 
institutional basis of society. However, the audacious manner, by which institutions 
segregate and barrage the extra-ordinary, is only one indication of the animosity with 
which perversion is perceived in social relations. Rather than a radical opposition, when 
the supposed pervert breaks the law, his intention is not to replace it with a different law. 
Breaking the law is nothing but the modus operandi for the extra-ordinary subject to 
extract the transgressive jouissance he wants the Other to dive into. 
In this vein, his benefaction to the Other is the sexualisation of death, that is to say, the 
extra-ordinary gets off with something that escapes division, the division imposed by the 
phallic signifier as a landmark separating limited from limitless jouissance. This accounts 
for the segregative policies against the extra-ordinary, without paying attention to the fact 
that even this sexualisation is an illusive fantasmatic product. The extra-ordinary subject 
enjoys embodying the missing object that leaves a hole in the law of the Other (the empty 
space the phallic signifier inscribes). 
He is not troubled by the echo of the desire of the Other that poses the question: Che 
Vuoi? The extra-ordinary knows what he wants: to turn himself into the object, as the 
inversion of the matheme of fantasy effectively illustrates this: a c_ý $. 21 Nevertheless, 
what he does not know is how to obstruct desire from returning. The extra-ordinary cares 
only about the gap in the law, the hole where he is to be inserted as the object. This is 
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neither a revolutionary nor a political act; yet the void in relation to the law is and must 
remain a political question, because the possibility of a radical transformation of society 
revolves around this void, when all ideological fantasies attempting to mask the latter fall 
down. 22 
if we were to follow the typical psychoanalytic glossary, the fulcrum of a revolutionary 
praxis would lie in a certain 'neurotic' rather than 'perverse' position. This does not 
suggest a pathological manifestation, but a structural component of any ordinary 
subject. " It is our 'neurotic' position in discourse that disturbs our relations with 
authority figures and established institutions, addressing demands towards them. At the 
level of discourse, someone has to start from a hysterical position, in order to rebel 
against authority. The frame of conformity where traditionally ordinary 'neurosis' has 
24 been placed is also the fitting context for extra-ordinariness. Therefore, the extra- 
ordinary is no more revolutionary or conformist than the ordinary subject is. He just 
follows a different pathway in the persistent challenging of the Other, demanding from It 
25 
to face the truth of the incomplete status of Its existence. This does not simply reveal 
the emptiness of the locus of the Other. More than this, it opens the possibility for this 
emptiness to be filled and the law to be completed, by becoming the object that covers 
26 
the void. 
This provocation occurs in a manner which is not out of line with that of the hysteric. 
For this reason, in the previous chapters, the 'pervert' was included into the discourse of 
the hysteric. The hysteric desires eternal deception, the eternal repercussion of desire as it 
is served by the fiction of the Other at each time. This is why ideologies have not reached 
their end. Despite the severe crisis, the Other is still revealed through fictional constructs. 
Thus, it is not the 'perverse' structure as an antithesis to the 'neurotic' that introduces 
novelty. 27 The discursive manifestation of novelty as the provocation of the master 
suggests a common ground between the 'pervert' and the 'neurotic', but the former 
implements an alternative provocative practice that does not question the fullness of the 
signifier (the phallus), but its emptiness. Rather than completing the law with the right 
signifier, the 'pervert' seeks to complete the law with the right object. The extra-ordinary 
desires the eternal repetition of the Other's jouissance derived from a non-failing object, 
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but his desire is as deceiving as the hysteric's, since desire can never find its complete 
fulfilment and always needs the Other to sustain it. 
If the extra-ordinary provokes authority, that is because he does not accept it as a 
hegemonic position of power that claims to have the knowledge of what the Other 
desires. The duty the extra-ordinary performs is not to refute desire per se, but rather its 
phallic, eternal repetition promoted by any tyrannical power. He unveils the idiocy of 
phallic jouissance, that is, its restrained and ephemeral status. 28 
One can erect as a duty the maxim of countering the desire of the tyrant, if the tyrant is 
the one who arrogates to himself the power to enslave the desire of the Other. 29 
The tyrant as the master of a totalising system of power claims to enchain the desire of 
the Other. In other words, he presents himself as if the knowledge of what the Other 
wants is kept in a box. The extra-ordinary knows that the box is empty, as empty as the 
agalma, the object a, can be. 30 He knows the fallacious arrogation of the tyrant. The latter 
does not have the phallus, although he claims to do so. Reduced to an object, the extra- 
ordinary compensates for the lack of the phallus (that is, an imaginary object that 
occupies the place of symbolic loss) and demonstrates the ubiquity, the elusion and the 
eternal circulation of the object, which is not to be included in any box. 31 It cannot be 
given as a gift to the Other, otherwise a mythical Other is implied. The omnipresence of 
the object a marks the inherent emptiness of the locus of the Other; it is what reminds the 
subject that the Other does not exist. 
11.2 Tarnished Utopias 
Regardless of the abundance of discursive arguments that one falls upon in works of 
historians, political scientists, sociologists and psychologists who presume to objectively 
explore the question of fascism, the nature of the latter remains an enigma. The plenitude 
of accounts reflects less a holistic approach and more a bewildennent of this particular 
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ideological phenomenon. Numerous allusions to fascism as a pastiche ideology" or the 
counterpart of 20th century communist totalitarianiSM33 accumulate in its ambiguity, 
closing the blinds to the absconding character of its definition and comprehension. 
Although I believe totalitarianism is not a futile designation, its amorphous and 
unreserved pertinence to fascism, likewise the notion of 'perversion', is inconsistent with 
the scientific objectivity that many analyses may advocate. What occurs is that the search 
for an unequivocal definition and comprehensive account of fascism refuses to admit that 
the object of fascism keeps sliding away. 
It is because of this void that we have the plethora of discursive arguments regarding the 
nature, the historical occurrence and the impact of fascism. The problem does not lie in 
the ongoing effort to comprehend the phenomenon (that would be a self-contradiction, 
considering the aims of the present study), but in the certainty of defining it, putting it 
into a 'scientific' frame that serves ideological purposes. For instance, the denunciation 
of fascism's utopian profile endorses the current sweeping negativisation of all utopian 
politics that benefits the prevalent liberal consensus. 34 
The unfathomable core of fascism that impedes its scientific objectification is what 
brings the term to its psychoanalytic scrutiny. Moreover, the legitimacy of the persistent 
conception of fascism as a sexually deviant and decadent ideological formation in politics 
is the last focal point of my critique. The repetition of the mystifying link of fascism with 
perversion forms in itself a question for psychoanalytic research, since repetition suggests 
a certain unmasterable parameter. In Lacan and the Political, Stavrakakis conveys the 
relevance of Lacanian psychoanalysis to political analysis. In his words: 
Lacan's schema of socio-political life is that of a play, an unending circular play between 
possibility and impossibility, between construction and destruction, representation and 
failure, articulation and dislocation, reality and the real, politics and the political. '5 
36 Stavrakakis draws a fertile distinction between politics and the political . The 
first 
concerns political reality, as we know it in its pragmatic institutional form and regulatory 
practices that organise its system, on a symbolic and fantasmatic basis, like any other 
reality. However, the political involves the real that eludes political reality, yet it is 
fortnative and constitutive of social relations. The field of the political discerns the 
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manifestations of our encounter with the real in socio-political relations. The moment of 
its painful occurrence and the failure to represent it mark the moment of the political 
which "proves our fantasmatic conception of the socio-political institution of society as a 
harmonious totality to be no more than a mirage. , 37 For Stavrakakis, any ideologico- 
political aspiration that envisages the reinstating of society's han-nony and order as a 
unified whole aims at the impossibility of the political, the real ungraspable object, 
reducing utopia to a fantasy that stages this object. 38 
In a thorough historical and psychoanalytic discussion, Stavrakakis delineates the 
intricate problems of all utopian politics, as far as they rely on the production of a dual 
fantasy. One fantasmatic axis evolves around a 'beatific' theme, whereas the second axis 
reflects a 'horrific' theme that recants the positive side of fantaSy. 39 Utopian fantasies 
promise to turn. "disorder into order, " by mastering the element that disturbs this vision of 
harmony, namely, the insistence of the real. Nevertheless, the real cannot be mastered, 
since it cannot be taken into symbolisation; it always inflicts a hindrance on the 
signifying process. But what is possible, according to Stavrakakis' epistemological 
suggestion, is the encircling of this failure in our representation, as the encircling of the 
impossible: 
Although it is impossible to touch the real, it is possible to encircle its impossibility, 
exactly because this impossibility is always emerging within a symbolisation. 40 
Despite or, better, because of the irreducible character of the real, we have to adhere to 
symbolisation, as Adorno has suggested .41 But rather than 
forwarding a symbolisation 
that would conforrn to a fantasmatic logic of repressing the real and irrevocably 
eradicating its structural causality, another more compound symbolic route should be 
followed: the consummation of a symbolising act that endeavours to 'institutionalise' 
42 
lack, by acknowledging first the limits, the gaps of the symbolic imposed by the real . 
Psychoanalysis endorses this type of symbolisation, by developing strategies for the 
impossible task of representing the real. We do not find this task perfon-ned by studies on 
the fascist phenomenon that reduce its traumatic unknowable component to the ambiguity 
of 'perversion', precisely what stands for the 'anarchic' factor that undennines all types 
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of knowledge. Rather than institutionali sing lack, these studies further institutional i se 
existing systems of knowledge, keeping at bay the realisation of the gap that limits their 
narratives. 
The main goal of psychoanalysis is to create channels that make it possible to 'encircle 
the unknowable', what lies beyond knowledge. A systematic effort to symbolise the 
fissure that impedes the completion of the symbolic and "traverse the closure of fantasy" 
is feasible. 43 Inasmuch as this real impediment occurs within the field of language and 
knowledge, it can be encircled through symbolic means. The task of psychoanalysis is to 
circumscribe and situate the manifestations of the real and the particular disruptive 
moment of its emergence within symbolisation. 
The encounter with the real constitutes a traumatic moment par excellence, for what 
comes forth is the recognition of the impossibility of our symbolisation to become a 
closed system. 44 This is the starting point for what Ziz'ek considers as an authentic ethical 
posture, namely, to "assume fully the impossible task of symbolising the real, inclusive of 
its necessary failure. , 45 So, the acknowledgement of the constitutive role and the 
irreducibility of the real, without neutralising the latter, supports rather than abandons the 
act of symbolisation. What is at stake is not to mask the gaps of the real with fantasies, 
because only then an authentic utopian gesture is possible. As Z'i2ek put it recently: 
In its essence, utopia has nothing to do with imagining an impossible ideal society; what 
characterizes utopia is literally the construction of a u-topic space, a space outside the 
existing parameters, the parameters of what appears to be 'possible' in the existing social 
universe. The 'utopian' gesture is the gesture that changes the co-ordinates of the 
possible. 46 
How propitious is the current anti-utopian aura for future political action? Sean Homer is 
sceptical of the implementation of Lacan's ideas in the development of an anti-utopian 
political paradigm that accentuates the impossible of society as a harmonious unified 
totality. 47 Although he recognises the theoretical thrust of conceiving society as 
impossibility, Homer draws attention to the deadlock that such a Lacanian cogito 
stumbles upon. If society lies in impossibility, as Laclau and Mouffe argued, 
48 the field of 
Politics is also marked by the impossible. Failing to fabricate an ideological discourse and 
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incapable of historicising, psychoanalysis appears as 'politically impotent' and unable to 
encumber the way for other ideological narratives to breed the expectation of making the 
impossible possible, by promising to cover the fissure of the real in socio-political 
relations . 
49This means that psychoanalysis can interminably unveil the impossible, only 
for a recycling of ideologies (outside the psychoanalytic discourse) that attempt to veil it. 
However, before one misreads this suggestion, it is proper to note that Homer's 
perspective does not advocate the reduction of psychoanalysis to an ideological 
discourse. In my view, he does not disregard the impossible, but rather calls for a novel 
ideological programme, which is aware of the structural limitations of the socio-symbolic 
order and actively encompasses the psychoanalytic ideas that can tackle this limitation 
through praxis. 50 For Stavrakakis, Homer's position can be characterised in 'quasi- 
utopian' terms, as it acknowledges the lacking status of the Other, while it puts forward 
the idea of covering it; thus, this position obeys the logic of traditional utopian politics, 
51 with the difference of being psychoanalytically informed . Inasmuch as Homer's 
suggestion lingers on a fantasmatic political context, Stavrakakis argues, it ultimately 
'defers' the psychoanalytic part of his argument; it challenges and catechises 
psychoanalysis for meeting certain fantasmatic utopian demands, while the essence of 
Lacanian critique is to keep at bay the seductive fantasmatic utopias in politics and reveal 
its relevance for the political, by contending traditional politics. 52 The problem I perceive 
with Stavrakakis' use of the 'quasi-utopian' designation is that it inevitably triggers 
associations about a quasi -impos sibl e or quasi-possible political project, when Homer 
clearly recognises impossibility as a fundamental guiding principle for an ideological 
programme. 
For Stavrakakis, to perceive psychoanalysis as devoid of an authentic character that 
could be the fulcrum for a progressive socio-political agenda is reductionist. 53 Rather he 
juxtaposes the possibility of a 'post- fantasmatic' or 'less-fantasmatic' politics that accepts 
the irreducible ambiguity of democracy and thus fosters the prospect of a radical 
democratic project. 54 Yet such a conception is not uncomplicated, given that one cannot 
totally go beyond fantasy and still maintain his/her subjectivity (even when one traverses 
it, another fantasy eventually grows), precisely because fantasy is required for the 
coherence of the subject and the upholding of her desire. Furthermore, fantasy is either 
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there or not; we cannot have 'more' or 'less' fantasy. As I argued earlier, we can have a 
totalising fantasy, but always in relation to the real. Fantasy in itself is absolute and 
totalising par excellence. It is the real and the symbolic that always make it 'less- 
fantasmatic', as they impose a limit in its operation. 
So where does 'perversion' fit within this frame? The encounter with the extra-ordinary 
is an encounter with the real that reveals the contradiction that lies at the heart of the 
political. Extra -ordinariness suggests the embodiment of the real within the socio- 
political milieu; this is where the extra-ordinary subject incarnates the impossible object. 
Nonetheless, it suggests a fantasmatic strategy of incorporating the real in the symbolic, 
as an alternative to the encircling of the real through sublimation that Stavrakakis 
proposes. 
In sublimation we still have an (artistic) object standing for the object a, so the lack in 
the subject is still there, whereas in extra - ordinariness the subject occupies the locus of 
the object a, in an ephemeral eradication of his/her lack. Extra-ordinariness may not be a 
condition that subverts or transforms socio-political relations, yet it can have a certain 
political significance. Rather than a direct confrontation with the impossible, it suggests a 
fantasmatic embracing of the impossible in its inexpressible totality, which can be 
perceived as a utopian aspiration. 
Following ZiZ'ek or Badiou's contemporary views, the extra-ordinary gesture is not 
qualified as an authentic utopian act, because it does not traverse fantasy, it does not 
rewrite social conditions. Over the last fifteen years, there has been a strong anti- 
imaginary stance conveyed by Lacanian thinkers, underscoring the necessity of real 
pathways to radical political praxis. It is well-known that Z'iz'ek prioritises the 
negativeness of the real in his rhetoric, something that outstrips any positive imaginary or 
symbolic reflection in his work. But this entails the risk of neglecting the equal 
importance of all three registers for subjectivity. The imaginary constitutes an essential 
motive force, for any drastic action to take place, as long as the symbolic limit is not 
thwarted. It is also what keeps us humane and sustains our relation to the other. It is 
possible to touch the real, through imaginary means, without becoming a post-human 
figure (such as Antigone who remains the figurative conception of 
2i2ek's traversing of 
the fantasy). 55 Fantasy (and therefore ideology) can be a source of optimism and 
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motivation and it should not be bound exclusively to the static character of compensatory 
utopia, according to Bloch's distinction. 56 Inasmuch as fantasy infuses the subject's effort 
to grasp the impossible, recognising it as such, rather breeding the futile expectation of 
turning the impossible into possible (regaining the object, meeting happiness), the 
imaginary can form the pedestal for an anticipatory utopia. 
The imaginary does not operate only as a force that disavows difference, for the sake of 
an impossible unity and completeness. It also suggests an apparatus that soothes the 
realisation of the symbolic fissure, breeding hope and fascination, that is to say, it stirs up 
emotional states that encircle the lack of the subject. Moreover, it must be noted that the 
object a, apart from real properties, also has an imaginary hypostasis, as it is screened in 
fantasies that cover lack. If our image's coherence is an illusion, it is this illusion that 
motivates us as individual and social subjects and help us relate to each other (e. g. falling 
in love is an illusion, a fantasy). 
The anti-imaginary undercurrent in psychoanalysis is also what accounts for 
Stavrakakis's renunciation of idealism in the democratic discourse. But any system of 
power, either fascist or democratic, cannot function without an ideal. The point de 
capiton is not just a common point of reference as Stavrakakis notes; it is a master 
signifier, which means it constitutes an ideal par excellence. As the unary signifier, the 
master signifier relies on fantasy and imaginary certainty about its supreme status. The 
ideal embodied by the master is what motivates action, not only in politics, but also in 
sciences, arts and so on (e. g. a dominant scientific paradigm or a leading art movement). 
Is there a democratic prospect for the prevalence of an ideal that does not promise 
impossible jouissance, but possible jouissance, without confining it to the phallus? Since 
it is possible to touch jouissance, but not to represent it, the encounter with jouissance 
could endorse an ideal of incompleteness, an ideal of confronting the limits of human 
experience vis-a-vis unutterable enjoyment. 
This does not forward a good, sincejouissance is beyond the realm of good, and it does 
not follow the route of the Sadean fantasy. Sade's heroes wish to capture jouissance in its 
totality; only for them, it constitutes a pleasurable yet evil 'good'. Butjouissance defies 
the realm of pleasure, by inserting pain. Perhaps, extra-ordinariness is the condition that 
comes closer to the idea of touching possible jouissance. The difference is that the extra- 
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ordinary does not acknowledge his desire; rather he wants to eradicate it. Instead, a 
democratic ethos must recognise the centrality of desire and its perpetual movement 
around impossible jouissance, without crossing all the way to its fulfilment. For this 
reason, fantasy is essential for politics, as for the extra-ordinary, since it is whatfuels the 
hope to continue and persist. After all, jouissance is not only pain, but both pleasure and 
pain and it is due to fantasy that pain is tolerable or en oyable. 
We need an extra-ordinary utopianism to the extent it provokes pre-fixed phallic and 
normative access to enjoyment. The extra-ordinary himself does not go so far as to 
demand another master signifier, but his act is sufficiently provocative in divulging the 
futility of the master's imaginary superiority. However, the limits of the extra-ordinary 
utopian logic is that its fantasy of embodying the impossible never stops in its 
embodiment (precisely, because it is still a fantasy) and instead it continues to make 
attempts to grasp it, without accepting that the impossible remains impossible. 
An alternative utopia could probably maintain the fantasy of embodying the impossible, 
acknowledging it as such. 57 So any time fantasy collapses, violence does not emerge as a 
response, but we continue the effort to symbolically speculate and represent the 
impossible, precisely because in this effort resides hope that sustains our reason to live 
and desire. As some historians say, myths distort 'truth', yet we cannot live without them; 
myths can form the only tolerable approximation of 'truth'. One should see them as 
'colourful' disguises of the achromous core of his/her existence and the truth is we need 
more 6colour'. 
11.2.1 The Extra-Ordinary Against Political Aporia 
Stavrakakis points out the ongoing mistrust with which utopian politics have been 
58 
perceived over the last decades . Modem utopias promoted progressive 
ideals that 
cultivated the expectation of a final goal where the real would be mastered, giving rise to 
visions of secular bliss and human perfection. Assessing its devastating results, especially 
the catastrophe of the Second World War, current political reality has succumbed to what 
Stavrakakis calls the 'politics of aporia' that sanctions nihilistic and cynical beliefs, 
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derived from a new "appreciation of human finitude, together with a growing suspicion 
,, 59 of all grandiose political projects and the meta-narratives associated with them. 
It is true that in our contemporary world, traditional utopian models have withered, but 
today a new utopia of canonical majority has taken over the space of any action 
transformative of current social relations. Instead of radicalness, conformity has become 
the main expression of solidarity for the post-modem subject abandoned to her 
consecrated individuality. Where past utopias inscribed a collective vision to be fulfilled 
for future generations, the present utopia confiscates the future of the individual, unless 
she registers in a collective popularised expression of the nonn that reaps culture, 
politics, morality and the like. The ideological outcome of the canonical utopia is the 
belief that the majority constitutes a safety net for individuality. If the future of the 
individual is bleak, at least there is some hope in saving his/her present. 
This condition reiterates Bloch's distinction between anticipatory and compensatory 
utopia, with the latter gaining ground today. 60 By discarding the myth of a better future 
for all, the subject succumbs to the immobilising myth of a safe present for herself (the 
ultimate transmutation of individuality to individualism). The world can surmount 
Difference, simply by taking away Its painful radicalness, replacing It with a non-violent, 
pluralistic and multi-cultural present, as Ziz'ek harshly criticised it for its anti-rational 
status. In line with Badiou and Jameson , ZiZek 
discerns behind the multitude of identities 
and lifestyles in our post-modem world the dominance of the One and the eradication of 
61 Difference (the void of antagonism). It would have been ideal, if pluralism were not 
translated to populism and the non-violent to a sanctimonious respect of Otherness. 
As we saw in the previous part, Badiou also points to the nihilism that permeates 
modem ethicology that puts forward the 'recognition of the other', the respect of 
'differences' and 'multiculturalism'. 62 Such ethics is supposed to protect the subject from 
discriminatory behaviours on the basis of sex, race, culture, religion and so on, as one 
must display 'tolerance' towards others who maintain different thinking and behaviour 
patterns. For Badiou, this ethical discourse is far from effective and truthful, as it is 
revealed by the competing axes it forges (e. g. opposition between 'tolerance' and 
f Xity, ). 63 'fanaticism', 'recognition of the other' and 'identitarian I 
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Badiou denounces the decomposed religiosity of current ethical discourse, in the face of 
the pharisaic advocates of the right to difference who are "clearly horrified by any 
vigorously sustained difference. , 64 The pharisaism of this respect for difference lies in the 
fact that it suggests the acceptance of the other, insofar as s/he is a "good other, " in other 
words, insofar as s/he is the same as everyone else. 65 Such an ethical attitude ironically 
affirins the hegemonic identity of those who opt for integration of the different other, 
which is to say, the other is requested to suppress his/her difference, so that he partakes in 
the 'Western identity'. 
Rather than equating being with the One, the law of being is the multiple 'without-one', 
that is, every multiple being is a multiple of multiples, stretching alterity into infinity; 
alterity is simply "what there is" and our experience is "the infinite deployment of infinite 
differences. , 66 Only the void can discontinue this multiplicity of being, through the event 
that 'breaks' with the existing order and calls for a "new way of being. , 67 Thus, a radical 
utopian gesture needs to emerge from the perspective of the event, initiating a truth- 
process. 
Today's self-negating differences are focused on a present that has 'spoken' already and 
turned a deaf ear to voices that open up the uncertainty of temporality in discourse, the 
voices that demand a different utopian future. This static condition is reflected in the 
growing obsession with maintaining a peacock physique that never withers, as long as 
health products and cosmetics - always with the seal and warrantee of scientific 
knowledge - are used. 
68 Sade's perverse narratives form an ironic commentary on the 
vanity of utopian aspirations of eternal beauty. In his writings, beauty is accomplished 
and maintained through disintegration, fragmentation and destruction. Neither fascism 
nor any other system of domination envisioned beauty in such a self-destructive manner. 
Rather they followed the tradition of the idealisation of beauty as a harmonious and 
cohesive state, repercussive of the ideal of social unity and order. 
So between the two poles, imaginary unity and real Difference, Stavrakakis articulates 
an alternative pathway that opens up certain optimism for democratic politics. Following 
Laclau and Mouffe, he points not only to the totalitarian threat for democracy that 
promises to eradicate difference, but also to the threat of losing any reference to 
democratic unity. Sravrakakis argues, "This is the danger of particularism and of the 
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fragmentation of the social fabric into segments that deny the possibility of any 
,, 69 
meaningful articulation between them. Unity and difference can be seen as the two 
poles of a genuine democratic scheme that always re-articulates the relation between the 
two, keeping at bay the prevailing nihilism. As Stavrakakis notes: 
[ ... ] this gap 
[between the universal and the particular] should be viewed as opening the 
optimistic possibility of democracy as opposed to totalitarianism or radical 
fragmentation; a possibility that rests on the recognition of the constitutive character of 
this gap, this division, the inherent disharmony between universalism and particularism, 
community and the individual, the government and the governed, etc. The demos is 
at the same time the name of a community and of its division. 70 
The extra-ordinary initiates a game with the two poles: the fantasy of unification and the 
dividing real. Instead of solidifying a normative seclusion of the extra-ordinary, the 
encounter with the real the latter embodies can be perceived as an encounter with the 
inherent contradiction of our socio-symbolic order and the arbitrary hegemony of the 
master signifier. He is the ordinary other of a unified social whole who brings an extra- 
ordinary element that divides this unity. 
The perverse act is a sarcastic comment on the hebetudinous ambitions of power (the 
accomplishment of a sovereign Good), while authority's response to this 'offensive' act 
is the perverse label. Even though Sade had little in common with the perverse and cruel 
libertinage of his fiction, he embodied the archetype of perverse sexuality. Consequently, 
each pervert duplicates a depraved and brutal Sadean figure, regardless of his 
dissymmetry with the ideal personification of the torturer. Deleuze draws attention to the 
incompatibility of the discursive contexts that relate Sade to Nazism, by referring to a 
drastic proposition in Bataille's Eroticism regarding the linguistic difference between the 
sadist and the torturer; that is, the language of the victim and that of the authority. 
71 I am 
quoting from the translation of Bataille's original: 
As a general rule the torturer does not use the language of the violence exerted by him in 
the name of an established authority; he uses the language of the authority, and that gives 
him what looks like an excuse, a lofty justification [ ... 
] Thus de Sade's attitude is 
diametrically opposed to that of the torturer. When Sade writes he refuses to cheat, 
but he 
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attributes his own attitude to people who in real life could only have been silent and uses 
them to make self-contradictory statements to other people. In complete contrast with the 
torturer's hypocritical utterances, de Sade's language is that of a victim. He invented It in 
the Bastille when he wrote the Cent Vingt Journees. 72 
So, why this enduring Sadean lining of fascism? Leaving aside the question of whether 
the pervert is victimised by the authoritarian practices of power or not, my argument will 
focus on Bataille's view here. The pervert must be disengaged from the profile of the 
torturer. Yet the factors that sustain such a profile are more likely to inform us about the 
misinterpretation of what is commonly designated as perversion. A banal, though 
accurate, observation is that where meaning cannot be attached to the object, the term 
perversion commonly is used as a disfigurative label. Knowledge, inherently negated by 
its very impossibility to represent all, invents labels and taxonomies in order to disguise 
its own limitations. 
There is always a hard kernel that etches a real space beyond any possible symbolic or 
visual representation, as Ziz'ek and other Lacanian theorists have been demonstrating. 
Whenever something comes to occupy this space, the symbolic-imaginary continuity of 
the subject is disturbed. If the subject does not thwart this real some-thing, but rather 
enjoys it, she is likely to be included within a perverse frame. This is because the failure 
of representation is too painful to bear and lets the ultimate void come forth, the real of 
death. 
The perverse act has nothing to do with causing death (the pervert is not a killer), since 
the latter marks a line the pervert does not cross, like most other 'ordinary' subjects. 
Nonetheless, when death as the ultimate void and trauma is incarnated in an object 
(sexualised or not) that stirs up desire, this embodiment of the void receives the perverse 
epithet, precisely because it lets some of the deadly jouissance surface. Taking as an 
example the Holocaust, the absurdity and the unrepresentable nature of this mass carnage 
was ascribed to the operations of a perverse mechanism that Nazism manoeuvred. 
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During the occurrence of the Holocaust, nobody could incorporate in the symbolic the 
obnoxious executions conducted in the concentration camps, which were first described 
as 6re-education' camps and then as places intended for Schutzsha (protective Ot 
custody). 
74 
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The lack of a sufficient account of those real events in Politics, due to the inability to 
find the right signifier to denote the size of the catastrophe, brings the subject head to 
head with the experience of the splitting she tries so hard to repair. Even retroactively, the 
symbolic fails to attach some meaning. It is a moment of realisation of the authentic 
alterity that characterises human relations and cannot be overcome by fictional 
constructs. The encounter with the lack of meaning is what sanctions perversion as a 
category, especially when this lack is considered to be the source of illicit enjoyment. For 
example, the encounter with the exhibitionist, who occupies the space of the gaze, marks 
an encounter with the excluded real (under no circumstances one must show his genitals 
in public). 
11.3 The Gaze of the Holocaust 
In the present study, it has been already argued that systems of power produce symbolic 
narratives and images that serve their domination. Propagandistic strategies in politics 
typically sway from acerbic images that disturb the comfort of the subject to images that 
placate her, something that reflects, I believe, the dualistic structure of fantasy, i. e. its 
'beatific' and its 'horrific' side. 75 In National Socialism, parallel to the images 
representing the supreme natural beauty of the Aryan ideal that Leni Riefenstahl's films, 
such as The Triumph of Will (1935), 76 attempted to denote visually, fascist politics 
disturbed the safety and serenity of these images by promoting antagonistic images of 
non-Aryan threats (Jews, people with disabilities and so on). The greater the dichotomy 
became, the more the emptiness of the ideal came forth. 
The difference of Nazism from other horrific consequences brought by the collapsing of 
an ideological fantasy was that there was a real object, a left-over that occupied this 
empty space. To comprehend this, suffice it to recall once more the Holocaust carnage, as 
it was visually captured by the cameras of the Allied annies. The recorded images 
divulged the real size of the catastrophe that took place in the concentration camps. In 
this filming, one confronts the real gaze of the Holocaust (something we cannot have 
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with the Stalinist gulags). The images are organised around a gaze too difficult for one's 
eye to tackle. This is because we do not see the Nazi fantasy being unfolded around lack, 
but the very failing of this fantasy, its real remainder. The death panorama of the 
Holocaust is such an unbearable spectacle that the gaze, as the object, eventually falls, 
letting anxiety to spring out of it and enfold the subject. In this context, the viewer is 
likely to call this agonising spectacle (the desiring circuit between the subject and the 
image)77 perverse, implying that the Nazi who were responsible for this spectacle (the 
killing and the mass burying of the ossified corpses) and not the allies who captured it, 
enjoyed its gaze. If the excess of fascist narratives is considered as 'perverse', then 
images associated with fascist atrocities also suggest an excessive spectacle that can 
receive the same 'perverse' epithet. But this is inaccurate, precisely because this spectacle 
is the real remainder of the Nazi fantasy, namely the impossibility to enjoy, the lack of 
lack. 
This is why the Nazis never recorded the images of the Holocaust; these images were 
too 'Painful' for them. 78 The absence of meaning leaves the subject exposed to the nudity 
of law and desire, which more than anything makes anxiety appear, as this absence 
insinuates the presence of a real Other who enjoys (of course, there is no real Other of 
enjoyment; it is an artefact of the fantasy of the primordial Thing's return). The perverse 
image would be the image that discloses the truth of the Other: Its locus does not hold the 
object, the gaze that ensnares the desire of the viewer. The latter is caught up in a circuit 
ofjouissance without his/her will, without desire being acknowledged. 
The images of the fascist atrocities of the Second World War elicit anxiety, as they 
appear to abolish the link with the Other and adhere to the real Other. To be gazed at by 
the mass of disintegrated bodies leaves the subject lost for words; the signifier does not 
operate anymore. The gaze of the Holocaust does not simply mark the ultimate division 
of the subject, the splitting between the eye and the gaze, but also strips subjectivity from 
its locus, the Other. The subject is bereft of her symbolic safety and unable to be 
recognised as a speaking subject, since the signifier is rendered ineffective, feels nude 
and nothing more than a body, nothing more than biology. This is because the gaze does 
not belong to the symbolic Other anymore, but to the real arcane Other that recognises 
the subject as a fragile body exposed to fatality and dissolution. 
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The viewer is absorbed by the boundless jouissance unleashed by the falling object. The 
images of the Holocaust have no particular viewing angle, no subjective point of 
identification; what one sees is an endless mass of deformed bodies. Skin is not anymore 
the wrapping of the viewer's specular image, but exactly what eradicates otherness. 
79 Inevitably, silence is the only meaningful approach to these images . It is not a sign of 
respect, but more the phenomenology of experiencing the absence of the correct lexis, the 
signifier, and yet not being speechless. This means that the Other is still there, but mute. 
its locus becomes impotent, unable to hold desire's lacking status. Therefore, the subject 
confronts the limits of the signifying chain. She reaches the edge, admitting 7 don't 
know', the lack of knowledge that fills her with anxiety, turning her elocution into an 7 
don't want to know'. The subject has to bear the Other of jouissance, the Other of 
vulgarity who can only be 'perverse', not because one is dealing with perverse sexuality, 
but because lack and, concomitantly, desire are excluded. 
The 'perverse' circuit that the image initiates, offers a spectacle that the Other cannot 
master and put into words. This suggests a traumatic encounter, as the ego is faced with 
the realisation that words do not arise from it, but from an-Other place; yet the Other is 
unable to provide the subject with the symbolic means to adequately deal with a 
traumatic experience. The Other is mute in front of the real. It is not the same with the 
Other being absent. It is there, but Its locus is rendered inactive, the signifiers are 
ineffective and do not form a safety net anymore for the subject who, consequently, rolls 
down tojouissance. 
What follows is that the subject realises that her ego is unreliable. As a reflection of the 
other, the ego cannot identify with the extra-ordinary subject reduced to an object (a). 
Incapable of functioning as a specular image and playing the game of interchange with 
the ego, the image of the 'pervert qua object' raises the threat of fragmentation, since one 
can derive no pleasure from it, but plain jouissance. When the subject is called to identify 
with the object a, the object falls and thus raises the threat of losing subjective coherence. 
The subject got so close to the object that desire fades away, giving its place to the real, 
this is the realm of the drive. In line with Zupanc'ic' and Zi2ek, the subject who proceeds 
to a genuine act, more than traversing her fantasy, needs to traverse its very 'perverse' 
core. 
82 
The mythical Other, from whom each subject anticipates completeness, does not exist. 
Instead of a complete Other, there is a barred Other unable to recant this division. There 
is no signifier having absolute meaning by itself, without relying on other signifiers, and 
eliminating the barred status of the signifying chain. This signifier is missing (given as -1 
algebraically) introducing lack in the Other, what the symbol S (0) stands for. The extra- 
ordinary subject attempts to compensate for this lack by offering himself as the object. 
But eventually this accentuates lack, since the supposed perverse action aims to bring the 
Other to the limits of the signifying sequence, an aim that goes through the surprise of the 
other, who confronts the exhibitionist or the voyeur, the scream of the sadist's torture, the 
shame of being commanded by the masochist and so on. What is more, all constitute 
moments of anxiety, emerging from the splitting of the subject that embodies the very 
essence of the Other, Its incomplete status. 
The extra-ordinary renders the Other mute, not because he wants to dethrone the 
supremacy of Its locus. Rather than dernoralising the superiority of the Other, mutism 
unveils the paradox of the desire of the Other, namely a desire for jouissance, whose 
thrust breaks the limits of the symbolic law. The law does not prohibit jouissance; on the 
contrary, it sets the conditions for its emergence, by denaturalising the space of the body, 
attaching it to representation. At the same time, the law introduces lack, its structural 
impossibility to say all. By turning the impossibility to a possibility, the extra-ordinary 
subject embodies the very 'malfunction' of the law, the object a, the object of anxietypar 
excellence, the traumatic object that remains outside symbolisation. Therefore, no less 
than the ordinary subject, the so-called pervert conventionally imagines a social body of 
unity, where the 'corruptible' and the 'incorruptible' co-exist. This is law andjouissance 
in an ideal equipoise. 80 
Excessive jouissance is constitutively related with the law and the pervert tries to affirm 
that. In other words, he does not aim at the subversion of the law of the Other, but rather 
the opposite: the affirmation of Its power. Of course, it is nothing but a paradoxical 
fantasy to see a desiring Other beyond language. Being mute is not the same as being 
silent. Here the Other is still in the symbolic, It encounters the limit of language and 
decides to remain silent, whereas mutism suggests that the Other has been conquered by 
the real, namely, thejouissance embodied by the extra-ordinary. The desire of the Other 
283 
Apart from its real dimension, anxiety has imaginary features as well. This constitutes a 
point of demarcation from guilt (which is linked to the symbolic as a debt) with which 
anxiety is often confused. As it was previously elaborated, in the present study guilt is 
seen as the realisation of the erroneous status of the law, whereas anxiety is more the 
reaction to the absence of the law's lack. It is not a reaction to the emptiness lack 
suggests, but more to the real object that fills the void, that makes lack lacking, namely 
the object a. 
In Seminar X, Lacan repeatedly notes that anxiety is not without an object (West pas 
sans objet). 11 This means that the moment of the real, where the subject comes close to 
the object, marks the momentary confrontation with the absence of lack, the real fullness. 
But, as Stavrakakis notes, the lack of lack of the real does not mean that the latter is 
always full; it is more apt to regard the space of the real as being 'full of holes'. The 
entrenchment of the symbolic is what produces the real, as what is lost forever and 
reappears always as lack, as an insurmountable 'black hole'. It is in this real hole, where 
the object is plugged in, breeding the anxiety of lacking lack. 
insofar as the extra-ordinary posits his reduction to the object that occupies lack as his 
main goal, the encounter with the extra-ordinary suggests a confrontation with the object 
of anxiety, the lack of lack. The locus, where desire operates, is not empty but occupied. 
This condition of real fullness breaks down the imaginary and symbolic upholding of 
desire, precisely by revealing its inability to cover lack. The overflowing of 
"inexpressible enjoyment" Youissance) that the extra-ordinary position releases, marks a 
real presence that reveals the insufficiency of the imaginary and the symbolic to represent 
it; death andjouissance always elude and undermine representation, exposing its lacking 
status. 12 The extra-ordinary does not want what he does not have (lack), but to share what 
he is: the object. 
But does not 'perverse' identification with the object mean also identification with 
anxiety? If the neurotic experiences anxiety as the dominant symptom, then, for the 
, extra-ordinary subject, anxiety 
is his raison Xgtre, the indivisible component of 
dperverse' erotica. The extra-ordinary becomes the object for the Other to enjoy, to enjoy 
anxiety, which is always ruptured by the intervention of desire too soon. Desire tames the 
anxiety of jouissance and introduces castration, which in the case of neurosis is what 
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22 This is in line with 2i2ek's notion of "traversing the fantasy" and which Stavrakakis relates to the 
identification with the void, the symptom. See Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, p. 134. 23 1 mean the fact that all of us need to repress maternal jouissance in order to effectively emerge as 
subjects of desire. 
2' Kirsten Hyldgaard in her article "The Conformity of Perversion" fathoms the topic. See "The Conforinity 
of Perversion, " in The Symptom: Online Journalfor Lacan. com, Issue 5 (Winter, 2004). Available from: < 
http: Hwww. lacan. com/conformperfhtm > [accessed 23 January 2005]. 
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Dylan Evans, An Introductory Dictionary of Lacanian Psychoanalysis, (London: Routledge, 1996), pp. 
132-133. 
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imaginary-symbolic fiction. Only a real pathway can radically introduce something new or else the event, 
as Badiou suggested. 
28 This is an allusion to Lacan's witticism about the 'jouissance of the idiot'. See Jacques Lacan, Encore: 
The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX. - On Feminine Sexuality, The Limits of Love and Knowledge, 
1972-1973, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: W. W. Norton & Company, 
1998), p. 8 1. 
29Lacan, "Kant with Sade, " p. 70. 
30 See Jacques Lacan, Le Sýminaire, Livre VIII. - Le Transfert, 1960-1961, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, 
(Paris: Seuil, 1991). 
" That is a reversing of the process of castration. Instead of a symbolic act (castration) confronting an 
imaginary object and marking its absence, the imaginary defies this lack and covers it with the object; it 
does not 'let it go'. 
12 The definition of fascism given by Roger Griffin in the introduction delineates the heterogeneity of the 
meanings associated with the term. More about this puzzling character of fascism and the lack of a singular 
definition in Roger Griffin, International Fascism: Theories, Causes and the New Consensus (London: 
Arnold, 1998). 
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communist regimes, like those of Stalin or Mao Zedong. 
34 See Slavej Zi2ek, Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?: Five Interventions in the (Mis)use of a Notion 
(London: Verso, 2002 [2001]). 
35 Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political, p. 74. 36 Ibid., p. 7 1. 37 Ibid., p. 73. 38 Ibid., p. 82. 
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41 See Theodor W. Adorno, "Commitment" (1962) in The Essential Frankfurt School Reader, ed. by 
Andrew Arato and Eike Gebhardt (New York: Continuum, 1990 [1978]), pp. 300-318. 42 id., p. 86. 43 Ibid., p. 84. 44 Ibid., p. 85. 45 See Slavcj Zi2ek, The Metastases of Enjoyment: Six Essays on Woman and Causality (London: Verso, 
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Theory of Ideology? " The Letter: Lacanian Perspectives on Psychoanalysis no. 7 (Summer, 1996): 97-109, 
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56 See Ruth Levitas, "Educated Hope: Ernst Bloch on Abstract and Concrete Utopia, " in Not Yet: 
Reconsidering Ernst Bloch, ed. by Jamie Owen Daniel, Tom Moylan (London: Verso, 1997), pp. 65-79. 
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12. Extra-Ordinary Anxiety 
12.1 The Perverse Object of Anxiety 
The status of perversion in psychoanalysis constitutes more a conundrum than a lucid 
category of firm theoretical suggestions. Indicative of this mystification is the almost 
exclusive reference to perversion in terms of structure rather than symptom, which is 
rarely encountered in the psychoanalytic discourse on perversion, given the 
predominantly neurotic implications of the term. 
But if the neurotic structure is not to be equated just with the symptom, then why should 
the perverse ritual be equated with the structure of perversion? Let us put forward some 
ideas for re-examining the category of perversion in psychoanalysis and society, by 
returning to Freud's view of perversion as the negative of the neurotic condition: 
Thus [neurotic] symptoms are formed in part at the cost of abnormal sexuality; neuroses 
are, so to say, the negative ofperversions. 1 
Despite its problematic intricacies, Freud's early theorisation seems to be more accurate 
about the perverse condition than it was thought later. The Other still operates in 
perversion. However, it is not so much desire, as the jouissance of the Other that 
determines the position and the symptom of the pervert or whom I call the extra-ordinary 
subject. 
The desire of the extra-ordinary is the Other's jouissance. Placing himself in the 
position of the object (the quintessence of 'perverse' symptornatology probably) is the 
key strategy to unlock and derive jouissance. Contrary to what may seem to be the case, 
this position is not marked by passivity. Even reduced to an object, the extra-ordinary is 
not disinterested and apathetic, because he implements an active fantasy, which means 
that the extra-ordinary's desire is still present, dynamically involved in the 'perverse' 
ritual. 
The fantasmatic support of this ritual screens the desire of the extra-ordinary subject 
formalised in a scenario of turning himself into an ob ect to be infinitely enjoyed by the j 
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Other, to be carried away by the jouissance of the Other, acquiring a somehow 
autonomous status. Under the aegis of this enjoyable autonomy, the extra-ordinary 
becomes an organ that serves jouissance, an organ without a body, as Z'iz'ek elaborated 
the Deleuzian term. 2 Lacan notes that in Sade, as well as in masochism, desire manifests 
itself as a will tojouissance. Yet this will and the enjoying automaton the extra-ordinary 
wishes to become, in the service of the Other, constitute basically the staging of his own 
desire, which always fails to find satisfaction at the end. 
The will to jouissance in the pervert as in anyone else, is a will which fails, which 
encounters its own limit, its own restraint, in the very exercise as such of the perverse 
desire. 3 
By taking the position of the object a, the object-cause of desire, the extra-ordinary 
approximates the real. So, how does he abide the anxiety that stems from this 
approximation? It is the fantasy of becoming a sexual automaton that eroticises anxiety. 
In this bordering with the real, anxiety shifts from being an unbearable condition, as it is 
for the neurotic, to something that waxes the essence of the pervert's jouissance. My 
suggestion is that the extra-ordinary ritual posits one sine qua non: the eroticisation of the 
anxiety raised by the extra-ordinary subject's incarnation of the real object. Anxiety is a 
residue of subjective splitting (or better the residue of the possibility of recanting this 
splitting), which even in 'perversion' is not entirely eliminated. Even if one identifies 
with the object, this is an incomplete illusory process, as long as it is regulated by the 
imaginary. 
Fantasy is responsible for the fascination and the eroticisation of anxiety that always 
implies a certain secure remoteness from the object. 'Perverse' identification is thereby 
part of a fantasmatic game with the borders separating the symbolic from the real. One 
gets close to the real, but never too close, otherwise subjectivity is abolished. The 
remaining terms of the ritual involve the Other who is inundated with anxiety for drawing 
close to the object a and the other who experiences guilt, by confronting the limits of the 
law. But the moment guilt (the realisation of the gap in the law) appears in the other, 
desire also emerges and puts a full stop to the desire of the pervert. Castration in the 
extra-ordinary comes from the resurfacing of desire in the Other. 
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The obscene jouissance that the extra-ordinary channels, intimidates the other, who is 
not there as the specular image to interchange with the extra-ordinary subject's ego, but 
as the division caused by the object a. We can go as far as to say that the other treats the 
supposed pervert, similarly to the way the obsessional treats jouissance. In his successful 
disguise as the object, the extra-ordinary captures the desire of the Other, as it is revealed 
by mainstream fantasies or even practices that have an extra-ordinary quality. 4 However, 
the jouissance of extra-ordinary desire must remain as something impenetrable, 
forbidden. 
Sade, whose posthumous notoriety is indebted to Krafft-Ebing's introduction of the term 
'sadism', could form an interesting obsessive couple with his 'benefactor', given their 
common preoccupation with the aim to list all possible types of perversion that was the 
aim of both The 120 Days of Sodom and Psychopathia Sexualis. Such a list is impossible 
to complete, given the infinite possibilities of desire's metonymy. Both are engrossed 
with impossibility, but by following different pathways, Sade wanted to capture 
jouissance in its rudimentary form without severing it from the signifier, whereas Krafft- 
Ebing's effort was the opposite: to implement the signifiers of the prevalent medical 
discourse so that the coarse jouissance experienced in perversion is isolated and 
pathologised. But in any case, both take a safe distance from jouissance. This is why 
Sade himself was not a pervert. The naming and the numerical abundance with which he 
treats the perverse scenarios of his writings reveal a certain detachment from their 
jouissance, which is probably what makes them bearable to read. In The 120 Days of 
Sodom, one reads more abhorrent crimes than those Pasolini's filmic transposition 
portrays. 5 However, it is Sade's writings that have been charged for boredom and apathy. 
The extra-ordinary's desire is to desire jouissance. The neurotic fantasises about it, but 
in his interplay with the extra-ordinary, he steps back for fear of being overtaken by 
jouissance and the concomitant loss of consistency, as provided by desire. One must not 
get too close to the object a, no matter how fascinated s/he becomes with it. The object a 
is the cause of desire and the cause of anxiety. Whenever something comes to occupy the 
locus of this object, anxiety emerges, because the subject encounters the desire of the 
Other, without the knowledge (the donor of imaginary certainty) of what sort of object 
she constitutes for the desire of the Other, when the object is lacking. Anxiety plays the 
290 
essential role of safety valve for the desire of the subject. It accounts for the maintenance 
of the desiring status of the subject when the object is missing, whereas desire can play 
the role of the antidote for anxiety. Desire is a burden not as unbearable as anxiety is .6 
As early as in Seminar II, Lacan associates anxiety with real properties. In his reading of 
Freud's renowned dream of Irma's injection (a female patient of Freud), Lacan notes: 
The phenomenology of the dream of Irma's injection led us to distinguish two parts. The 
first leads to the apparition of the terrifying anxiety-provoking image, to this real 
Medusa's head, to the revelation of this something which properly speaking is 
unnameable, the back of this throat, the complex, unlocatable form, which also makes it 
into the primitive object par excellence, the abyss of the feminine organ from which all 
life emerges, in which everything is swallowed up, and no less the image of death in 
which everything comes to its end [ ... 
]7 
The real is unlocatable; it remains outside symbolisation. It is what fails the paternal 
function and sustains the traumatic kernel of subjectivity. The real is not an object per se, 
but it becomes the object of anxietypar excellence, through the apparition of the object a. 
In Seminar X, Lacan's central discussion on anxiety conceives the latter as the signal for 
8 the appearance of the object a. Primarily, it is the role of the object that Lacan speculates 
on, mapping out its diverse character; the object is linked with the lack of lack, the horror 
of the Thing, as well as thejouissance and the demand of the Other. 
Anxiety is a signal, but not a signal that alerts the subject about an internal danger 
against the ego. Lacan's outlook is different from that of Freud, as far as he links this 
signal to a particular "manifestation of the desire of the Other, as such. "9 The place of the 
ego is the locus of anxiety, where the latter appears in its signalling function. Anxiety 
signals the falling down of "all points of identificatory reference. "10 The ego always 
involves someone else (the other) and the signal notifies the subject about something that 
puts her being into question, in so far as it addresses a demand that does not have to do 
with need, but with the very lack of the subject, her loss. This something is desire and 
requests the disappearance of the subject, so that the Other is enabled to be constituted 
and take up Its interrogative role, the non-stop enunciation of the question: Che vuoi? 
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Apart from its real dimension, anxiety has imaginary features as well. This constitutes a 
point of demarcation from guilt (which is linked to the symbolic as a debt) with which 
anxiety is often confused. As it was previously elaborated, in the present study guilt is 
seen as the realisation of the erroneous status of the law, whereas anxiety is more the 
reaction to the absence of the law's lack. It is not a reaction to the emptiness lack 
suggests, but more to the real object that fills the void, that makes lack lacking, namely 
the object a. 
In Seminar X, Lacan repeatedly notes that anxiety is not without an object (n'est pas 
sans objet). " This means that the moment of the real, where the subject comes close to 
the object, marks the momentary confrontation with the absence of lack, the real fullness. 
But, as Stavrakakis notes, the lack of lack of the real does not mean that the latter is 
always full; it is more apt to regard the space of the real as being 'full of holes'. The 
entrenchment of the symbolic is what produces the real, as what is lost forever and 
reappears always as lack, as an insurmountable 'black hole'. It is in this real hole, where 
the object is plugged in, breeding the anxiety of lacking lack. 
Insofar as the extra-ordinary posits his reduction to the object that occupies lack as his 
main goal, the encounter with the extra-ordinary suggests a confrontation with the object 
of anxiety, the lack of lack. The locus, where desire operates, is not empty but occupied. 
This condition of real fullness breaks down the imaginary and symbolic upholding of 
desire, precisely by revealing its inability to cover lack. The overflowing of 
"inexpressible enjoyment" (iouissance) that the extra-ordinary position releases, marks a 
real presence that reveals the insufficiency of the imaginary and the symbolic to represent 
it; death andjouissance always elude and undermine representation, exposing its lacking 
status. 12 The extra-ordinary does not want what he does not have (lack), but to share what 
he is: the object. 
But does not 'perverse' identification with the object mean also identification with 
anxiety? If the neurotic experiences anxiety as the dominant symptom, then, for the 
extra-ordinary subject, anxiety is his raison d'etre, the indivisible component of 
i perverse' erotica. The extra-ordinary becomes the object for the Other to enjoy, to enjoy 
anxiety, which is always ruptured by the intervention of desire too soon. Desire tames the 
anxiety of jouissance and introduces castration, which in the case of neurosis is what 
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unleashes and mitigates the anxiety of the subject, precisely because lack is re- 
introduced. The subject does not possess the phallus, so therefore she has to seek it, 
becoming a desiring subject with continuous alternating episodes of anxiety and desire. It 
is impossible to approach the object of desire and anxiety and still desire it. The law has 
to impose a certain safe distance from it, with fantasy being the golden thread that links 
the two: desire and obj ect-cause of desire. ' 3 
According to contemporary psychoanalytic suggestions, the efforts of the pervert aim at 
the restaging of castration. Judith Feher-Gurewich writes: 
Thus perverts' desire does not have the opportunity to be organized around finding a 
fantasmatic solution to the real of sexual difference. The classical scenario of Oedipal 
dynamics, with its share of lies, make believe, and sexual theories, is not accessible to 
them. This is why they will search desperately to access symbolic castration that could 
bring solace to their misery. 14 
Nonetheless, it is contradictory to see the extra -ordinary's goal as the re-insertion of 
castration, when in fact there is nothing in his perverse scenarios that incarcerates him in 
misery. It is more a fantasmatic solution to the deciphering of the enigma of sexual 
difference, precisely by veiling difference. The extra-ordinary wishes to maintain this 
veiling, inasmuch as hisjouissance is derived this way. Even if the extra-ordinary efforts 
to infinitisejouissance are eventually sealed by castration, this is more a side effect of the 
6perverse' act. At the end, desire always re-inscribes itself. Symbolic guilt is inserted in 
the extra -ordinary's world through castration, not because the latter relieves him, but 
because his fantasy has failed. This failure is what creates the misery of the pervert, as in 
any other subject. 
His main target is centred in filling the Other with jouissance. However, it is not 
something he produces, but more something he unlocks. The pervert unleashes a 
jouissance, already present in the Other, by eradicating the primacy of the phallic 
signifier and revealing the Otherjouissance (the emptiness, the feminine). The neurotic's 
anxiety concerns the preservation of desire through the duplication of castration, whereas 
the pervert's anxiety emerges from the reverse condition. This is the question of how to 
extract Jouissance from the object without itself falling. He does not want to let the object 
293 
fall, not for fear of castration, but for the wish to retain jouissance. Inexorably, the 
nagging question of how to obstruct desire from returning to its initial place grips the 
pervert. Because together with desire, the lack in the Other returns, restoring and 
maintaining Its desiring status, instead of Its enjoying status. 15 Without doubt, these are 
fantasmatic relations which sustain 'perverse' desire forjouissance and, at the same time, 
impose a safe distance from the horror of the Thing's return. 
Anxiety intervenes as the mediating term between desire andjouissance. The desiring 
subject seeks jouissance, but not in its pure fonn. Jouissance has to be related to the 
Other, to occupy a space within the Other of signification, to be put into words. This is 
what phallic jouissance, thejouissance of the idiot, aims at. 16 The idiocy of it lies in its 
vain and limited character, sincejouissance always fails signification and only a residue 
is left behind. The remainder is the object a that perpetuates the desire of the subject. But 
the object is desired as absent. Coming too close to it, one finds this absence occupied by 
a real presence. In that case, the object has to fall, like the phallus in its exhausted stage, 
in order to maintain the desiring status of the subject. The moment desire returns, the 
object falls, or better the moment the object falls, desire returns. 
While the subject is engaged in an impossible task (that of inscribing jouissance in the 
place of the Other) she draws closer to the object. The closer she gets, the more anxiety 
surfaces, alerting the subject about the presence of a real Other, a primitive pre-symbolic 
being. In the case of the pervert, things are somehow different. It is not so much the 
inscription of jouissance in the Other that troubles him, but more the erasure of desire 
from the field of the Other and Its return to a state of unconstrained enjoyment. So, for 
the pervert it is essential that the object maintains its potency, not in the service of desire 
but in the service of jouissance. The anxiety of the extra-ordinary becomes an erotic 
signal that calls the Other to abandon the locus of desire and indulge injouissance. But 
eventually desire puts an end to it. 
It is not the extra-ordinary that aims at castration, so that he lets loose some of his 
anxiety. As an integral part of sexual jouissance, the extra-ordinary does not want to give 
up anxiety which is what the neurotic does with his symptom, in the reverse way. The 
Other's anxiety, the exposition of Its truth, requests the confinement of the jouissance 
operating in perversion. Castration has to be imposed, because of the contaminating 
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nature of the object's jouissance. The more it maintains its omnipotent character, the 
more it threatens the Other's consistency, as provided by desire. The extra-ordinary 
dramatises the staging of castration. It is not an actual event, as the phallus does not 
belong to the order of the cosmic world. Nonetheless, politics and power locate the 
phallus in the imaginary realm. Emblems of patriarchal power (objects such as sceptres) 
are handed from one authority figure to the next, propelling the replication of the same 
power mechanism and concealing the absence of the phallus. 
The social and the political world needs the 'pervert' in order to redefine and re-inscribe 
the imaginary boundaries of its morality and hence, since the patriarchal orientation of 
the majority is taken as a gnomon, enhance the existing moral code. This reflects the 
underlying imaginary dynamics of what social constructionism and Foucault has long 
now described: the exception of the pervert makes the rule for the 'normality' of the 
present moral, social, political and cultural organisation of the world. As long as the 
pervert remains outside of this world, the safety from the perilous obscenity and 
odiousness of real jouissance is ensured. Concomitantly, this is translated to further 
distance from desire and its permanent endurance, something that nourishes guilt, as was 
previously argued. As if guilt suggested a privileged moral state, power uses it as an 
essential demagogic tool, in order to secure its good and further vilify the 'pervert', who 
also experiences guilt for 'betraying' desire, not in the sense of staying away from 
jouissance, but failing to fully consummate it. 17 
12.2 The Analytic Point of Ignorance 
The subject's lack is the cynosure of the analytic process. The psychoanalytic discourse 
places the object a, the marker of lack, in the dominant position. The analyst embroiders 
the transferential relationship with the analysand, by centralising the constitutive lack of 
the object, as a precondition for desire, which brings the subject to the locus of the Other. 
As well as lack, the specular image that takes over it and marks its boundaries, namely 
the ego, is the other focal point of analysis. The image has its borders, this is the frame of 
the mirror. Around the limits of the image is where anxiety will make its appearance, as 
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what signals the momentary disruption of all points of identification. 18 The limits of the 
mirror are symbolised by Lacan's 'little diamond' (<>), the sign which indicates the 
relation between the subject and the object in the matheme of fantasy ($<>a). This 
relation is mediated by desire. The role of the specular image, functioning as a sort of 
filter, is to protect the subject from anxiety, by covering lack, but also marking it. The 
reflection in the mirror functions like a window frame that demarcates the illusory world 
of recognition (imaginary) from what Lacan calls 'stage' (symbolic reality). 19 In this 
stage, we find the desire of the masochist and the sadist. The extra-ordinary and the 
ordinary subject stage their desire in the same arena, playing the same part, with 
diametrically different techniques. 
The scenarios of 'perverse' desire do not just linger in a fantasmatic frame (as happens 
with neurosis); the extra-ordinary cross the window, taking fantasy on stage, that is, 
acting it out in the symbolic. The vacillation between desire and jouissance is absent 
from the extra-ordinary, because he is certain about what he wants. Contrary to the 
neurotic, whose desire always remains in doubt (this is the desire of the Other), the 
pervert does not have the doubt, but the knowledge of what he desires. The enduring 
question of 'what the Other wantsfrom me'is absent; the 'pervert' takes the game in his 
hands, he knows and applies the rules. The desire of the 'pervert' is to be passively 
enjoyed by the Other, as it is best manifested in masochism. Lacan notes that the 
masochist is supposed to know how to enjoy the Other. 20 The masochist is the one who 
gives the orders, the commands, the knowledge to the Other who has to tackle Its limits. 
The masochist is aiming at thejouissance of the Other the final term he is aiming at 
is anxiety of the Other. 21 
The connection between jouissance and anxiety in the case of the masochist and any 
other extra-ordinary position, I believe, reflects the relation between the real and the lack 
in the Other that fosters desire. Table 2 (p. 297) illustrates the relationship between 
jouissance, anxiety and desire, as adumbrated by Lacan in Seminar X. 
22 
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Table 2: The Relationship between Jouissance, Anxiety and Desire. 
Jouissance 
0 Anxiety 
Desire 
Jouissance is the real substance related with the primitive Other, the unrepresentable 
devouring Thing that elicits anxiety as a signal for the obliteration of the subject. Taking 
a safe distance from the Other ofjouissance, due to the intervention of the signifier that 
divides the Other, a left-over of the primordial jouissance remains, namely the object a 
that supports the desire of the subject and maintains her division. Now, once a real object 
(a) occupies the place of desire (lack), like in the case of extra-ordinariness, anxiety 
emanates together withjouissance (the real dimension of the object), as the signal for the 
occupation of the locus of desire, which recants its lacking status. This raises the threat of 
regressing to the devouring status of absolute and primitive jouissance. 
The extra-ordinary subject disparages the limit of desire. The Other is not there as 
desiring, but brought to a 'perverse' scenery only to experience jouissance. The so-called 
pervert claims to derive no pleasure from the act he performs and brings the other to the 
edge of his/her fantasy. There, pleasure stoops to jouissance and anxiety comes forth. In 
the staging of the object, the pervert plays the role of the 'instructor', making sure that the 
Will-to-jouir of the Other is being served. By this, it should not be assumed that there is 
any crafty or creative aptness of the extra-ordinary, as Chasseuget-Smirgel has argued in 
her linking of perversion to creativity. 23 There is a fixed knowledge of how to present the 
object to the Other; that is to say, it is presented in a certain ritualistic fashion. For that 
reason, perversion does not induce novelty in the socio-political edifice, although it plays 
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an essential role in motivating such fornentations that lead to novelty. In analogy with the 
hysteric (neurotic) position, the extra-ordinary's position questions the Other of 
knowledge. Both society and psychoanalysis need the extra-ordinary in order to progress 
and advance their views on subjectivity. 
It is often reported by psychoanalysts that the 'pervert' is not prone to undergo analysis 
due to the lack of lack that characterises the perverse conditioný the lack of the question 
about the knowledge of desire. The extra-ordinary knows what he desires and does not 
express any lacking point in this knowledge. If the certainty of the extra-ordinary is 
considered accountable for his exclusion from the analytic process, another certainty, that 
of the firm explanatory power of psychoanalytic knowledge, remains presumptuously 
intact. During the analysis of the extra-ordinary, the limits of psychoanalytic knowledge 
are put to the test, as the analyst strives to introduce him/herself as the object-cause of 
desire for the 'pervert', without being effective. The pervert has already turned himself 
into the object. So, he is not willing to speak about his lack, what he is missing, namely, 
the agalma, simply because he incarnates it; for this agalma is nothing but the object a. 
By lacking lack, the pervert agonises the analyst, something that breaches the viability 
of transference. The agalma is to be found in the locus of the Other and psychoanalysis is 
in a constant quest for it. The analyst's challenge is to "make his desire sufficiently enter 
into this irreducible ob ect a to offer to the question of the concept of anxiety a real 
guarantee, " but the extra-ordinary as analysand refuses the other as a subject of 
knowledge. 24 Even if there is a point of ignorance for the extra-ordinary, and there must 
be one, as far as the pervert desires too, this point must remain untouched. The analyst 
must not address it, which means that the very knowledge of the analyst is defied. 
Confronting the difficulty of introducing the desire of desire to the pervert's universe 
breeds the analyst's anxiety, who has to endure again the everlasting question of how to 
be desired by the Other. The analyst finds it hard to come to grips with the excruciating 
anxiety generated by the encounter with the lack of lack of the pervert: no demand, no 
question and no doubt. Lack belongs to the order of the symbolic and sets the podium of 
the analytic process, upon which transference will be built. Its absence renders the 
analytic process infertile. Here, in the anxiety of the analyst, is probably where the 
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exclusion of the pervert from the psychoanalytic practice often lays, homologous with the 
social segregation of the pervert due to the anxiety he generates in the social other. 
The extra-ordinary does not wish to abandon the stage where he gets hold of the missing 
object. He does not wish to recognise lack and search for the missing phallus. While he 
occupies the place of the object, the extra-ordinary is the imaginary phallus of the Other. 
More than a simple tactic, the 'pervert' deploys an analytic transaction. His adamant 
renunciation of a knowledgeable other targets any type of institutionalised knowledge. 
The pervert provokes the other by putting his/her desire to the test, not through demand, 
the expression of lack, but through exactly the opposite: the expression of no demand that 
underpins a condition that lacks lack. A certain space is needed for desire to emerge and 
demand to be addressed. Nonetheless, the pervert fills up this space, the absence of which 
provokes anxiety in the other. 
But the total filling of a certain void, which should be preserved which has nothing to do 
with either the positive or negative content of the demand, this is where there arises the 
disturbance in which anxiety is manifested. 25 
The space between the subject and her desire is secured by the eye and its role in fantasy. 
Space, as Lacan says, is "something which has a certain relationship not with the mind 
,, 26 but with the eye. The eye is responsible for the elision of the object. Only what I can 
see I perceive as separate from me and thereby I desire it as the missing link to the 
complete state of existence. In other words, I desire the placenta as the missing object, 
once I am separated from it. But the essence of the object can never be reached, as it 
requires always a certain distance from the subject to appear as such. Once it is separated 
from the latter, it is never recovered, it just elides. The object always remains an elision, 
sustaining the desire for it. If the extra-ordinary embodies the object, then it means that 
he himself becomes an elision for the eye of the other and escapes full symbolisation. The 
status of the extra-ordinary in society is described by this elision. His presence resembles 
a syllable which is indispensable for the meaning of the word, but only if its 
pronunciation is omitted. 
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12.3 The Truth of Anxiety 
The object affected by desire is affected by the "truth of the anxiety, " which means that 
anxiety is primarily an affect that only the desiring subject can experience. 27 The affect of 
anxiety is totalising and doubtless, but is also the cause of the doubtfulness of the subject, 
defied by the desire of the Other, as to what sort of object she constitutes for the Other. 
Anxiety is no doubt; anxiety is the cause of doubt. 28 [ ... ] you are only rediscovering here 
what an interrogation which was essential at the beginning, has already punctuated in my 
discourse, namely whether anxiety is not so absolute a mode of communication between 
the subject and the Other that to tell the truth one could ask oneself whether anxiety is not 
properly speaking what is common to the subject and to the Other. 29 
A painful truth permeates all encounters with the object. Anxiety marks several points in 
the subject's formation. In her pre-subjective period, before the development of language, 
the subject constitutes an object. Once the Other sets in together with the catalytic 
formation of the unconscious, the subject emerges as well. At that moment, the subject is 
irreversibly marked by finiteness, namely desire and anxiety. The subject's struggle and 
inability to be recognised by the desire of the Other form a route paved with anxiety, 
since its role as a signal informs the subject that the object does not exist. It cannot be 
located symbolically. The threat of returning to the pre-subjective archaic abyss tightens 
the noose around the subject, once the object-cause of desire disappears. Confronting 
truth requires the sacrifice of desire, the sacrifice of the object a. This is something that 
clashes with the efforts of the extra-ordinary who wishes to maintain the potency of the 
object. He, thereby, seeks the anxiety of the Other, the possibility of positivising the 
phallus (eradicating lack, - ýp, so that it becomes a real presence, a full ý0), exposing the 
truth of Its (non)existence. 30 
As of now I want to emphasise that what escapes the masochist and what puts him in the 
same position as all the perverts, is that he believes of course that what he is looking for, 
is the jouissance of the Other; but precisely, since he believes it, that is not what he is 
looking for. What escapes him, even though it is a tangible truth, really lying about 
everywhere and within everybody's reach, but for all that never seen at its true level of 
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functioning, is that be seeks the anxiety of the Other. Which does not mean that he is 
trying to annoy hi M. 31 
As a result, the extra-ordinary is associated with the peril of the real, which explains the 
marginalisation and pathologisation he is subjected to by the social body that constantly 
searches for the promising object, the one to be recognised by the desire of the Other. It is 
not the recognition of desire by the Other that puts the subject in a masochistic position, 
but the rejection ofjouissance by the Other. 32 
To encapsulate the main points of this discussion, the extra-ordinary subject, typically 
classified as pervert, places himself in the position of the object in order not just to serve 
the Other's jouissance. Through this position the extra-ordinary gives vent to his desire, 
namely to be passively enjoyed by the Other. So, the Other's enjoyment is also the extra- 
ordinary subject's own enjoyment. In the locus of the object is where anxiety resides, on 
the side of the real. The worshipping of the object (the fetish) is for its real properties 
which remain resistant to any form of signification, to any type of lack. 33 
Suffice it to recall the characters of Sade's writings. Their potency remains unbending 
after the end of each orgasm, which is combined with the worst possible blasphemies 
against God, the Other, the guarantor of lack. Unless moralistic purposes are being 
served, it is futile to demand the extra-ordinary to compromise and inscribe himself in the 
signifying chain, by renouncing ofjouissance. If he does not comply, he is punished with 
the labelling of a negative designation for social deviance. We should accept the pervert's 
desire to detach himself from signification, where the object drops, and see what he can 
edify a conformist majority about desire. 
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13. Negating Disavowal 
13.1 Disavowing the Pervert 
In his seminal 1927 paper on fetishism, Freud introduced the term Verleugnung, 
commonly translated as disavowal. Over the years, the term has turned out to become 
probably the most typical criterion and mechanism for the psychoanalytic interpretation 
of perversion. Not just the fetishist, but also the sadist, the masochist, the voyeur, the 
exhibitionist and every other subject of 'perverse' structure disavows castration. Freud 
wrote, when explaining the operation of disavowal: 
It is not true that, after the child has made his observation of the woman, he has preserved 
unaltered his belief that women have a phallus. He has retained that belief, but he has also 
given it up. In the conflict between the weight of the unwelcome perception and the force 
of his counter-wish, a compromise has been reached, as is only possible under the 
dominance of the unconscious laws of thought- the primary processes. Yes, in his mind 
the woman has got the penis, in spite of everything. ' 
In its common psychoanalytic interpretation, disavowal is perceived in terms of a 
splitting of the ego, a splitting between the renunciation and the affirmation of external 
reality. This is the knowledge of the mother's lack of a penis, which contradicts the belief 
that she actually has one. In Lacanian terms, it concerns the lack (what holds the desiring 
status) in the Other. The m(O)ther's lack is what is disavowed, as a tactic that conceals 
and recognises the castration of the Other: the Other who enjoys without any limit and 
the Other as lacking. So, disavowal, by allowing a transition from knowledge to a belief 
that contradicts the former, plays a reconciliatory and reparatory role, as it defends the 
subject against castration. It helps the subject to be aware of what she disavows and 
maintains her desire in this way. 
The pervert incarnates the object a, what compensates for the loss and positivises the 
phallus of the mother (according to the formula: a/ -(p), as what causes and captures her 
desire. This is where the problem emerges, since the extra-ordinary will not search 
anywhere else for the object; instead he will offer himself as the object in order to fill the 
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lack in the Other. The extra-ordinary does not desire to know what his desire is about; 
instead, lack is overshadowed by the fantasy of completing the Other. He knows that lack 
determines the status of the Other. The knowledge is there, but it contradicts the belief 
that he is the object that can satiate desire. 
The extra-ordinary's existence is marked by an imaginary condition where lack is 
lacking. Due to the disavowal of lack, doubt is considered to have deserted the perverse 
universe. Therefore, the uncertainty of desire, the question of how to be recognised by the 
desire of the Other, has gone astray. The 'perverse' subject resists in succumbing to the 
symbolic law (the phallic function) and accepting difference (castration) that regulates 
symbolic relations. He wants to complete the law, yet at the same time he en oys the 
void, the incomplete staging of the law, by bringing back some of the lostjouissance. He 
wants to enjoy the symbolic, the Other. 
Taking the notion of disavowal as something that strictly defines the boundaries of 
perversion is deceptive, 2 inasmuch as disavowal seals the fantasmatic processes of any 
subject; therefore, it is less emblematic of the perverse condition and more a fundamental 
characteristic of subjectivity. Lack (the mark of castration) is also disavowed in the 
fantasies of the ordinary neurotic subject, especially when it comes to politics, where the 
fantasy of power becomes the motive force for acting. In totalitarianism, with Nazism 
erroneously or not perceived as a cautionary case of totalitarian excess, the subject of 
power serves the concealment of the Other's lack by disavowing Its lack. Deriving his 
power from the absolute character of the phallic signifier, the master of a certain system 
of domination has to appear firm about holding the key to the knowledge about the object 
that fills the Other. Knowledge provides hypostasis to the fantasies of power, so that its 
void is materialised and attributed to an external factor. 
Precisely because it functions at the level of a compromise, the 'perverse' act, unlike 
psychosis, does not abolish subjectivity. The psychotic is a kind of living dead, inasmuch 
as the relation with the Other has faded out. For the neurotic the question of death is 
something that torments his existence, whereas the pervert, who still relates to the Other, 
brings a part of death into living, without any question. Death is what can be sexualised 
and wrapped up in a ritualistic fantasy, which frames a real space. This frame, as in the 
ordinary subject, keeps anxiety at bay, but also makes it irrupt. The most important thing, 
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however, is that this fantasmatic frame operates in extra -ordinariness, maintaining 
subjectivity. This also suggests an incomplete identification of the extra-ordinary subject 
with the object. 3 
The paradoxical conformity of the extra-ordinary subject who shares more similarities 
than differences with the ordinary subject, can explain his negative and unfitting profile 
in the social order. The irony is that the current socio-political state asks the subject to 
implement a negative stratagem par excellence to conceal castration, so that the phallic 
hegemony and its substitutes, that is to say, the goods that power promotes, are secured. 
The stratagem for preserving the Other, as the benefactor of goods, involves both 
disavowal and negation, interlaced in such a way that the subject actually negates the fact 
that she disavows differences. 
Therefore, xenophobia, discrimination and war are not practices against a threatening 
other who steals jouissance from me. 
4 They are converted to their negative linguistic 
articulation: "I am not a racist, " "I am not a moralist, " "I am not religious 
fundamentalist ... .. I am not a jascist5" "I am not a homosexual, " but there is always a 
'but' that completes and contradicts these utterances. The supreme ideals of equal 
opportunities, universal democracy, peace and so on are ideally secured by the very 
denunciation of the opposite forces. When the everlasting question of (sexual) difference 
is confronted, power, unable to give any meaning to it, implements perversion as a 
category that disguises this meagreness. It simply means: avoid giving any answer, 
discard it as an anomaly, pathology or malfunction that needs reformation. 
Political power will negate the fact that power as such embodies its desire. Currently, 
the profile of neo-fascist and far right groups is rather heterogeneous in the present 
political discourse in Europe. On the one hand, there are legal far-right parties operating 
in several countries, having parliamentary representation. 5 Probably, their populist 
language or their 'damaged' utopianism still confines their wide acceptance, yet their 
increasing percentages in national elections must be a point of concern. On the other 
hand, there are several extreme-right groups of Nazi nostalgia which illegally operate in 
many European countries, without, however, articulating a consistent political rhetoric or 
programme. Contrary to these extremist groups, legal neo-fascist parties renounce anti- 
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Semitism or their far-right profile in their programmatic guiding principles, as proof that 
totalitarian power is not what they aim at. 
In his exegesis of the Nazi vilification of the Jew as the object a for fascism, Slavoj 
ZiZ'ek grounds his argument, to great extent, in the notion of disavowal. According to his 
view, the Nazi knows very well that the Jew is not the source of his discontent, but on the 
other hand he still believes the Jew engrosses evil. 6 Nonetheless, it seems to me that 
disavowal did not become Nazism's modus operandi, until the Nazi party came to power, 
which let its fantasmatic aspects (always regressive and narcissistic) prevail at the 
expense of symbolic Difference. 
Likewise, this is what one should expect from legal neo-fascist groups, as only their 
rising in power would enact the hegemony of their master signifier, their totalising 
imaginary aspirations. When Nazism collapsed, Eichmann negated the disavowal of the 
Jew that Zizvek bespoke, by stating his cordial predilection for the victims of the 
Holocaust that he himself conducted. At least, a real sadist or a masochist cannot be 
accused of negating his position towards jouissance. The pervert will negate desire, 
detaching himself from it, but never from jouissance. He will not say "I am not a sadist, " 
but rather "I am a sadist, I inflict pain, not because I want to, but because it has to be so. " 
This peculiar 'non-perverse' negated disavowal in politics does not concern the failure 
of acknowledgement of the law of the Other, but the jouissance of the Other, which 
brings it closer to a typical 'neurotic' conceptualisation. For any ideologico-political 
system to work, jouissance must be excluded and affixed to the obscene and low 
opponent. Consequently, the jouissance derived from the act of marginalisation and 
vilification of the opponent is negated. Considering thatjouissance is the essence of the 
real Thing, it is thus the negation of a Vorstellungs Reprdsentanz that is the organising 
factor of each ideology. No less than the general ideologico-political arena, historical 
forms of fascism (Italian fascism, National Socialism) negated the knowledge that the 
Other is there also to jouir. This is why fascism was nothing but another pseudo- 
revolutionary movement, which negated thejouissance it wanted to put its finger on. 
Negation reveals more a neurotic attitude towards jouissance, denounced as a perverse 
desire, that dominates both political and social life. Negation presupposes the acquisition 
of the meaning of 'Noand it suggests a vigorous and compromising attitude between an 
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7 idea remaining unconscious (repressed) and conscious at the same time. Thus, to negate 
means to go against the law and succumb to jouissance in a concealed way. Negating 
castration releases a destructive force against the paternal function, a force fuelled with 
jouissance. It is not the symbolic reality, but the non-symbolic real as a threatening 
source that is being negated. This means that the real is actually expressed through 
symbolic means, but in a negative form. 8 Therefore, the responsibility for extracting 
jouissance is also negated. 
This makes the fascists remain adamant and pitiless in their discursive position, as 
masters. The real that the fascist ideological narrative, a fantasmatic construct, allows to 
emerge appears in a negated fonn. The real is kept in the unconscious, but, at the same 
time, negation lifts its repressed status. 9 Regardless of its totalitarian innuendos, historical 
fascism operated in a parallel axis to other systems of power, as far as ideology is 
concerned. Behind any ideology, the Thing lurks, the disavowal of which has as a result 
to transfer this internal perversity of ideology to an external source. Ziz'ek notes on this 
externalisation: 
What we are thus arguing is not simply that ideology permeates also the alleged extra- 
ideological strata of everyday life, but that this materialization of ideology in the external 
materiality renders visible inherent antagonisms that the explicit formulation of ideology 
cannot afford to acknowledge. It is as if an ideological edifice, in order to function 
44 normally, " must obey a kind of "imp of perversity" and articulate its inherent 
antagonism in the externality of its material existence. 10 
V In this fashion, Ziz'ek recognises an element of perversity in all ideologies, as a 
prerequisite for their 'normal' functioning. This is because all ideologies disguise lack 
and thus desire through disavowal. They know that lack is there, but at the same time 
they believe it is eliminated. There is an object that takes over lack, that is to say the 
Good each ideology endorses, through imaginary means. If we generalise ZiZ'ek's 
suggestion, we can either see all ideological relations mediated by a perverse liaison or 
perversion as a condition that simply helps the subjects relate to each other, when 
signification fails and they are confronted with the everlasting question of sexual 
difference, the non-representable dimension. Ideology then is just one solution that makes 
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use of the perverse strategy, when dealing with Difference. in any case, it is not 
pathological and cannot be determined mainly by relying on the role of disavowal. 
Instead of pere-vers II sexuality, that searches not for absolute jouissance, butjouissance 
related to desire, the political question is more pertinent to the pere-versus, so to say, 
anything that goes against the recognition of the desire of the Other. Any attempt to 
disguise lack for instrumental purposes is a pere-versus tactic. 
To the extent that this external materialisation of ideology is subjected to fantasmatic 
processes, it divulges nothing more than the perversity that organises all social and 
political relations far from the sexual pathology associated with the pervert. The Other of 
power, this fictional Other that any ideology fabricates, is the One who disavows the 
discontinuities of the normative chain of society. Expressed through the signifiers used 
by leadership, this Other knows very well the cul-de-sac of the fictional view of society 
as a unified body, but still believes that unity is possible, substantiating this ideal. 
The ideological Other disregards the impossibility of bridging Difference; therefore It 
meets the perversion that It wants to associate with the extra-ordinary. Disengaging it 
from pathology, disavowal can be stated differently, as a prompt that says: 'let's 
pretend! ' Pretend as if a universal harmony, good and unity are feasible. Symbolic 
Difference is replaced with imaginary difference which nourishes antagonism and 
hostility, by fictionalising an external threat that jeopardises the unity of the social body. 
We can argue that the fantasy of the obscene extra-ordinary, who offends the conformist 
norm, is in itself a perverse fantasy. The Other knows very well that the pervert 
constitutes no threat, but still requires his punishment, moral reformation or treatment. 
This ideological 'perversion' is a necessary component of the fon-nulation of a political 
identity and, as with any type of identity (sexual, ethnic, etc. ), something is affirmed and 
negated at the same time, which is precisely how disavowal operates. Around the 
subject's identity that always needs to be affirmed as being thoroughly efficient and 
superior par excellence, all imaginary antagonisms unfold. Developing an identity 
involves a process of narcissistic identification with an image moulded by symbolic and 
imaginary constituents. Nonetheless, the extra-ordinary is the blot, this ambiguous 
unlocatable point in the image of the social subject, the real stain in the so-called social 
identity of a certain group of subjects. 12 
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Seen as an analogy with the process of identifying with the mirror image, lack is the 
stain in the self-image that the subject disavows in order to sustain the coherence of her 
image. A fixed image is cultivated and associated with the pervert or, to have a loan from 
the socio-psychological terminology, the configurative nucleus of the social 
representation of the pervert is so trite and rigid that the moment one articulates the word 
6sadist', for instance, the whip and the leather attires comprise the routine visualisation of 
the sadist's image. 
The difficulty in symbolically defining and differentiating the pervert from the ordinary 
subject is overcome by this firm image. This is a conservative, non-rational practice, 
which does not implement logos, rational cogito, but imaginary certainty. The reflection 
of one's body in the mirror proposes a dual confrontation: one with the image itself that 
calls for identification and a second with the limits that the frame of the mirror imposes. 
Yet this limit is erased, when the eidolon in the mirror is reflected upon another mirror. 
Then, the image is multiplied and stretched out to infinity, while space is transformed 
into something indefinite, without a beginning or an end, similar to the way universal 
space is conceived. In politics, the image is imprinted onto the identity of a nation that 
sees itself as peerless and stretched to immortality. 13 The perception of history as a 
coherent and progressive continuum functions as a metaphoric mirror that infinitises the 
eidolon of a nation. Like a series of images, history is also perceived as a linear series of 
events that fosters the illusion of 'history repeating itself . 
The extra-ordinary subject is not described by this ideological perversion. Quite the 
opposite, the extra-ordinary tips over the 'perversion' of the ideology by developing an 
identity well adjusted to the group he belongs to. But he also sexualises and embodies 
lack instead of desexualising it and attributing it to an external source belonging to the 
out-group. This process of desexualisation and resexualisation is the result of the 
defusion of the drive, an obscure and rare term in Freud that denotes the separation of 
libidinal drive components from the death drive with which they normally mingle. 
Nonetheless, Deleuze splendidly draws on the notion of defusion in Coldness and 
Cruelty, where he writes: 
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As for the anchoring of sadism and masochism in pain, this cannot really be understood 
so long as it is considered in isolation: pain in this case has no sexual sIgnificance at all; 
on the contrary it represents a desexualisation which makes repetition autonomous and 
gives it instantaneous sway over the pleasures of resexualisation. Eros is desexuallsed 
and humiliated for the sake of resexualised Thanatos. 14 
I interpret this process as the result of bringing an extra component ofjouissance (pain) 
into the ordinary (the homeostatic regulation of pleasure), as the supposed pervert 
embodies it and whom I call the extra-ordinary subject. By identifying with the object, 
the subject desexualises ego. He reduces it to the partiality of the object linked to the 
erotogenic zones of the body and the repetitive character of their excitation. Contrary to 
egotistic pleasure that constitutes no threat for the coherence of the ego, 15 to derive extra- 
pleasure from the repetitiveness in partiality (fragmentation) suggests the humiliation of 
egotistic Eros and the embracing of death in a re-sexualised form, in a kind of painful 
Eros. This experience of suffering in sexual gratification (specifically, jouissance) is the 
raison d'itre of the extra-ordinary subject. 
13.2 The Immoral Agent of Ideological Power 
The network of ideologies have to deal with the malice and the omnipresence of the 
object a. The impossibility to erase its circulation is refuted by the fantasy of power. The 
master's failure to eliminate the surfeit ofjouissance is disguised under its externalisation 
and embodiment by the so-called pervert. 
So, is mastery perverse? Not quite. The fantasy of omnipotent mastery promises the 
satisfaction of desire through the actualisation of a certain ideal. This fon-ns an imaginary 
virile circuit, a system of domination, as we conceived it in previous chapters of the 
present study, that has to do less with pathology and more with a common fantasmatic 
condition. The 'perverse' factor seems to form the essence of the fantasy's function and 
its very 'normality'. 
In this way, 'perversion' (excessive en oyment) in fantasy is the immoral agent of 
power, through which morality and the 'neuroticism' of the subject are maintained. It 
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allows one to imagine the feasibility of excess in terms ofjouissance through both sexual 
and non-sexual scenarios. The idea of paradise, for example is a religious fantasmatic 
6perversion' that promises an excessive pleasure, precluding pain, since desire would not 
operate anymore, once you reached the kingdom of heaven. Liberal democracy on the 
other hand envisages a secular globalised heaven in which the capitalist industry is the 
non-lacking 'perverse' structure that produces excess; it promises all individuals the 
prospect of turning society into an 'omni-bourgeois' heaven where everyone fits. 
11 Through a fantasy of excess that power cultivates as its vision, it pledges the satiation of 
desire. Of course, this is paradoxical and nothing but a 'perverse' strategy, in the sense of 
exploitation and instrumentalisation of desire by political power - the kind of 
4perversion' we do not find in the extra-ordinary subject. It is more appropriate to dissect 
this fantasy of excess that resists signification and is found in all ideologies, before one 
renounces excess and ascribes it to extra-ordinariness. It is the very essence of 
subjectivity, the fundamental fantasy that insists in all structures and which is always 
'perverse. ' Freud and Lacan illustrate this point: 
The contents of the clearly conscious phantasies of perverts (which in favourable 
circumstances can be transformed into manifest behaviour), of the delusional fears of 
paranoics (which are projected in a hostile sense on to other people) and of the 
unconscious phantasies of hysterics (which psychoanalysis reveals behind their 
symptoms) - all of these coincide with one another even down to their 
details. 16 
Neurosis consists in dreaming, not perverse acts. Neurotics have none of the 
characteristics of perverts. They simply dream of being perverts, which is quite natural, 
for how else could they attain their partner? 
17 
This 'perverse' content offers fantasmatic support to the subject's relation to her partner; 
not necessarily her romantic partner. By disavowing the emptiness of the image in 
fantasy, one can relate to the other. S/he can be seduced by, fascinated or identified with 
the image of the other, which is fantasmatically represented as diaphanous, varnished and 
coherent. This infatuation is precisely due to the disavowal of the lack of the image. The 
other as non-lacking can fill my own lack. 
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The master espouses and cultivates a similar heroic image of himself. A non-lacking ego 
is his fantasmatic panoply. Mastery produces excess, the surfeit embodied by the object 
a. The master usurps this surplus, but of course he has to present himself as if no 
enjoyment is derived from this surplus, in order to defend his masterful non-lacking 
position, i. e. a position of imaginary certainty concerning the existence of a complete 
Other. In the name of this potentiality of the complete Other, the usurped surplus is 
disavowed and attributed to the one who embodies it, the so-called pervert. Eventually, 
the extra-ordinary is also disavowed in turn, for occupying a space of excess. Everyone 
knows he is not a threat, yet they believe he destabilises the ethical basis of society. 
Regardless of power's various ideological masks, the vilification of the extra-ordinary 
serves the concealment of the real hard core, in the heart of ideology (its excess or lack). 
In that case, the main imaginary goal of power envisages a complete non-desiring Other, 
who appears to be untarnished (the Other of paradise, the Other of Brahma, the Other of 
equality or, currently, multiculturalism etc. ). Disavowing the extra-ordinary is a tactic 
that stirs up animosity against the latter, only because his act provokes the ordinary socio- 
political continuum. ' 8 The idolisation of the Aryan image by the Nazis was the 
culmination of this ideological disavowal that sanctioned fascist domination. This is why 
the imaginary machinery of fantasies and images cannot have a liberating function and it 
will always be associated to types of dominance in politics. 
The Nazi renunciation of the Jew was not simply a matter of failing to acknowledge 
symbolic Difference. Nazism associated it with a moral criterion that had the Aryan ideal 
as its guiding ethical principle. Is the disavowal of the Jew to blame for the anti-morality 
of Nazism? Inasmuch as extra-ordinariness does not make a stand for an alternative 
morality, it is difficult to answer the question affirmatively and insert an extra-ordinary 
quality to anti-Semitism. The extra-ordinary subject's primary concern does not entail 
morality. If the latter is implicated in perversion, this is seen as a repercussion of the 
mechanism of disavowal, but not its aim, which is entering and maintaining transgressive 
jouissance. 
Disavowal does not target the subversion of prevalent moral principles. If there is a 
provocation of existing morals, this is more the outcome of the belief that the object is 
present (the mother's penis), which contradicts the knowledge of its absence. Once more, 
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disavowal functions as a compromise between the predominant moral code and its 
transgression. Obviously, this attitude does not fit current morality, but an extra-ordinary 
attitude would not fit into any institutionalised moral scheme, at any rate. The normative 
savoir-faire and conformism will always be incongruous with the perverse symptom, 
namely fleshing out the object a. The object a is there to obscure all moral schemata with 
its ungraspable, obscene and omnipresent character - exactly what describes perverse 
sexuality. This is something that Lacan bespeaks, linking sexuality with dmorality: 
People then began to meet perverts -they're the ones Aristotle didn't want to see at all 
costs. There is in them a subversion of behaviour based on savoir-faire, which is linked to 
knowledge (savoir), knowledge of the nature of things -there is a direct connection 
between sexual behaviour and its truth, namely its amorality. Put some soul at the 
beginning of that - dmorality... 9 
Perversion is beyond morality, which is an attitude that originates in the real: "Morality is 
to be sought on the side of the real and more especially in politiCS. 9')20 Nazism developed 
an anti-moral law that had nothing to do with perversion, but with the real in politics. The 
occurrence of the Holocaust was not charged with any extra-ordinary enjoyment. It was a 
moralistic attitude, common in politics, when the real is confronted, that originated in the 
anti-liberal pseudo-ethos of the fascist. Jews as representatives of a patriarchal moral 
system of liberalism were the targets of Nazism, in order for the latter to maintain the 
mastery of its own morality. The annihilation of the Jew can be understood as the 
punishment of a closed and strict traditional patriarchal system of conventional morality, 
a rival symbolic system (a fictional anti-Other), rather than the elimination of the object. 
In her work, emphatic of the idealisation of the partial-drive, Chasseguet-Smirgel 
argued that fascism served a pre-genital anal ideal, exemplified by the reduction of the 
Jew at the level of shit. 21 Fascism needs the Oedipal law, but first it has to be degraded to 
the level of shit, to be reduced "to the law of intestinal functioning. , 22 Shit is the medium 
to take control over the external world, but, no matter how commensurate it is with the 
phallus, shit is not lacking; it does not confront the fear of castration as it always returns 
to where it was cut from the body. Explaining fascism in this vein is then an anxiety 
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response to the fantasy of the phallus preserving its supremacy in a scatological fashion, 
impossible to be castrated. 
But instead of including fascism into a frame of scatological discourse, it is better to 
understand the anal qualities of fascist totalitarianism or any other transfiguration of the 
latter, by looking at the very function of the shit, as the first object of exchange. Shit is 
the first object a the subject produces and the first object to spur ambivalence. So, the 
anal argument conveys nothing but the essence of the 'neurotic' dimension of the subject: 
her ambivalent position regarding authority. 
Along the lines of Chasseguet-Smirgel's argument, the Nazi, similarly to Sade, 
abrogates the pre-existing moral (symbolic) equilibrium and replaces it with Chaos. 23 The 
creator, the father, is dethroned. Nonetheless, if the Sadean creator wishes to establish a 
chaotic universe, the fascist wishes to ensconce a new order. What is more, Sade 
developed a well-organised philosophical system (or a fantasy) ofjouissance with its own 
anti-moral principles. It would be inaccurate to confuse this system with Chaos and 
anarchy. 
As it was argued in the second part, the Sadean system is regulated byjouissance that, 
despite its decomposing nature, becomes the impossible thread that stitches the 
consistency of the system. Repetition, as exemplified by the Sadean tortures and crimes, 
forms a paradoxical rigid circle of eternity and infinity. The paradox lies in the excess of 
repetition, which is nothing but the expression of jouissance or the death drive in 
Freudian terms. Deleuze writes in Coldness and Cruelty: 
Evil as defined by Sade is indistinguishable from the perpetual movement of raging 
molecules; the crimes imagined by Clairwil are so intended as to ensure perpetual 
repercussions and liberate repetition from all constraints. Also in Saint-Fond's system, 
the value of punishment lies solely in its capacity for infinite reproduction through the 
agency of destructive molecules [ ... ] pain only acquires significance in relation to the 
form of repetition which conditions its use. 24 
Repetition is a way of binding but also unleashing evil from its restraints and the name 
for this evil isjouissance. The formalism of the Sadean system is organised by repetition 
which is reflective of Sade's mechanistic system and reveals proximity with Spinoza's 
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mathematical thought. This formalistic, mechanistic and repetitive pattern reveals the 
Sadean sadist's need of institution. This is understood, if we consider the Sadean sadist 
more as a master and less as an extra-ordinary subject. The master of Sade's system 
needs to establish a paradoxical institution of jouissance, whereas the extra-ordinary 
needs normative institutions in order to transgress them perpetually through jouissance, 
25 something that challenges the power and the authority of these institutions . 
Following the argument of this final part that opts for the term extra-ordinariness 
instead of perversion, my view is that anal and generally perverse references to fascism 
reveal and maintain an obstinate conservatism. They are conservative responses to the 
anxiety caused by the realisation of the emptiness of the phallic signifier, the hollowness 
of its primacy, when a real object (embodied by the extra-ordinary subject) comes to 
occupy this empty space. The extra-ordinary subject exposes this emptiness and offers it 
to the Other in a sexualised form, namely in the form of jouissance; he offers a real 
object, which is the source of anxiety for the Other. 
Revolutionary movements do not originate in a perverse structure, neither perversion 
aims at abolishing an established morality and ideology. Such a perception preconceives 
any innovation in the ideologico-political terrain as perversion, which is erroneous. How 
can one associate political innovation with the outcome of a perverse fomentation, when 
the mechanism of disavowal is far from fostering any socio-political changes or 
abolishing the law in order to replace it with a different one? The use of disavowal 
becomes in itself a conservative concept, a compromise, when it overshadows any 
challenging behaviour of subjects who are otherwise well adjusted to social order. What 
epitomises the sterile efforts of the extra-ordinary subject is rendering the law invalid, 
just for the sake of re-creating and empowering the same fractional law, namely filling 
the Other withjouissance only for desire to return at the end. 
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I perceive negation more as a hostile and aggressive attitude (originating in the death drive) towards 
castration, whereas disavowal originates in Eros. Disavowal does not go against castration, but keeps it a 
bay, by not acknowledging it, which is different from negating it. In this way, the sexualisation of the 
object (the mother's penis) remains intact. 
91 am aligned with Stavrakakis' use of the term 'negation', when fantasy's relation to the real is 
contemplated, rather than the term 'disavowal' which obeys a perverse logic that 2i2ek ascribes to fantasy. 
See Yannis Stavrakakis, Lacan and the Political (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 107. 
10 See Slavoj Zi2ek, "Fantasy as a Political Category: A Lacanian Approach, " Journal for the 
Psychoanalysis of Culture and Society 1, no. 2, (1996): 77-85 (p. 77). 
11 This is a Lacanian neologism that denotes the meanings of 'perversion' and 'vers le pýre% referring to 
the search forjouissance that does not abolish the division of the subject, her desire. In this respect, the 
pýre-vers is typical of both neurosis and perversion, where the Name-of-the-Father is not foreclosed and 
thereby complete jouissance remains unobtainable. See Diana Rabinovitch, "What Is a Lacanian Clinic? " 
in The Cambridge Companion to Lacan, ed. by Jean Michel Rabat6 (Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2003), pp. 208-220. 
12 See Slavej Zilek, For They Know Not What They Do: Enjoyment as a Political Factor (London, New 
York: Verso, 2001[1991]). 
" Each nation together with its values, beliefs, traditions, also possesses a certain image through which is 
commonly represented. For example, Mediterranean countries cultivate a stereotypical image of dark 
bronze sunburnt features in their representation, whereas Northern European countries associate fair 
characteristics with their representative image. 
14 See Gilles Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty (New York: Zone Books, 1991), p. 120. 
" Insofar as it follows the homeostatic principle. 
16 See Sigmund Freud, "Three Essays on the Theory of Sexuality, " (1905), The Standard Edition of the 
Complete Psychological Works of Sigmund Freud, Vol. 7, trans. by James Strachey (London: Hogarth 
Press and the institute of Psycho-analysis, 1953-1974), p. 80. 
17 See Jacques Lacan, Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX,. - On Feminine Sexuality, The 
Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Bruce Fink (New 
York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 87. 
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" Of course, this continuum is a mythical construct. Society is far from being a coherent unit that follows a 
linear development. 
'9 See Jacques Lacan, Encore: The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book XX. - On Feminine Sexuality, The 
Limits of Love and Knowledge, 1972-1973, ed. by Jacques-Alain Miller, trans. by Bruce Fink (New York: 
W. W. Norton & Company, 1998), p. 87. 
" See Jacques Lacan, The Seminar of Jacques Lacan, Book X. - Anxiety, 1962-1963, trans. by Cormac 
Gallagher from unedited French Manuscripts (Printed by Anthony Rowe Ltd, Eastbourne), X11 (27/2/63), p. 
1. 
" See Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, "Reflexions on the Connexions between Perversion and Sadism, " 
International Journal of Psychoanalysis 59 (197 8): 27-37. 
22 Ibid., p. 32. 
23 See Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel, Creativity and Perversion, (London: Free Association Books, 1985). 
24 Deleuze, Coldness and Cruelty, p. 119 (emphasis in the original). 
25 That was the reason for incorporating the extra-ordinary subject into the discourse of the Hysteric in the 
second part. As the hysteric, the extra-ordinary needs a master, in order to provoke and dispute him. While 
the hysteric questions the master, by inserting the uncertainty of desire, the extra-ordinary questions him, 
by injecting the certainty of a supreme and destabilisingjouissance. 
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Part IV: Conclusion 
To sum up the efforts of the final part, far from dispersing the notion of perversion 
around all ideological frames, the argument, which I forwarded here, is that the 
politicisation of the notion of perversion benefits the masking of the very 'perverse' 
structure of mastery in politics. What I call perverse is not a moralistic view of particular 
and unusual sexual practices, but the faltering of the subject over the gap of the symbolic, 
where the so-called pervert is encountered as the very material embodiment of the 
enjoyment that stems from this gap. So, fitting both to the socio-symbolic continuum and 
its fissure, where he identifies with the object a, the so-called pervert hypostatises less a 
pathological subversion of the existing system of domination and more a required 
provocation of any institutionalised and dominant establishment. Based on this 
paradoxical conformity of the so-called pervert, I implemented a different designation, 
less negative, moralistic and pathological, for alluding to the subject that embodies the 
real in the symbolic. 
I coined the term extra-ordinary subject, in contradistinction with the ordinary (neurotic) 
subject, who supposedly conforms harmoniously to the dominant socio-political 
dynamics. Considering that the ordinary subject's conformity also relies on 'perverse' 
fantasising, while mastery makes use of disavowal in order to protect the supremacy of 
the ideal and the power it promotes, it is pharisaic to pathologise the extra-ordinary 
subject just for taking his fantasy to the symbolic stage, generating and sexualising 
anxiety, in this way. The role of disavowal is less to demarcate a deviant perverse 
structure and more to segregate the enjoyment hoarded in the non-representable real core 
of subjectivity. 
But the non-representable factor must not be equated with the non-speculative, the 
silence of the unutterable. Silence is not a sign of respect for the real, otherwise the limit 
of the symbolic is inevitably associated with a moralistic attitude that cultivates guilt, not 
as recognition of a symbolic debt, but as the pedestal for an imaginary law, which is not 
lacking. There is nothing to be respectful for in the encounter with the real, since the 
latter is beyond any moral encoding, beyond any symbolic definition. There is no moral 
obligation for the subject to remain silent, it is the limit of the symbolic itself that 
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imposes this muteness as necessity. Having said this, signifiers and representations 
endlessly encircle the real void, unable to fill it, but because of their failing there is 
always something more to be grasped. Above all, the void must be recognised as the 
failure of the lexis, the incomplete status of the symbolic law. Following Stavrakakis, the 
real always remains ungraspable by symbolic reality and similarly, the political is always 
something that eludes, yet determines politics. This is why the void is necessary to be 
recognised in politics and not to be perversified or de-politicised, thrown to the social 
margins for the sake of imaginary fullness. On the contrary, the void must remain the 
essence of symbolic dialectics in the field of the political. The task of a psychoanalytic 
research would be to circumscribe and track down the manifestations of the real. A 
symbolising act that will acknowledge "the real limits of the symbolic and will attempt to 
symbolically 'institutionalise' real lack" is the only way to approximate the void without 
turning it into the motive force behind the antagonisms that dwell in ideological 
fantasies. I 
Notes 
1 See Yannis StaVTakakis, Lacan and the Political (London: Routledge, 1999), p. 86. 
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Thesis Conclusion: Love the Object of Your Anxiety 
The objective of the present study was to expose the theoretical, practical and ideological 
obfuscation that stems from the association of fascism with the category of perversion. 
As a recurrent theme in cultural, sociological, and psychoanalytic narratives, this link 
sustains the enigmatic status of fascism in the collective imaginary mind as a decadent 
ideological amalgam, without recognising its elusive character. Along with this effect, the 
category of perversion falls into a moralistic or criminological frame. 
By critically revisiting this discursive link, I argued that the interpretation of fascism 
that takes perversion as the pedestal for its suggestions is in itself an ideological strategy. 
It aims to secure the power of a political system of domination, by isolating the pervert as 
a hazardous subject for the moral, political and social edifice. My critique pointed out the 
insufficiency of such exegetical schemata, even when they belong to the psychoanalytic 
discourse. In concluding, I proceed in a final synopsis that emphatically re-articulates the 
central implications of the study for the further advancement of psychoanalytic theory, 
inasmuch as research on perversion is concerned. 
The first aim of the study was to bring into the spotlight the discursive infiltration of 
fascism with perverse designations, by chronologically recounting theoretical and filmic 
texts that forge it. The collection of diverse texts aimed to comprise a solid background 
literature, regarding the connection of fascism to perversion, that extends from academic 
disciplines to popular forms of culture. Nonetheless, this effort entails the risk of 
reducing these heterogeneous texts to a singular discourse. Notwithstanding the common 
spirit of modernity that imbues them, the selected texts belong to different discourses, 
ranging from social theory and philosophy, to psychoanalysis. 
But my aim was not to evaluate the structural and representational aspects of the films 
or to assess their narrative in isolation. My review was epigrammatic, omitting the 
difference and the importance of the role of the discursive medium in enfolding a 
message (e. g. the role of the image in films). Aware of this limitation, my aim was to 
evaluate the validity and functionality of the textual message regarding fascism's 
affiliation with perversion. Another important point of my critique was to explore the role 
of psychoanalysis in the narrativisation of this theme. Insofar as psychoanalysis wove the 
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argumentative core of most of the texts included in my retrospective account, its 
suggestions on perversion were the epicentre of my discussion, which, rather than taking 
them for granted, questioned their relation to traditional psychoanalytic ideas and 
narratives. Despite the ostensible contradiction, I still maintain the belief that 
psychoanalysis is a flexible approach of great explanatory power, as long as it keeps at 
bay the risk of turning itself into an institutionalised body of knowledge. 
In this context and following chronological criteria, the first part of my discussion drew 
on Horkheimer and Adorno's work, as two prominent representatives of the Frankfurt 
School. In the Dialectic of Enlightenment, written between 1941 and 1944, the two 
authors prioritised critical reason as the quintessential premise for the modernisation of 
socio-political relations. Subjection of critical reason to the utilitarian purposes of 
Western capitalism perverts its dynamics. This 'perversion' of critical reason stirs up 
fascism, as the culmination of capitalist domination, which is also translated to a 
perversion of the sexual instinct. 
In my analysis, Horkheimer and Adorno's view on domination's underlying perverse 
character, similar to that of Sade, was considered as pivotal for the emergence of the 
motif of the socially unfitting and psychologically dysfunctional pervert who favours 
autarchic means of both sexual and political control. Furthermore, Freudo-Marxist 
versions, such as that of Marcuse and Reich, espoused and expanded this cogito in ways 
that lead to mystification. If authoritarian aspects of Western society are due to perverted 
natural desires, then the utopian ideal of sexual liberation would fulfil a world from 
which perversion will be absent; simply because there will be no oppression which has 
been erroneously likened to repression. But the 'pervert' as an unproblematic individual, 
I argued, is an idea rejected both by authoritarian and anti-authoritarian systems. 
Perversion as a term is always negative. 
Even in psychoanalysis, the conceptualisation of perversion is not based on more 
affirmative ground. If Freud's legacy in the theory of the perversion was a limited, yet an 
inventive and revolutionary body of work, for many of his successors it turned to become 
a rigid set of principles. The psychoanalytic theory of perversion was reduced to a self- 
referential system of knowledge, typically defined as the failure of the Oedipus complex. 
It is not surprising, thence, to see that, when orthodox psychoanalysis is applied to 
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po itics, te common exegesis evolves around the Oedipal paradigm. An essay by Ernest 
Jones, originally written in the early 1940s, but not as influential as the Dialectic was at 
that time, illustrated this point. Furthermore, Jones' Oedipalisation of Nazism was 
dissected in relation to the objectives of my study. The dreadfulness of Hitler, as a 
sadistic paternal imago, explains the passivity displayed towards him by German people 
and other leaders, as a sign of unconscious homosexuality. Commonly, for orthodox 
psychoanalysis, whatever breaks the Oedipal logic, patriarchal and conservative in its 
conception, is considered as an indication of perversion. This suggests that even in 
psychoanalysis perverse tenninology conveys conservatism. 
Expanding the scope of the study to the analysis of other discursive contexts, in the 
1960s and 1970s, we find the cinematic edifice becoming increasingly political. Suffice it 
to recall the films of adept directors, such as Pasolini, Cavani and Visconti, who, in the 
course of their intriguing and uncompromised career, re-inscribed historical fascism into 
radical filmic narratives, deeply influenced by modernist thought (for instance, the 
influence of psychoanalysis and Marxism is crystallised in their filmic narratives). My 
discussion focused on three films: Sal6, Ae Night Porter and The Damned, as illustrative 
of a representation of fascism that projects the latter onto images of perverse eroticism. 
The fascist is portrayed as a sadist, a masochist, a transvestite, a paedophile, etc. 
Since the making of these films, the image of the fascist's sexual libertinage has been 
regularly recreated, not only in cinema, but also in other popular mediums. In our 
contemporary era of dominant televised images and messages, there is an ongoing 
fascination with the sexual indecorum of fascism. Music videos by rock stars, such as 
Marilyn Manson, documentaries, regarding Hitler's sexual life or Thor Kunkel's recent 
book on Nazism's porn industry are a few examples. As I argued, such erotic 
representations of fascism amount to the misunderstanding of its totalising ideological 
character, as well as increase the mystification of the category of perversion. 
In the 1970s and 1980s, the work of Janine Chasseguet-Smirgel marks the trajectory 
from orthodox psychoanalysis to Neo-Freudianism. Her theoretical suggestions decentre 
psychoanalytic interpretation from the Oedipal creed, focusing more on the omnipresence 
of pre-Oedipal traits in the human condition. Chasseguet-Smirgel de-pathologises the 
notion of perversion, linking it to creativity and the promotion of socio-political changes. 
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However, she re-mystifies and re-pathologises the term, inasmuch as perversion results in 
sexual con(fusion), illusion and paranoia. This is also the frame where Nazism is placed. 
in the same line, Klaus Theweleit assumes a frame of archaic pre-Oedipal relations, for 
exploring the male fantasies of Nazi militia. Despite their innovative narratives, the 
perverse lining that Chas seguet- Smirgel and Theweleit discern in psychic reality has an 
equivocal status, still perceived as the failure of the Oedipus complex. 
What I argued was that Neo -Freudianism, notwithstanding its novel insights, regarding 
the category of perversion, still operates within an Oedipalising logic, even when it takes 
a pre-Oedipal cognomen. What is at stake is the risk for psychoanalysis becoming an 
inflexible and recycled hermeneutical model. Although the focus on the sinuous archaic 
processes and their ubiquitous manifestation in various aspects of subjectivity must 
remain part of the portfolio of future psychoanalytic research, the insistence to associate 
these processes with the negative term of 'perversion' is the foothold that I believe 
prevents psychoanalysis from moving forward, abandoning the hegemony of the Oedipal 
paradigm. The Lacanian scope this study espoused opens a field of research possibilities 
which transcends perverse dialectics. Dealing with loss, the formation of the image and 
the anchoring in the field of symbolic exchange are common factors that determine 
subjective experience, regardless of any clinical classification. 
Putting forward these new possibilities was also the main goal of my critique of 
Lacanian thinkers, such as Juliet Flower MacCannell and Slavcj Zizvek, who indubitably 
endorsed contemporary psychoanalytic discourse and divulged its explanatory power in 
understanding ethical, social and political issues. But, when it comes to the 
implementation of psychoanalytic ideas explaining perverse relations, MacCannell and 
Ziz'ek treat them as if they were unproblematic and canonical schemata. 
Despite their inventive critique, I argued that the two thinkers do not promote the 
disentanglement and the de-ideologisation of the notion of perversion. Their 
interpretations greatly rely on pre-fixed vocabularies that rigidify traditional conceptions 
rather than ratifying new psychoanalytic horizons, beyond the equivocation of perversion, 
as a category. Indicatively, MacCannell treated the case of Eichmann, following Lacan's 
inversion of the matheme of fantasy that appears in "Kant with Sade. " Nevertheless, the 
inverted matherne only sporadically appears in the Lacanian corpus and always 
in 
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relation to the Sadean fantasy; this means that it is never considered explicitly as 
indicative of a perverse structure. Eichmann's alleged Kantian ethics that Hannah Arendt 
connected to the notion of the 'banality of evil, is interpreted by MacCannell as 
perversion. Eichmann's position coincides with Sade's perverse accomplishment of 
Kantian ethics through his anti-moral, evil-didactic philosophy. 
What I objected to the verdict on Eichmann was that the implementation of this 
argument may ostensibly appear to be a great explanatory tool for dissecting conditions, 
where the ethical duty meets evil in its banal form, yet this does not suggest any perverse 
ethics; it is still Kantian ethics qua Sade. In any case, Eichmann was Kant, with or 
without Sade, which does not make him a pervert. Rather than a set of ideas of 
unreserved credence, Lacan's ethical speculation should be the pedestal for an ongoing 
ethical debate. The ethics of desire is not uncomplicated, since it encloses the risk of 
particularisation of a universal will-to-desire by the alienated desires of a specific subject. 
As far as Slavoj Zizvek's theorisation about fascism is concerned, disavowal, as the 
cliche mechanism for defining perversion, constitutes a central aspect of his argument. It 
is not just the discursive position of the fascist that Ziz'ek describes here, but also the 
whole structure of fascism's ideological fantasy, which disavows the Jew, similarly to the 
pervert's disavowal of the lack of the mother's penis. When ideology itself, for Zi2ek, 
resides in a perverse organisation, since it materialises and externalises its inherent gap 
(its division), by projecting it to others, the emphatic use of disavowal, as distinctive trait 
of fascism, remains a question. Disavowal describes more the ideologisation of social 
relations. Nonetheless, ideology is not perversion; otherwise, politics are 'perversified'. 
My argument views perversion as a de-politicised condition - as what brings into the 
social the extra element ofjouissance that 'normally' has to be excluded - which acquires 
its perverse label after it has been ideologised. This means that 'perverse' is a term that 
serves delineating normative reality, precisely by digressing from it. 
In my analysis, the first step was to elaborate the discursive position that the fascist 
occupies in relation to the position of the pervert. By implementing the structure of 
Lacan's four discourses, I put forward a distinct reading of the discursive position of the 
pervert, which is absent from Lacan's work. Inasmuch as the pervert is also related to the 
Other, he communicates his desire from a certain place in discourse. I drew a point of 
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demarcation between fascism and perversion, by placing the pervert in the discourse of 
the Hysteric, since both the pervert (at least, the subject commonly designated, as such) 
and the hysteric reject the knowledge about their desire, as fabricated by the Other. Both 
provoke the Other, but for different reasons. The hysteric wishes to maintain the lack in 
the Other, by constantly demanding knowledge, because the hysteric's existence depends 
exactly on this lack. The pervert wishes to maintain certainty, by rejecting any other type 
of knowledge about what the Other desires in him. His certainty adumbrates a singular 
modus operandi for meeting the desire of the Other, that is satiating desire with 
jouissance. 
For the pervert, lack means jouissance, whereas for the hysteric it means law. Fascism, 
as well as any other type of ideology, is better described by the discourse of mastery. Its 
fantasy is organised upon the basis of master signifier(s), the emptiness of which is 
concealed by a fantasy of power (the perversity that Ziz'ek discerns in it). Therefore, I put 
forward the following original suggestion: as far as fantasies (of power) are always 
regressive to an early stage of omnipotence, seeking unification with the primordial 
Thing, they strive to fulfil a 'perverse' goal, but only in the discourse of the Master 
fantasy is linked to domination. Only the master places the signifier in the dominant 
position assisted by fantasies of power. The pervert, like the hysteric, is dominated by the 
split signifier, which means that all his fantasmatic efforts to fill up the lack in the Other 
lead to its reproduction. 
Another distinction that I formulated, based on the notion of Lacanian discourse, was 
between different systems, which take mastery as the central core of their organisation. 
Since only in the discourse of the Master is the signifier in the dominant position, only 
there can we talk about the formation of a representational system of domination, which 
tries to represent Truth through an ideal (signifier). The master ideal is thought to be the 
key to the satisfaction of the Other's desire. For this reason, it is supported by a fantasy of 
power which dramatises in an absolute fashion this satisfaction. 
Having different ideals and different fantasmatic scenarios that stage the satisfaction of 
desire, convalescing the early loss, I distinguished between three systems of domination 
that try to come to terms with the loss, namely the real. Alluding to ZiZ'ek's recent 
conceptualisation of the real, as manifested through a triadic form, namely imaginary 
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Real, symbolic Real and real Real, I postulated the formation of three systems, 
respectively: an Oedipal system, a Totalitarian system and a Sadean system. There were 
two reasons for this distinction in accordance with the objectives of my study: first to 
separate Sade from totalitarianism(s). Even though Sade did produce a system of 
domination, his master signifier(s) and fantasy were self-subversive, self-destructive and 
contradictory par excellence, contesting any idealised conception of unity and rebirth that 
grounds a totalitarian system. The second reason was to demonstrate that the so-called 
pervert as a subject fits to any of these systems, like any other 'ordinary' subject, yet the 
pervert fits always as a marginalised figure. 
If Sade is not a proto-fascist figure, then this has implications for the ethical debate that 
sees in the Nazi atrocities the fulfilment of a Kantian ethical edict, capable of generating 
evil. It is a paradox that Sade first exemplified in his anti-moral philosophy. The 
paradoxical relation of Sade's philosophy to Kant's ethics was narrativised, originally, by 
Horkheimer and Adomo in the Dialectic of Enlightenmentg where Sade is seen as the 
archetypal of the instrumentalisation of the reason of Enlightenment. In the 20th century, 
this instrumental isation was highly epitomised by the capitalist model of organisation of 
Western society that culminated in the Second World War fascism. Years later, Lacan 
would draw the same link and argue that the Sadean fantasy embodies the truth of Kant. 
Given the moral implications of Lacan's suggestion for the category of perversion, I 
tried to illustrate some of the problematic aspects of the Sadean infiltration of Kant's 
moral philosophy. An imaginary law of limitless jouissance, such as the one that 
organises the fantasies of Sade cannot acquire a universal status, inasmuch as the 
pathological interests of the executioner are not eradicated. Sadean heroes are less 
instruments of the Other's jouissance and more the ones that instrumentalise the latter, 
when the victim comes to occupy this locus. The locus of the impersonal categorical 
imperative is taken over by a discernable source. 
The particularisation of the categorical imperative is also the case for fascism, since the 
will behind the law is no other than the will of Hitler. What is more, Nazi officers, such 
as Eichmann and Goebbels, zealous proponents of Hitler, were driven by the fantasy of a 
rejuvenated Germany and the ascendance of the Aryan race. They served an imaginary 
law, which means they were interested in the evil they committed. Their evil was radical. 
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Finally, the critique of this study broached the systematic 'fascist' tactic of (ab)using a 
vague term, such as perversion, in order to protect a certain ideological hegemony, 
supported by a normative majority. The marginalisation and the demonisation of the so- 
called pervert serve a dual ideologico-political purpose: to maintain a pre-fixed political 
status quo, by letting novelty to be linked with moralistic incivility and pathology, as well 
as to give a name and isolate the subject that brings some of the forbidden deadly 
jouissance in the terrain of symbolic reality. 
The real void in the socio-symbolic universe must remain intact as a strategy miserly 
employed by mechanisms of power that consistently try to ascribe the miscreant real to 
external sources and turn it into an ideological affair, when it is not. Reaching the core of 
my critical inquiry, I pointed out that this 'fascist' strategy is not bound to fascist 
ideology only, but to all political ideologies. Because the problem with the so-called 
perverse subject is that he does not sufficiently meet the reasoning for his exclusion. He 
is still a member of a certain social group, conforming to its basic organising moral or 
legal principles, yet he breaks off a normative cycle that builds an insulation shield, 
'protecting' the social edifice from the streams of real enjoyment which are not 
controlled by the law. The law allows a minimum level of enjoyment, so that it lets desire 
flow. 
Therefore, any excess of this enjoyment beyond the permitted symbolic echelon must be 
amputated. Just as the painful confrontation with the cadaver demands its rapid burial, 
any possible fascination with such spectacle must also be buried, otherwise it is perverse. 
It is this extra element to pain, the extra jouissance, that deten-nines the label of the 
pervert. He comes to incarnate, to pass into what I called corpo-reality, this extra bodily 
enjoyment, from which he is deterred, by being classified as a pathological case. 
This incarnation of the surplus object is a source of anxiety. The subject who embodies 
this extra element is not bound to any criminological act. It may be essentially 
provocative for a subject to be aroused by the spectacle of a dead body, but he will not 
demand to change the burial customs. This would only be an aftermath of the subject's 
allure by the spectacle. Similarly, for the sadist, the last thing in his mind would be to 
normativise the infliction of pain. Because his jouissance is enfolded precisely in the 
voice of pain. 
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As shown from my postulation, it is a great misconception to characterise 
institutionalised forms of torture as perversion. One has to go only so far, as to recall the 
tortures practised with captives in the war in Iraq, either by US forces or by 'terrorists', as 
well as the obsolescent policy of 'ethnic cleansing' that over the last decade has been 
revived in former Yugoslavia and African countries. Bureaucratic evil is incongruent 
with the so-called pervert's aspirations, even though from the readings of Arendt and the 
Frankfurt School to the mis-applications of Lacan's arguments, one finds this enduring 
problematic narrative, which I adumbrated and reappraised in this study. 
Of course, a study that deals with two rather thorny concepts, fascism and perversion, 
has to confront the criticism of not intruding into more specific relations, between 
particular types of fascism and particular types of 'perverse' sexuality. Without doubt, 
fascism has many other faces, than the ones chronicled in the first half of the previous 
century. This entails the risk of reduction and overgeneralization in my study, despite the 
fact that National Socialism remained the primary fascist paradigm for this study, 
considering its associated atrocities. 
Yet my study had to confront the problem of dealing with the equivocal generality of 
perversion, without resting in general theorisations. It is true that under the caption of 
perversion, the most contradictory and diverse sexual practices are put together. But, 
inasmuch as I tried to evaluate the logic behind the category of perversion, in terms of 
structure and ethical implications, this study, hopefully, succeeded in overcoming the 
general and forwarding some particular suggestions for the reconsideration of the 
category of perversion. 
My suggestion is that the subject, who incamates the extra enjoyment in socio-political 
relations, must be re-approached through a different prism, abandoning the misleading 
term 'perversion'. We could de-pathologise this category, by simply referring to an extra- 
ordinary subject, who still adapts himself well in the social order, but not so well as to be 
accepted by the ordinary, so to say, by the normative ethos. One should not demand the 
expiation of the extra-ordinary subject. My belief is that extra-ordinariness can be a 
prosperous basis for resourceful dialectics for future psychoanalytic speculations and 
initiate original research in the field of ethics and socio-political relations, as long as it is 
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not exploited by ideological purposes and in a 'proto-fascist' fashion attributed to 
fascism. 
If until now ethics, clinical categories and subjective structures have been determined by 
the relation to the Other and the missing signifier, namely the phallus, I tried to blaze a 
novel psychoanalytic direction that focuses on a presence rather than an absence. This 
means, apart from the missing phallus, the real presence of the object a, the object-cause 
of the desire of the Other can be the thread for an embroidery of new psychoanalytic 
ideas and introduction of new concepts. In the real and anxiety-provoking presence of the 
object is where the extra-ordinary subject is to be found, as the embodiment of this 
obj ect. 
The object of course does not exist; it is elusive. Nevertheless, what about the so-called 
pervert who 'exists' (in the sense that is he is inscribed in the symbolic, he has a desire), 
by taking the place of the non-existent? If we abdicate our own 'fascist' standpoint, 
loving the pervert can be the source for meeting the main goal of psychoanalysis, i. e. 
tolerating and coping with anxiety and ambiguity, not through the uncertainty of desire, 
but through the terrifying certainty ofjouissance that breaks moral and normative limits, 
demanding their constant re-inscription. Loving the 'perverse' is another option for 
enjoying anxiety, alternative to the enjoyment of the symptom. 
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